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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the mediation and evaluation of personhood in light of 
Finnish online dating advertisements. The specific focus is on the 
performance and interpretation of what has been called “self-promotion,” or 
the idealization of the self in relation to others. The theoretical aim of the 
study is to piece together an approach that locates online dating 
advertisements within the field of human semiotic behavior and social life. 
The study operates with concepts originating from linguistics, discourse 
studies, and anthropology. They are connected by the overarching 
frameworks of semiotic anthropology (e.g. Agha 2007; Silverstein 2003; 
Urban 2001) and Kockelman’s (2013) pragmatism-based semiotic theory of 
interaction, infrastructure, and ontology. These frameworks are presented in 
chapters 1 and 2. 
Chapter 3 elaborates the research design. The online dating 
advertisement genre is approached as a cultural instrument of personhood 
and intersubjective interaction that sifts social reality into “desirable” or 
“ideal” and “undesirable” or “non-ideal” in multiple ways. In order to 
instigate social relations with “desirable” and “ideal” others, writers inhabit a 
“promotional” persona. That is, they exert both practical and theoretical 
agency in controlled performances of their identity, for which they will be 
held accountable later in subsequent encounters, insofar as such encounters 
are ever actualized. 
Three sets of data are examined in the study: 1) The primary data consists 
of 111 Finnish-language online dating advertisements that were collected 
from two different online dating services in 2007 (Deitti.net, Match.com). 2) 
A questionnaire was held for a group of 27 university students in order to 
elicit actual examples of interpretations based on three different kinds of 
advertisement texts. 3) The third set of data consists of cultural 
metadiscourses that are about online dating advertisements as a type of 
interaction. It includes (i) three online dating guidebooks, (ii) a variety of 
Internet discussions, newspaper articles, and other writings, and (iii) a 
segment of a television program. Such metadiscourses illuminate the kinds of 
“backstage” interpretive practices that usually do not become public in actual 
advertisement performances.  
The mediation of personhood is examined from four empirical 
perspectives. Chapter 4 focuses on the kinds of “characteristics” that 
different kinds of sign patterns project on interactants. The chapter discusses 
the general difference between “describable,” “performable,” and 
“proposable” characteristics and their different interactional dynamics. It 
then takes a look at the more specific textual patterns that advertisement 
texts consist of: theoretical and reflective representations, lists and 
taxonomies, narratives, fictive personae, and patterns of discourse habitually 
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linked to individuals (e.g., pseudonyms and mottos). Moreover, three entire 
texts will be analyzed in light of the questionnaire responses in order to 
examine differences in reported interpretations of such textual patterns. 
Chapter 5 takes on the question of evaluative stancetaking and its role in self-
promotion by looking at common types of stances and such metapragmatic 
cues that indicate the writers’ understandings of their stancetaking. The 
chapter focuses on matters of polarity (“positive” versus “negative”) and on 
the naturalization and poeticization of evaluative stances. Chapter 6 deals 
with addressivity. It examines how the patterns discussed in chapters 4 and 5 
are mapped onto frames of participation, i.e., how writers select for 
addressees and attempt to control the ensuing interaction. Chapter 7 looks at 
the metadiscourse data from the standpoint of explicit opinions, ideological 
positions, and normative models concerning the production and 
interpretation of online dating advertisements. Finally, chapter 8 concludes 
the study by discussing the findings and their implications.   
By comparing the actual discursive practices in the advertisement data 
and the metadiscourses about online dating advertisements as a type of 
discourse the study shows, first of all, that in stereotypic models of “self-
promotion” specific kinds of evaluative stances are often the most salient 
feature, whereas many actually occurring phenomena are entirely 
overlooked. Such biased stereotypes may in part be a reason for the fact that 
evaluative stancetaking seems to be a somewhat marked or even problematic 
act in online dating advertisements. The study also illuminates the non-
narrative organization of personhood, selfhood, and biography, since 
taxonomic and hierarchical structures of theoretical representations are one 
of the most salient textual patterns in the data. Moreover, the study draws 
attention to the importance of the indexical patterning of text-artifacts and 
their performative dimensions. Textual patterning at all layers, from 
“macrostructures” to orthography, becomes interpreted as signs of 
personhood contributing, for instance, to  particular “views of subjectivity,” a 
level of meaning often overlooked in studies of online communication. 
Although such interpretations may be indeterminate and fragmented, 
sometimes even in opposite and contradictory ways, they can be fruitfully 
analyzed in terms of orientations to different signs or different semiotic 
ontologies (or interpretive models). More generally, the study stresses the 
importance of reflexive models and ideologies of interaction. For instance, 
the nature of online dating advertisements as an intersubjective encounter 
can be understood in almost entirely opposite ways (e.g., as “distant” versus 
“intimate,” “authentic” versus “inauthentic,” or “reliable” versus “unreliable”) 
in light of different ontologies. 
 
Keywords: semiotic mediation, personhood, selfhood, identity, practical and 
theoretical agency, self-promotion, online dating advertisements, evaluation, stance, 
biography, genre.  
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ABSTRAKTI 
Tämä tutkimus käsittelee sitä, miten henkilöyttä (personhood) välitetään ja 
arvotetaan suomenkielisissä verkon kontakti-ilmoituksissa. Tarkempi fokus 
on ”itsepromootioksi” (self-promotion) kutsutussa ilmiössä eli siinä, miten 
itseä idealisoidaan suhteessa toisiin ja miten tällaisia performansseja 
tulkitaan. Tutkimuksen teoreettisena tavoitteena on koostaa semioottiseen 
antropologiaan nojaava lähestymistapa, joka sijoittaa kontakti-ilmoitukset 
kokonaisvaltaisesti osaksi ihmisten semioottisen käyttäytymisen kenttää 
(esim. Agha 2007; Kockelman 2013; Silverstein 2003; Urban 2001). 
Tutkimuksen teoreettiset lähtökohdat esitellään luvuissa 1 ja 2.  
Luvussa 3 esitellään yksityiskohtaisemmin työn tutkimusasetelma ja 
näkökulma tutkimuskohteeseen. Kontakti-ilmoitusgenreä lähestytään 
henkilönä olemisen ja intersubjektiivisen vuorovaikutuksen kulttuurisena 
instrumenttina, joka monin eri tavoin siivilöi sosiaalista todellisuutta 
”toivottuun” tai ”ihanteelliseen” ja ”ei-toivottuun” tai ”epäihanteelliseen”. 
Tutkimuksessa käytetään kolmea eri aineistoa: 1) Pääaineisto koostuu 111 
suomenkielisestä kontakti-ilmoituksesta, jotka on kerätty kahdesta eri 
verkkopalvelusta vuonna 2007 (Deitti.net, Match.com). 2) Lisäksi 
hyödynnetään kyselytutkimusta, jonka vastaajina toimi 27 yliopisto-
opiskelijaa. Kyselyn tarkoituksena on tarjota esimerkkejä kolmen erilaisen 
ilmoituksen todellisista tulkinnoista. 3) Kolmas aineisto koostuu sellaisesta 
kulttuurisesta metadiskurssista, jossa käsitellään kontakti-ilmoituksia 
vuorovaikutuksen tyyppinä. Aineisto sisältää i) kolme kontakti-ilmoituksia 
käsittelevää opaskirjaa, ii) joukon Internet-keskusteluja, lehtiartikkeleita ja 
muita kirjoituksia sekä iii) otteen televisio-ohjelmasta. Tällaiset ”kulissien 
takaiset” metadiskurssit valaisevat sellaisia tulkinnallisia käytänteitä, jotka 
eivät useinkaan tule ilmi varsinaisten performanssien aikana.  
Tutkimuskohdetta lähestytään neljästä empiirisestä näkökulmasta. Luku 
4 keskittyy sellaisiin ”ominaisuuksiin”, joita ilmoitusten erilaiset 
merkkirakenteet voivat projisoida osallistujille. Luvussa pohditaan yleistä 
eroa ”kuvailtavien”, ”esitettävien” ja ”ehdotettavien” ominaisuuksien välillä 
ja erityisesti niiden erilaista vuorovaikutuksellista dynamiikkaa. Tämän 
jälkeen analysoidaan tarkemmin näiden konkreettisia tekstuaalisia 
ilmentymiä aineistossa: mm. teoreettisia ja reflektiivisiä representaatioita, 
listoja ja taksonomioita, narratiiveja, fiktiivisiä persoonia sekä sellaisia 
kielenaineksia, jotka ovat vakiintuneet yksilön ominaisuuksiksi (esim. 
pseudonyymeja ja mottoja). Lisäksi kolmea kokonaista tekstiä analysoidaan 
kyselyvastausten valossa. Tarkoituksena on selvittää, millaisia eroja em. 
tekstuaalisten rakenteiden tulkinnassa esiintyy. Luku 5 ottaa tarkasteluun 
evaluoivan asennoitumisen (evaluative stancetaking) ja sen roolin 
”itsepromootiossa”. Luvussa vertaillaan muutamia erilaisia aineistossa yleisiä 
asennoitumisen tyyppejä sekä pohditaan sellaisia metapragmaattisia vihjeitä, 
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jotka ilmentävät kirjoittajien käsityksiä omasta kielellisestä 
asennoitumisestaan. Luku 6 tarkastelee sitä, miten luvuissa 4 ja 5 käsiteltyjä 
rakenteita kytketään osallistumisrakenteisiin eli miten kirjoittajat valikoiden 
kohdistavat puheensa tietynlaisille osallistujille ja pyrkivät kontrolloimaan 
vuorovaikutusta. Luku 7 paneutuu metadiskurssiaineistoon ja esittelee 
ilmoitusten tulkintaa koskevia eksplisiittisiä mielipiteitä, ideologisia 
kannanottoja ja normatiivisia malleja. Lopuksi luvussa 8 pohditaan 
tutkimuksen tuloksia ja niiden merkitystä. 
Kontakti-ilmoitusten diskursiivisten käytänteiden ja niitä koskevan 
metadiskurssin vertailun avulla tutkimus osoittaa ensinnäkin, että 
”itsepromootiota” käsittelevissä stereotyyppisissä malleissa huomio usein 
keskittyy tietynlaisiin evaluoivan asennoitumisen ilmauksiin ja monet 
todellisuudessa keskeiset piirteet puuttuvat tyystin.  Tällaiset stereotyypit 
voivat osaltaan vaikuttaa siihen, että evaluoiva asennoituminen on 
ilmoituksissa usein tunnusmerkkinen, jopa ongelmallinen toiminto. 
Tutkimus valottaa myös ei-narratiivisia tapoja jäsentää minuutta ja 
biografisia representaatioita, sillä aineistolle tunnusomaisimpia ovat 
hierarkkiset ja taksonomiset tekstuaaliset rakenteet. Tutkimuksessa 
painotetaan tekstiartefaktien indeksikaalisen jäsentymisen ja 
performatiivisten ulottuvuuksien merkitystä. Tekstin semioottinen rakenne 
kaikilla tasoilla, ”makrorakenteista” ortografiaan, tulee tulkituksi merkkeinä 
siitä, kuka ja millainen kirjoittaja henkilönä on. Näin ne vaikuttavat mm. 
tekstien välittämiin kuviin kirjoittajien mielen toiminnasta tai 
”subjektiviteetista” (views of subjectivity). Vaikka tällaiset tulkinnat usein 
hajaantuvat jopa täysin vastakkaisiin ja ristiriitaisiin suuntiin, niitä voidaan 
selittää eri tulkitsijoiden orientoitumisella erilaisiin merkkeihin tai erilaisiin 
semioottisiin ontologioihin (tulkintaa ohjaaviin malleihin ja olettamuksiin). 
Ylipäänsä tutkimuksessa painotetaan vuorovaikutusta koskevien 
ideologioiden ja refleksiivisten mallien merkitystä. Eri tulkitsijat voivat 
esimerkiksi ymmärtää kontakti-ilmoitusten luonteen intersubjektiivisena 
kohtaamisena lähes täysin vastakkaisin tavoin (esim. ”etäisenä” vs. 
”läheisenä”, ”autenttisena” vs. ”epäautenttisena” tai ”luotettavana” vs. 
”epäluotettavana”). 
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PREFACE 
I feel I should warn my prospective readers that this work might not be so 
much about online dating advertisements or their linguistic analysis as it is 
about my attempts to tackle American pragmatism as a metatheory of human 
behavior and experience. The lion’s share of the time devoted to this project 
has been devoured by an obsession to understand Charles Peirce and, in 
particular, his semiotic theory – as well as its more recent anthropological 
and linguistic operationalizations. A second caveat is that my main personal 
interest has always lain in questions of personhood and selfhood: What are 
persons and how do their habits and values emerge sociohistorically, 
biographically, and interactionally? What is the role of language in all this? 
Why do linguistic symbols have such a curious power over us? And can 
individuals change the habits of thought, action, and emotion that they have 
acquired?  
An important part of the long process that leads to this dissertation and 
the form it now takes has been my desire to shift towards a semiotic and an 
anthropological perspective on language – to learn to look at linguistic 
practices and their effects from a more holistic perspective. This desire was 
fueled by a long-standing dissatisfaction with what I felt were restrictively 
language-centered and grammar-centered approaches in linguistics. Still, in 
my view, true understanding of “language” and its human import derives 
from conceptualizing it clearly and analytically within a bigger picture of 
human behavior and experience, or in relation to whatever is left outside as 
“non-language.” Like Agha (2007c: 232), I advocate an “integrationist-
expansionist-and-collaborative” mode of research. It is my belief that critical 
dialogues both within and between different research traditions could be 
helped immensely by the advancement of a common (or compatible) 
metatheory and conceptual basis.  
My quest has been for, to quote Kockelman (2005: 2), “an empirically 
tractable” and “metaphysically satisfying” framework for studying language 
as part of larger semiotic processes and particularly in relation to cultural 
understandings of personhood and identity. Initially, it was Urban (1991) 
that, many years ago, offered a first glimpse of a different and enticing 
approach to the study of language and discourse. That book started an 
ongoing trajectory towards the kind of theoretical and methodological 
approach that, finally, seemed to address the kinds of questions that had 
been preoccupying my mind for a long time. I have thoroughly enjoyed the 
process of trying to understand Peirce and other, slightly less mind-bending 
pragmatists, such as George Herbert Mead, William James, and John Dewey. 
This process has been greatly aided and complemented by brilliant scholars 
in the Northern American tradition of semiotic anthropology (Asif Agha, Paul 
Kockelman, Greg Urban, Michael Silverstein, and Richard Parmentier) with 
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their interpretations, extensions, and applications of pragmatist ideas in the 
fields of anthropology and linguistics. Professor Agha’s graduate seminar was 
particularly influential in putting different pieces together during my visit to 
Penn in the spring of 2013. 
(Also, as far as I understand, pragmatism-based naturalistic and holistic 
approaches illuminate interestingly, and critically, certain currents of 
modern neuroscience (cf. also Damasio 1999; Thompson & Varela 2001) as 
well as another long-standing fascination of mine, Buddhist psychology, with 
which Western neuroscience itself has in recent years fruitfully engaged (see 
e.g. Hanson & Mendius 2009). Traces of such links may, therefore, be 
perceivable along the way.)  
In this study, I have tried to adopt a view of personhood as a distributed, 
interactionally accumulating, and complexly sign-mediated process – as a 
“species of semiosis” – in order to gain a grasp of the kinds of discursive 
processes in which personhood becomes evaluated (e.g., idealized, 
denigrated; appreciated, assailed; idolized, belittled; sanctified, demonized), 
with a specific focus on relatively self-controlled semiotic behaviors (such as 
“self-promotion”) in which people deal with the various should’s, or the 
normative models of personhood, that they orient to. Such questions are 
important both for science and for the Art of Being Human – to which, I 
believe, human sciences should ultimately contribute. Although this study 
started out years ago as empirical discourse analysis, it soon started 
becoming more theoretically and metatheoretically driven. Ultimately, it has 
revolved around finding the kinds of conceptual approaches that are needed 
for a satisfying account of the relationship between language, personhood, 
and value. During the project I have wanted to (and had to) expand my 
scientific self into new domains. Whether that counts as a vice or a virtue and 
to what degree I have succeeded in the task I leave to others to assess. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
If you had to convey an image of who you are in a relatively short text-artifact 
of, say, 150 words, where would you begin? The raw materials available to a 
writer are diverse: perceivable attributes, typical behaviors, past experiences, 
recurring moods or mental states, the people you prefer to interact with, your 
possessions, your ideas and opinions and, so on. All of these could be 
denoted by a wide range of lexico-grammatical structures, voiced from 
different perspectives (e.g., your own, your best friend’s, your mother’s, your 
archenemy’s) and composed into a myriad of metrical patterns of text, many 
of which could be recognized by readers as tokens of particular sociocultural 
types of action or status (such as “telling a story” versus “analyzing” or being 
“humorous” versus “profound”). In fact, from the standpoint of some fictive 
omniscient narrator, for any individual there is a practically infinite number 
of self-presentational forms that might be considered, in some sense, equally 
“truthful.” This, however, is far from the empirical reality. 
You do not find anyone describing, for instance, one’s bodily features in a 
dating advertisement like one would at a doctor’s office. In any type of event, 
one finds regularities of what is considered relevant information and how 
that information is to be formulated and addressed to others. In other words, 
there is a constant orientation to cultural ontologies that specify what are the 
appropriate and effective ways of being a particular kind of person in a 
particular kind of event. Furthermore, most of those “practically infinite” 
options would never even occur to an individual in any situation. Self-
presentation is socially and interactionally preconditioned by the habits we 
have developed and the norms we have been socialized into. Whatever 
knowledge we have of ourselves has been accumulated in and shaped by 
interactions with our social, cultural, and physical environments. That is, 
one’s understanding of what is a “truthful” or “possible” interpretation of 
oneself is the precipitate of long chains of semiotic processes on biographic 
and sociohistorical time scales. Those processes include the various ideals we 
have adopted as well as our stances towards them. To the degree that we 
have self-awareness and self-control, we can actively try to be what we think 
we should be, or to reconcile our personal habits and interests with cultural 
ontologies. These processes, in turn, serve as the roots of our future habits. 
Self-presentation, then, is not merely self-representation. Our semiotic 
behaviors, the ways in which we signify and interpret, do not “reflect” 
something we “are” independent of them. Our very existence in the world is 
mediated by the multitudes of semiotic processes we are entangled in – some 
of them linguistic, most of them not. 
This study looks at one particular and, in many ways, peculiar type of 
semiotic encounter: online dating advertisements. The following kinds of 
questions will be addressed: How to be a person to some anonymous other 
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via a written text-artifact? How do aspects of persons and their lives translate 
into artifactually mediated textual patterns? How to anticipate others’ 
interpretations and the ontologies they rely on? How to promote one’s 
existence and characteristics so as to appear ideal and desirable to others? 
Ultimately these are specific instances of a ubiquitous phenomenon: the 
artifactual mediation of personhood, selfhood, and social relations in 
different semiotic modes or infrastructures, each with their particular 
possibilities and constraints. Before going into the details of this study, let us 
consider, as a sort of “exotic” contrastive analogy, a different kind of practice 
in which artifacts are shaped in the image of persons and used as 
instruments of social life. 
In March 2013, when I visited the Voodoo Museum in New Orleans, the 
establishment had accompanied their collection of voodoo dolls (see figure 1) 
with an interesting description of how these dolls are produced. First of all, a 
doll has to bear a resemblance to the person who is the object of the spell. 
This can be achieved by pinning on the doll a picture of the person or simply 
a piece of paper containing his or her name, in which case the appearance 
can be imagined. In other words, there has to be a sufficient degree of 
iconicity, or perceivable likeness, between the doll and the person for the 
magic to work. This, however, is not enough. The second step is to make the 
doll part of someone by rubbing the doll against the person or by attaching 
pieces of clothing or hair or fingernail clippings onto or inside the doll. This 
indexical, material contact establishes a link between the doll and the 
essence, spirit, or soul of the person so that he or she can be controlled 
through the doll. (See also e.g. Frazer 1998 [1890]: 28–44; Gell 1998: 96–
104.) In many ways, online dating advertisements are much like voodoo 
dolls. In fact, contrary to the popular image, the most common use for 
voodoo dolls was not ― or is not ― black magic but the pursuit of power or 
love. Voodoo dolls and dating advertisements are both semiotic artifacts that 
are formulated as an extension of a person. Subsequently, the artifact can 
stand for that person and mediate social relations between him or her and 
other people – displaced from the person and, as in the case of voodoo dolls, 
even unbeknownst to them. But how to capture both the likeness and the 
essence of a person in a text-artifact? As will be seen later, this is an actual 
concern in online dating advertisements as well. 
In terms of agency, voodoo dolls and online dating advertisements differ 
considerably. In the online dating advertisement genre, it is the writers 
themselves who are in charge of producing artifactual extensions of 
themselves (or their selves). The writers need to entextualize some pattern of 
writing that captures their likeness and essence in an effective manner. As 
the writers translate and arrange aspects of their lives into patterns of 
writing, they interpret other signs in other semiotic modes (e.g., perceptions, 
memories, habits, values) in particular ways. That is, an online dating 
advertisement is simultaneously already an interpretation of a person and a 
sign for others to interpret. Or, to put it differently, writing an online dating 
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advertisement is simultaneously a dialogue with self and a dialogue with 
others. Writers can also sketch normative figures of ideal or non-ideal 
respondents or social relations. Such textual performances are then aligned 
to by various readers who have the power to decide whether or not the writer 
is worthy of a reply. In other words, interpersonal compatibility is 
anticipated and modeled by the writer, but it is first actually experienced and 
responded to by the reader. So, in the case of online dating advertisements, 
the source of power for the mediation of social relations is not voodoo spirits 
but the desirability of the imagery conveyed by the advertisement. In both 
cases, however, it is believed that giving one’s intentions and desires a 
specific kind of public and aesthetic artifactual form will contribute to their 
realization in some relevant way. Also, in both cases, such effects are 
ontology-specific and community-specific. Therefore, voodoo dolls would 
probably not prove effective for the readers of this text, whereas online 
dating advertisements might. 
 
Figure 1 Voodoo dolls in New Orleans 
The rest of this first chapter situates language and discursive artifacts 
within a larger frame of semiotic behavior and intersubjective interaction. 
Language will be seen as a complex form of human behavior that consists of 
several dimensions and layers of signifying and interpreting. Semiotic 
behavior and its artifactual residues will be seen as the basis for all social 
interaction or sign-mediated encounters between persons. The second 
chapter elaborates the pragmatist1 framework of the study. Section 2.1 will 
                                                 
1 Pragmatism is a somewhat vague umbrella term with many possible interpretations concerning 
what it covers (in terms of ideas and principles) and whom it covers (in terms of scholars). In this 
study, it will mainly be used to refer to a relatively strictly Peircean view (which itself is, of course, 
subject to many possible interpretations). Peirce, in fact, tried renaming his original brand of 
pragmatism pragmaticism (“a word ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers”) in 1905. As will be seen 
later, Peirce’s approach has an intimate tie to his semiotic theory that he also called semeiotic. 
Therefore, semeiotic pragmaticism might be the aptest label to describe the approach that serves as a 
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approach the constitution of social reality from a semiotic and interactional 
standpoint. Semiotic encounters between persons, such as the ones mediated 
by online dating advertisements, usually become interpreted as instances or 
tokens of cultural types with specific norms and characteristics. The notions 
of genre and register, among others, have been used to refer to such types, or 
reflexive models, that guide and regiment semiotic behavior. These concepts 
will be discussed in 2.2. Finally, they will be generalized towards the more 
fundamental notions of semiotic ontology and ultimate interpretants. 
The second chapter will also discuss the relation of language to 
personhood, selfhood, and identity (2.3). Personhood will be used as a 
general term encompassing the various sociocultural entitlements, 
commitments, and characteristics related to personifiable entities (of which 
human individuals are a prime example). The main focus will be on such 
interactional processes in which personae, or empirically recognizable modes 
of personhood, are attributed to or undertaken by persons and in which 
social relations become negotiated. Selfhood refers to the reflexive capacity of 
persons to grasp and to guide the semiotic processes they are involved in. 
Individual persons and selves will be seen as long-term precipitates of 
semiotic and interactional processes. That is, they consist of gradually 
accumulated, internalized, habitualized, and embodied products of social 
interaction. Identity, finally, refers to the ways in which selves evaluate 
patterns of life arranging them in hierarchies of relative desirability and 
positioning them on various maps of the social world. That is, identity is a 
complex metasemiotic process that organizes the personae, social relations, 
and habits of individuals and communities into more or less coherent wholes. 
The theoretical discussion leads up to a more detailed description of the 
research design and the research questions. Chapter 3 will specify the 
approach that this study takes towards online dating advertisements as a 
type of semiotic encounter and as an instrument of personhood. In section 
3.1, four more specific questions, concerning the performance of 
“promotional personae” and the entitlements and commitments associated 
with them, will be derived from this general approach. The subsequent 
chapters (4–7) will, then, elaborate and examine these questions in light of 
the empirical data that will be presented in 3.2. Finally, chapter 8 discusses 
the findings and concludes the study. 
                                                                                                                                          
metatheoretical background for this study. This approach will be occasionally complemented with 
other classical pragmatists (such as George Herbert Mead) and neo-pragmatists (such as Hilary 
Putnam), whose ideas sometimes differ from Peirce’s. Mainly, however, this study operates with 
concepts originating from linguistics, discourse studies, semiotic anthropology, and Kockelman’s 
(2013a) pragmatism-based theory of ontology, interaction, and infrastructure, as will be seen in 
chapters 1 and 2. 
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1.1 LANGUAGE AND SEMIOTIC BEHAVIOR 
“Language” is a concept that delineates certain aspects of human behavior 
and experience from others (i.e., from “non-language”). Whatever is included 
in or excluded from any particular scientific or non-scientific definition of 
language is the result of complex sociohistorical and ideological processes 
(see e.g. Bauman & Briggs 2003; Agha 2007c). As an object of study, then, 
language is not a natural entity with unitary boundaries that exists in the 
world independent of how a certain community of people understands it (see 
also Määttä 2000). The same applies for ethnotheoretical understandings. 
Different folk views refer to partly different objects in different contexts with 
the same concept and project different qualities on those objects. Such 
contextual, cultural, and ideological understandings of the nature, limits, and 
possibilities of language should, however, be part of its empirical study, as 
they guide the use and interpretation of language. Although language users’ 
awareness and understandings of their language use is only ever partial (in 
both senses of the word), to a certain extent language tends to become what 
its users believe it to be, both diachronically and synchronically (see e.g. 
Silverstein 1976). In other words, various ideological (or metapragmatic, 
metasemiotic) models of language and interaction add additional, reflexive 
layers of meaning on linguistic practices (see also Urban 2001). Those 
metalinguistic practices that reason about language, then, selectively 
assemble and reify in specific ways parts of an inherently diverse web of 
semiotic processes. 
The aim of this study is to approach language holistically from the 
standpoint of human behavior and experience (see e.g. Kockelman 2013a: 
135; also Bruner 1986), not as abstracted from actual events or artificially 
delineated from other meaningful processes. Online dating advertisements 
are seen as an instrument that mediates social relations and experiences of 
social reality. Language is itself a form of behavior and experience as well as a 
means of interpreting other forms of behavior or experience. The reflexive, 
metasemiotic capacity of language to represent other, actual or imagined, 
forms of behavior and experience is essential for human life and for the 
understanding of phenomena such as identity, selfhood, and personhood. 
That is, language will be approached both from the standpoint of residence in 
the world and representations of the world (see Kockelman 2013a; and 2.1.4). 
As a form of residence in the world, language breaks down into and interacts 
with other types of embodied behaviors embedded in various environments 
(such as heeding affordances, using instruments, undertaking actions, 
fulfilling roles and identities). As a form of representation of the world, 
language relates to other modes of representation (such as perceptions, 
beliefs, and intentions).  
This means, first of all, that referentialist language ideologies (see 
Rosaldo 1982; Hill 2006; Wilce 2009a), according to which the main 
function of language is to represent reality by referring to entities existing 
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outside and independent of language and by predicating things about them, 
are insufficient for the purposes of this study. Such approaches usually pay 
little attention to the performative dimension of language. That is, they tend 
to ignore the ways in which language shapes experiences of reality and 
creates social facts.2 Furthermore, language cannot be reduced to grammar 
(or morpho-syntactic constructions), lexemes, registers, genres, 
conversational practices, or any other type of general sign. While such norm-
bound patterns of regularity are of utmost importance to any analysis of 
language, they form merely part of the meaning of actual discursive patterns. 
The meaning of any entextualized stretch of language in an actual 
interactional event, spoken or written, is highly emergent. That is, it 
emanates from the ways in which different semiotic components (linguistic 
and non-linguistic) stand in relation to one another, partially cancelling, 
strengthening or changing each other’s effects, and yield composite effects 
that are not reducible to the components alone. This will be called text-level 
indexicality (see e.g. Silverstein 1993; Agha 2007a: 24—27; also Kockelman 
2013b: 47, footnote 12).3 
In this study, language is seen as one constituent of human semiosis (or 
sign-activity), inseparable from other constituents. Semiosis – understood 
here strictly in the Peircean sense – refers to a web of temporally unfolding 
processes in which signs become interpreted as standing for objects of 
various kinds (producing “meaning,” “knowledge,” or “experience” and 
ultimately “minds,” “selves,” and “persons”). Meaning, then, is anchored in 
the practical effects of sign-activities. All experiences, perceptions, and 
knowledge of reality, including knowledge of our “inner” selves, are sign-
mediated, based on interpretable signs. A semiotic object refers to anything 
that is knowable, of whatever kind and of whatever degree of concreteness or 
abstractness (and should not be confused with “objects” as things in the 
everyday sense). The objects that will be of particular interest for this study 
include persons and the various constituents they consist of, such as mental 
states or social statuses. In the Peircean view, humans think and experience 
the world in signs. Signs begin with qualisigns that are mere 
phenomenological qualities or qualitative possibilities – the classic example 
being a “feeling of red” – that become embodied in more complex signs 
(when, for example, one recognizes a red figure against a white ground as an 
                                                 
2 In terms that will be introduced in section 2.1, these approaches focus excessively on object-sign 
relations at the expense of sign-interpretant relations. 
3 And it is in these kinds of actual events and textual relations that norm-bound regularities change 
or persist. While such patterns of regularity rely on various underlying principles of invariance (or 
legisign principles), such as genetics, event-memory, or habit (see Agha 1997b: 196), ultimately 
linguistic norms are based on interdiscursive achievements in actual events on a sociohistorical time 
scale that keep regularities alive by connecting present events with past ones. “Synchrony,” then, is 
merely an abstract conceptual framing of a temporally unfolding continuation of events; it is 
“semiotically frozen time” implied by intertextuality (Silverstein 2005: 9). 
 23 
instance of the letter “a,” and so on). In other words, Peircean semiotic 
breaks “meaning” down to its elementary semiotic partials.4 The empirical 
object of research from the standpoint of the study of language is semiotic 
behavior, i.e, the various human activities and their artifactual residues 
(such as patterns of sound waves, ink on paper, or pixels on a screen) that are 
either interpreted as signs or that serve as interpretations of other signs (see 
e.g. Agha 2007a). Chapter 2 will further elaborate this view. (For general 
overviews of Peircean semiotics in anthropology and linguistics, see e.g. 
Singer 1984; Daniel 1984, 1989; Mertz 1985, 2007; Parmentier 1985a, 1994; 
Hanks 1996; Agha 1997b; Deacon 1997; Lee 1997; Kockelman 2005, 2006a, 
2010, 2013a; Nieminen 2010.)  
1.2 INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN INTERACTION 
Interpersonal interaction is approached in this study from the standpoint of 
semiotic encounters, or events in which signs connect persons to one another 
(Agha 2007a: 10). When signs that are relatively publicly perceivable are 
mutually oriented to and interpreted by interactants, they serve as 
connecting links that calibrate individual subjectivities in relation to one 
another into various degrees of intersubjectivity. The more private the signs 
are, the more mediating links they require. For instance, a sign such as pain 
is perceived relatively directly by a self, but to others it is accessible only via 
more mediate signs such as distorted facial expressions or woeful moaning. 
Such signs can, however, be highly effective and may even produce similar 
sensations of pain in empathic intersubjects. The culturally and 
interactionally co-constructed relation between the self’s behaviors (a 
distorted face, moaning, etc.) and the other’s responses (empathy, 
consolation, etc.) shapes the experience of both interactants. 
It should, however, be noted at the outset that interpersonal interaction is 
merely one form of human interaction. As will be seen more clearly in 
chapter 2, we must also account for interactions between persons and their 
environments as well as intrapersonal interactions (such as interactions 
between past and future selves). For instance, how one expresses one’s own 
                                                 
4 From a phenomenological point of view, language comprises many layers of experience, starting 
from the basic sensory and perceptual level. Some of these layers have traditionally been excluded from 
accounts of linguistic meaning (or sometimes, as in the case of singularities and idiosyncrasies, from 
the scope of science altogether). Semiotic processes tend to enter the field of linguistics only once 
arrays of qualisigns have been analyzed as sinsign tokens of cultural types (lexico-grammar in 
particular) and their symbolic-indexical meaning is being negotiated. Under these traditional layers 
run streams of “subjective” meaning that include experiences such as the pleasure of hearing a soft, 
gentle speaking voice or the inspiring feeling of holding the thin, coarse paper of an old book between 
one’s fingers. Regardless of where the margins of “language” are drawn, such phenomena are certainly 
part of semiosis. (See also Daniel 1984: 46, 54; or Dewey 2005 [1934]: 36–59.) 
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pain is an interaction between different constituents of the same person. If 
one has enough self-control, one may even entirely conceal one’s pain. Still, 
either option is opted for in anticipation of the responses of others, whether 
these others are co-present, imagined, or internalized (e.g., in the form of 
cultural norms of behavior). Intersubjectivity and interaction, then, are 
fundamental phenomenona that extend far beyond interpersonal 
communication (see also section 2.3). 
In the case of online dating advertisements, the signs that mediate 
intersubjective interactions are carried by patterns of writing embodied in 
digital text-artifacts. They are a particular kind of artifactual residue of 
semiotic behavior. In the form that they are displayed to the interactants 
(i.e., as writing on a screen), they are figures shaped out of light (and, in that 
particular sense, differ considerably from traditional ink on paper). 
Artifactual residues, then, come in varying degrees of relative tangibility and 
physical durability. The degrees of tangibility and durability of the sign 
vehicles determine the range of text-artifacts they can be shaped into. In 
contrast to speech or bodily gestures, prototypical writing-based artifacts 
enable the flexible displacement of the artifact from the interactants and, 
therefore, the mediation of intersubjective interactions across spatial and 
temporal distances.  
The distinction between texts, as patterns of interpretable signs, and 
written, spoken, or other text-artifacts, as artifactual carriers of those signs, 
is an important one. A text can be defined as any array of co-occuring signs 
that can be framed as a whole in which each constituent sign can be 
interpreted in relation to one another.5 The sufficient correspondence of text 
as it is “laid down” by animators and as it is read out of the artifactual 
residues by respondents is precisely the kind of intersubjective achievement 
discussed above. Entextualization refers to the process of laying down texts 
as interactional and denotational entities distinguishable from their 
surrounds. (See Silverstein 1993; Silverstein & Urban 1996; Agha 2007a; also 
Bauman & Briggs 1990; Pressman 1994.) Contextualization focuses on the 
ways in which texts are indexically anchored to their surrounds. That is, the 
meaning of contextualized processes is in some way dependent on the 
contextualizing processes (see e.g. Kockelman 2013a: 98).6 We see, then, that 
stereotypic labels such as “writing” or “conversation” cover a variety of 
different types of text-artifacts as well as patterns of entextualization and 
contextualization. Both “writing” and “conversation” can, for example, 
                                                 
5 Text, then, is a sort of temporary “synoptic” enclosure (i.e., whatever is viewed together as a 
delimited and detachable entity), in which the constituents are subject to indexical iconicity (i.e., their 
co-occurrence allows each constituent of whatever size to be given meanings based on its relations, 
such as similarities and contrasts, with other constituents and the entire whole). 
6 Context, ultimately, resides in the participants’ shared interpretations and their sanctioning of 
each other’s interpretations – or “attitudes already in place.” Any text-context distinction, therefore, is 
relative, dynamic, and frame-specific. (See Kockelman 2005: 286–287.) 
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involve widely varying degrees of “directness, immediacy, mutual awareness, 
and possible reciprocation” (Agha 2007a: 10).  
Trying to understand online dating advertisements as interaction seems 
less fruitful if they are disconnected from the wider processes they are 
embedded in. Part of the purpose of these encounters is precisely to lead to 
subsequent encounters in different semiotic modes and channels (such as 
dyadic face-to-face conversations). Such writing-based interactions can, 
therefore, only be properly understood in relation to the characteristics of 
those subsequent encounters that they aim at. That is, if one is interested in 
persons and their residence in the world, the division of labor between 
different channels, instruments, and affordances that interconnect persons in 
various kinds of encounters (some of them written, some spoken, some of 
them not even linguistic) is essential. Just like linguistic signs can be selected 
(paradigmatically) among alternatives and combined (syntagmatically) into 
more complex forms, the channels a person can access simultaneously or 
sequentially give rise to diverse configurations of intersubjective interaction. 
(See Kockelman 2013a: 40–41, 201.)  
We will return to the notion of intersubjectivity from a pragmatist and 
semiotic standpoint in section 2.3. As a point of comparison, we might end 
this section by considering Duranti’s (2010) anthropological interpretation of 
Husserl’s and Schutz’s phenomenological thinking – which in a number of 
ways seems relatively compatible with the pragmatist stance adopted in this 
study. It is important to note that intersubjectivity refers to the human 
capacity that enables a person to recognize an artifact such as an online 
dating advertisement (i.e., a constellation of pixels on a screen) as signs of 
and as a channel to another human being in the first place. That is, 
intersubjectivity is a set of basic dimensions of human experience that 
constitute the precondition for increasingly complex social interaction. 
Unlike, say, an agreement between participants in conversation, 
intersubjectivity is not a product of communication but a condition for its 
possibility. Grounded in sociality and empathy, intersubjectivity is the 
capacity of seeing the world from the point of view of others (cf. also Mead 
1934: 144–173). There is intersubjectivity even when others are not 
physically present.7 It is in the nature of intersubjectivity that “[a person] 
finds himself surrounded by objects which tell him plainly that they were 
produced by other people, [––] artifacts in the broadest sense” (Schutz 1967: 
109). According to Duranti (2010: 13), the most specific dimension of 
                                                 
7 This is, however, a slightly misleading formulation. Deciding a priori where co-presence begins or 
ends is tricky. Where does one draw the line? In what sense, for instance, is the whole of humanity not 
physically co-present on the planet? It is, rather, a question of objects being framable as being co-
present (i.e., indexically and inferentially linked) in a number of ways (see Kockelman 2013a: 202, note 
6; also Hanks 1996: 45–48, 120). Intersubjectivity, then, involves the ability to perceive or to infer the 
presence of others in the same natural and cultural world based on a variety of signs, including the 
artifactual residues they have left behind. 
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intersubjectivity is “the complex, varied and yet highly specific type of being-
with that is made possible by the language faculty and its actualization in 
particular human languages, dialects, styles, genres and registers.” 
Discursive behaviors and their artifactual residues, such as online dating 
advertisements, then, are forms of intersubjective being-with on many levels, 
starting from language use as a sign of an embodied presence (or residence) 
in the world “even before it can be decoded according to grammatical or 
lexical information” (ibid.). In other words, “language use is always 
simultaneously practical and theoretical activity” (ibid.). More specific 
cultural dimensions of intersubjectivity are involved when such discursive 
artifacts are interpreted either as an enactment of particular goals and social 
roles or as symbolic representations of some state of affairs in the world – for 
example, when online daters carefully present themselves as specific kinds of 
persons in order to receive replies from desirable kinds of participants.  
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2 A SEMIOTIC VIEW ON LANGUAGE AND 
PERSONHOOD 
This chapter takes a closer and slightly more technical look at the 
pragmatism-based approach to the semiotic constitution of reality. Section 
2.1 first presents some of the basic properties of semiotic processes. Section 
2.2 then, building on those basic principles, considers various reflexive 
models of semiotic behavior (e.g., genres, registers, and social personae). 
Finally, section 2.3 takes a look at questions of personhood and selfhood. 
Classical pragmatism was based on the philosophical thinking of Charles 
Peirce (1839–1914) and his colleagues and followers, most notably William 
James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. Peirce’s pragmatism was 
characterized, among other things, by a commitment to reform some of the 
dualistic, mentalistic, individualistic, and nominalistic understandings of 
reality, reason, and selfhood in the Cartesian tradition. Another major goal 
was to link fundamental philosophical concepts, such as “meaning,” “truth,” 
or “reality,” to human practices and human experience. (See e.g. Misak 2004; 
Anderson 2009.) The latter goal is what has made Peirce’s pragmatism a 
fruitful metatheoretical framework for empirical human sciences. It has been 
noted that one of the keys to understanding Peirce’s thinking is to keep in 
view its systematic and holistic nature (see e.g. de Waal 2013: 2). That is, 
Peirce’s classification of the sciences and his thinking in the fields of 
mathematics, positive sciences, and philosophy all illuminate his semiotics. 
However, since Peirce founded his thinking systematically on the same basic 
principles (most notably the universal categories of Firstness, Secondness, 
and Thirdness), his semiotic theory in many ways crystallizes the other 
aspects of his thinking.8 The aim of this section is not to extensively discuss 
Peirce’s ideas per se but, rather, to lead the way to the anthropological and 
linguistic applications and operationalizations of Peircean semiotics that will 
be employed in the empirical analyses (e.g. Silverstein 1979, 1993; Agha 
2007a; Kockelman 2005, 2006a, 2010, 2013a). 
2.1 THE SEMIOTIC CONSTITUTION OF REALITY 
Since many of the phenomena that will be discussed in the following sections 
follow from the basic properties of semiotic processes, a summary discussion 
of the elementary particles of meaning – the interactional and processual 
                                                 
8 As Peirce himself remarked [1977: 85–86] (quoted in Atkin 2010): “[I]t has never been in my 
power to study anything,—mathematics, ethics, metaphysics, gravitation, thermodynamics, optics, 
chemistry, comparative anatomy, astronomy, psychology, phonetics, economics, the history of science, 
whist, men and women, wine, metrology, except as a study of semiotic.” 
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triad of sign, object, and interpretant – is in order. As was already mentioned 
in passing, in the pragmatist view all knowledge of reality is considered sign-
mediated (see e.g. Parmentier 1994; Misak 2004: 21; Kockelman 2013a: e.g. 
102, 110, 166).9 That is, all objects (whether they are material substances, 
perceptions, foci of joint attention, beliefs, intentions, feelings, social statuses 
or relations, identities, or instruments, etc.) are projections from semiotic 
processes in which signs give rise to interpretants. Objects may or may not be 
bounded and tangible. To put it more accurately, they may be more or less 
enclosed (e.g., more or less precisely delimited, continuously perceivable, 
detachable from semiotic processes, portable across contexts, 
intersubjectively recognized, or subject to high degrees of agency) 
(Kockelman 2013a: 56). In short, an object is whatever is knowable by the 
signs it exhibits. To quote Peirce: 
 
I shall endeavor consistently to employ the word ‘object’, namely, to mean 
that which a sign, so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, enables one 
who knows that sign, and knows it as a sign, to know. (MS 599: 31–32; see 
also Parmentier 1994: 4.) 
 
A sign, then, is something which “stands for” an object in some capacity 
(Peirce 1986: 99; see also Kockelman 2005). In a sense, signs can be 
regarded as mediate realizations of the object (Parmentier 1994: 4). We can 
only experience something based on the interpretable signs that that 
something exhibits, and we can only know that something to the extent we 
can interpret those signs. That is, over time our knowledge of an object may 
increase as our ability to interpret it grows.10 This applies to physical objects 
as much as it does to the kind of object that is most relevant to this study, 
persons. 
Peirce split the object into the dynamic object and the immediate object 
(see e.g. Parmentier 1994; Atkin 2010). The dynamic object is the object as 
that which gives rise to signs and constrains the potential for interpretation. 
The immediate object, in contrast, is the object as mediated by interpreted 
signs. To take up a simple example: In the case of a relatively physical object, 
such as a human face, the dynamic object would be the face as mere 
                                                 
9 Reality may be perceived relatively directly (consider, for example, qualisigns) but not 
immediately (at least not in the sense of “non-mediated”; cf. e.g. with phenomenological notions of 
immediacy). No sphere of “pre-semiotic” knowledge, then, exists in the pragmatist view. The 
pragmatist view seems to resonate well with Bakhtin’s and Vygotsky’s notions of mediation. These 
parallels, however, cannot be dealt with within the confines of this study, but see e.g. Wertsch (1985) 
and Paavola & Hakkarainen (2008: 169). 
10 Since all objects are mediated by the kinds of signs a particular kind of organism can perceive 
and by the ways in which it can interpret them, all experience and knowledge is perspectival. No object 
per se (unmediated by semiotic processes) is accessible, even if such an object may exist independently 
of any particular interpreter (e.g., some physical object). 
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embodied form, which exists independently of any particular interpreter, and 
the infrastructural access that interpreting agents have to the face. The 
immediate object would be the face as it actually appears to some interpreter 
from his or her relative perspective as mediated by, for example, gaze 
behaviors (regimented by cultural norms so that, for example, only particular 
parts of the face may be appropriately available for one’s gaze), touch 
(particularly if the interpreter is blind), cultural concepts, analytical or 
poeticized linguistic descriptions of the face, and so on. That is, the object of 
a sign both organizes and is organized by the interpretants of the sign. 
Reality as dynamic objects works its way into semiotic processes but is only 
accessible to interpreters as immediate objects. The dynamic object can also 
be seen as the cause (such as a personal habit or a physiological source of 
pain) for the fact that a person has expressed a sign. The immediate object, 
then, is that which exists because the sign brought an interpreter’s attention 
to it (such as a particular experience of pain, shaped by one’s own and others’ 
responses to it). (See Kockelman 2013a: 23, 54–60; also Colapietro 1989: 17–
21.) To further illustrate the point, in the context of online dating 
advertisements and specifically from the reader’s perspective, we might think 
of the writer-person as the dynamic object and the gradually sharpening 
interpretations that the reader makes based on the writer’s entextualized 
signs at different stages of the interactional process as the immediate 
objects.11  
2.1.1 INTERPRETING OBJECT-SIGN RELATIONS 
Any semiotic process relates three components: a sign, an object, and an 
interpretant. The last of these components that we have not yet discussed 
explicitly is the interpretant. The interpretant is whatever a sign creates or 
determines insofar as it stands for an object (see Kockelman 2013a: 46). It is 
in these “proper significate effects” of signs that meaning is anchored in the 
Peircean model (CP 5.475; see also 2.1.2). Interpretants can be classified in 
many different ways. Let us take up a classification that pertains particularly 
to human interpreters and their responses.12 An affective interpretant is a 
                                                 
11 Persons, of course, are interpretable objects to themselves too. As will be seen more precisely in 
section 2.3, we also know ourselves as immediate objects based on the signs we can perceive and 
interpret. 
12 It is important to emphasize that the interpretant is not an interpreter (i.e., a person) (see also 
Dewey 1946: 87). The core of Peirce’s model of semiotic processes is not tied to humans or any other 
particular kind of agent (although Peirce himself at times hesitated on this matter, see e.g. Deely 1990 
or Daniel 1989: 84 on Peirce’s famous “sop to Cerberus,” EP 2: 478–481). In Peirce’s monist thinking, 
all phenomena are described according to the same general principles. All actually existent processes 
(Secondness) embody chance or possibility (Firstness) and are bound by habit or law (Thirdness) to 
various degrees. “Matter” (which Peirce also called “effete mind”) is more heavily bound by law than 
“mind” (but not entirely; Peirce was one of the first to advocate the view that Newton’s laws are merely 
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feeling caused by a sign, i.e., a change in the interpreter’s bodily state (which 
is itself a further sign for the interpreter). An energetic interpretant is a 
behavioral response, i.e., a physical or mental effort. A representational 
interpretant is a speech act or a mental state that represents the object-sign 
relation with propositional or conceptual content. (See Kockelman 2005.) 
Any interpretant can itself be a further sign to be interpreted — and so on in a 
web-like manner. A sign will usually give rise to several different kinds of 
interpretants simultaneously or in succession. Ultimately, a sign may 
produce a “habit-change” or a “modification of a person’s tendencies toward 
action” (Peirce 1955: 277). An ultimate interpretant, whether affective, 
energetic, or representational, is itself no longer a sign but a disposition to 
behave in certain ways (e.g., a habit, belief, or a propensity projected on 
others). (See e.g. Kockelman 2005: 274–278; 2013a: 65–66; Cf. Peirce 1955: 
276–279; de Waal 2013: 83–84.) It is an interpretation (e.g., “that person is 
angry,” “this text is ironic”) within which an interpreter acts until other signs 
give sufficient reasons to change that interpretation. We will return to 
ultimate interpretants in section 2.2.3.  
We can now put together the previous discussion in the form of the 
following diagram (1) of the semiotic triad. As illustrated by the two levels of 
arrows pointing in opposite directions in the diagram, there is, at a lower 
logical level, a vector of determination flowing from the dynamic object 
through the sign to the interpretants and, at a higher logical level, a vector of 
“representation” from the interpretants to the immediate object (Parmentier 
1994). In order to avoid terminological confusion, the vector of 
“representation” might be more appropriately called the vector of mediation 
(or standing in relation to) (Colapietro 1989: 17–20). When these vectors are 
brought into proper relation in semiosis, knowledge of objects through signs 
is possible. To simplify, one might say that the vector of determination is the 
reality working its way into the semiotic process. That is, any sign is 
grounded in prior processes and constrained by them. The vector of 
mediation is the way in which interpretation of signs makes them effective in 
particular ways (i.e., makes the reality experienceable and knowable in 
particular ways) and shapes the future direction of the unfolding process. 
(See also Kockelman 2013a: 174 on protentive and retentive framings of 
semiotic processes; and see the discussion of sieving, ontological 
assumptions, and ontological transformativity in 2.1.3.)  
                                                                                                                                          
a statistical average, see de Waal 2013: 151). For Peirce, the very possibility of humans having minds 
presupposes the “mind-like” nature of the universe. Only something that is interpretable can be 
interpreted. That is, the human mind has, in a sense, grown out of the universe and is not a distinct 
substance as per some dualist views (see also e.g. Damasio 1999). A person is a particular 
manifestation of mind in the universe (among other things), and the mind is merely a “species of 
semiosis” (Colapietro 1989: xx). As Deely (1990: 86) puts it, the “action proper to signs” is seen “as 
already at work in physical nature itself beyond the bounds of organic matter or prior to its advent.” 
That is, anthroposemiosis presupposes physiosemiosis (and zoosemiosis). 
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Diagram 1 The vectors of “determination” and “representation.”  
Semiosis, in other words, is a relation between object-sign and sign-
interpretant relations. In Kockelman’s (2005: 234; 2006a: 6; see also Peirce 
CP 8.332; Colapietro 1989: 6) formal definition, a sign stands for its object 
on the one hand, and its interpretant on the other, in such a way as to make 
the interpretant stand in relation to the object corresponding to the sign’s 
own relation to the object. A sign, therefore, is that which “has the ability to 
redirect the flow of energies” and which “puts things in touch with each 
other” thereby enabling the exchange of information (Esposito 1979: 23). 
Signs give us an awareness of how we are in the middle of things: a sign is 
“anything that has roots and bears fruits; it is anything that is grounded and 
growing” (Colapietro 1989: 22). The semiotic process, then, is a series of 
interactions, or relations between activities, that creates a “pathway through 
time” (Deely 1990: 90).  
The importance of the temporally unfolding chain of interpretants for the 
Peircean model cannot be overemphasized. Meanings do not inhere in signs 
(as the “other side of the coin”). They are mediated by dynamic and 
interactive relations between objects, the signs they give rise to, and the 
interpretants that are calibrated to the signs in actual semiotic events. This 
kind of model opens to empirical inquiry the question how habits and 
regularities (i.e., socially shared, culturally transmitted, or temporally 
relatively stable kinds of meaning), which structuralist views tend to abstract 
into systems purified from time, space, and variation, come about and persist 
or change over time. Moreover, it should be noted that the set of signs that an 
interpreter can perceive in any discursive artifact (such as an online dating 
advertisement) and the range of interpretants an interpreter can produce are 
not predetermined or limited to those traditional units and categories 
defined within linguistics (see also Nieminen 2010: 37–48). Rather, the 
interpretation of texts is a layered and creative interactive process that 
involves many dimensions of “meaning” (including, say, ethnopsychological 
interpretation of what someone’s linguistic structures say about their 
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personality, grounded in the interpreter’s cultural and personal 
backgrounds). 
2.1.2 MEANING AS THE EFFECTS OF SIGN-ACTIVITY 
Semiosis is an open-ended, web-like process. Any component in the basic 
triad (object, sign, or interpretant) may simultaneously be a component 
(object, sign, or interpretant) in other semiotic processes. Moreover, the 
interpretants of a sign come in temporally unfolding and mutually 
interacting chains, each new interpretant clarifying the object further.13 This 
is where “meaning” is anchored in the Peircean model. That is, the meaning 
of a sign is in its conceivable effects or “upshot.” The so-called pragmatic 
maxim states this principle as follows: 
  
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, 
we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our 
conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. 
(Peirce in W3: 266.) 
 
The web-like unfolding of the effects of a sign – its actual, possible, and 
necessary consequences as well as all the processes that branch from them – 
means that objects, the signs they give rise to, and their interpretants tend to 
be spread out in spacetime and between persons. This is what is meant by the 
distributed nature of semiotic processes (see 2.1.5).14  
Before moving on to questions of agency in semiosis, a few more specific 
classifications of signs should be introduced, as they illustrate the discussion 
above and will be used later in empirical analyses. Qualisigns, as already 
mentioned in 1.1, are perceptual qualities or qualitative possibilities. They are 
embodied in or organized into sinsigns, which are actual existents, or 
qualities actually paired with an object (see e.g. Lee 1997a: 118; Kockelman 
2013a: 51). Legisigns are general signs (or types) that exist as regularities, 
                                                 
13 In Peirce’s teleological and normative model, these chains tend towards final interpretants in 
semiotic communities. Final interpretants are idealized end points of interpretation, when unanimity 
(or “truth,” “goodness,” or “beauty”) has been achieved. (Final interpretants should not be confused 
with ultimate interpretants, see 2.2.3.) In a sense, final interpretants relate to the semiotic division of 
labor (which will be discussed in 2.1.5), to various “ritual centers” (Silverstein 2003: 222), and to other 
expert, prestige, or communal processes in which authoritative interpretations are worked out, ruled 
on, and disseminated. “Idiosyncratic” interpretants only tend to be possible in a relative sense, locally 
and temporarily. (Cf. Daniel 1989: 85.) 
14 To rephrase this in a Bakhtinian idiom, an inescapable implication is that all semiotic processes 
are inherently dialogical. A sign only has meaning insofar as it is recognized, made sense of, and 
regimented by the self’s or the others’ subsequent interpretants. That is, there is a dialogical process of 
give and take between signs and interpretants. (See also Daniel 1984: 21–23; Parmentier 1985b: 376; 
Piippo 2012: 147.) 
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habits, and norms. They are only manifested through sinsigns that conform 
to them. That is, they are never encountered directly, only through their 
sinsign replicas (or tokens). For instance, the alphabet (as a collection of 
legisigns) allows one to recognize a pattern of colored pixels on the computer 
screen (as qualisigns) as a token of the letter “a” (as a sinsign). The ground 
refers to the principle that links an object and a sign. Grounds can be 
relatively iconic, indexical, or symbolic.15 In iconic semiosis, the sign is 
linked to the object by virtue of the sign’s own qualities. That is, the sign may 
be seen as resembling the object or, in the case of qualisigns, the sign is 
embodied in the object. This means that, for instance, a red object embodies 
redness rather than “resembles” it. (See Ransdell 1986: 63, 67.) In indexical 
semiosis, the sign is linked to the object by spatiotemporal contiguity, i.e., co-
occurrence within some frame (see Silverstein 2005). In iconic and indexical 
semiosis the ground per se, in a relative sense, exists independent of any 
particular interpreter. Symbolic semiosis, by contrast, is “conventional.” That 
is, the link between the object and the sign is created by the interpretant and 
grounded in cultural norms.16 It should, however, be kept in mind that icons, 
indexes (or indices), and symbols are not really types of signs but, rather, 
types of grounds, which merely describes a part of any semiotic process. 
Icons, indices, and symbols refer to particular kinds of interpretations of 
object-sign relations and are not mutually exclusive: the same sign can be 
given iconic, indexical, and symbolic interpretations, by different interpreters 
or by one interpreter simultaneously or subsequently.  
Iconic, indexical, and symbolic layers of semiosis interact in many ways. 
For instance, the frame of co-occurrence in indexicality or the criteria and 
focus of perceived likeness in iconicity may themselves be symbolically 
                                                 
15 Both classifications presented here are based on Peirce’s universal categories, which are families 
of more specific categories: Firstness (manifested as, e.g., chance, possibility, sense, embodiedness; 
qualisigns, icons), Secondness (manifested as e.g. actuality, existence, brute force, embeddedness; 
sinsigns, indexes), and Thirdness (manifested as, e.g., generality, law, habit, understanding, 
enmindedness; legisigns, symbols). In this processual and interactional metaphysics, firsts, seconds, 
and thirds follow one another, and the latter ones build on and presuppose the former ones. (See e.g. 
Misak 2004; Kockelman 2013a: 67; De Waal 2013.) 
16 Symbols are grounded in norms. Normativity refers to the ways in which types of circumstances 
and types of human behavior become habitually linked by complex sets of entitlements (what one can 
or is allowed to do) and commitments (what one must or must not do). Norms originate in the 
imitation of others’ behaviors and are regimented by the sanctioning practices of a community, such as 
reward or punishment. Norms (as Thirdness) organize the range of socially appropriate and effective 
types of behaviors in types of circumstances (or, more generally, the range of appropriate and effective 
interpretants of signs). Norms interact with and are only in a relative sense separable from causes (as 
Secondness) that organize the range of causally feasible and efficacious behaviors. Practice, in this 
study, refers to any particular norm and performance to the behaviors that instantiate a practice (cf. 
with the other meanings of “performance” discussed in section 5.2.2). (Kockelman 2005: 255–259 and 
the references therein; 2013a: 54–62; see also Sapir 1985 [1931]; Piippo 2012.) 
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determined (see e.g. Hanks 1996: 45–48, 120; also footnote 7 in section 1.2). 
Symbolic semiosis, then, organizes the interpretation of iconic and indexical 
signs (or relations between qualities, to put it differently). Symbols are by 
nature legisigns and are only encountered as their sinsigns replicas (or 
tokens). Moreover, as general signs, symbols need icons to convey 
information and indices to link that information to particular ongoing events. 
(See e.g. Parmentier 1994: 10.) Linguistic symbols encompass both iconic 
information (e.g., stereotypic conceptual content or imagery) and indexical 
information (e.g., stereotypic sense relations or appropriate contexts of use), 
which vary according to the competence and experience of the user. That is, 
symbolic knowledge grows in breadth and in depth with a person. Both on 
biographical and sociohistorical scales symbols grow out of indexical and 
iconic relations. In addition to being relatively “arbitrary,” symbols, then, are 
relatively “motivated” too. They are complex signs that, in human practices, 
both organize iconic and indexical relations and are organized by them. (See 
Deacon 1997.) 
2.1.3 AGENTS AND KINDING 
How does a particular sign come to stand for an object instead of some other 
sign and why does it give rise to a particular interpretant and not some other 
interpretant? What directs the unfolding of semiotic processes? To 
supplement the general model of meaning introduced above and to bring it 
closer to the object of this study, let us now discuss agency and introduce the 
notions of selection and sieving (see Kockelman 2013a: 17–19, 41–42, 81–85; 
on the relation of Peircean semiotics to agency, see also e.g. Ransdell 1986: 
54; Colapietro 1989: xix, 95–97). 
An agent is whatever is capable of affecting which interpretant a sign gives 
rise to. It may be a selecting agent that is capable of sensing a sign and 
instigating an interpretant. In the case of humans, the agent may be more 
encompassing than an individual person (e.g., a group) or less encompassing 
(e.g., a mental state). Kockelman (2013a: 20–21) gives an example of a 
stereotypic enchaining of cognitive processes: an object first causes a 
sensation; the sensation, then, indexically (or causally) gives rise to a 
perception, the perception inferentially (or logically) to a belief, the belief to 
an intention, the intention to an instigation of, say, a speech act (see also 
Rosenthal 2004). Each state in the chain can be framed as an agent, which 
can itself be entangled in many other semiotic processes. That is, agents are 
semiotic processes too and, therefore, fundamentally distributed by nature 
(see 2.1.5) and only under particular framings coincide with entities such as 
persons. 
The agent may also be a sieving agent that “gives rise to consequences for 
no other reason than serendipity” (Kockelman 2013a: 29, original italics). 
For instance, the features of a particular environment, instrument, or 
infrastructure may limit the the unfolding of semiotic processes in particular 
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ways. Any semiotic process involves both selection and sieving. In fact, a 
major source of sieving are those processes that are already in place or under 
way (e.g., previous interpretations or presumed cultural norms, learned 
codes, habitual channels or infrastructures) (see Kockelman 2013a: 44). 
Agents operate on different time scales. Any single framing tends to overly 
reify agency. What, for instance, on an interactional time scale appears to be 
a relatively intentional selection by a person, may appear as non-
intentionally sieved or selected for on evolutionary, sociohistorical, or 
biographical time scales (e.g., a genetic predisposition caused by natural 
selection or a relatively arbitrary habitual behavior one has been socialized 
into). 
Let us now have a look at the following diagram (2). The top half of the 
tetragon (S-O-I) corresponds to the sign-object-interpretant relations 
familiar from diagram 1. The bottom half represents the sign-agent-
interpretant relations. The agent (A) takes the sign as “input” and yields as 
the “output” an interpretant. In other words, the agent interprets the sign-
object relation according to its interests or characteristics.  
 
Diagram 2 Relations between relations based on Kockelman (2013a). 
As was mentioned earlier, any component in a semiotic process can 
simultaneously be a component in other semiotic processes. Choosing among 
different possibilities (i.e., seeing a particular component as a sign, object, or 
interpretant in a particular process) is referred to as semiotic framing (see 
Kockelman 2005: 236, 269–271; 2013a: 50). For instance, in the previous 
diagram, the interpretant (I1) of the first process is a new sign (S2) in the 
subsequent process. 
We can illustrate framing in light of the object of this study. Any segment 
of an entextualized online dating advertisement can be framed both as a sign 
and as an interpretant. When a writer describes some aspect of himself – 
think of it as O1 in the diagram – such as a behavioral routine, a physical 
attribute, or an emotional pattern, which he knows through some sign(s) (S1) 
(e.g., feelings, memory images, perceived reflections in the mirror), the act of 
giving such non-linguistic signs an explicit linguistic description functions as 
… I2 
A2 A1 
S1 
O2 O1
I1=S2 … 
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a representational interpretant (I1). It formulates the object as a particular 
kind of semiotic object by projecting propositional and discursive structure 
onto it. That is, the interpretant interprets the sign in a particular way in light 
of particular cultural symbols (and with particular consequences in terms of 
possible inferences, accountability, etc.). At the same time such linguistic 
descriptions function as addressed signs (S2) to be interpreted by 
(anticipated) readers (A2). They eventually prompt new interpretants (I2) 
from those interactants that actually end up reading the advertisement (e.g., 
mental representations of the writer as a person; feelings of suspicion, 
indifference, trust, interest, desire; the decision to reply or not; the reply 
text).17 Self-presentation in dating advertisements, then, is a dialogue both 
between writers and readers and between past and future versions of the 
writer. As an interpretant, the text interprets both for self and for others 
those signs that serve as ingredients for the text. 
From the standpoint of agency, it is noteworthy that the writer, as agent 
A1 that instigates the representational interpretant (I1), will be able to 
anticipate the readers’ (A2) interpretations (I2) and can try to signify in a 
particular way in order to bring about a particular kind of interpretation. 
Addressed signs are the kinds of signs that have been expressed for the sake 
of particular interpretants to which the signer is committed (Kockelman 
2005: 252; see also e.g. section 5.4). That is, writers interpret themselves (I1) 
in ways that are addressed to actual or imagined others and are meant to 
prompt desirable kinds of interpretations (I2). In terms of interactional turn-
taking, one may speak of the mobilizing of particular kinds of responses from 
others (see e.g. Stivers & Rossano 2010). The capacity of agents (1) to control 
the expression of signs, (2) to compose particular kinds of object-sign 
relations, and (3) to commit to particular kinds of interpretants is called 
practical agency. Their capacity to representationally (1) thematize and (2) 
characterize semiotic processes and (3) to reason about them is called 
theoretical agency. (See Kockelman 2013a: 81–82.) Agents, then, have 
various degrees of flexibility (practical and theoretical agency), for which 
they are made accountable by others’ recognizing and regimenting 
interpretants (e.g., in the form of evaluation, entitlement, and obligation, see 
Enfield 2013). (Specifically from the standpoint of this study, see also chapter 
3.) 
                                                 
17 The interpretants produced by the readers are additional interpretants in the first process, since 
they relate to the same object (i.e., I2 mediately interprets O1). One might say that they point to the 
same dynamic object that becomes represented as two different immediate objects for two different 
persons. To what extent the writer’s knowledge of the object (O1) and the reader’s knowledge of the 
same object (O2) come to correspond to one another is a matter of the intersubjective calibration of the 
semiotic processes. Such questions are, of course, at the heart of all social interaction but, as will be 
seen later, they can find particularly acute forms in settings like online dating advertisements in which 
the interactants are physically displaced from one another and may sometimes hold very different 
interests. 
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To return to the question of selection and sieving in online dating 
advertisements, it should be noted that the conscious choices made by 
writers of online dating advertisements in terms of what to reveal and how is 
merely one of the most apparent manifestations of agency. A wide range of 
semiotic processes can occupy the position of a sieving or selecting agent. For 
instance, various cultural norms and ontologies, including genre models and 
models of personhood, both enable and constrain particular forms of 
signifying and interpreting. Similarly, habitual and less conscious patterns of 
self-presentation that individual writers have developed shape the 
composition of their texts. Furthermore, the characteristics of the channel 
and the instrument that serve as infrastructure for the linguistic self-
presentation considerably sieve the range of possible object-sign and sign-
interpretant relations. As will be seen in more detail later, the fact that a 
digital text-artifact can only carry certain kinds of signs that can only be 
interpreted in certain ways will be of utmost importance to the social 
interaction they mediate. 
Finally, let us introduce a few more essential concepts that will be central 
later on. A reader who stumbles across an online dating advertisement on a 
dating forum text becomes, first of all, aware of the fact that some actual 
human individual exists out there, based on some very basic indices (such as 
the fact that someone has written and posted the text). Moreover, the reader 
can instantly project upon that individual some basic cultural default 
understandings of what persons generally speaking are like. Then, by 
interpreting whatever signs are perceivable for the reader in the text-artifact, 
he or she can project more specific kinds, such as social statuses, mental 
states, or physical characteristics, on that individual, gradually building a 
more specific interpretation of the person as a semiotic object. From a more 
general perspective, individuals, however, need not be human individuals 
and kinds need not be human kinds. A kind is any projected propensity to 
exhibit particular signs, or to “behave” in particular ways (and is, therefore, 
one type of ultimate interpretant). An individual is any relatively stable 
background (or, in some sense, a relatively enclosed object) on which more 
specific (and sometimes less stable and less enclosed) kinds can be projected 
as semiosis unfolds. As will be seen in 2.2, the text(-artifact) itself is an 
individual on which various kinds (such as the ascription of a particular 
genre) can be projected based on various indices. Those assumptions about 
indices, kinds, and individuals that enable the interpreting agent to perceive 
indices and to project kinds on individuals are called a semiotic ontology. 
(See Kockelman 2013a: 4–6, 54–56; 2013b.) The same signs can be read as 
indices of different kinds in light of different ontologies. For instance, the 
characteristics that are projected on writers based on the signs they exhibit in 
their texts depend considerably on the readers’ ontologies and can result in 
widely different interpretations, as will be seen in 4.2.  
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2.1.4 RESIDENCE IN THE WORLD 
As was mentioned previously, the notion of the semiotic constitution of 
reality covers both representations of the world and residence in the world. 
The term residence in the world refers to the relatively non-propositional 
processes by which humans interact with and make sense of the 
environments they are embedded in. More specifically, the aim of this section 
is to underline that residence in the world, too, is understood in terms of 
semiotic processes. Kockelman (2013a: 96–106) organizes residential 
processes into five constituents: affordance, instrument, action, role, and 
identity. They all have the triadic, web-like, processual, and distributed 
nature described above. Any knowledge of even basic natural kinds or 
material substances is based on the signs they exhibit and the interpretants 
we are able to produce through our interactions with them (including 
everyday perception as well as such complex cultural behaviors as physical or 
chemical analyses of them). Similarly, the affordances that such natural 
features provide and the instruments that such affordances can be 
incorporated into are semiotic processes. For instance, an instrument such as 
a hammer is a sign that can be appropriately interpreted by using it to hit a 
nail (and troped upon, or interpreted “incorrectly,” “illegally,” or “creatively” 
by throwing it at an unsympathetic opponent in an outburst of rage). The 
more interpretations there are for “hammers,” the more complex 
instruments they are. In a different framing, a hammer is an interpretant of 
its component signs, such as the affordance provided by steel and wood. 
Finally, we may note that the linguistic representations that denote objects 
such as hammers are symbolic instruments that can be used to coordinate 
and reflect on more practical manipulations of such objects.  
Online dating advertisements, too, are actor-wielded, affordance-heeding 
instruments that are used to undertake actions, to inhabit roles, and to fulfill 
identities – and not merely collections of linguistic representations. As an 
instrument they, for instance, make use of the affordance provided by space 
or distance to provide the function of “displaced” and “anonymous” 
communication. (Various other instruments and infrastructures, such as 
computers and network technology, are, of course, needed as well.) As will be 
seen later in the analyses, those residential processes that online dating 
advertisements are embedded in essentially affect the interpretation of the 
representations of the self and others that online dating advertisements 
carry. Representations of the world, then, are one particular, albeit often a 
particularly important, group of semiotic processes that already presupposes 
residential processes, such as actions and instruments. Meaning, in short, is 
not to be understood merely as “inner” representations of an “external” 
world. We objectify, signify, and interpret with all our behaviors and 
anticipate the effects of not just our representations but all our interactions 
with the physical and social world. That is, humans reside and comport 
within an interpretation of the world (Kockelman 2013a: 135).  
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2.1.5 DISTRIBUTED SEMIOSIS AND DIVISION OF LABOR 
A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale a me alienum puto) and 
then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, ‘You see, your faculty of 
language was localized in that lobe.’ No doubt it was; and so, if he had filched my 
inkstand, I should not have been able to continue my discussion until I had got 
another. Yea, the very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion 
is equally localized in my inkstand. 
(Peirce in CP 7.366 [1905].) 
This section explores the distributed nature of semiosis and, as its special 
case, the semiotic division of labor in and between communities, a notion 
particularly relevant for this study. The implications for questions of 
personhood will be further elaborated in section 2.3. Part of the anti-
Cartesian commitment of Peirce’s pragmatism was to go beyond dualist, 
mentalist, and individualist notions of “meaning” and “mind.”18 These 
notions were re-envisioned as distributed semiotic phenomena that emerge 
out of interactional processes. 
The problem with individualist and mentalist views that reduce 
“meaning” and “mind” (or intentionality) to states of individual brains or 
mental substances is, first of all, that they tend to neglect those mediating 
infrastructures and actual semiotic behaviors that give rise to experiences 
and knowledge of the world (including embodied infrastructures such as 
hands that provide perceptual information, perform cultural techniques, and 
wield various instruments). In the pragmatist view, all knowledge of either 
“inner” or “outer” realities is based on interactions with physical, cultural, 
and social environments.19 That is, humans experience, think, and exist 
                                                 
18 “Anti-Cartesian” should be understood as a shorthand for a critical revision and reformulation of 
certain ideas in the Cartesian tradition and not as a rejection thereof. According to Peirce, “Descartes 
marks the period when Philosophy put off childish things and began to be a conceited young man” (CP 
4.71; quoted in Anderson 2009: 154). Similarly, the fact that Peirce’s work in some regards was a 
critique of Kant, should not overcloud the fact that it was also based on and owed enormously to the 
Kantian tradition. In fact, Peirce regarded Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason as “perhaps, the greatest 
work of the human intellect” (quoted in Leaf 1989: 187). 
19 We could contrast this view with, for instance, Verhagen’s (2010: 1) crystallization of the 
principles of cognitive semantics: “A fundamental principle in cognitive linguistics is that semantics is, 
indeed, primarily cognitive and not a matter of relationships between language and the world (or truth 
conditions with respect to a model). [N]otions such as ‘perspective,’ ‘subjectivity,’ or ‘point of view’ – – 
capture aspects of conceptualization that cannot be sufficiently analyzed in terms of properties of the 
object of conceptualization.” In the pragmatist view, cognition itself is precisely an interactional 
relation between organisms and their environments. No object of conceptualization can have any 
properties (in Verhagen’s sense) independently of the interpreting agent. That is, no “objects” are 
simply out there. In that sense, agreeably, all meaning does indeed involve “subject[s] of 
conceptualization,” or agents of interpretation more generally. The “subject” itself, however, is a 
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mediated by other persons, environments, and instruments (see Skagestad 
1999; 2004; Wilce 2009a: 60; Kockelman 2013b: 48; cf. with Popper’s [1972] 
notion of “exosomatic organs”). Interactions with others and the use of 
artificed instruments (including “prosthetic” extensions of personhood, such 
as voodoo dolls or online dating advertisements) enable interactants, for 
instance, to make their signs last longer or travel further or to create more 
accurate, complex, or imaginative interpretations of them. Moreover, even 
relatively private representations or intentional states must cohere with 
others’ attitudes and cultural norms in order to be effective in social life. 
“Meaning” and “mind,” then, are embodied and embedded in environments, 
artifacts, and interactions as much as they are embrained (see Kockelman 
2006a: 3).  
Secondly, approaches that equate minds with those individual biological 
organisms in which minds are embodied and embrained during actual 
moments of cognitive or affective operation easily overlook the dimension of 
habit and continuity (see Colapietro 1989: 105). Minds exist to other minds 
and give rise to real effects in many ways independently of the biological 
epicenter (e.g., via the artifactual residues they have left behind; via others’ 
memories, anticipations, and imaginings of them; via the habits and attitudes 
they have given rise to in others). Persons as semiotic objects include 
dimensions other than whatever is going on in the biological organism at any 
particular moment. In a number of ways, persons can really be in many 
places at the same time (and even after the biological epicenter has ceased to 
exist). That is, minds and persons also reside in continuities of interactions, 
or in distributed webs of habit, on different time scales.20  
Minds and persons, then, are “species of semiosis” (Colapietro 1989: xx). 
Any semiotic process is distributed in interactions between objects, signs, 
and interpretants, which may be displaced to various degrees from one 
another in different points of spacetime and between different agents. 
Moreover, such processes rely on ontological assumptions and regimenting 
metaprocesses that are more or less culture-specific and community-specific. 
Consequently, all semiotic processes, intentionality and personhood 
included, can be theorized as infrastructurally and interactionally 
distributed (Kockelman 2013a; also 2006b: 112–117).  
                                                                                                                                          
complex and layered ensemble of interactional processes and agents. From a pragmatist standpoint, 
then, neither strict “language”-“world” (or cognition-world) nor “subject”-“object” dichotomies make 
sense. 
20 In Peircean metaphysical terms, one might say that individual persons and minds exist as much 
in the dimension of Thirdness (in continuities, generalities, and distributed habits) as they do in the 
dimension of Secondness (in particular events and actual embodied processes). Or, like Peirce himself, 
one might compare persons to words. Lexemes are only ever actually encountered through particular 
word-forms (or sinsign tokens), but their meaning essentially resides in the types (or legisigns) that 
gradually emerge out of complex chains of particular usages and interactions. (See Colapietro 1989: 
103; cf. also Gell 1998: 221–223.) 
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Meaning can be unevenly and unequally distributed in communities. 
Objects can be known at different grades of clearness by different agents, 
persons, communities, or generations (see Peirce 1955). The term linguistic 
division of labor (Putnam 1975) points to the fact that reference to objects by 
linguistic signs has a social patterning.  That is, denotational stereotypes and 
prototypes reside in the practices of different semiotic communities. There 
are, for instance, institutional practices of ratified experts with specialized 
skills and tools who have authority over and the last word on the truth (or 
correctness of reference) concerning a particular kind of object or a 
particular denoting expression (see Agha 2007a: 127; Carr 2010). This can be 
generalized to all kinds of semiotic processes and applies to “material” as well 
as “social” or “mental” kinds (see Kockelman 2013a: e.g. 72–73). In other 
words, experts can be goldsmiths or chemists as well as psychologists or 
judges.  
Divisions of labor also exist (1) between different genres of discourse (or 
any other practices) that make the same objects knowable in different but 
complementary ways and (2) between expert and lay users of any particular 
genre. Online dating, too, has its own experts. In addition to normative 
metadiscourses embodied in, for instance, online dating guidebooks (see 3.2 
and chapter 7), there are professional experts who offer commercial advice 
and ghostwriting services for online daters. The production of promotional 
personae and the mediation of social relations in online dating, then, are also 
linked to an economic division of labor. That is, they have become 
mediatized (see Agha 2012; also Irvine 1989). One such professional expert, 
whose services include “writing unique profiles to get you noticed” and 
“writing one-of-a-kind emails to get someone’s attention,” emphasizes in an 
article the importance of being the “real you” and “just being yourself,” 
because “that way, you know when someone shows interest, it’s because he or 
she likes the actual things you said” (Erika Ettin in Philly.com, January 29, 
2013). There is an interesting tension between the emphasis on being “real” 
and the suggestion that someone else should write your profile for you. 
According to the logic of such mediatized practices, professional experts 
know better what the “real” someone should look like, when shaped into a 
specific kind of text-artifact, than that someone herself. In light of such 
ontological assumptions, “realness” of a text-artifact (or the persona 
mediated by the text-artifact) does not require the person’s direct 
involvement with it (cf. with the requirement of indexical contact discussed 
at the beginning of chapter 1). The online dater merely serves as an 
authorizer (or a principle in Goffman’s terms), but the practical agency of 
composing the signs according to cultural models is relegated to experienced 
experts.21 (Where the “true self” is anchored and how the relation between a 
                                                 
21 It is also noteworthy that in these cases there is no explicit distinction between principals, 
authors (or ghostors), and animators in the text. They differ from expressions like “my friends call me 
X,” “I’ve been described as Y,” in which the source of represented speech is explicilty denoted. As will 
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person and a text is understood in different contexts are questions that will 
be returned to in chapter 7.) 
Much of meaning, then, ultimately relates to public and socially 
structured semiotic processes and is, therefore, inherently linked to 
questions of power and control. Since interpretants of even very private signs 
are often publicly perceivable, interpretable signs themselves, they can be 
regimented, even forcefully, by authorities (such as states, churches, or group 
pressures). Insofar as agents are capable of anticipating others’ 
interpretations and controlling their own semiotic behaviors, they can try to 
mask the kinds of signs and interpretants that would be considered non-
desirable or inappropriate and to feign ones that would be considered 
desirable or appropriate. One example particularly relevant to this study is 
biographic control, or individuals’ attempts to avoid and – if too late – to 
repress the publicity and circulation of information about themselves that 
might be considered stigmatizing by others (see Goffman 1990 [1963]). The 
other need not be an actual person or community. In Mead’s (1934) terms it 
can also be a generalized other that one has internalized in the form of, say, 
social norms or ego ideals (see also Piers & Singer 1971 [1953]). The 
distribution of meaning-making often involves a dialectic between processes 
that attempt to hide object-sign relations from interpreters (whether it is the 
workings of the superego or underground resistance movements, or a person 
trying to “save face” or “keep up appearances” in social interaction) and 
processes that attempt to uncover them (whether it is psychoanalysis or the 
Inquisition, or someone interpreting the “true self” behind an “embellished” 
dating advertisement) (see also Kockelman 2013a: 180). 
2.2 REFLEXIVE MODELS OF SEMIOTIC BEHAVIOR 
This section takes a closer look at reflexive models that guide the 
performance and interpretation of semiotic behavior. The main focus here 
will be on the notion of genre, which in many fields of study refers to the fact 
that people have the ability to interpret particular artifacts and events such as 
films, books, art performances, meetings, conversations, or digital text-
artifacts as tokens of general cultural types. Such models, then, bring 
regularity, predictability, and “sameness” or “similarity” to unique semiotic 
unfoldings in the social world. For instance, the fact that a number of diverse 
texts can all be recognized as instances of the type “online dating 
advertisement” or a number of individual persons as “online daters” relies on 
reflexive models of semiotic behavior. Such interpretive models provide 
stereotypic guidelines of human intentionality. They partake in event 
construal, in which interpersonal happening becomes interpreted as specific 
                                                                                                                                          
be seen later, such expressions are frequently used in online dating advertisements to give one’s 
descriptions an air of objectivity, disinterestedness, or reliability.  
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kinds of intersubjective events (see Silverstein 2003: 201; cf. Hymes 1972). 
This section first discusses the notions of genre and register and then 
generalizes the discussion towards ultimate interpretants and semiotic 
ontologies. 
2.2.1 GENRE, FORM, AND CONTEXT 
In discourse studies, a customary way to begin theoretical reflections upon 
the notion of genre is by referring to a bipartite history of studies that stems 
from a difference in the focus of analysis. Some traditions have had as their 
main point of interest the generic “form” of discourse (i.e., regularities in 
entextualized arrays of linguistic signs), some the “context” (i.e., regularities 
in indexical links between language use and types of speech events). Some 
have defined genres primarily as conventionalized and recurring forms and 
structures, some as context-specific language-mediated social actions. (Cf. 
e.g. Hasan 1985; Miller 1984; Swales 1990; Bhatia 2004.)22 Regardless of 
whether such commonly repeated divisions accurately reflect any actual 
tradition of genre studies, one of the genuine effects of such a dichotomy is 
that the relation between “form” and “context” and the theorization thereof 
may easily fall out of sight. As for the formal structure of text-artifacts, it is 
evident that many genres are highly conventionalized ― but certainly not all, 
online dating advertisements being one example (see also Nieminen 2010). 
But what exactly is the place of “form” in the ontology of genre?  
Bauman (2004: 3; 2000: 84) starts off his discussion of genre by 
characterizing it as a “constellation of systematically related, co-occurent 
formal features and structures that serves as a conventionalized orienting 
framework for the production and reception of discourse.” He later continues 
(2004: 4): 
  
The invocation of generic framing devices … carry with them sets of expectations 
concerning the further unfolding of the discourse, indexing other texts … These 
expectations constitute a framework for entextualization …  
 
Formal features and structures per se, then, are of secondary interest to 
Bauman compared to what they “carry with them.” That is, genre is 
understood as an inherently indexical phenomenon. The “framing devices” 
that the respondent recognizes as “generic” point to other texts and signal 
that the text in question is to be interpreted in a more or less similar way as 
those other texts. A generic construal, then, can be characterized as 
“indexical functional interdiscursivity” (Nieminen 2010: 201), as it allows for 
                                                 
22 Such reflexive models have also been called, for instance, activity types (e.g., Levinson 1992 
[1979]). Moreover, types of events are often further divided into more fine-grained episodic structures 
described in terms of units such as moves and steps (e.g. Swales 1990), sequences (e.g. Hasan 1985), or 
adjacency pairs (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974). 
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a particular text to be interpreted as having a functional similarity with a 
tradition or type of previous texts. In other words, the interactants of 
semiotic communities interpret individual texts in light of various indexical 
stereotypes that link individual texts with general circumstances (e.g., typical 
environments, actions, roles, and intended consequences on different time 
scales). The ascription of genre to an interactional event yields 
interpretations and projects expectations that are far more specific and 
robust than without any genre ascription (if such a scenario is even 
conceivable in actuality).23 Therefore, such generic models contribute to the 
intersubjective co-ordination of events to the extent they are shared by 
participants. 
Linguistic genres, such as online dating advertisements, model relations 
between linguistic activities and surrounding environments. They involve (1) 
a stereotype of some discursive pattern or artifact to be performed or 
interpreted and (2) a stereotype of associated social relations and practical 
consequences. That is, linguistic genres model appropriate and effective links 
between residential and representational processes (or interactional and 
denotational texts; see Silverstein 2003). Interactants can adopt such models 
either by abstracting them from particular instances they have encountered 
over the course of their interactional histories or by learning them directly as 
normative general models (e.g., during their educational curriculum). The 
models, then, consist of decontextualized, or stereotypic, knowledge about a 
variety of interactional and semiotic dimensions of the type of event in 
question (see e.g. Nieminen 2010 for an analysis of such dimensions). From 
the standpoint of discourse performance, the decontextualized genre model 
becomes recontextualized in a particular actual interactional event. From the 
standpoint of discourse interpretation, a particular interactional event 
becomes contextualized as an instance of the decontextualized general 
model. (See Bauman & Briggs 1990.) The explicit linguistic “framing devices” 
mentioned by Bauman are merely one example of the kinds of indices that 
can point to particular genre models. Any aspects of the ongoing event, 
whether in the text or in the context (e.g., social roles, physical location, 
interdiscursive positioning, or preceding interactional history), may serve as 
such indices for the interactants. For instance, even formally or 
denotationally highly unprototypical online dating advertisements are easily 
                                                 
23 A text such as a film review or a dating advertisement is perfectly understandable on many levels 
for someone who has never encountered or heard of one before and is therefore incapable of 
interpreting the text as a “film review” or a “dating advertisement” but otherwise has a sufficient 
linguistic and cultural competence. Those who are familiar with the genre have, however, a better grasp 
of, for instance, who the writers and readers most likely are in terms of social statuses and intentions, 
what the necesseray prerequisites and possible consequences of such texts are, how such texts are 
typically structured, whether the particular token is appropriate or typical, how such texts are related 
to other texts and events. That is, genre knowledge provides a much more detailed understanding of 
the interactional structure of the event and of its relation to different social and semiotic processes. 
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recognizable as instances of the genre based on their semiotic context 
(including, for instance, the obvious fact that one has intentionally entered a 
dating service and performed a search for dating profiles). 
Furthermore, particular texts are always more than instances of general 
types, and particular texts should not be reduced to their genre 
“membership” alone. According to Bauman (2000: 85): 
  
[T]he fit between a particular text and the generic model – or other tokens of the generic 
type – is never perfect. Emergent elements of here-and-now contextualization inevitably 
enter into the discursive process. 
 
That is, there will inevitably be intertextual gaps between general models (or 
decontextualized stereotypes) and particular instances. The indexed genre 
model is merely an interpretative resource in light of which the particular 
text can be interpreted in the here-and-now. Any actual interpretation of a 
text is the result of an interplay between different reflexive models and the 
emergent elements of the particular event. If genres are understood as 
reflexive models, then no text inherently “belongs to” a genre. The indexical 
link between genre models and particular texts is an interpretive and 
interactional achievement.24 Accordingly, interactants may not agree at all on 
generic interpretations or may gradually or suddenly switch from one 
interpretation to another (e.g. when reading April Fools; see the discussion of 
ontological transformativity in 2.2.3). Interactants may also differ in terms of 
how fine-grained supra-genres or sub-genres they are able distinguish. 
Moreover, the same text can index two or more generic models or may not 
seem like a very typical instance of any model, thereby yielding various 
hybrid, mixed, or gradient interpretations (see e.g. Bhatia 2004; Solin 2006; 
Mäntynen & Shore 2014; cf. Agha 1997a; 2007a: 245–265). In fact, it has 
been suggested that different genres differ in terms of their tendencies 
towards creativity versus fidelity to tradition and in terms of the explicitness 
or implicitness of their anchoring to a specific genre (see Briggs & Bauman 
1992; Urban 2001). For instance, commercial advertisements, the 
prototypical promotional genre, sometimes aim at being “unique” or 
“innovative” and at masking their persuasive nature by exhibiting a minimal 
resemblance (or a maximal intertextual gap) with other advertisements (see 
e.g. Halmari & Virtanen 2005; Östman 2005.)   
                                                 
24 One example is the process of data collection, which is usually based on a combination of explicit 
scientific criteria and the intuitions of the researchers as speakers of a language and members of a 
culture. Such settings easily lead to reified notions of genre(s), as it is easy to overlook the inherent 
reflexivity of generic interpretations. 
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2.2.2 REGISTERS AND SOCIAL PERSONAE 
A close kin to genre is register. The mutual division of labor between these 
two concepts has been settled quite differently in different traditions. (For an 
entirely different kind of approach, see e.g. Hasan 1985 or Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2004.) In Agha’s account (2007a: e.g. 55, 80–81), registers are 
reflexive models of conduct that link repertoires of performable linguistic 
and non-linguistic signs to stereotypic images of personhood and social 
relations for some community of interpreters that recognizes the link. 
Registers, then, are stereotypes of social indexicality. They emerge in 
sociohistorical processes of enregisterment that regroup sets of behavioral 
signs under stereotypes of personhood. A register comprises a set of 
enregistered emblems, i.e., signs that convey stereotypic images of persons 
(e.g., “educated,” “female,” or “leftist”). Three elements are involved: 1) a 
perceivable sign, or diacritic, 2) a social persona, or an icon of personhood, 
that the sign is connected to, and 3) a social domain, or the community for 
whom the sign has an emblematic function. (Ibid., p. 235–236.) 
The linguistic diacritics that give rise to register interpretations and 
persona ascriptions need not necessarily be visible or audible linguistic 
forms, such as word forms, morpho-syntactic constructions, or phonetic 
patterns, per se. The representational contents denoted by tokens of symbols 
may equally serve as diacritics. Agha (2007a: 235, original italics) notes as 
follows: 
 
Important though they are, objects of sense perception are not the only kinds of 
perceivable things that have emblematic functions; things denoted by objects of sense 
perception can also have such functions. … [U]tterances make the things they denote 
present or palpable as objects of cognition.  
 
To evoke stereotypic social personae, the writers of online dating 
advertisements can, then, resort to particular linguistic forms as diacritics in 
their performances (e.g., dialectal or colloquial forms) or use various role 
designators to denote diacritics. Role designators include (1) nouns that 
denote types of social entities, (2) verbal or adjectival descriptions of 
attributes and behaviors of persons (e.g., appearance, habitual actions, or 
emotional patterns), and (3) a variety of discursive patterns that organize 
such descriptions (see Agha 2007a: 249; also chapters 4–6). Such 
designators are linked to each other through stereotypes of personhood, and 
one usually enables inferences about the others. That is, role names are 
revealing of stereotypic characteristics and descriptions of characteristics 
index nameable stereotypic roles. (See Agha 2007a: 246–249; Agha 2011a: 
29; also section 5.4.) In the context of online dating advertisements, it is 
particularly important to note the fact that denotational patterns can become 
enregistered. We can, for instance, recognize social types such as those 
“(egoistic) people who love to talk about and praise themselves” or those 
“(annoying) parents who only ever talk about their children” regardless of the 
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specific linguistic and discursive patterns they compose. In other words, 
diacritics can be linguistic signs or interpretants of linguistic signs, whether 
affective, energetic, or representational, and a person can be interpreted 
based on the signs she animates or based on the signs she is the object or 
interpreter of. Moreover, a speaker can impose persona readings on co-
present or absent others by denoting them as figures in her own speech. 
In Agha (2007a), with its main emphasis on social relations, the term 
“genre” is only used in a non-technical sense to refer to the formal patterning 
of denotational text. However, many kinds of register phenomena, such as 
the enregisterment of denotational patterns mentioned above, come close to 
our previous discussion of genre. When we recognize a text-artifact as a “film 
review,” we recognize segments of text as instances of “film reviewing” (an 
enregistered denotational pattern) and we recognize the one doing the 
reviewing as a “film reviewer” (an enregistered social type). There seems to 
be a general tendency to use the term “register” when approaching social 
indexicality from the standpoint of types of actors, whereas “genre” focuses 
on types of activity per se. Since action and actors can only be separated 
conceptually, there is an obvious overlap between the two concepts. Any 
stereotype of action includes some default values for the actors as well. 
Genres might, therefore, be viewed as more complex models that incorporate 
an interactional frame of participation and the tasks of producing and 
receiving some artifactual end product, which, in the case of linguistic 
genres, usually embodies a specific kind of denotational text.25 Different 
instances of the same genre may, then, be performed with different register 
values or personae (see also Goffman 1990 [1959]: 37). That is, we may 
recognize, say, “intellectual and objective-analytical film critics” as opposed 
to more “egocentric and subjective-evaluative film reviewers” performing the 
same task. Also, a genre perspective with its focus on the organization of the 
activity itself draws attention to the wider practices and intertextual relations 
in which genres are embedded (e.g., how discourse is recontextualized from 
different sources, rhetorically designed in view of particular audiences and 
linguistically structured and formulated in light of particular ideologies as 
part of professional practices that produce, for example, a “film review”; and 
how, subsequently, the “film review” becomes circulated in society, 
embedded in other practices, and replicated in other texts, such as film 
advertisements). The distinction between register and genre, then, is 
practically useful in many settings. For the purposes of this study, it is, 
however, equally useful to see the underlying similarities between such 
reflexive models. 
                                                 
25 An instance of register-based interpretation, in contrast, may be as “simple” as seeing a passer-
by in the street wearing a particular kind of clothing and inferring that the person is a “foreigner” or a 
“Hasidic Jew.” No mutual reflexive awareness of this encounter or any coordinated pattern of linguistic 
behaviour needs to take place. 
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2.2.3 SEMIOTIC ONTOLOGIES AND ULTIMATE INTERPRETANTS 
As we concluded in the previous discussion, genre and register can be 
understood as two specific kinds of conceptualizations of reflexive models. A 
reflexive model allows interactants to recognize some particular sign (e.g., an 
attribute or behavior of a person; a speech act or a linguistic artifact) that is 
present in an event as a token of a general type. Such recognition allows the 
interactants to interpret the event in light of general stereotypes (e.g., a type 
of activity or a type of person) and to expect it to further unfold in particular 
ways. Calling a particular reflexive model enregistered refers to that fact that 
it has become recognized by, or the habit of, a larger community (regardless 
of how consciously aware interpreters happen to be of such interpretive 
processes) (Agha 2007a: 185–188; see also Daniel 1984: 25; Sapir 1985 
[1927]).26 From the standpoint of the recognizability of genres and registers, 
such reflexive models are stereotypes of indexicality (or indexical legisigns) 
(see Agha 2007a; Nieminen 2010). That is, they tell us that when a particular 
set of signs is perceived, some general icon (e.g., an image of personhood or a 
diagrammatic structure of denotational text) pertains to the ongoing event. 
From a wider cultural standpoint, genres and registers have the nature of 
symbols. They are general signs that create links between objects and signs 
(or kinds and indices; behaviors and their consequences) that would not exist 
independently of the community of interpreters and are not based solely on 
inherent qualities or relations of co-occurence. Rather, the precise logic that 
links particular kinds of linguistic behaviors with, for instance, particular 
intentions or social statuses grows out of symbolically motivated and 
regimented sociohistorical processes. Such symbolic processes organize and 
regroup iconic qualities and indexical relations (or embodied and embedded 
behaviors) in ways that cohere with other cultural practices, beliefs, and 
values. Consequently, genres and registers can be detached from their actual 
usages in events in which they have a “particularizing-indexical” function 
(Agha 2011c: 173) and discussed and reasoned about as general cultural types 
(e.g., in everyday conversations, in educational contexts, in the media, in 
guidebooks and manuals for writers; see chapter 7).  
In the general semiotic terms introduced in section 2.1, reflexive models 
involve particular kinds of semiotic ontologies, or sets of assumptions, that 
enable an agent to perceive indices and to project kinds on individuals. That 
is, interactants scan environments, persons, and activities for cumulating 
indices that lead to interpretations such as “this is a film review,” “that 
person is angry at me,” or “this is not to be taken literally” and coordinate 
their behaviors accordingly. Individuals, then, can be animate persons or 
inanimate artifacts. Indices may be any kinds of perceivable and 
interpretable signs evinced by persons or their artifacts. Kinds are ultimate 
                                                 
26 A process of interpretation can, for example, be relatively intuitive, in which case an interpreter 
only experiences the results of a semiotic process without being particularly aware of the signs 
interpreted. 
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interpretants, or projected propensities to behave semiotically in particular 
ways, that are used to make sense of events and to anticipate their future 
unfolding. Ultimate interpretants will stand until there are sufficient grounds 
for change. The notion of ontological transformativity refers to such 
changes in relations between individuals, kinds, indices, and agents’ 
assumptions (Kockelman 2013b). As an illustration, let us consider the 
parasitic genre of April Fools (see e.g. Visakko & Voutilainen 2012). April 
Fools are text-artifacts that can be kinded in two quite different ways with 
very different kinds of consequences and expectations. Most readers would 
begin interpreting such a text as, say, a news article. Eventually, some of the 
readers would pick up the cues intentionally left by the writer and come to 
the realization that the text is, in fact, not a news article but supposed to be 
interpreted in light of an entirely different kind of model. The gradual 
accumulation of indices would lead to a new interpretation of both the nature 
of the text-artifact and the social statuses of the participants. In other words, 
the agent’s ontological assumptions about the kinds that constitute the 
individuals in question would be transformed. Similar general principles 
apply for all the kinds examined in this study, such as chronotopes (see 4.3) 
and the emotions, moods, intentions, beliefs, or other mental states of 
interactants (see e.g. 4.2, 5.4, 6.4).27 As will be seen in chapters 4 and 7, 
different agents often orient to different indices and project different kinds 
on the text-artifact and its writer. The coherence of semiotic objects, 
including persons and selves, then, is socially fragmented and often requires 
active efforts of maintenance (such as anticipating non-desirable 
interpretations; see chapters 5 and 6). 
2.3 PERSONHOOD, SELFHOOD, AND IDENTITY 
As we noted in our previous discussion of agency (2.1.3), individuals are 
often not very precise or useful analytical units. This section further clarifies 
the constituent processes of human individuals, insofar as they relate to the 
concerns of this study. This section is also meant to elaborate and flesh out 
our initial discussion of personhood as an interactionally and 
                                                 
27 In more specific semiotic (and less psychologizing) terms, a “mental state” (e.g., a belief, a 
perception, or an intention) may be seen as an intentional status (as a specific kind of ultimate 
interpretant or embodied sign) that is projected by intentional roles (signs indicative of someone’s 
intentional status) and intentional attitudes (responses that attribute or ascribe an intentional status to 
someone). Having a mental state in the psychological sense means a self-attributed epistemic 
commitment (belief), empirical commitment (perception), or practical commitment (intention). Such 
commitments are self-controlled propensities to signify and interpret in ways that conform or cohere 
with a specific intentional status (or kind). (See Kockelman 2006b.) We may see from the above 
discussion (and from later discussions and analyses) that genres and registers, as relatively complex 
kinds of cultural ontologies, combine and coordinate both social and intentional statuses. 
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infrastructurally distributed semiotic process (2.1.5). In particular, the aim is 
to understand subjectivity, selfhood, and identity in relation to language and 
personhood. An additional aim of this discussion is to point out that a 
contrast between individuality and sociality is essentially misconceived (see 
also Mead 1934: 201–203) and that individuals emerge out of sociohistorical 
and interactional processes. 
2.3.1 PERSONS AS PRECIPITATES OF INTERACTIONAL PROCESSES 
The premise in this section is that individuals only exist as ontology-specific 
framings that reify and enclose what, in different framings, would appear as 
sets of relatively coherent but radically distributed processes.28 In this 
relative sense, various forms of “individuality” and “identity” already exist at 
the biochemical level of the human organism. Each organism has, for 
instance, a DNA pattern that reflects a particular lineage and, for most 
organisms, is unique to a certain degree. It has also been noted that the 
human immune system functions as a semiotic sieve that is to some extent 
capable of distinguishing the “self” (as a particular organism) from “others” 
(as organisms, objects, or environments distinct from the self). (See e.g. 
Sebeok 1988, 1989: vii; Wilce 2003.) From a developmental perspective, it 
has been suggested that humans only gradually begin to understand 
themselves as individual personified wholes. This realization is inherently 
linked with a progressively increasing capacity to interact with one’s physical 
environments (e.g., by using one’s extensions, such as limbs, organs of 
perception, and tools, to discover one’s boundaries in brute indexical 
contacts with the resistance of the world) and a gradually increasing capacity 
to interact with others, to take into account the perspective of the other, and 
to understand others in terms of intentionality (see also 4.2). In such 
interactions one discovers that others’ testimonies and knowledge will often 
correspond better with one’s experience than one’s own and that one’s 
desires and intentions will often be denied by others. (See e.g. Colapietro 
1989: 69–75; Kockelman 2006b: 83–86; also Dewey 2005 [1934]: 62.) The 
individual, then, emerges as the locus of frustration, ignorance, and error as 
much as that of knowledge and intention (“I err, therefore I am”). This 
(mis)representational capacity of a person (or, more generally, the capacity 
to fail to cohere) will be referred to as subjectivity (see Kockelman 2006a; 
2006b: 108–109; 2013a: 142). The development of subjectivity means that 
one learns to distinguish between more private and more public semiotic 
realms. What is noteworthy is that such distinctions are the result of 
                                                 
28 Since most of the constituent processes that make up an individual involve the environment as 
much as they involve the organism, separating the two is only a particular framing or ontologization. 
When it is useful or necessary to emphasize the inseparability of (the constituents of) the organism 
from (the constituents of) the environment, one may use, for instance, the term envorganism (coined 
by contraction and concatenation from env-ironment and organism) (Kockelman 2013a: 19). 
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interactional processes in which others function as interpretants of the self. 
That is, the roots (or conditions) and the fruits (or consequences) of 
individuality are outside individuals and selves are socially organized (see 
also Mead 1934: 164–168 and section 2.3.2). 
Subjectivity and intersubjectivity can be seen as inverse framings. One 
gradually realizes oneself both as a subject (as partially different, with a 
differing perspective) and as an intersubject (as partially similar, with an 
overlapping perspective). If the mind is understood as a distributed semiotic 
process (see 2.1.5) not localizable in individuals alone, then one may say that 
in those processes in which selves and others are mutually entangled as co-
interpreters, there is a fusing of minds into commind (EP 2: 477–478; cf. also 
Duranti 2010). That is, intersubjectivity can be seen as partially 
corresponding experiential worlds based on joint semiotic processes and 
shared ontologies (including genres, registers, and other cultural stereotypes; 
see 2.2). Kockelman (2005: 253) distinguishes three degrees of 
intersubjectivity. In the first degree, a self stands in relation to an object in a 
way that corresponds to how an alter (or an other that is intersubjectively 
linked with a self) stands in relation to it. There is a mere correspondence of 
interpretation (e.g., as the result of cultural, biographic, or biological 
similarities), of which the interactants may not be consciously aware. On the 
second level, a self stands in relation to an object on the one hand, and to an 
alter on the other, in a way that makes the alter stand in relation to the 
object in a way that corresponds to how the self stands in relation to it. The 
alter’s relation to the object is caused by the self’s relation to it (e.g., through 
joint attention), whether the self is aware of the fact or not. That is, there is 
causality in addition to correspondence. Finally, on the third level, a self is 
committed to making an alter stand in relation to an object in a way that 
corresponds with and is caused by the self’s relation to it. In other words, 
there is correspondence, cause, and commitment. In the third degree of 
intersubjectivity, the interactants have a reflexive awareness of an achieved 
or attempted correspondence of interpretation, often mediated by linguistic 
symbols and cultural knowledge. Intersubjectivity, then, is closely 
interlocked with selfhood as the capacity to care for others’ interpretations 
(see also 2.3.2) and with the adoption of cultural instruments, roles, and 
traditions (see Kockelman 2006b: 86; also 2.2 and 2.3.3;). 
We can conclude from the above that persons are both shaped by others 
and shape others in more or less conscious and committed ways in 
interactional encounters on different time scales. They learn to step into the 
role of the other and to act in ways that relate to others’ attitudes. In Mead’s 
classic formulation, selfhood is conceptualized from two perspectives, as the 
I-self and the Me-self. The I-self is the creative and more or less conscious 
epicenter of the individual that acts socially and reacts to others’ attitudes. In 
semiotic terms, the I-self is the self as expressing signs (or indices) to others. 
The Me-self is the self as having taken into account, or having internalized, 
others’ organized attitudes, or others’ regimenting interpretants of one’s 
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signs (or kinds). (Mead 1934: 174–175; Kockelman 2013a: 89–90; see also 
5.4.) This model, in some sense, conceptualizes persons both as “subjects” of 
semiosis (the I-self) and as objects of semiosis (the Me-self) (see Singer 1984: 
59–61). Persons gradually acquire habits of thought, behavior, and emotion 
in relation to generalized others and their anticipated interpretations.29 They 
learn to inhabit a range of personae, each of which is committed to giving rise 
to or avoiding specific kinds of interpretations from specific kinds of others. 
Such modes of personhood have been classified in a variety of ways in 
different traditions. Distinctions have been made between, for instance, 
ought, actual, and ideal selves (Higgins 1987); feared, real, and ideal selves 
(Wallace & Fogelson 1965: 380–383); true (qua psychologically existing), 
actual (qua socially expressed), and ideal or possible selves (Rogers 1951; see 
also Bargh et. al. 2002); real and possible selves (Markus & Nurius 1986). It 
is to this kind of field that “self-promotion” and the “promotional persona,” 
too, relate. 
In the social lives of individuals, wide ranges of interactional events give 
rise to wide ranges of interpretations of personhood and selfhood. Some turn 
out to be ephemeral and scatter in spacetime and vanish from memories, but 
others live on and become internalized, habitualized, and embodied by 
interactants in different ways. This is what is meant by the fact that persons 
and selves as semiotic objects are precipitates, or accumulating and 
transforming end products, of distributed semiotic processes. Such processes 
are subject to all the forms of organization, regimentation, and division of 
labor that human interactions in general are subject to. On the sociohistorical 
scale, some conventional types of events aim at perpetuating accumulated 
interpretations of personhood (e.g., rituals of solidarity or professional 
performances that maintain expert statuses), whereas others aim at 
ontological transformativity (e.g., performative or “baptismal” events of 
various types, whether official, such as weddings or sentencings, or 
mundane, such as first dates or break-ups). On individual biographic scales, 
some “landmark” events will turn out to be more central than others and 
some persons will prove more consequential as interpreters of the self than 
others. Emergent and unforeseen successions of events can push persons 
onto unexpected new biographic trajectories, and some such trajectories may 
be entirely out of the individual’s control (e.g., being labeled as an “enemy” 
                                                 
29 The term generalized other refers to an individual’s assumptions about the organized responses 
of others (see Mead 1934: 154–164). Such assumptions are based on direct experiences and particular 
responses of particular others that have been further analyzed, organized, and generalized over time 
(id., p. 158). The generalized other is the “attitude of the whole community” (id., p. 154) or a “reflection 
of the general systematic pattern of social or group behaviour” (id., p. 158) that “enters as a 
determining factor into the individual’s thinking” (id., p. 155). It is an individual’s capacity to take the 
attitudes of others toward himself or herself, toward one another, and toward common social activities. 
Such a capacity enables individuals to coordinate their behaviors in light of all the different roles and 
goals at play, or the presumed rules of the entire social “game.” 
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by some hostile other or a “disruptive” or “disabled” problem child by 
professional experts). (See e.g. Mehan 1996; Silverstein 2003; Haviland 
2005; Wortham 2005.). Online dating advertisements represent one fraction 
of such complex processes. The task of the online dater is both (1) to organize 
and to communicate an understanding of herself or himself as a person to 
others and (2) to negotiate social relations and compatibility with anticipated 
and imagined others. Such tasks may transform, reorganize, or perpetuate 
the person as a semiotic object. Each semiotic encounter between online 
daters both presupposes a set of pre-existing interpretations accumulated on 
biographic time scales and entails new interpretations on the interactional 
time scale. The encounter itself is regimented by a variety of norms and 
ontologies formed over sociohistorical time scales (see section 2.3.3). 
However, what is specific about online dating advertisements as compared to 
many other types of encounters is the high degree of control writers have. It 
explicitly brings forward the attempts of selves to care for the signs they 
compose and the interpretations they give rise to in others.  
2.3.2 SELFHOOD AS CARING FOR AND COHERENCE 
Selfhood refers to the reflexive capacity of persons as interpreting agents to 
care for the semiotic processes that they are involved in and that they become 
accountable for (Kockelman 2006a; 2013a: 171–199). The notion of caring 
for involves both agency and affect.30 Selves, first of all, react affectively to 
                                                 
30 The terms affect, emotion, feeling (as well as attitude, desire, mood etc.) have been used in 
widely differing ways in existing literature. A common – and commonly criticized – dividing line is 
often drawn between what is considered “natural” (or “universal,” “biological”) and what is considered 
“cultural.” Such distinctions are often difficult to maintain and sometimes beside the point. It has 
become somewhat clear that culture, for instance, shapes neurological and physiological patterns (or 
the causes of affect) (see e.g. Wilce 2003). Moreover, affects are never experienced in isolation but the 
ways in which they are responded to shape their manifestation. That is, affects are always caught up in 
reflexive semiosis and cultural epistemic formations. They cannot be reduced to their biological causes 
but can hardly be understood without reference to them either. Keeping these caveats in mind, there 
seems to be a relatively cross-cultural (or species-specific) basic set of bodily signs, such as excitement, 
joy, anger, grief, or shame. In this study, these are called affects (cf. affective interpretants, see section 
2.1.1 and Kockelman 2005; 2013a: 64–65). In semiotic terms, affective unfoldings (Kockelman 2013a: 
177–182) are any semiotic processes that incorporate affective interpretants in some way relevant for 
some specific framing (since, arguably, all human processes involve some degree of affect). Emotion 
can be used to refer more specifically to the culturally theorized, complexly performed, and 
intersubjectively shared types of responses to affect (e.g., expressing or repressing; dealing with, 
reveling in, masking, feigning, invoking; attributing to others; evaluating and linking with morality and 
causality). (See Kockelman 2006a: 114–117; Wilce 2009a: 8–9, 28–30.) There can, then, be expression 
of emotion without a corresponding affect, as in the case of faking joy over others’ success (although 
eventually simulation may lead to affect). Finally, any affective unfolding can itself become the object 
of another affective unfolding (”emotions about emotions,” e.g., shame about experiencing desire). 
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the unfolding of the semiotic processes they are entangled in. One may desire 
a particular outcome and, therefore, be pleased with an unfolding that is 
coherent with one’s desire or enraged by a contrary one (cf. also Wilce 
2009a: 10, 110, 116–117, 122–123). Secondly, depending on the type of 
semiotic process, selves may have more or less flexibility (or practical and 
theoretical agency) in relation to such processes. Selves may, then, strive to 
signify and interpret in ways that maintain the coherence of such processes. 
One may care for one’s kinds (e.g., social statuses, personae, and relations; 
mental states and moods; bodily attributes), one’s possessions (e.g., 
instruments or artifacts; achieved prestige statuses or acquired knowledge), 
and significant others (e.g., friends and family; opponents and enemies). 
Selves, in all, consist of those objects that are reflexively cared for. As 
clarified in previous sections, such objects are projections from the semiotic 
and interactional processes that one is involved in and held accountable for. 
Ultimately, then, one cares for others’ recognizing and regimenting 
interpretants (see Kockelman 2013a: 193). If others’ interpretants of one’s 
signs do not correspond with the interpretation one has committed to (e.g., 
when trying to be an “intellectual” one gets interpreted as a “wannabe”; or 
when one falls short of the biographic ideals set by generalized others by 
lacking a “successful career” or a “wild youth”), selves may respond with 
emotions (e.g., shame, sadness, and ultimately a raging desire to try harder) 
and agentive repairs (e.g., studying harder, refining one’s performances, 
seeking new experiences or better employers; or simply justifying to oneself 
why others are wrong). Selfhood, then, is understood as ensembles of 
semiotic processes the reflexive coherence of which is being cared for 
(Kockelman 2013a: 176). 
Selfhood is closely related to the notion of identity. It follows from the 
previous discussions that identity cannot be understood in terms of static, 
reified labels and that strict dichotomies between personal and social 
identities are untenable. In Agha’s (2007a: 233–277; also 1996) discussion, 
for instance, identity points to the entire relational field of social-indexical 
processes in which images of personhood become claimed by, attached to, 
and detached from persons. Kockelman (2013a), in turn, theorizes identity as 
a complex type of residence in the world. Identity refers to a metaprocess 
that reflexively organizes other residential processes (such as actions and 
roles) and their coherences. Identity involves some self as an ensemble of 
constituents (kinds, residential and representational processes, or patterns of 
life) that is being reflexively cared for and that is identifiable as the same 
across contexts and may be enclosed as an individual and contrasted with 
other individuals (see Kockelman 2013a: 130; cf. also section 2.1.5). When 
the constituents, or patterns of life, of a self (as signs) become interpreted in 
light of, for example, affects, traditions, cultural norms, stereotypes, 
prototypes, others’ patterns of life, or any other evaluative techniques (as 
interpretants), value (as an object) results. Value organizes social worlds and 
patterns of life from the standpoint of a self in terms of relative desirability 
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(e.g., whether what just happened was good or bad; whether it is more 
important to be “happy” or “successful”; whether there is even a difference 
between the two; whether one is content with remaining a “linguist” or 
anxious to become an “anthropologist”; whether one hates or likes being 
regarded as “serious”; whether one’s dear friend should take it or leave it; 
whether their lifestyle is an insult to ours; whether one prefers city life or the 
countryside, solitariness or sociality, jazz or blues, etc.). That is, value serves 
to reflexively organize persons into relatively coherent wholes (see 
Kockelman 2013a: 129–131, 172).  
Identity, then, is a process of existential rationality that consists of the 
evaluation of complex patterns of life in terms of desirability and coherence. 
Identity allows persons to head towards or away from particular positions in 
social and semiotic worlds based on value (for Kockelman’s elaborate 
metaphor of travelers, terrains, places, maps, contours, and paths, see 2013a: 
183–199). Values may be expressed by a wide variety of signs, such as the 
combinations of roles one performs, the plans one plots, the intentions one 
holds, the courses of action one chooses. Online dating advertisements only 
capture a tiny fragment of identity, but they illustrate interestingly a 
particular set of conditions under which persons in an explicit discursive 
manner express their values (or those social and intentional statuses that 
cohere with their values) and care for their constituents.    
2.3.3 CULTURAL ONTOLOGIES AND METADISCOURSES OF 
PERSONHOOD 
This section further discusses the role of cultural understandings in the 
formation of persons, subjects, and selves. In 2.3.1 we noted that subjectivity 
develops in embodied contacts with the social and physical environments one 
is embedded in. Such indexical self-awareness is, however, guided by and 
“infused with a specific cultural understanding” (Urban & Lee 1989: 6). In 
fact, even the most elementary kinds of physical techniques and social 
contacts are regimented by cultural ideologies (see e.g. Sapir 1985 [1927]; 
Mauss 1973 [1935]). For instance, the German “Black pedagogy,” which was 
introduced in the 1930s and spread to many countries, including Finland, 
advised parents to refrain from all unnecessary physical contact with or 
attention to their children in order to raise good, independent citizens 
(Kinnunen 2013: 60–61), effectively erasing an entire perceptual channel 
from the toolbox of intersubjective contacts and limiting knowledge of 
persons to visual and auditory signs. Furthermore, it is well documented how 
the notion of psychological individualism gradually developed and took over 
in Europe with massive consequences (see Dumont 1986; Danziger 2012: 
67–68; also Wilce 2009a: 140–143, 159–161). Whereas many cultures 
recognize negative forms of interpersonal isolation, such as “aloneness” or 
“loneliness,” it has been suggested that it may be peculiarly characteristic of 
the Western world to place high value on positively evaluated variants, such 
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as “solitude” or “privacy” (e.g. Daniel 1989: 75–76). Ideas and experiences of 
intersubjective separateness and distance (cf. section 7.3), then, in part stem 
from cultural understandings. On sociohistorical time scales, both folk and 
scientific theories and ideologies as well as their political and practical 
implications enable and constrain particular practices of human sociality, 
models of personhood, and ranges of conceivable identities. 
Such symbolic ontologies become embodied and disseminated in cultural 
metadiscourses (see Urban & Lee 1989; Agha 2007a: 151; Wilce 2009a: 168–
169; 182–183). Mauss (1985 [1938]) in his classic article charts the 
emergence of the Western individualistic conception of the self in a narrative 
that runs through, for example, traditional totemic clans, Etruscan and 
Roman mask (Lat. persona) societies, Roman legal discourse, Stoic ethics, 
Christian metaphysics, and finally Western philosophy and psychology. En 
route, Mauss gives vivid illustrations of the fragmentary nature of the 
process. Different constituents of persons were differentially and 
hierarchically given meanings and regimented culturally in terms of agency, 
ownership, and accountability. For instance, in the case of slavery, having a 
soul did not immediately entail ownership of one’s own body: “[I]f the serfs 
did not possess their body, they already had a soul, which Christianity had 
given them” (Mauss 1985 [1938]: 17). Having a soul, though, did not yet 
mean a unique individuality in the modern Western sense (see Danziger 
2012: 67–68). Even though Mauss’s narrative has been considered somewhat 
straightforward and lacking in conceptual clarity (see e.g. Carrithers 1985), it 
clearly shows the importance of sociohistorically developing and 
spatiotemporally circulating cultural metadiscourses for the evolution of 
forms of personhood.  
Urban and Lee (1989) distinguish two archetypes of cultural 
metadiscourse according to whether the focus is on the self or on relations 
with others. “Therapeutic” (or self-to-self) discourses have as their goal the 
interpretation of the experience of selfhood. “Legal” (or self-to-other) 
discourses, in contrast, deal with problems related to others. That is, 
different genres of discourse interpret and regiment personhood, selfhood, 
and subjectivity in different ways (Urban & Lee 1989: 7; Lee 1997b: 10; also 
Wilce 2009a: 168–171). The main data of this study, online dating 
advertisements, is itself a form of metadiscourse of personhood with both 
“therapeutic” and “legal” aspects. It interprets and organizes experiences of 
personhood and selfhood in terms of “self-promotion” (see chapters 4–5) 
and sieves others into “ideal” and “non-ideal” respondents (see chapter 6). 
Moreover, such a metadiscourse of personhood is itself “legally” regimented 
by further metadiscourses, such as online dating guidebooks or Internet 
discussions (see chapter 7).  
Online dating advertisements, as a genre that incorporates a particular set 
of ontologies and practices, then, are both a regimenting metadiscourse of 
personhood and regimented by other metadiscourses of personhood. From 
the standpoint of an individual, online dating advertisements are also a form 
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of biography, and autobiography in particular. If we understand biography 
very broadly as any kind of mediation or “recording” of a person’s life and if 
we understand “life” as the total cumulative trace of a person, then most 
biographies are highly fragmentary. The better and the more comprehensive 
a set of biographies is, the more it asymptotically converges with “life.” In 
this kind of framing biography is sociohistory calibrated to particular 
individuals. The ways in which social life can be organized into individual 
biography is itself a complex semiotic process that is subject to many forms 
of regimentation. In fact, autobiography itself as self-produced and 
individual-centered narrative may be a relatively modern practice.31 As a 
model of autobiography online dating advertisements offer a considerable 
degree of biographic control. In the confines of an online dating 
advertisement, one can creatively select biographic contents and project the 
kind of coherence on the totality of one’s life that might otherwise meet with 
opposition or counterclaims from others. However, that may not be an easy 
task for all. As we have seen, it is our habits, which usually require no active 
efforts of planning or executing, that keep us together and make up the 
foundation of our identity by ensuring our recognizability and coherence over 
time to ourselves and others. In online dating advertisements one’s 
embodied habits of residence in the world are not of much use. Nothing ends 
up in your advertisement unless you write it there. Online dating 
advertisements, then, force writers into an autobiographic reflection, 
particularly if they have not yet developed strong habits of autobiographic 
self-representation. 
2.3.4 SEMIOTIC TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF  
Many cultural practices, religious or therapeutic ones, for instance, function 
as technologies of the self (Foucault 2001: 1623–1632; Wilce 2009a: 154–
157) that are used to transform selves and identities. Many of such symbolic 
technologies are discursive in nature, whether specialized ones such as 
                                                 
31 It has been suggested that (auto)biography, as we now know it, is a relatively modern 
phenomenon, taking root from the 1700s onwards. Earlier works centering upon particular individuals 
would present those persons as examplars of moral virtues or as contributors to a collective history. 
The modern autobiography, however, is based on the idea that an individual life is unique and the 
defining characteristic of a person. It is usually implied that the coherence of a life is specifically of a 
narrative kind, i.e., a story in which the individual self is the main character. (See Danziger 2012: 71–
72 and the references therein; also Giddens 1991: 76 and the references therein.) The emergence of the 
new autobiographical genre seems to coincide with similar individualist changes in other cultural 
practices, such as marketing and design. It has been proposed that collective ideals of design were first 
abandoned around the 1760s, when potters began to design products for specific market segments. 
Promotional practices linked such products with images of personhood (wealth and class in particular) 
and formulated them into social indexicals that could be used as means of persona performance and 
social differentiation. (See Wernick 1991; Agha 2011a; cf. also Dewey 2005 [1934]: 8.)  
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“talking cures” or “confessions” of various kinds (or silent retreats for that 
matter) or everyday ones such as particular conversational genres of 
narrative (see e.g. Wortham & Gadsden 2006). In section 2.3.1, we already 
noted how discursive practices can change individual selves and biographic 
trajectories for better or for worse (see e.g. Mehan 1996; Wortham 2005; also 
Wilce 2009a: e.g. 87–105). That is, habitual discursive practices are 
important means of evaluating and interpreting behaviors and experiences 
and serve as sources of “positive” or “negative” value.  From the standpoint of 
individuals – who are caught in a riptide of sociohistorical and cultural 
forces, personal habits acquired on biographic time scales, and conscious 
agency – such tehnologies can even be used as instruments to purposefully 
transform one’s habits, to adapt to new environments, or to create coherence 
in one’s life, as part of a “project of the self” (Giddens 1991: 75). 
The effects can extend as far as the biological infrastructure of the person. 
For instance, the term experience-dependent neuroplasticity has been used 
to refer to the ways in which neuronal patterns are redirected and reshaped 
according to the experiences of the organism (LeDoux 2003; also Kandel 
1998; Thompson & Varela 2001; James 1950 [1890]: 104–127). Although 
many experiences are largely constituted by factors outside of individuals’ 
control, there is a window for what has been called “self-directed 
neuroplasticity,” in which language may play an important part (Schwartz 
2003; Hanson 2013: 14–15), That is, by systematically shaping one’s 
experience and its affective tones in the here-and-now through self-control of 
one’s semiotic behaviors, one may gradually guide the habitual basis of one’s 
experience into new directions. Whereas individuals usually have relatively 
little control over the occurrence of affect on interactional time scales, by 
minding one’s responses to affect it is possible to some extent reshape the 
habitual basis of affect on biographical time scales (see also the discussion of 
ontological inertia in 8.2.2). A lot of attention has been given to the human 
“negativity bias,” or the tendency to attend to and rely on negative rather 
than positive information (e.g. Vaish, Grossman & Woodward 2008), and its 
implications for human well-being (e.g. Hanson & Mendius 2009). 
Evaluative models of personhood and habits of evaluation and stancetaking, 
then, are particularly important from the standpoint of such social and 
psychological realities. Online dating advertisements, as a biographic 
instrument with a marked focus on evaluative stancetaking, offer one kind of 
viewpoint on such processes. Our modelings and theorizings of persons and 
lives constantly serve as maps for future paths. Therefore, it is important to 
understand such cultural practices that produce representations, evaluations, 
and reinterpretations of selves and others (including the kinds of “norms” 
and “self-knowledge” that self-help guides of various sorts peddle). Such 
practices, however virtual, fictional, or innocent at first, can easily prove self-
actualizing in the autopoiesis of selfhood. That is, life grows from biography. 
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
Chapter 3 first applies the theoretical framework presented in the previous 
chapters to the object of research. That is, it elaborates the perspective from 
which online dating advertisements are examined in this study. It then 
presents a set of more specific empirical research questions (3.1) and the data 
(3.2) of the study. This study approaches the online dating advertisement 
genre as an instrument of personhood that mediates specific kinds of identity 
performances in intersubjective interaction. Online dating advertisements 
take part in the patterning of social reality on multiple levels. They function 
as a sieve that sifts social reality into categories such as “desirable” or “ideal” 
and “undesirable” or “non-ideal” in multiple ways. Writers and readers as 
agents use them to select for “desirable” and “ideal” forms of personhood and 
social relations. (See also Kockelman 2013b.) Such effects of sieving and 
selection are based on (1) the features of the infrastructure (i.e., a digital 
writing-based artifact linking two “anonymous” and spatiotemporally 
displaced participants, only enabling the performance of particular kinds of 
signs), (2) the semiotic ontologies that guide the processes of interpretation 
(e.g., various reflexive models, stereotypes, and ideologies of discourse and 
personhood), and (3) the more personal interests and values of the particular 
agents involved. The aim of this study is to examine the semiotic organization 
of such processes in online dating advertisements. 
First of all, the writers’ own constituents of personhood become sorted 
out in the process. That is, of all the biographic potential and of all the signs 
that could be used to mediate them, the infrastructure of the interaction 
merely enables a particular subset. Furthermore, as conscious yet habit-
driven creatures the writers are usually willing and able to make public only a 
particular subset of their “signs of the self” (e.g., what they, in light of their 
interests and ontologies, think others would consider “desirable” in light of 
their respective interests and ontologies). To the extent that writers are self-
aware and self-presentationally competent, they can exert agency over what 
becomes mediated within the confines of the infrastructure. In fact, they 
must have a minimal level of self-awareness and self-presentational capacity 
in order to exist at all to the reader. In the absence of bodily signs, whatever 
the writers wish to communicate about themselves has to be translated into 
linguistic utterances, textual patterns, and symbolic propositions – besides 
relatively simple visual signs, such as outward appearance, that can be 
communicated via pictures. In that sense, then, online dating advertisements 
are a highly theoretical form of self-presentation. They rely on the writers’ 
theoretical agency, or capacity to describe and reason about their lives. 
Secondly, online dating advertisements sieve respondents into different 
types (as figures in the text) and groups (as actual respondents). The reader 
will both interpret the writer as a person (e.g., whether he seems “desirable” 
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or not) and herself as a person from the writer’s standpoint (e.g., whether she 
fits his criteria of “desirable” persons). Finally, it is up to the reader to select 
an appropriate course of action. That is, if she experiences “compatibility” 
she may instigate a further semiotic encounter, whereas in the absence of 
“compatibility” she may refrain from doing so. 
The semiotic ontologies that this study is particularly interested in include 
both reflexive models of discourse and reflexive models of personhood. More 
specifically, the focus is on their mutual relation, the ways in which writing-
based textual artifacts mediate forms of personhood. The fact that “online 
dating advertisements” are a recognizable genre means that there are 
stereotypes that pertain to different aspects of such events and encounters. 
Particular texts are, to varying degrees, produced and interpreted in light of 
such stereotypic models. It is not, however, assumed that genre models are 
unitary or that any actual text would straightforwardly or unproblematically 
“belong to” a certain genre. In fact, it is one of the goals of this study to 
examine (a) to what extent generic models seem to converge between 
semiotic communities and to what extent they are fragmented and (b) to 
what extent they are complied with and to what extent “disobeyed” by actual 
writers of actual texts. 
The notion of “self-promotion” is itself a relatively vague designation that 
is understood differently by different interactants both as a concept and in 
relation to the online dating advertisement genre (e.g., it may be regarded as 
more or less constitutive of the type of discourse). There is, however, a strong 
stereotypic link between dating advertisements and “self-promotion” both in 
research and culturally (see e.g., Coupland 1996; Bhatia 2004; Muikku-
Werner 2009; also chapter 7). Other terms, such as the “marketing of the 
self,” are also used to refer to more or less similar phenomena. The 
assumption this study builds on is that such designations point to stereotypes 
of selection and sieving – which are not unitary or shared by all semiotic 
communities or interactants. That is, “self-promotion” is understood in 
terms of reflexive models that some participants orient to. The goal of this 
study is to examine the more specific nature of such models and how they 
manifest themselves in social interaction. 
“Self-promotion” as a notion implies a particular kind of relation between 
processes of selfhood and forms of discourse. In this study, the notion will be 
approached broadly and loosely as an orientation towards a distinction 
between relatively more “ideal” semiotic personae (e.g., controlled, imagined, 
wished-for, virtually modeled, or tentative versions of the self) and relatively 
more “real” ones (e.g., actual, confirmed, or intersubjectively recognized 
ones) in specific interactional settings. The terms “ideal” and “real” are not 
meant as a reifying dichotomy but as umbrella terms for the various kinds of 
layered, relative, and processual distinctions that emerge in social 
interaction. That is, the empirical analyses in this study aim to illuminate the 
kinds of actual discursive phenomena in online dating practices that the 
notion of “self-promotion” can be calibrated to. Moreover, the relationship of 
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“self-promotion” to (other) ideological, or even religious concepts, such as 
the “commodification of the self,” “(in)authenticity,” or “uniqueness” (see e.g. 
Coupland 1996; Keane 2002; Shoaps 2002; Dutton 2009; Agha 2011a), is 
seen as an empirical question in this study. 
“Self-promotion” as idealization,32 then, involves practical agency. The 
writers as selves can control the expression of signs in their text-artifacts and 
compose sign-object relations in light of their ontologies and interests. That 
is, they can shape their discursive artifacts so as to give rise to “ideal” 
interpretants and to avoid “non-ideal” ones. “Self-promotion” in the online 
dating advertisements in the data of this study also essentially involves 
theoretical agency, since the central means of the presentation of self and 
others are linguistic representations that thematize and characterize other 
semiotic processes in other semiotic modes and reason about them. In sum, 
within the confines of the infrastructural limitations, writers have a relatively 
considerable degree of flexibility (practical and theoretical agency) in the 
advertisement event (nth). They are at liberty to inhabit a “promotional 
persona.”33 They will, however, be held accountable for that persona in 
subsequent events (n+1th and so forth), insofar as such events are ever 
actualized. The anticipation of subsequent events, then, is an essential part of 
self-presentation in online dating advertisements, and the interplay of 
flexibility and accountability will be at the heart of the perspective adopted in 
this study.34 
                                                 
32 For Goffman (1990 [1959]: 72), idealization is one of the general features of all self-
presentational performances: “An idealized impression is offered by accentuating some facts and 
concealing others.” The task undertaken in the online dating advertisement genre could, then, be seen 
as an exceptionally marked and salient form of a more or less ubiquitous process, namely, the 
idealization of one’s identity (or the control and selectivity exercised in all semiotic performances). 
33 In other words, according to the hypothesis of this study, the “promotional persona” is a larger-
scale model of personhood (see Agha 2011c) that smaller-scale models can be fitted into. That is, any 
number of more specific kinds of sociocultural and personal identities can be idealized according to 
similar principles. Models of personhood on different scales interact and may become embedded in 
many ways. In fact, the kind of “fractionated” selfhood (ibid.) that the “promotional persona” 
presupposes is itself an even larger-scale model. The very fact that one may possess and inhabit a 
variety of more or less self-fashioned or self-selected personae – instead of one’s social life being 
determined by, say, profession, caste, gender, or kinship status – and that some of those personae may 
be idealized in particular ways is in itself a sociohistorically specific form of personhood. 
34 One traditional dividing line that has been drawn strictly and persistently in some traditions of 
discourse studies is that between the “real” writer of the text and the writer as a textual “construct,” an 
inscription or a figure within the text or a projection from the structure of the text. Tellingly, in the 
study of spoken language, in which the focus is on artifacts shaped out of light or air that do not run 
very far from the interactants that produced them, no such dualist distinction seems to prevail. In the 
approach adopted in this study, persons as interpreted based on their written artifacts and persons as 
interpreted based on their bodily signals or phonetic signs, or any other signs for that matter, are 
equally “real.” How different interpretations interact and (in)cohere in social life is a matter of 
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3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
STUDY 
Online dating advertisements were chosen as the empirical object of this 
study because of the prominence of the presentation of self in them. They 
were also considered a particularly interesting type of discourse from the 
standpoint of idealized selfhood and personhood (cf. Wallace & Fogelson 
1965; Markus & Nurius 1985). Both traditional printed dating advertisements 
(see e.g. Muikku-Werner 2009; also Östman 1999) and online dating 
advertisements have been studied in many fields of studies and in many 
languages (see e.g. Lawson & Leck 2006; Whitty 2008; Holappa 2011, 2014). 
Studies that have paid attention to actual language use will be of particular 
relevance for this study. Moreover, online dating and online communication 
in general as practices have been studied extensively in communication 
studies, psychology, and social studies (e.g., Kerr & Hiltz 1982; Turkle 1995; 
Coupland 1996; Gerlander & Takala 1997; Hardey 2002; Bargh et. al 2002; 
Whitty 2008). However, their focus tends to be on macrostructures, 
channels, media practices, or relationship formation in general – not so 
much on questions of intersubjective interaction or personhood per se. There 
also seems to be a tendency towards quantitative or questionnaire-based 
research. Analysis of the range of actual semiotic behaviors and the cultural 
ontologies they are based on is the main concern of this study. For instance, 
Lea & Spears (1995: 208) note that the relative absence or suspension of 
embodied emblems of, for example, gender, age, or physical disabilities in 
online communication can have an empowering effect on persons. To fully 
understand such effects of the “disembodied” (see Hardey 2002) nature of 
online communication in any particular phase, they need to be considered in 
light of actual interactions and cultural models and in relation to antecedent 
and subsequent interactions, or chains of semiotic encounters. 
Printed dating advertisements and online dating advertisements share 
many features and might be regrouped in the same “colony” of genres (see 
Bhatia 2004). Printed dating advertisements might also be regarded as an 
                                                                                                                                          
empirical investigation. Furthermore, the interpretation of fictive characters and live human beings is 
essentially similar in many ways. For instance, reading “fictional” and “real” minds are essentially 
based on similar semiotic principles. That is, they are particular instances of the general principle of 
kinding (or the “theory of mind” or “ethnopsychology”). (See Kockelman 2013a: e.g. 72–74, 137; cf. e.g. 
Leech & Short 1981: 188; Semino 2007.) Seeing the underlying similarities between fictive and living 
characters, rather than the obvious differences, is particularly relevant for the kind of data used in this 
study. Firstly, the writers often aestheticize their self-presentational performances by recontextualizing 
elements of literary fiction or popular culture in their own texts in order to produce particular modes of 
subjectivity (see e.g. 4.2 and 6.3.3). Secondly, until a face-to-face encounter has taken place, the 
interactants only exist to one another as personae mediated by textual-semiotic performances. In fact, 
in the online dating phase it usually has not even been confirmed with certainty that the other persona 
actually corresponds to some biographic individual and is not a fake or a fiction. 
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“antecedent genre” for online dating advertisements either in the 
sociohistorical sense (Jamieson 1975) or in the biographic sense (Devitt 
2004) of the concept. The differences, however, are equally notable. The fact 
that printed advertisements are very limited in terms of length, and may also 
be charged based on character count, makes them an entirely different kind 
of object from the standpoint of the questions this study is interested in. 
Printed advertisements may also be more easily subject to normative 
regimentation by the editorial staff of newspapers. In sum, the degree of 
flexibility of an online dater is considerably higher than that of a traditional 
dater. 
This study examines from four different perspectives how “ideal” 
personae and social relations are mediated semiotically and interactionally in 
online dating advertisements and how such processes are reflexively 
interpreted and evaluated by interactants. Chapter 4 focuses on the kinds of 
“characteristics” that are mediated by online dating advertisements on 
different levels of semiosis. Or, to put it another way, chapter 4 approaches 
textual patterns as indices that project kinds on individuals (see 2.1.3). A 
specific emphasis will be on how different patterns differ in terms of 
interpretability and idealization. The chapter will discuss the micro-level 
mediation of spacetime and “views of consciousness” or “mind styles.” The 
“views of consciousness” are examined in light of both textual analysis and 
questionnaire data (see 3.2). The latter part of the chapter (4.4) starts off by 
examining the linguistic presentation of self and others as a form of 
theoretical agency in relation to other semiotic modes and charts the kinds of 
recurring textual patterns (such as taxonomies and narratives) that online 
dating advertisements in the data consist of.  
Chapter 5 takes on the question of evaluative stancetaking and its role in 
online dating advertisements and in the idealization of personhood. The 
chapter contrasts a few salient but maximally differing patterns of 
stancetaking and examines the kinds of metapragmatic cues that are 
indicative of the writers’ own understandings and ontologies concerning 
their evaluative stancetaking behaviors. A particular focus is on matters of 
polarity (“positive” versus “negative”), which will be linked to the notions of 
metastance relations and discursive agency (i.e., animators, authors, and 
principals). The chapter takes a critical and empirical stance towards the 
relationship between “promotional” discourses and “saying positive things,” 
which has sometimes been taken for granted (cf. e.g. Bhatia 2004). 
Chapter 6 delves into patterns of addressivity. It examines how the 
patterns discussed in chapters 4 and 5 are mapped onto frames of 
participation. Since usually only particular subsets of readers will be 
recognized as ideal interactants, the aim of the chapter is to analyze how 
writers select for addressees and attempt to control ensuing interactions.  
Chapter 7 looks at cultural metadiscourses that consist of explicitated 
opinions, experiences, ideological positions, or normative models concerning 
online dating advertisements. The focus is on the kinds of semiotic ontologies 
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or assumptions about the relation between personhood and language use 
that such metadiscourses embody. That is, the point is to see how the 
persona performances in online dating advertisements are supposed to be 
interpreted and evaluated according to publicly disseminated cultural 
discourses, such as online dating guidebooks or Internet discussions. In 
earlier research on interpersonal communication on the Internet, Gerlander 
& Takala (1997), for instance, drew attention to contradictory assessments 
about the nature of the interpersonal contact mediated by e-mail. Some 
informants found it “faceless,” “formal,” and “distant,” but others found it 
“intimate” and “informal” (see also Whitty 2008). Also, it was pointed out 
long ago that simplistic stereotypic views according to which online 
communication is harmful to “real,” “genuine,” or “authentic” interaction 
only occur in particular contexts and particular communities (see Kerr & 
Hiltz 1982). Similar contrasts appear in the context of online dating. Chapter 
7 examines, in semiotic, interactional, and context-sensitive terms, what 
precisely it is that, for some communities, makes a particular kind of 
intersubjective contact, for example, “distant” or “intimate,” “authentic” or 
“inauthentic,” or “reliable” or “unreliable” and how it might affect the 
interpretation of such encounters. Although the metadiscourse data 
examined in chapter 7 is not directly (i.e., causally or sequentially) linked to 
the advertisements in the data or the questionnaire, it is nevertheless a 
relevant viewpoint on the production and interpretation of personhood and 
the patterns discussed in chapters 4, 5, and 6. As there are ontologies and 
processes that do not become public in the actual online dating contexts but 
tend to remain private or repressed, it is necessary to look at more detached 
and decontextualized rationalizations and normative generalizations of those 
primary processes (see 3.2 for a more detailed discussion). That is, the 
external metadiscourses can be seen both as sources of normative 
interpretation and as “backstages,” in which things that have to be held back 
during the performances can be expressed (see Goffman 1990 [1959]: 114, 
129). 
In a sense, then, the perspectives of the chapters move from the writer 
and the event of writing towards the direction of the readers (both as figures 
and respondents) and response events and further towards subsequent 
events of general cultural theorization and reflection. Finally, chapter 8 
discusses the findings of the analyses, reflects on their theoretical 
implications, and concludes the study.  
3.2 DATA 
Although the goal of this study is not an ethnographic analysis of self-
presentation or courtship behavior in any specific ethnographic or 
demographic segment or group – but rather the analysis of a more general 
social and cultural process of idealization of personhood – the ideal is to 
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locate such interactional processes, linguistic structures, and their circulation 
socioculturally as accurately as possible (cf. Agha 2007a: 12–13). Differences 
between different semiotic communities will be taken into account at least in 
general conceptual terms. The analyses of the entextualized sign patterns in 
the text-artifacts are contrasted and complemented with meanings given by 
actual people of various statuses and standings. Their accounts come both in 
solicited (questionnaire data) and in spontaneous forms (the writers’ own 
metapragmatic commentaries; external metadiscourses on the Internet, 
online dating guidebooks, television programs).35 That is, apart from the 
questionnaire, the “informants” observed in this study are not individuable 
persons but, rather, personae on the Internet – or highly mediatized 
personae of actual, individuable persons, such as authors or celebrities. In a 
sense, the informants are much like the object of study itself. 
The empirical part of this study is based on three main sets of data. This 
section describes the different sets of data and justifies their use and mutual 
division of labor. 
 
1. Advertisement text data 
 
The primary data consists of 111 Finnish-language online dating 
advertisements that were collected from two different online dating services 
in 2007.36 The data sources were: 
  
1) Deitti.net, an Internet service maintained by City magazine, and 
2) Match.com, the Finnish version of a multinational dating service. 
 
The first service was directed at young urban adults, whereas the second one 
had a wider geographical and age range. The advertisements in the data were 
collected from four different categories: 1) men seeking women, 2) women 
seeking men, 3) women seeking women and 3) men seeking men. The 
majority of the data belongs to the first two categories, since these were the 
most voluminous on the sites as well. The exact ethnographic segmentation 
of the writers is not a priority in this study. The age range, sex, and sexual 
orientation of the writer is mentioned explicitly only when it is particularly 
relevant for the analysis and is not obvious from the quoted text-segment 
itself. 
                                                 
35 Perhaps this study could have even taken up Swales’s (1998: 1) term textography, by which he 
meant ”something more than a disembodied textual or discoursal analysis, but something less than a 
full ethnographic account,” in the context of the study of situated academic writing. 
36 This set of data was originally collected (by the author of this study as a research assistant) for 
the project “Contexts of Subordination” (2007–2010) as part of a larger multi-genre corpus. The same 
data has, therefore, been used in other studies too, although for quite different kinds of purposes (see 
Visapää, Kalliokoski & Sorva 2014). 
Research design and data 
66 
Only the free text sections of the profiles were systematically analyzed in 
this study. That is, the other parts of the profiles, pictures and standard 
questions, were excluded from the data.37 The advertisement text data set 
contains about 2,010 sentences and 22,260 words. Contrary to traditional 
printed newspaper dating advertisements, there is virtually no limit on the 
length of the texts. The longest ones consist of about 70 sentences. In terms 
of length and structure, they seem in some ways more reminiscent of 
recorded oral dating messages (see Coupland 1996) than of newspaper dating 
advertisements (see e.g. Muikku-Werner 2009). 
As for ethics and privacy, three kinds of questions have been considered 
in relation to these personal yet semi-publicly circulated and anonymous 
texts (cf. Bex 1996: 154): How to protect the privacy of the writers? Who 
holds the authors’ rights to these texts, morally and juridically (i.e., the 
writers versus the owners of the dating forums)? How to honor the authors’ 
rights, while preserving the right to academic study? First of all, the texts are 
only quoted in this study to the degree necessary. With the exception of the 
three texts used in the questionnaire (see below and chapter 4), entire texts 
have not been reproduced. As an additional precaution, the pseudonyms of 
the writers are always dealt with separately from the texts. Moreover, by the 
time this study is published, the texts will be about eight years old and the 
possibility of recognizing individual writers is low to begin with. 
 
2.  Questionnaire data 
 
To compare the researcher’s analyses to others’ interpretations, a 
questionnaire was held in 2014 for a group of respondents that consisted of 
27 university students (of which 23 identified as female, 3 as male, and 1 did 
not answer the question) aged 19–49 taking a course in Finnish discourse 
studies. The questionnaire (see Appendix 2), based on an earlier pilot study 
and focus group experimentation, was mainly meant to elicit actual examples 
of more “subjective” layers of interpretation that might be described as “mind 
styles” or “views of subjectivity” (see 4.2). 
The respondents were presented with three different texts and were asked 
to describe up to three different “impressions” (vaikutelma) that each text 
gave rise to and to justify them with language-related or contextual reasons. 
                                                 
37 At the time when the data was collected, pictures were already frequent in dating profiles. The 
exclusion of the pictures from this study is not meant to downplay their importance in matching and 
courtship – or in the semiotic process of interpreting persons. However, the analysis of pictures alone, 
and particularly in conjunction with the writing, would require a project of its own. Pictures were taken 
into account whenever they proved relevant for the analysis of patterns of writing. Similarly, the 
division of labor between the optional standard questions and the free texts as well as any explicit 
references to or overlap with the standard questions in the free texts were taken into account in the 
analyses when necessary. The specific focus of interest of this study, then, is only on self-initiated 
linguistic performances in the free text section. 
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They were also encouraged to underline or otherwise mark relevant segments 
in the text. The form of the answers was not further specified (although the 
instruction “name the impression,” for example, perhaps projects an NP 
more strongly than a clause). In the instructions, the respondents were 
further advised to focus on impressions of the “frames of mind” of the 
writers, for example, by describing what the “atmosphere in the text is like” 
or how features of the text express the “train of thought or emotional states” 
of the writer. The point of these instructions was to lightly steer the 
responses towards “mind styles” and to avoid, for instance, biographic 
speculations and other advanced inferences. 
The suggested time to be used on one text was about five minutes. In 
total, the group had about 20 minutes. As predicted, some finished even 
earlier, and a few had to rush through the last answers. The point of the time 
limit was not to give too much time in order to avoid “overinterpretation” 
(i.e., highly inferential interpetations based on minute details), to keep the 
focus on the most intuitively salient impressions, and to elicit interpretations 
based more on the unfolding of the textual structure rather than the 
denotational contents of the text.38  
As will be seen in section 4.2, the questionnaire showed interesting 
patterns of convergence and fractionation in the interpretations. The 
advantages of the particular group of respondents include the fact that it was 
relatively coherent in terms of age as well as educational and socioeconomic 
background. Furthermore, language students might be somewhat more 
competent than the average in reflecting on and reporting their 
interpretations. At the same time it seems that they might tend towards more 
normative and evaluative approaches, although this probably is a very 
general feature of contexts in which people have the opportunity to 
anonymously assess anonymous others – which, incidentally (but not co-
incidentally), is also a marked characteristic of online dating. 
   
3. External metadiscourse data  
 
The third set of data consists of (1) two online dating guidebooks and one 
more general lifestyle guide with sections on online dating, (2) a variety of 
Internet discussions, newspaper articles, and other writings, including dating 
site rules, regulations, and advertisements, and (3) a segment of a popular 
television program (see also Data sources). The guidebooks and the television 
program were chosen on the basis of both their topicality and estimated 
popularity and circulation at the time of their publication and their relevance 
                                                 
38 In retrospect, the time could have been slightly longer. Moreover, in spite of the instructions, 
some of the answers were relatively far-fetched speculations about the writers’ personal histories or 
intentions – perhaps an inevitable part of these types of interpretative processes. 
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for the research questions.39 Data gathering on the Internet, however, can 
rarely be very systematic. The aim was to find writings that seemed to draw 
attention and rouse active discussion and that more or less explicitly dealt 
with actual semiotic behavior, language use, or interpersonal interaction. The 
Internet-based part of the external metadiscourse data, then, is an 
opportunistic sample that is meant to explore the breadth of ideas about and 
conflicts over online dating advertisements. Only those parts of the external 
metadiscourse that deal with the relation between language and personhood 
have been analyzed in the study. 
The external metadiscourse data tends to talk about online dating 
advertisements as a type. These metadiscourses typically draw from past 
experiences of many people as well as popular conceptions concerning the 
object-discourse. Online dating guidebooks and dating service rules, and 
sometimes feature articles, offer generalized, more or less normative, and 
more rationally justified instructions and models that are supposed to guide 
interactants in the task. Some of the guidebooks do include genuine 
examples of advertisements or elicited accounts of actual online dating 
experiences. Likewise, some of the Internet discussions deal with actual, 
particular experiences, even including actual replies from actual 
respondents. Still, these particular instances tend to be treated as examples 
of general tendencies.  
In a sense, this sort of data might be seen as the more or less far removed 
roots and fruits of actual online dating advertisements along various lines of 
semiotic chains (see Agha 2007a: 67–69, 205). That is, they may be framed 
both as late-stage generalizations, rationalizations, narrativizations, and 
normatizations of past experiences and as general models, norms, and 
examples that orient to future experiences in early stages of the process. They 
may serve as pathways in or as pathways out of the actual encounter 
mediated by the advertisement and may transform the ontologies that shape 
the actual encounter. The discursive events that immediately precede an 
online dating advertisement (e.g., drafts, discussions with others, using 
others’ advertisements as actual models) or follow it (e.g., e-mails or 
messages exchanged through the online dating site between writers and 
respondents) would certainly be interesting as data. They, however, tend to 
be highly personal and less readily available as data. Furthermore, their 
circulation is usually limited to a small number of people. The actual 
                                                 
39 Specific details were, however, difficult to obtain. One of the guidebooks (SK), for instance, drew 
considerable attention in the media, as it was written by a female semi-celebrity TV reporter. Media 
attention, of course, is no guarantee of high sales figures or numbers of readers. As for the television 
program (Parittomat, “The Pairless”), no accurate details on the particular episode were available, but 
the opening episode of the series, which was broadcast a few weeks earlier (40/2012), was among the 
top 20 most popular television programs of that week on that channel (YLE TV1), with an estimate of 
297,000 viewers and a wider reach of 451,000 persons. 
(Finnpanel, www.finnpanel.fi/tulokset/tv/vko/top/2012/40/yle1.html [Nov 1, 2012]). 
 69 
published advertisements, on the other hand, are accessible to anyone who 
registers at the website and whose path of selectivity (e.g., choice of dating 
site, search criteria) happens to cross them. Dating guidebooks and television 
programs as mass media commodities are available to an even larger 
audience but require a particular pattern of consumption (e.g., the purchase 
of a book or watching television at a particular time). Various Internet 
discussions are easily accessible and relatively permanently available. The 
composition of the data might, then, be further justified by the fact that it 
comprises such public phases of the process (others’ advertisements, 
guidebooks, rules and regulations, Internet discussions, mass mediated 
artifacts) that serve, for many, as normative reference points or as the 
starting point of their genre competence.40 
                                                 
40 Supplementary sources of information that were taken advantage of at various stages of the 
study include: a number of newer profiles on a variety of other dating sites, comparing online dating 
advertisements with similar profile-based sites used to instigate different kinds of social relations (e.g., 
Couchsurfing) and experimenting personally with advertisement writing and profile composition. 
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4 ENTEXTUALIZING SELVES AND OTHERS  
Erinomainen keino tutustua naisiin... hieman, kun näkee vaivaa on helppo erottua 
tavanomaisen tasapaksuista profiileista ja tehdä itsestään mielenkiintoisen (tai no 
eipä tarvii tehdä, jos on ;) )... 
An excellent way to get to know women… by taking a little trouble it is easy to 
stand out from the usual monotonous profiles and make yourself interesting (well 
no need to do this, if you already are ;) )… 
Kake (IS Oct 17, 2012) 
The focus of the next three chapters will be on the different ways in which 
personhood is metasemiotically interpreted, communicated, and controlled 
via online dating advertisement text-artifacts. This chapter first explores how 
the characteristics of selves and others are entextualized (see section 1.2) in 
online dating advertisements and what “promotionality” might mean in that 
process. The analyses examine how persons become knowable as semiotic 
objects to selves and others mediated by different kinds of textual sign 
patterns. In other words, this chapter focuses on the textual patterning and 
organization of biographic contents in genre-specific ways in the 
advertisements. Chapter 5 will take a more specific look at evaluative 
stancetaking, and chapter 6 will examine how such textual patterns are 
addressed to others. 
Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter are more conceptually driven. They sketch 
the range and dimensions of the textual mediation of personhood via online 
dating advertisements from different standpoints. These perspectives are 
motivated by the general theoretical approach of this study. Section 1 takes 
on the notion of distributed personhood and clarifies how persons, in a 
sense, split up into different semiotic processes, such as “performed” and 
“described” characteristics, that mediate different kinds of encounters and 
require different kinds of interpretations from others. Sections 2 and 3 take a 
closer look at one part of such processes: the mediation of first-person “views 
of subjectivity” or “mind styles” and the mediation of spacetime in the 
advertisement texts. Section 4 then delves deeper into the data and presents 
some of the recurring textual patterns of self-presentation. That is, section 4 
classifies such patterns of usage that embody in different combinations the 
possibilities charted in the preceding sections. Sections 1 and 2, in contrast, 
are more concerned with online dating advertisements as general 
infrastructure for the mediation of personhood, or as an instrument that 
enables and constrains certain forms of self-presentation by virtue of its 
characteristics.  
Urciuoli (2008) refers to the type of promotional activity one has to learn 
to master in job applications and job interviews as “skill talk.” It is a set of 
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sociohistorically evolving discursive patterns that regroup the biographic 
constituents of a person in a particular way that is considered appropriate 
and effective for the presentation of one’s “skills” in a professional context. 
Similarly, the data of this chapter exhibits patterns of idealizing and 
relationship-oriented “characteristic talk” that regroups the constituents of a 
person in a way that is considered appropriate and effective by the writer so 
as to appeal to ideal others (and to sieve off non-ideal ones). Before getting to 
these processes, let us take a look at some of the general preconditions of 
entextualizing a person’s “characteristics” in this context. 
4.1 “CHARACTERISTICS” AS KINDS PROJECTED ON 
HUMAN INDIVIDUALS 
“Characteristics” here refer to kinds projected onto persons based on indices 
perceived in their written text-artifacts by interpreting agents (see 2.1.3 and 
2.3.3). “Characteristic,” then, is an auxiliary term that approaches kinding 
from the perspective of the writers and readers of online dating 
advertisements. One of the basic ways of communicating characteristics is 
using various role designating devices (Agha 2007a: 249), i.e., words, 
constructions and other sense-bearing linguistic expressions that explicitly 
denote aspects of personhood, to describe selected habits, experiences, and 
life events. However, persona readings do not rely merely on denotational 
contents. The ways in which such linguistic signs are co-textually organized 
and patterned in terms of text-level indexicality is itself an indice of 
personhood. The organization of a text about self and others relates to an 
understanding of what persons, subjectivities, social relations or lives 
consists of and how they are structured. That is, the emergent textuality and 
indexical interplay of different semiotic partials is itself another “sign of the 
self” (Singer 1984).  
Moreover, this chapter takes into account the infrastructures or modes of 
mediation of the examined discourse (see Kockelman 2013a: 201). Different 
channels (e.g., Internet-based online dating services) and instruments (e.g., 
particular kinds of genred digital text-artifacts) select for particular kinds of 
signs and sieve off others. 41 Similarly, different kinds of signs differ in terms 
of the interpretations they require or allow in particular infrastructural 
circumstances. That is, particular kinds of infrastructures enable and 
constrain the mediation and the interpretation of linguistic signs and self-
                                                 
41 An instrument is an artificially designed entity that incorporates certain affordances for the 
purchase they provide (and excludes others that may be incorporated in other instruments; cf. e.g. the 
lack of voice in online dating advertisements as compared to video or phone dating services) and that 
actors can wield for the function they serve. A channel is that which connects signers and interpreters 
with one another. It can be an instrument or a mere affordance (e.g., air that carries sound waves). (See 
Kockelman 2013a: 31, 97.) 
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presentational forms in different ways. This section serves as a lead-in to 
further empirical analyses by suggesting three general types of characteristics 
in online dating advertisements (“describable,” “performable,” and 
“proposable”). These types of characteristics differ both in terms of their 
relation to the infrastructure and in terms of their relations to subsequent 
(n+1th and beyond) and antecedent events (n-1th and beyond). 
4.1.1 “DESCRIBABLE,” “PERFORMABLE,” AND “PROPOSABLE” 
CHARACTERISTICS 
The fundamental question that this chapter is interested in is what kinds of 
personal characteristics can anonymous digital text-artifacts mediate and for 
whom. Or, phrased differently: How do different signs of personhood travel 
from their epicenters via particular modes of mediation and what are the 
conditions for the interpretation of such signs? Let us begin by considering a 
rough but essential distinction between what might be termed “describable” 
and “performable” characteristics. A describable characteristic refers to the 
use of linguistic symbols to metasemiotically denote aspects of personhood, 
such as embodied attributes or habitual behavioral patterns. Let us consider 
an example (4.1). (Two dashes have been used in the examples to indicate 
omitted parts.)42 
 
(4.1) ¶Olen nuorekas ja innostun helposti uusista asioista. – – Nautin hämyisästä 
tunnelmasta kynttilän valossa ja takkatulen lämmössä. Olen=kin melkoinen romantikko, 
mutta silti jalat maassa oleva, järkevä karjalaissyntyinen nainen. 
(4.1) ¶I’m youthful and I easily get excited about new things. – – I enjoy a dim 
atmosphere by candlelight and in the warmth of a fireplace. [So] I am quite the romantic 
but still a reasonable, down-to-earth Karelian-born woman. 
 
Here, the initial stretch of text projects a characteristic onto the writer using 
a role designating device (the adjective nuorekas, “youthful”) in combination 
with appropriate deictics (1SG PRES). Later on in the text the writer describes 
a tendency to enjoy a particular kind of setting (“a dim candlelit atmosphere 
in the warmth of a fireplace”). This description is further used as grounds or 
evidence, as marked by the clitic -kin (see Vilkuna 1984: 404; VISK § 842), to 
support another self-initiated typification, “romantic” (romantikko). 
Description with linguistic symbols, in other words, allows or even calls for 
cultural reasoning, inferences, and logical operations (see 4.4.1). With the 
following clause (mutta silti, “but still”), the writer coordinates “romantic” 
with other typifications (“down-to-earth,” “reasonable”) and contrasts the 
entire set of typifications with an implicit assumption (“typically [those who 
                                                 
42 The translations aim at preserving the style and orthography of the original texts whenever 
possible (including errors, misspellings, etc.). Elements that seem necessary in the translation but do 
not really have an explicit equivalent in the original have been placed in brackets. 
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are referred to as] ‘romantics’ are not expected to be [what is referred to by] 
‘down-to-earth’ and ‘reasonable’”). That is, the writer anticipates and pre-
emptively renounces possible inferences (see 5.4). Even an excerpt as short 
as this shows how symbolic description – drawing from an organized web of 
cultural symbols and stereotypes – enables the explicit sketching and implicit 
presuming of complex relations between human attributes and behaviors (or 
social, mental, and material kinds). It allows the writer to invoke a micro-
ontology of personhood and use that to mediate self-to-other relations in the 
here-and-now (see also chapter 6). 
However, because of the infrastructural circumstances of the interactional 
event (i.e., two anonymous unknowns not physically co-present to one 
another), described characteristics require a specific set of attitudinal 
interpretants from the reader. Since, for the reader, such described 
characteristics are present only as generalized imagery evoked by the 
linguistic symbols, their desirability, plausibility, and trustability have to be 
interpreted in very general terms. The reader can, for instance, evaluate the 
coherence of denotational stereotypes (e.g., “Do I agree with the writer that 
‘enjoying a cozy candlelit ambience in the warmth of a fireplace’ is an 
instance of being ‘romantic’?”) or the mutual coherence of different 
characteristics in light of stereotypes of personhood (e.g., “‘In my experience, 
can people of Carelian origin in fact be ‘romantic’?”).43 In other words, the 
validity and accuracy of such descriptions (i.e., how the actual behavior of the 
person corresponds with the images conveyed by the symbols) only becomes 
negotiable at subsequent events, when either the typified object-signs are 
independently accessible (e.g., visible in a face-to-face encounter) or the 
descriptions become contrastable with other typifications of the same objects 
(e.g., other peoples’ narratives that contradict the person’s self-initiated 
account).  
As will be seen in detail in chapter 7, a wide range of cultural 
metadiscourses fosters a distrust of anonymous unknowns and their 
language use in online dating. According to such views, online self-
presentation should not be trusted since “anyone can say anything.” Such 
views seem target “describable” characteristics in particular. Writers indeed 
do have a high degree of control and choice over the tokens of symbols used 
to compose the advertisement text. However, any characteristic only has 
social relevance insofar as it is recognized and ratified by others. Therefore, 
the writer needs to conjure up an image that is attractive enough to be 
conducive to a subsequent interactional event but also sustainable at that 
subsequent event in a different semiotic mode. In order to achieve both 
goals, described characteristics need to relate coherently to one another, to 
                                                 
43 As for physical traits, a photograph considerably adds to the informational content of a profile. 
Still, photographs are merely still images of living, moving objects and are often staged, posed for, 
carefully selected among alternatives, and even retouched. In fact, one of the online dating guidebooks 
(ND: 44) warns that “a picture tells [a lot], but lies” (Kuva kertoo mutta valehtelee). 
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other interpretations of the same person, and to various cultural ontologies 
of personhood. That is, writers ultimately do become accountable for 
described characteristics in subsequent events along semiotic chains.  
In many other respects, the “anyone can say anything” mentality is 
essentially flawed. Not everyone can, for instance, write a “sensitive” poem or 
a piece of “profound” philosophical musing or tell a “hilarious” joke in one’s 
advertisement. Such forms of discursive agency are limited by what one is 
able to author in light of one’s ontologies and accumulated competencies. We 
might call performable those characteristics that mainly consist of discursive 
behaviors. Such characteristics, in other words, are inseparable from 
language use and have no existence outside or independent of language-use 
but are always performed verbally. For instance, someone who is “profound” 
is someone who speaks or writes “profoundly,” whatever that means in terms 
of concrete discursive patterns according to some specific ontology (cf. e.g. 
4.2.2 and 4.23). Performable characteristics, then, are genuinely actualizable 
via a text-artifact. (They can, of course, be simultaneously described as well, 
like in the following example.) That is, digital text-artifacts can mediate an 
actual instantiation of such kinds of personhood, instead of merely 
describing or representing them. Performable characteristics can be directly 
experienced by the reader and evaluated in terms of, say, desirability or 
compatibility already in the event of reading the advertisement. The reader 
may, for instance, reject the writer as non-desirable right away (without the 
writer ever knowing about it) and without having to wait for another event of 
physical co-presence to see if “words” and “reality” match. Moreover, the 
cultural metasemiotic models on which the recognition of attempted 
“funniness” rely may be much more fractionated and less shared among 
respondents than the denotational stereotypes of lexical and 
morphosyntactic elements. What kind of discursive performance actually 
counts as “funny” is also based on the readers’ tastes, which as 
sociohistorically and biographically conditioned personal habits are subject 
to considerable variation. Described and performed characteristics, then, are 
based on different kinds of indices, presuppose different kinds of discursive 
agency and rely on different kinds of recognizing and regimenting 
interpretants. 
Let us consider the following example (which will be dealt with more 
extensively in 4.2.3). In this excerpt, the writer mentions having once lived in 
Greece for a short time, but humorously clarifies that the reason was work-
related and not a romance. Based on several indices, the text is easily 
recognizable as an attempt at a humorous style. In addition to the discursive 
patterning (e.g., the staged dialogue “no,,,not” anticipating the kind of 
inference some type of respondent might make) and explicit orthographic 
indices in the form of smileys, the writer playfully evokes stereotypes of 
Scandinavian women and Greek men (here represented by an imagined 
individual named Jorgos, which from a Finnish perspective is perhaps a 
funny-but-authentic-sounding name). In addition, the writer shortly after 
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explicitly describes her habits of laughing and characterizes her taste in 
humor:  
 
(4.2) Murteesta huomaa että itä-suomen kasvatteja oon, vaikka oon ollu sieltä pois 10 
vuotta, asustellu Tampesterissä, Kreikassakin käyny pyörähtämässä (ei,,,ei Jorgoksen 
perässä, töitten:) ja nyt sitten 4 vuotta täälä Helsingissä. Mie tykkään 
nauramisesta,,,saatan heittää aika hurttiakin huumoria – – 
(4.2) From the dialect [you] will notice that I’m a daughter of eastern finland, [sic] 
although I’ve been away from there for 10 years, [been] living in Tampester [= a 
nickname for the city of Tampere], also popped into Greece (no,,,not after Jorgos, [but] 
work:) and now then 4 years here in Helsinki. I like laughing,,,I may even make some 
quite risky jokes – – 
 
The above segment of text can, then, be interpreted and evaluated as an 
actual instance of the sense of humor of the writer. The reader can directly 
respond to the writer’s humorous performance either as a success or a 
failure. Such interpretations also interact with a variety of other indices and 
evaluations of the writer’s personality, social background, and mental 
propensities. As will be seen later (4.2.3), in the questionnaire data, the 
writer was simultaneously typified as both “funny” or “laid-back” and 
“bimbo” or “uneducated.” In other words, the stretch of text also mediates 
characteristics that were hardly intended by the writer. A further point to 
notice is the interplay and overlap of the described and performed 
characteristics. The performance of humor reparticularizes the symbolic 
description of “being humorous” and having a “risky” sense of humor. That 
is, the described characteristic can now be interpreted in the light of an 
actual example, the performed characteristic, instead of mere general 
cultural knowledge about such characteristics. 
Finally, a third, composite kind of characteristics might be named 
“relational” or proposable characteristics. Proposable characteristics 
explicitly formulate the need of a complementing or incorporating 
interpretant from some other before they become fully effective. That is, they 
invite a contribution or collaboration from another person. In example 
(4.3a), the addressee is explicitly included as an essential factor in the 
described scenario (cooking). In example (4.3b), the reader is asked to fill in 
the story as a co-author (see also 4.4.3): 
 
(4.3a) Tykkään ruuan laitosta (varsinkin yhdessä), ulkoilusta erilaisssa tapahtumissa 
käymisestä varsinkin mukavassa seurassa (lue kenties sinun kanssasi) – – 
(4.3a) I enjoy cooking food (especially together), going outdoors attending various events 
especially in nice company (read perhaps with you) – – 
 
(4.3b)¶Ja vihdoin eräänä loppukesän kauniina iltana hän tapasi Jonkun..” ¶Kuka ja 
millainen oli tuo Joku, mitä hän halusi elämältä, mitä hän halusi nuoren parin arjelta..? 
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¶Kerro se minulle, jos ajatuksesi kuulostavat lupaavilta, saatat saada myös kuvan 
paluupostissa ja pääset tutustumaan tähän neitoon tarkemmin.. 
(4.3b)¶And finally one beautiful late summer evening she met Someone..” ¶Who and 
what kind was that Someone, what did he want from life, what did he want from the 
young couple’s everyday life..? ¶Tell that to me, if your thoughts sound promising, you 
may also get a picture in return mail and get to know this maiden more closely.. 
 
As can be seen in the latter example, actual textual patterns (of the kinds 
examined in 4.4) that mediate complex figures of personhood often 
incorporate all three types of characteristics. For instance, a narrative, firstly, 
is a particular way of organizing the description of actions and attributes. 
Secondly, particular narrative styles give rise to performed images of 
particular kinds of subjectivities or personalities. Thirdly, as seen in the 
previous example, narratives may also be used to mobilize co-constructive 
efforts from respondents and to assess mutual compatibility and 
commitment to shared patterns of life (see also example 4.29 in 4.4.3 and 
section 6.3). 
4.1.2 TRUTH AND REPRESENTATIVENESS 
The differences between described and performed characteristics have 
important consequences for the temporal, interactional, and distributional 
dynamics of the mediation of personhood. In a sense, described 
characteristics are future-oriented promises and commitments that the 
writer will be held accountable for at subsequent encounters, insofar as such 
encounters are ever actualized.44 When interpreting describable 
characteristics, a reader has to decide whether or not to instigate a further 
semiotic encounter (e.g., by sending a reply) based on some degree of trust 
on the fact that the description is at least a more or less sincere attempt to 
reliably capture some embodied reality. That is, replying to someone (as an 
energetic interpretant) requires particular kinds of feelings or intuitions (as 
affective interpretants) of both the desirability of that person as a potential 
partner and of the reliability of that person as a moral actor and 
communicator (see also 6.4 and chapter 7). When, at some later event (such 
as a face-to-face encounter), a description becomes empirically investigatable 
in terms of validity and accuracy, the result may be either congruent (the 
description was relatively “true”) or non-congruent (the description was 
“false”). Such degrees of congruence or non-congruence between different 
semiotic modes become evaluable as further signs of personhood (e.g., 
whether some non-congruence was intentional or merely contingent on the 
                                                 
44 Sometimes such promises are made linguistically explicit with performatives like “promise” or 
“guarantee” (e.g., “I guarantee that if you want to get to know me I won’t leave you cold”; Takaan että 
jos löytyy halua tutustua ni en jätä kylmäks). Usually, however, such promises are based on presumed 
norms of human conduct (cf. also chapter 7). 
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different backgrounds of the interactants). Such evaluations differ based on 
the type and mode of semiotic process (e.g., “fact” versus “wish”) as well as 
the ontologies and epistemic formations in question (see e.g. 4.4.1, 5.1–5.2 
and 7.2). Descriptions such as “hoping to be good-humored” (i.e., an ideal 
mood or trait of personality expressed in a non-technical register) and “being 
175 cm tall” (i.e., a physical attribute expressed as a fact and in institutionally 
standardized units) are susceptible to quite different techniques and 
practices of evaluation. Since described characteristics are based on explicit 
and salient symbol-tokens, they are relatively easy to decontextualize and 
hold against their animators even on longer time scales.  
Described characteristics can also be evaluated in terms of their 
representativeness. Since “characteristics” are typically understood as more 
or less habitual in nature, even such descriptions that cannot be shown to be 
strictly speaking false (if they are, for example, appropriately hedged either 
temporally or modally) can be judged by others to be true only under 
unreasonably specific or rare conditions. Therefore, such descriptions can be 
judged as not sufficiently typical of the person or relevant for the type of self-
presentation in question, and may even be considered intentionally 
misleading. A “lie by omission” (i.e., intentionally failing to mention some 
experientially salient attribute) would be an inverse case.45 Performable 
characteristics, in contrast, are directly experienceable and evaluable in 
terms of skillfulness, finesse, or desirability already at the event of reading 
the text. The one thing the reader needs to trust in is that the performance 
actually emanated from the purported person and was not ghosted by 
someone else (i.e., that the author and the principal coincide). Performable 
characteristics too, however, become assessed in terms of representativeness 
and transportability. The question then is how the impression experienced at 
the one writing-based encounter corresponds to what is experienced in other, 
perhaps more prototypic and habitual everyday encounters, such as face-to-
face conversations. That is, both performable and describable characteristics 
have a “promissory” nature (see Goffman 1990 [1959]: 14), but of different 
kinds. For performed characteristics cross-modal iconicity is a point of 
concern: how to signify and interpret the same characteristic in different 
semiotic modes with, for example, different time windows of signifying and 
interpreting (see also Scollon 1997). Being, for instance, “intelligent” under 
realtime pressures versus in writing, when one often has more possibilities 
for planning and honing, are somewhat different tasks (cf. 4.2.2 and 4.2.3).  
If writers are understood to have more conscious awareness and flexibility 
in relation to representational descriptions, then they are also easier to hold 
accountable for described characteristics. Would, for instance, an accusation 
                                                 
45 In addition to mental and social kinds, evalutions of representativeness can also apply to more 
directly perceived material kinds such as appearance (e.g., whether the picture in the online dating 
profile corresponds sufficiently with what the person will look like most of the time in most kinds of 
encounters). 
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of the type “you were funny in the advertisement but not on our first date, 
therefore you misled me” be plausible? In such cases, the non-congruence of 
impressions is more readily explained in terms of unintentional factors (e.g., 
difference in circumstances combined with interpersonal factors such as a 
“lack of spark” or “chemistry,” see also 7.3). This is, of course, not to say that 
performable characteristics cannot become evaluated as intentionally 
unrepresentative or misleading (and examples will be seen in the 
questionnaire responses in the next section). The “fakeability” of performed 
characteristics is, however, complexly linked to ontology-specific 
understandings of the characteristic (e.g., what kinds of signs index the 
characteristic; what kind of intersubjective access there is to such signs; how 
well such indices can be controlled; how much accumulated training or 
socialization they require; see also Goffman 1990 [1959]: 17–19). From the 
standpoint of feigning, indices that require technical competence, such as 
behaving “intelligently” or “eloquently,” differ from more generally human 
ones, such as appearing “empathetic” or “worried.” Similarly, such 
characteristics differ in terms of the kind of intrasubjective and 
intersubjective coherence they presume: for instance, the concern that 
someone is being “insincerely” or “merely ostensibly” empathetic is different 
from (and probably substantially more common than) the concern that 
someone is being “insincerely” or “merely ostensibly” intelligent.  
The general point being made here is that language use and the linguistic 
mediation of personhood in online dating advertisements can be more 
accurately understood when the interplay of mediational infrastructures and 
presumed ontologies of personhood are taken into account.46 Finally, it 
should be noted that the distinction between “describable” and 
“performable” crosscuts the distinction between symbolic and indexical 
semiosis (as well as residence in the world and representations of the world). 
(For a related distinction between “claimed” and “demonstrated” knowledge, 
see Vatanen 2014.) “Describable” characteristics require general symbols 
that represent other, more or less displaced signs (e.g., embodied habits or 
attributes). It is precisely the “description” (qua symbolic representation) of 
other semiotic modes of personhood that enables the communication of such 
signs to others via digital text-artifacts. Symbols, however, as legisigns (or 
types) are always realized as sinsign replicas (or tokens) in actual discursive 
events as part of arrays of co-occurring signs. In other words, any symbol in 
actual usage is indexically linked to many other signs that co-interpret one 
                                                 
46 Metaphorically speaking, online dating advertisements function like a semiotic prism that 
refracts personspacetime into different directions. When different kinds of signs “pass through” the 
text-artifact, they get refracted in slightly different directions. These different (re)fractions of persons 
(e.g., “described” and “performed” ones), then, carry different “wavelengths” of information, and they 
unfold and are encountered on different time scales and under different kinds of attitudes. For 
instance, in a particular sense, performable characteristics travel faster and are encountered more 
directly by the reader. 
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another. This means that any “described” characteristic is already embedded 
in a “performed” structure. Pure “description” does not exist. Any piece of 
writing, therefore, has an emergent indexical patterning, a level of meaning 
that can neither exist without nor be reduced to its constituents (such as 
clauses or morpho-syntactic elements). What was called “performable 
characteristics” here merely refers to such indexical effects that are easily 
recognizable and reportable (i.e., relatively enregistered or based on highly 
emblematic indices), understood as relatively intentional and therefore 
evaluable in terms of skillfulness of the performance (see also Bauman & 
Briggs 1990). However, the two levels are always present to various degrees 
in any actual interpretation of text. The following section will take a more 
empirical look at such indexical effects in light of the questionnaire data. 
4.2 VIEWS OF SUBJECTIVITY 
Text-level indexicality is an essential ingredient in conveying what has been 
called, for instance, “views of subjectivity” or “visions of consciousness” (Lee 
1997a: 366) or “mind styles” (e.g. Semino 2007). These terms point to the 
interpretation of sign patterns as an indication of how the mind of the person 
to whom they are attributed (e.g., an animator or a figure) is operating (and 
that they, in fact, not only have a mind but an understanding of others’ 
minds). In a sense, such effects are communicable first-person experiences of 
the world. Traditionally, the ability of humans to infer others’ mental 
processes and to predict further behaviors based on them has been referred 
to as the “theory of mind.” Here it will be treated as a subspecies of kinding 
(see section 2.1.3): the capacity of agents to project propensities on 
individuals in order to explain and predict the unfolding of their semiotic 
processes. (See also Kockelman 2010; 2013a: e.g. 161–164.) The aim of 
sections 4.2.1–4.2.3 is to examine the interpretation of views of subjectivity 
in the light of the questionnaire data (see section 3.2). That is, the focus in 
the following analyses is on how mental states (consisting of modes, such as 
belief or intention, and contents, such as what is believed or intended) and 
ensuing interpretations (such as social statuses or traits of personality) are 
projected on individuals based on the indices they exhibit in their text-
artifacts. Three texts were chosen for the questionnaire. They were 
considered to differ maximally in terms of their textual structure. The 
following analyses compare such structural differences with differences in 
the interpretations of the respondents of the questionnaire.  
One of the methodological challenges is the fact that interactants 
intuitively experience the effects of a considerably larger array of signs – 
often relatively subtle and volatile and only sometimes public and 
unambiguous – than they are acutely aware of or can pinpoint exactly or 
explicitly. The typifications and rationalizations interactants offer for their 
own or others’ mental patterns are, then, already a reflexive step or two 
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removed from more immediate impressions. It is, however, precisely such 
chains of reflexive reasoning and intersubjective negotiation that make 
mental states emblematic (or public and unambiguous) and individuals 
accountable for them. Such unfoldings construe and enclose the functioning 
of the mind as object-like and event-like in particular ways (see Kockelman 
2010: 80–84). That is, relatively private semiotic processes (e.g., mental 
states) and relatively public semiotic processes (e.g., speech acts) are 
inextricably linked. Therefore, instead of regarding linguistic representations 
as inaccurate reflections of private processes, we conclude that the proper 
locus of subjectivity, in fact, is in such reflexive, distributed and interactional 
semiotic chains, of which linguistic representational interpretants constitute 
one layer (see also the discussion of metastance relations in chapter 5). 
Subjectivity, then, is semiotically mediated and not merely “represented” 
in such processes. (Remember the previous discussion of mind as a species of 
semiosis in chapter 2.) Cultural norms, such as reflexive models of discourse, 
which regiment semiotic behavior, both enable and constrain patterns of 
subjectivity. For instance, scientific discourses or narrative styles in literary 
fiction (such as “free” forms of speech and thought representation) are 
different kinds of artificed instruments that enable specific ways of 
interacting with and interpreting the world. (See e.g. Lee 1997a: 10; 1997b: 
365.) In various cultural ontologies, models of subjectivity are closely linked 
to social statuses. Particular roles require particular mindsets. Western 
notions of scientific rationality, for instance, have long shaped norms and 
ideologies that specify what the language use of the rational mind of a 
scientist should be like (see e.g. Bauman & Briggs 2003). The relation 
between private and public processes is itself an ideologically regimented 
notion. There is considerable genre-specific variation in how and to what 
extent private processes (e.g., intentions, beliefs, perceptions, affects) can or 
must be entextualized into public representations (e.g., how “personal” or 
“emotional,” “concise” or “voluble,” “spontaneous” or “planned,” 
“crystallized” or “branching” it is appropriate to be) (see also Hymes 1972). 
Subjectivities are, in other words, interpreted, evaluated and regimented in 
light of cultural norms and stereotypes. The same text can mediate a different 
view of subjectivity for different readers or in different types of events (e.g., 
being “rambling” vs. “spontaneous and voluble”). In some contexts and for 
some social statuses, there seems to be a particular concern for discrepancies 
between mental states and speech acts (e.g., a fear that someone may be 
“saying something, but not really meaning it”). In such cases, patterns of 
discursive behavior often become interpreted in light of ideological notions 
of, for instance, “(in)authenticity” or “(in)sincerity” (see e.g. Keane 2002; 
Shoaps 2002; Hill 2008; Wilce 2009b: 133–136) (see also chapter 7). 
A written text-artifact, such as an online dating advertisement, then, is an 
instrument that mediates mind-functioning in intersubjective contacts in 
light of various cultural models. The aim of this section is to explore how the 
patterning and formulation of the text-artifact mediates particular kinds of 
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experiences of (the writer’s) subjectivity in the event of interpretation. The 
three texts that were chosen for the questionnaire were considered to differ 
maximally in terms of their temporal-perspectival unfolding based on their 
linguistic structure. The actual patterns that differentiate the three texts are 
diverse. Any text navigates the reader on a specific path through semiotic 
worlds by directing attention to various objects, knowledge structures, and 
stances in particular orders and combinations. On a denotational level, these 
objects may cover different modes and contents (e.g., desires, emotions, 
perceptions, or knowledge about different domains of the social or natural 
world) and may be related to time, space, and personhood in different ways 
(e.g., from various points of reference; with various levels of abstractedness 
or concreteness; in various degrees of factuality, possibility, or necessity). 
That is, texts mediate series of perspectives on the worlds in question. Each 
online dating advertisement consists of an indexical patterning of 
entextualized events (Et). These entextualized sign patterns, in turn, are 
embedded in speech events (Es) of text production or interpretation.47 
Moreover, the temporal location of entextualized events is calculated in 
relation to reference events (Er), which may be the speech event or other 
entextualized events (see Lee 1997a: 285; Kockelman 2010: 90–92; also 
Kockelman & Bernstein 2012: 326). Different combinations of such relations 
can produce a variety of temporal and aspectual effects. On non-denotational 
levels, the formulation and the organization of the sign patterns (e.g., in 
parallels, repetitions, or rhymes) mediate various metrical effects. Texts, 
therefore, have particular rhythms and structures of temporal unfolding. We 
see, then, that temporality in its many forms is an important factor in 
subjectivity (see Benveniste 1971: 226–227; Lee 1997a: 284–292; Kockelman 
& Bernstein 2012).48 One might say that speech events have their own 
patterns of temporal unfolding, or textual “microtimes” (see Urban 2001: 
101), based on not only the denotational but also the phenomenological and 
compositional qualities of the sign patterns. Such phenomenological and 
compositional qualities, like the sonority of linguistic signs (or the qualisigns 
they embody) or the composition of the imagery conveyed by linguistic 
symbols, also yield various aesthetic effects. Furthermore, the texts mediate 
                                                 
47 In Jakobson’s (1990 [1957]) original notation the linguistic description of an event was called a 
“narrated event” (En). To avoid confusions with narrativity and narratives proper (see 4.4.3), the term 
“[en]textualized event” (Et) is used here (as in, for example, Lee 1997a). “Speech event” (Es), when used 
here, can refer to any kind of discursive event (oral, written, or other). 
48 Kockelman & Bernstein (2012), for instance, distinguish four different ways of framing 
temporality: temporality as metricality (focus on the repetition of tokens of an event type), temporality 
as performativity (focus on the causes and consequences of an event), temporality as reckoning (focus 
on the temporal location and length of an event), and temporality as worldview (focus on cultural 
understandings of time). Some of these interlocking aspects of temporality will be examined 
throughout the study (e.g., temporality as performativity), some in specific sections (see 4.3 and 4.4.3 
in particular). 
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different kinds of interactional texts based on how their sign patterns become 
interpreted as indices and icons of social relations and interactional positions 
and recognized as instances of enregistered cultural types, such as rhetorical 
patterns, styles, or genres linked to particular social personae. Finally, 
various means of metapragmatic commentary of one’s textual-semiotic 
processes may be employed by writers to introduce an explicit layer of 
reflexive subjectivity in the text. 
4.2.1 “POETIC” OR “DEMANDING”? 
The aim of the following three sections is to show that you cannot not give off 
an indexical view of subjectivity. Such views, however, depend on the 
ontologies of the respondents and on their practices of reporting, which gives 
rise to a diverse and fragmented set of interpretations. To see how textual 
patterning shapes the temporal-perspectival unfolding of speech events and 
correlates with interpretations of the writer as a person, let us first 
concentrate on the beginning of the first example (4.4), a list of seven parallel 
sentences, each one typographically placed on a separate line.49 
 
(4.4) 
Haluan miehen joka on tyytyväinen itseensä 
Haluan miehen joka tietää mitä halua 
Haluan miehen joka haluaa rakastaa 
Haluan miehen joka osaa näyttää tunteensa 
Haluan miehen joka osaa keskustella 
Haluan miehen joka on itsenäinen, mutta kaipaa kumppania 
Haluan miehen joka tyytyväinen siihen mitä näkee peilistä olematta kuitenkaan liian 
itserakas 
Onko tällaisia? Täällä rehevä, kaunis (kauneus on katsojan silmissä), tumma, 
itsenäinen – – 
En väitä olevani täydellinen (sellaista ei ole), mutta olen mukava, pidetty – – 
Jos kiinnostaa kuulla lisää vastaa ihmeessä. Kuva kuvasta. 
(4.4) 
I want a man who is satisfied with himself 
I want a man who knows what he wants 
I want a man who wants to love 
I want a man who can show his feelings 
I want a man who can have a conversation 
I want a man who is independent, but longs for a companion 
I want a man who is satisfied with what he sees in the mirror but without being too vain 
Are there men like this? Here is a luscious, beautiful (beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder), dark, independent – – 
                                                 
49 As the texts are quite lengthy, segments that are of secondary importance for the analyses here 
have been left out. Some of them will be used later as examples for other purposes. 
 83 
I don’t claim to be perfect (that does not exist), but I’m nice, liked – – 
If [you’re] interested in hearing more please do reply. A picture for a picture.50 
 
Each of the seven sentences has a similar syntactic structure. The verb in the 
matrix clause denotes a mental process of “wanting” and has the NP miehen 
(“man” ACC) as its object. Each instance of the noun is qualified with a 
relative clause headed by the relative pronoun joka (“who”). That is, the only 
varying part in the parallel structure is the VP part of the relative clause that 
describes the object-person from seven different angles. The repetition binds 
the seven sentences together into a metrical pattern that has a particular 
dynamic of unfolding as the signs are perceived and interpreted by 
respondents. Even an “inner” reading of the structure, a combination of the 
visual form and the (simulated) sonority of the linguistic signs, evokes a 
rhythmic pattern so that “the reality of the discourse object is felt as well as 
cognized” (Urban 2001: 100; see also Wilce 2009a: 91). That is, the textual 
pattern simultaneously mediates iconic-indexical and indexical-symbolic 
effects. 
The respondents of the questionnaire were asked to describe up to three 
different impressions that each text gave rise to and to justify them with 
concrete linguistic or contextual features. Only three out of twenty-seven 
answer sheets clearly contain no verbal reference to or drawn marking of the 
parallel structure. All other respondents orient more or less explicitly to the 
structure as a salient sign of personhood. The interpretations of the first text 
seem to divide into two groups. Table 1 lists some examples from the first 
group of interpretations that focused on what was perceived as the “poetic” 
and “dramatic” quality of text. In the first group, not a single typification 
occurred more than once:   
 
typification n reasons 
literary (kaunokirjallinen) 1 “the boring clichés of online dating expressed 
linguistically in a less boring manner” [T1/3] 
poem (runo) 1 “the arrangement of the whole text” [T1/10] 
sweet (herttainen) 1 “the poetic style in the beginning” [T1/16] 
tries to be artistic and 
original (yrittää olla 
taiteellinen ja omaperäinen) 
1 “the poetic form of the beginning, the rhetorical 
question and the negative adjectives about self” 
[T1/20] 
dramatic (dramaattinen) 1 “repetition, omission of punctuation, rhythm” 
[T1/25] 
Table 1. Interpretations of the writer being “poetic.” 
There is, then, considerable variation in the symbols selected for the 
typifications, but the different typifications and their accompanying 
                                                 
50 See also example 4.17 in 4.2.2 and example 4.21f in 4.4. 
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rationalizations are bound together with a sort of family resemblance 
(“artistic” ~ “poem” ~ “literary” ~ “poetic” ~ “original” ~ “dramatic” ~ “less 
boring”). There is also variation as to whether the object of the typification is 
the text itself (“poem”) or its animator in terms of persona (“sweet,” 
herttainen) or in terms of intentions (“tries to be artistic and original,” 
yrittää olla taiteellinen ja omaperäinen). As can be seen from both the 
typifications and the reasons given for them, descriptions of effects are 
constantly mixed with evaluations of the desirability of the person (“sweet”) 
or the success or respectability of their intentions (“tries to be”). This 
illustrates the point made in the previous section that performable indexical 
effects are directly experienced by readers and instantly submitted to their 
evaluation. 
In the second group of interpretations (Table 2), in contrast, there is a 
clear recurrence of the same or similar typifications. These interpretations 
focus on the intensity of the mental state or the commitment of the writer. All 
respondents in the two groups are different. That is, not one respondent 
simultaneously reported the writer as both “poetic” and “demanding.” 
  
typification n reasons 
knows what she wants/seeks 
(tietää mitä haluaa/tahtoo/ 
etsii); “I know what I want” 
(1SG voicing) (“tiedän, mitä 
haluan”) 
7 “the verb ‘haluan’ recurs many times as a list” [T1/5]; 
“tells specifically what kind of man she is looking for” 
[T1/9]; “uses the word HALUAN [I want], which is 
stronger than e.g. HALUAISIN [I would want/like]” 
[refers to the contrast between the indicative and the 
conditional mood, see 5.1.2] [T1/12] 
vaativa (demanding) 4 “the repetition of the word ‘haluan’ speaks of being 
demanding” [T1/2]; “the ‘haluan miehen’ beginning” 
[T1/18] 
determined 
(määrätietoinen) 
2 “the structure of the text [is] strong, daring” [T1/23]; 
“ample descriptions; knows who she is and what she 
is looking for” [T1/26] 
mature (kypsä) 1 “knows what she wants” [T1/17] 
Table 2. Interpretations of the writer being “demanding.”  
At least two things are instantly noteworthy here. First, the idiom-like 
typification “knows what she wants” with slight variations in the form occurs 
numerous times, and so does “demanding.” One respondent uses a technique 
of 1SG voicing, which can be interpreted as a representation of either the 
writer’s speech or thought. Second, the same representational interpretant 
occurs both as a typification (“knows what she wants”) and as part of the 
reasons given for another typification (“mature” because “she knows what 
she wants”). That is, what for some is a representation of the impression 
given off by the writer is by others framed as a reason leading to a further 
typification. 
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The typification “knows what she wants” is an explicit metarepresentation 
of the writer’s reflexive subjectivity (i.e., her knowing of her wanting). The 
complement clause that represents the content of knowing (“what she 
wants”) employs the same linguistic symbol used by the writer (haluta, “to 
want”) in a free, nominal relative clause, in which the verb “to want” has no 
specific complements. It is, then, construable as a sort of generalization of 
the seven more specific instances of wanting. The recurrence of particular 
instances is what becomes interpreted as the “knowing” of what one wants, a 
more general or overarching mental propensity that motivates each instance 
and their total number. That is, saying “I want” seven times is interpreted as 
a sign of the writer’s awareness of her wanting and the intensity of her 
wanting. The 1SG voicing “I know what I want,” then, represents the writer’s 
mental habits and epistemic convictions. “Knows what she wants” can also be 
taken as a more immediate interpretation of the writer’s speech behaviors. 
That is, saying “I want” seven times can also be interpreted as a sign of a 
propensity to behave in ways that express one’s desires to others. In this case, 
the 1SG voicing “I know what I want” would represent the writer’s speech 
behaviors. Moreover, one respondent paraphrases “wants” with “seeks” 
(“knows what she seeks”), which further links the represented mental 
propensities (knowing, wanting) and the perceivable speech behaviors 
(expressing one’s desires) with social activities (seeking the object of one’s 
desire): that is, really wanting something and being aware of one’s wanting 
leads to the expression of such desires and the intention of realizing them. 
Such interpretations are no longer so much about the intensity of the writer’s 
mental states per se but about the intensity of her commitment to the 
fruition of those states. Some respondents take other kinds of inferential 
steps and interpret such propensities as traits of personality. That is, a 
person who generally knows what she wants is seen as “demanding” (with a 
neutral or possibly slightly negative connotation) or “mature” (with a positive 
connotation). All these typifications, then, are an inferential step or two 
removed from one another. Such inferences are perhaps fueled by the fact 
that “knows what she wants” is to some degree enregistered as an idiomatic 
way of talking about people with determination or life experience.  
Another relevant observation here is the somewhat salient overlap 
between the writer’s performance and the respondents’ interpretations and 
reports of it in terms of the use of the symbol “to want” (haluta). The 
respondents’ choice of the idiom “knows what she wants” might have been 
catalyzed by the writer’s salient use of the symbol in the first place, since the 
idiom was by far the most recurrent typification. Both the convergence of 
typifications on the idiom and the chaining of inferences around it might, 
then, be in part explained by the perceptually salient and systematically 
recurring symbol-tokens used by the writer. That is, the second group of 
respondents relied more on denotationally explicit symbol-tokens and the 
kinds of inferences and deductions that they easily enable, whereas the first 
group reported interpretations based on less emblematic signs. 
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Furthermore, two subgroups of interpretations can be distinguished 
within the latter group. Some respondents seem to focus more on the 
wanting agent (e.g., as being “determined”), others on the object of wanting 
(“tells specifically what kind of man she is looking for,” “ample descriptions 
[of the desired other]”). We might call these agent-centered and patient-
centered (see Urban 1991: 31–33) readings of the denotational patterning. 
The difference can be understood in terms of two possible figure-ground 
construals. One type of interpretation focuses more on the constant 
representational mode (matrix clause + REL), the other on the variable 
representational contents (VP). This difference, too, correlates with the 
emblematicity of the signs. The repetition of haluan miehen joka (“I want a 
man who”) replicates the signs verbatim from one instance to another. The 
signs, and the repetition itself, then, are phenomenologically emblematic 
(e.g., directly and continuously visible throughout; see also chapter 5). They 
are also relationally emblematic, since each instance shares the same 
qualities (which also contrasts them with the rest of the text). (See 
Kockelman 2013a: 77.) The repetition of the VP part of the complement 
clause, in contrast, enumerates denotationally and phenomenologically 
varying instances of a relatively covert and inferential type (i.e., the processes 
that the ideal man is involved in). The different instances of the covert type, 
then, only exhibit relational emblematicity and what they have in common is 
a relatively abstact layer of meaning.  
From the standpoint of personhood, the most important thing to notice, 
however, is the difference between the first group of respondents and the 
second one. Whereas in the second group the parallel structure was 
interpreted as quantitatively intensifying the denoted mental process and 
the writer’s commitment to its consequences, in the first group the structure 
was taken as qualitatively contextualizing the event as a different mode of 
subjectivity altogether – a dramatic one detached to a degree from ordinary 
everyday experience. Apparently, for some, the poetic effect was so strong 
that the return to more mundane affairs right at the end felt downright 
“rude” (tyly), as the curt instructions clashed with the “poetic and aesthetic” 
quality of the beginning (ristiriitainen alun poeettisuuteen ja esteettisyyteen 
nähden) [T1/16]. 
This fractionation of respondents into two camps also seems to correlate 
with the interpretation of other features of the text, such as the kind of 
double-voicing strategy used by the writer towards the end of the text. She 
uses a set of independent clauses embedded in parenthesis in the middle of 
other clauses to comment on elements of the matrix clauses in a sort of sotto 
voce (see also 4.2.2). This secondary voice, carrying a secondary perspective, 
was interpreted by some respondents as “funny” [T1/7] or “humorous” 
(implying “sarcastic” or “ironic”) [T1/24], which are relatively coherent with 
the qualitative interpretation of the “poetic” style of the writer, and by others 
as a sign of “insecurity” [T1/5; T1/21] or “contradiction” [T1/9], which point 
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to a felt incoherence with the quantitative interpretation of the writer as 
“knowing what she wants.”  
4.2.2 “REFLECTIVE” AND “ANALYTICAL” 
If the views of subjectivity mediated by the previous text were based on the 
microtemporal and phenomenological structuring of the text as well as the 
denotational patterning of mental processes, similar dimensions are involved 
in the following example, but in a quite different manner and with opposite 
effects. The following text is marked by its compact structure and “finished” 
quality compared with the other two texts examined here (and 4.6 in 
particular). It contains no saliently “poetic” rhythmic patterning or 
repetitions, alternative formulations, or commenting double voices. 
 
(4.5) 
Tuntuuko sinustakin, että nykymaailmasta olisi rakkaus vähentynyt / vähentymässä? 
Minusta ainakin tuntuu ja se ilmenee monessa seikassa. Toivon löytäväni naisen, 
jonka kanssa rakkautta voisi ainakin paikallisesti lisätä ;) 
Olen valmis kohtaamaan naisen koko sydämelläni, mutta enemmän sopivan hitaasti 
edeten kuin syöksymällä päätäpahkaa. Olen ollut sinkku aivan riittävästi. Havaintoni 
mukaan naisen löytyminen on silti ollut ongelmallista, vaikka en pidä isoa 
vaatimuslistaa. Ymmärrettävää se on siinä mielessä, kun nykyinen kulttuuri suosii 
ihmissuhteiden etsimisessä liikaa kilpailuhenkisyyttä inhimillisen vuorovaikutuksen 
luomisen kustannuksella. Haluan itse suosia jälkimmäistä metodia! 
Elämäntilanteeni antaa aihetta haasteisiin, mutta omanarvontuntoni ja 
hyväsydämisyyteni luovat edellytyksiä suuren rakkauden ja elämännautinnon 
lähteille; elämää on vielä paljon näkemättä, mutta jo nähty on antanut suuren 
ymmärryksen ihmissielun vajavaisuudesta ja haavoittuvuudesta. Sen tähden olen 
erityisen ymmärtäväinen ja keskustelutaitoinen kumppani. En pidä rakkautta ja 
parisuhdetta itsestäänselvyytenä, joten olen myös luotettava ja rehellinen kumppani. 
Elämänilo on tärkeää, jonka takia henkinen ja fyysinen läheisyys on minulle iso juttu 
naisen kanssa; nautin monenlaisesta hellyydestä, erotiikasta, yhteisestä tekemisestä 
jne. Toisaalta olen sellainen pohdiskeleva ja semiboheemi taiteilijasielu, jolle oman 
itsensä kanssa yksin vietetty aika on ajoittain oleellista. Aikaa on löydyttävä asioiden 
kehittämiseen / sulatteluun, rauhoittumiseen ja pysähtymiseen. 
(4.5) 
Do you too feel that in today’s world love has decreased / is decreasing? I at any rate 
do feel so and it can be seen in many things. I am hoping to find a woman with whom 
love could be increased at least locally ;) 
I am ready to encounter a woman with all my heart, but progressing slowly rather 
than rushing headlong. I have been single long enough. According to my 
observations finding a woman has nevertheless been difficult, although I don’t keep a 
long list of demands. It is understandable in the sense that the current culture favors 
competition in the search for relationships at the expense of human interaction. I 
myself want to favor the latter method! 
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My situation in life gives reasons for challenges, but my self-esteem and kind-
heartedness create bases for sources of great love and pleasure in life; there is a lot of 
life to be seen, but what [I] have already seen has given [me] a great understanding 
of the insufficiency and the vulnerability of the human soul. Therefore I am a 
particularly understanding and conversationally skilled companion. I don’t take love 
and relationships for granted, so I am also a reliable and honest companion. 
The joy of life is important, which is why mental and physical intimacy is a big thing 
for me with a woman; I enjoy many forms of tenderness, eroticism, shared activities 
and so on. On the other hand I’m a sort of reflective and semi-bohemian artistic soul, 
for whom time spent alone with oneself is at times essential. There has to be time for 
developing / digesting things, quieting down and pausing. 
 
On the denotational level the text favors generalizations and abstract 
principles or tendencies of life (e.g., “the current culture favors competition 
in the search for relationships at the expense of human interaction,” 
nykyinen kulttuuri suosii ihmissuhteiden etsimisessä liikaa 
kilpailuhenkisyyttä inhimillisen vuorovaikutuksen luomisen 
kustannuksella). The text denotes relational processes and mental processes 
that are opinions and reasoning more often than affects or desires. That is, in 
contrast to the previous text, there is a tendency towards abstract thought 
and theorizing (see 4.4.1). Correspondingly, there is explicit reflexive 
metadiscourse that specifies ongoing actions and intentions and links them 
with values and principles (“I am hoping to find a woman, with whom love 
could be increased at least locally ;),”51 “I am ready to encounter a woman 
with all my heart, but progressing slowly rather than rushing headlong”). 
Moreover, the writer frames the contents with explicit metalanguage of 
argumentative reasoning (sen tähden, joten, “therefore”) and observations 
and generalizations (havaintoni mukaan, “according to my observations”). 
The lexical selections of the text include abstract, specific, and specialized 
items (semiboheemi, “semi-bohemian”; ihmissielun vajavaisuus, “the 
insufficiency of the human soul”; kulttuuri, “culture” in a relatively technical 
sense; metodi, “method”), some of which point towards scientific discourses. 
The sentence structures are often heavy because of nominalizations and 
embedding (“My situation in life gives reasons for challenges, but my self-
esteem and kind-heartedness create bases for sources of great love and 
pleasure in life,” Elämäntilanteeni antaa aihetta haasteisiin, mutta 
omanarvontuntoni ja hyväsydämisyyteni luovat edellytyksiä suuren 
rakkauden ja elämännautinnon lähteille). 
The clearest pattern in the answer sheets is a focus on the mental 
capacities of the writer (“intelligent,” “academic,” or “reflective”) and the 
                                                 
51 The winking smiley, however, was interpreted by a few respondents as a sign of a euphemism or 
double entendre. That is, the writer’s intentions were interpreted as sexual. For instance, one 
respondent regarded the writer as “gross” (törkeä) because of his “innuendos about sex” (vihjailu 
seksiin) [T2/16]. 
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nature of the information presented in the text (“knows how to embed 
information in his text,” “general regularities,” or “analytical”). Once again, 
several respondents picked words used by the writer himself (such as 
pohdiskeleva, “reflective”) or used semantically related words, although the 
convergence is not as clear as in the previous text. 
 
typification n reasons 
scientific matter-of-factness 
(tieteellinen teksti, tieteellinen 
asiallisuus) 
2 “lots of fancy/foreign words (sivistyssanoja)” 
[T2/2]; “expressions like ‘observation’ and 
‘method’” [T2/11] 
reflective (pohdiskeleva, 
ajatteleva ja pohdiskeleva) 
2 “long commentaries about life and love and 
society” [T2/9] 
smart (fiksu, 
(fiksu/akateeminen) 
2 “knows how to embed information in his text” 
[T2/20]; “…or pretends to be, at least he himself 
thinks he is an intellectual” [T2/27] 
writing that has been 
considered for a long time 
(pitkään mietitty kirjoitus) 
1 “salient words: semi-bohemian, method… Still, 
colloquial and playful” [T2/21] 
appeals to reason, generalizes 
(järkisyihin vetoava, yleistävä) 
1 “puts forth general regularities [of life]” (yleisiä 
lainalaisuuksia)” [T2/13] 
analytical (analyyttinen) 1 “analyzes himself and his potential partner” 
[T2/9] 
intelligent or wants to appear 
that way (älykäs tai haluaa 
vaikuttaa siltä) 
1 – [T2/19] 
self-satisfied (itseriittoinen) 1 “underlining his own intelligence” [T2/16] 
Table 3. Interpretations of the writer as “reflective” and “analytical.” 
Interestingly, two respondents also typify the writer as an “artist” (taiteilija) 
or having an “artistic character” (taiteilijaluonne), which is in some sense 
contrary to the general emphasis on intellect and rationality in the 
interpretations. It is also noteworthy that the reasons these two give 
explicitly point to the writer’s own fleeting typification of himself as an 
“artistic soul” (taiteilijasielu) (“Describes himself as such, also shows 
between the lines,” Kuvaileekin itseään vähän sellaiseksi, näkyy myös rivien 
välistä [T2/15]; “Mentions the fact himself, but e.g. talking about the soul 
earlier,” itse mainitsee asian, mutta esim. sielusta puhuminen aikaisemmin 
[T2/19]). Such interpretations, then, are strongly anchored in the writer’s 
denotationally explicit and phenomenologically emblematic symbol-tokens. 
In fact, the only additional justification the first respondent is able to give is a 
vague reference to an impression “between the lines.” The other one cites the 
fact that the writer had previously talked about the “soul” as an example of 
the kind of sign that justifies her interpretation. 
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Although the general tone of the interpretations was perhaps even more 
unanimously negative than in the case of the other two texts, some 
respondents also regarded the writer as skilled and experienced. As for more 
specific details, one respondent noted the directly addressed question (“Do 
you too feel like,” Tuntuuko sinustakin) as a positive sign of seeking a contact 
(Hakee yhteistä; [K]ohdistaa sanomansa suoraan lukijalle [T2/13]) (see 
also chapter 5). Another one, in contrast, regarded the beginning as 
advertisement-like in a negative sense (mainostyylinen, “in the style of 
commercial advertisements”). Similarly, the general air of “smartness” was 
often interpreted as a sign of negative intentions (e.g., a will to manipulate 
readers) or questioned in terms of its representativeness (e.g., in the sense 
that the writer merely “wants to appear that way”). Some respondents 
considered the signs of “smartness” as the writer’s self-aggrandizing attempt 
to underline his intelligence, particularly combined with the fact that the 
writer does not describe any negative characteristics. A few respondents also 
took notice of the curiously vague comment (“My situation in life gives 
reasons for challenges,” Elämäntilanteeni antaa aihetta haasteisiin) and 
interpreted it as a veiled warning about some problematic biographical fact 
that will be fully confessed later (“refers to something that the man does not 
want to say right away but is not planning to conceal either,” viittaa johonkin 
asiaan, mitä mies ei halua heti kertoa, mutta ei aio sitä salatakaan 
[T2/12]). However, one thing that most of the respondents seemed to agree 
on, despite other differences, relates to the composition of the text. The 
advertisement is, for good or bad, a “writing that has been considered for a 
long time” (Pitkään mietitty kirjoitus) [T2/21], as one respondent put it. In 
that sense, it contrasts clearly with the following one. 
4.2.3 STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS: “LAID-BACK” VERSUS 
“CHILDISH” 
The third text resembles a “stream of consciousness” style of writing, and 
that is, in fact, a typification that actually occurs in the questionnaire 
responses too. Of the three texts examined in this section, the following is 
also the one that most clearly contains segments that are narrative in nature 
(see 4.4.3).  
 
(4.6) 
Nää kerro itestäs jutut on aina vaikeita,,,ainakaan valokuvissa en tykkää olla yksin, jos 
ollenkaan. Tuokin kuva on muutaman vuoden takaa kun kaveri sai jotenkin puhuttua 
ittellensä meikkimalliks valmistuessaan maskeeraajaks, joten maskaran määrä on siks 
aika suuri:) Avoeron olen kokenut tuossa vuosi sitten ja nyt vaan alkaa sosiaalinen elämä 
kiinnostaa uudelleen,,,aattelin kokeilla sit tällastakin kun ei tule niin usein tuolla 
baareissa pyörittyä. Kavereitten kanssa tykkään kyllä iltaa viettää ” syöpötellen ja 
juopotellen”:). Kotisohva ei myöskään oo pöllömpi tapa viettää aikaa ja siinä kai tulee 
töitten jälkeen ihan mukavasti aikaa vietettyäkin, vaikka virtapiikkejäkin tulee ja pidän 
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kuntoilustakin kävellen, rullaluistellen jne. olen avoin kaikelle liikunnalle. Murteesta 
huomaa että itä-suomen kasvatteja oon, vaikka oon ollu sieltä pois 10 vuotta, asustellu 
Tampesterissä, Kreikassakin käyny pyörähtämässä (ei,,,ei Jorgoksen perässä, töitten:) ja 
nyt sitten 4 vuotta täälä Helsingissä. Mie tykkään nauramisesta,,,saatan heittää aika 
hurttiakin huumoria, vähän sellanen räväkänpuoleinen varmaan,,,joten ehkä se on 
parempi että toinenkaan osapuoli ei ainakaan hirrrvn ujo ole ( vaikka sekin voi olla 
söpöä) huumorintaju ja itseironismi on aina plussaa! Mie osaan kyllä ujostellakkin, 
varsinkin sillon kun jostakin kiinnostun, se on aika persiistä:) Jos kiinnostuit ja olet 
suhteelllisen normaali kaikin puolin, eli olet muuttanut kotoa pois ja työpaikallekkin on 
raahauduttava, otappa yhteyksiä:) Vaikeeta sanoo jotain fiksua ja kiinnostavaa tähän 
loppuun, joten mie sanon vaan Hellurei! 
(4.6) 
These tell about yourself things are always tough,,,at least in photographs I don’t like to 
be alone, if at all. That picture is from a few years back when a friend of mine somehow 
talked me into modeling for [her] when she was qualifying as a make-up artist, so that’s 
why the amount of mascara is pretty big:) I have experienced a break-up about a year 
ago and well now social life is beginning to interest [me] again,,,I thought I’d also try 
something like this since I don’t tend to hang around in bars that often. With friends I do 
like to hang around “ feasting” and “drinking”:). [Your] home couch is not a bad way to 
spend time either and I suppose that’s where I tend to spend quite a lot of time after 
work, although I do get surges of energy too and I like to exercise by walking, roller-
skating etc. I’m open to all forms of sports. From the dialect [you] will notice that I’m a 
daughter of eastern finland, although I’ve been away from there for 10 years, [been] 
living in Tampester, also popped into Greece (no,,,not after Jorgos, [but] work:) and now 
then 4 years here in Helsinki. I like laughing,,,I may even make some quite risky jokes, 
[I’m] a bit kind of fervent I suppose,,,so maybe it’s better that the other [person] is at 
least not terrribly [sic] shy either ( although that too may be cute) a sense of humor and 
self-ironism [sic] are always a plus! I can be shy too, especially when I get interested in 
someone, it sucks:) If you got interested and you’re relativelly normal in every way, that 
is you have moved away from home and have to drag yourself to a workplace, get in 
contact;) Hard to say something smart and interesting here in the end, so I’ll just say 
Bye-bye! 
 
According to one respondent the text is a “stream of consciousness,” because 
the different sentences in the text are “in no way related to one another” and 
the text is not “polished” (lauseet eivät liity toisiinsa mitenkään, ei 
huoliteltua tekstiä) [T3/9]. That is, she draws attention to loose interclausal 
relations and topical coherence as well as a lack of editing. The longest clause 
complex in the text (starting with Mie tykkään nauramisesta,,,, “I like 
laughing,,,”) incorporates seven clauses (of which one is elliptic) in one 
orthographic sequence structured with parentheses and sets of three commas 
and ending with an exclamation point. The commas sometimes separate 
main clauses from one another, sometimes subordinate clauses from main 
clauses (,,,joten, “thus”), and seem to have some sort of division of labor with 
full stops and ordinary, solitary commas. The text makes no use of a division 
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into paragraphs or similar organizing indices but, rather, just flows from 
beginning to end. Moreover, the text employs colloquial or regional variants 
of pronouns (nää pro nämä, mie pro minä), adverbs (siks, sit, täälä), verb 
inflection (ei oo, oon ollu), noun declination (persiistä), clitics (-kkin) and 
proper names (Tampester, “Tampere”). Other examples of the writer’s 
graphemic creativity include, for example, the metaplasmic (or purposefully 
misspelt) form of hirrrvn, a variant of the intensifying adverb hirveän 
(“terribly”), which apparently imitates a particular kind of expressive 
pronunciation, the number of graphemes representing tremulants (-rrr-) 
being iconic of intensity. The humor of the writer was already discussed in 
4.1.1 (the case of Jorgos). There is, then, a superimposition of different layers 
of indices (stream of consciousness, colloquiality, humor). 
The following list contains five excerpts from the questionnaires, 
including the one already discussed. Each respondent interprets, and 
criticizes, the performance slightly differently in light of different norms of 
social behavior: 
 
- “No censorship on what [she] dares to say” (Ei sensuuria mitä kehtaa sanoa) 
- “The story is a bit dull and biographical. Rambling” (Tarina vähän tylsää ja 
elämänkerrallista. Jaarittelevaa) 
- “May drivel on a lot about something irrelevant. A long text” (Saattaa höpötellä 
jostain epäolennaisesta paljonkin. Pitkä teksti) 
- “The clauses are in no way related to one another, the text is not polished (lauseet 
eivät liity toisiinsa mitenkään, ei huoliteltua tekstiä) 
- “[she] didn’t think at all what you should write in a text like this so that it would 
work” (ei miettinyt yhtään, mitä tällaiseen tekstiin kannattaisi kirjoittaa, jotta se 
toimisi) 
 
The first respondent approaches the textual structure from the standpoint of 
the writer’s affects and biographic self-control. Her interpretation focuses on 
the fact that the text brings into public light things that one could have and 
others would have retained in the private realm and that others might have 
been ashamed of such speech acts. The second respondent, on the other 
hand, regards the biographic scope of the writer as too wide and the 
presented information as too unprocessed from the standpoint of the 
respondent’s affects. The verb jaaritella (“to ramble, blather”) denotes a 
verbal process that lacks concise, crystallized, and polished expression. The 
third respondent similarly concerns herself with the lack of biographic focus 
as well as the mere quantity of the presented information. The fourth one, as 
we saw earlier, is worried about the coherence of the text as well as its 
relation to a presumed ideal of what a “polished” text-artifact should be like. 
Finally, the fifth respondent assesses the composition of the text in relation 
to the purposes and consequences of the ongoing type of interactional event. 
The former comments focus more on the process of being a person and the 
latter ones on the process of producing a genred text-artifact. The important 
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point, however, is that in each interpretation stereotypes of entextualization 
overlap with stereotypes of personhood. 
The respondents above discuss from different perspectives the relation 
between private “thought” and public “communication.” Their comments 
reflect a specific kind of understanding of how written text-artifacts should 
relate to more private semiotic realms, or how artifactual residues should 
relate to the temporally unfolding semiotic processes that produced them. 
Ultimately, then, we are dealing with cultural norms of entextualization that 
regiment appropriate forms of texts and textuality, spoken and written, and 
their relations to human subjectivity and social behaviors (see e.g. Haviland 
1996; Silverstein 2000; Wogan 2004; also Scollon 1997). The underlying idea 
in the comments above seems to be that since digital text-artifacts can be 
edited, serially redesigned, modified and structured – they should be. A sort 
of temporal compression and interactional economy is expected. Not 
everything that goes on “in” one’s mind should come “out” in a speech event. 
That is, one is supposed to spare the reader from one’s “rambling” thought 
processes and processual phases of textual composition. From the standpoint 
of such ontologies, the problem with text (4.6), then, is that it contains 
elements that could and should have been edited out and are, therefore, seen 
as “speech-like” or “thought-like.” In (4.6) such indices include a loosely 
articulated and structured denotational text as well as expressions of 
planning and comments on the compositional process (e.g., “Hard to say 
something smart and interesting here in the end, so I’ll just say Bye-bye!,” 
Vaikeeta sanoo jotain fiksua ja kiinnostavaa tähän loppuun, joten mie 
sanon vaan Hellurei!). Later examples (see e.g. sections 5.2.2 and 5.5) will 
also include, for example, interjections and reactive particles, metalanguage 
of planning and repair, “inner turn structures” that have not been 
“monologized” as expected (i.e., asking a question from oneself, processing, 
replying to oneself). 
The question is, in part, about the degree to which one’s unfolding 
semiotic processes are expected to be evaluated, controlled and reflexively 
processed before making them public (e.g., in the form of linguistic signs). 
Conversely, we may ask what are the kinds of contexts in which signs are 
understood to spring “straight” from one’s subjectivity without processing. 
The very possibility of either control or directness is differently attributed to 
different types of processes. Stereotypically, speech and writing are often 
seen as different in this regard. Even with no empirical data on the actual, 
particular process of entextualization (e.g., how much time was actually 
available for or spent by the writer of a specific text-artifact such as an online 
dating advertisement), the writer can be held accountable for a lack of 
structuring, honing or condensation, since this sort of flexibility is 
stereotypically presumed as a possibility. As will be seen later, precisely 
because of assumptions like this images of “spontaneity” or “directness” (as 
positively valued forms of “stream of consciousness”) can be used in online 
dating advertisements to fight stereotypes of excessive fine-tuning and 
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polishing and related stereotypes of calculating or manipulative intentions 
(see 5.2.2). The performance and interpretation of various degrees of 
“spontaneity” versus “premeditatedness” can be seen as a form of 
stancetaking (cf. also with the discussion of privacy and confession in chapter 
5). Ultimately, ideas about the “spontaneity” of speech or thought versus the 
“premeditatedness” of writing are based on particular cultural ideologies of 
entextualization and personhood.52 It should also be noted that there are 
many kinds of stereotypes of digital text-artifacts. The diversification of 
digital and social media has brought about new types of text-artifacts, 
processes of entextualization, and ideological models associated with them. 
For some respondents, text 4.6 is not quite as problematic, perhaps not even 
markedly “spontaneous” or “rambling,” but merely normal in this context. 
That is, text-artifacts and textuality are looked at through different models by 
different interactants (see also chapter 7). 
Many respondents found the “stream of consciousness” technique 
effective or even appealing. The typification “laid-back” in different forms 
was the most recurrent one:  
 
typification n reasons 
laid-back (rento, rentoa kieltä, 
kirjoittaja pyrkii rentouden 
vaikutelmaan, “the writer aims 
at an impression of laid-
backness”) 
6 “dialect, choice of words, humor” [T3/19]; “salient 
colloquialisms” [T3/23]; “dialect, colloquialism, 
smiley, colorful choices of words and linguistic 
self-expression” [T3/26] 
direct, unreserved (välitön, 
suora) 
2 “no censorship on what she dares to say” [T3/7] 
open (avoin, avoimuus) 2 “reveals freely and diversely even [personal] 
details about herself” [T3/26] 
Table 4. Interpretations of the writer as “laid-back.” 
As in the preceding two sections, the impression was reported by some as an 
actual effect and by some as an intended effect (“aims at an impression of 
laid-backness”). Sometimes, however, “laid-back” or a similar stereotypically 
positive typification combined with a negative one, such as “annoying” 
[T3/6] or “uneducated” [T3/19], which was one of the most frequent 
typifications:  
 
                                                 
52 As an analogy: notions of “permanence” or “durability” of language are not a direct consequence 
of the physical attributes of the infrastructure (such as the dispersion of sound waves versus the 
stability of ink on paper) but mediated by cultural ideologies. (In ideological naturalization such 
physical attributes may, of course, be used as an argument.) In contrast to Western reliance on print 
and archives, other cultures may value memories embodied in humans and transmitted orally from 
person-to-person as the most “permanent” kind of memory practice (see Wogan 2004). 
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typification n reasons 
uneducated (ei korkeasti 
koulutettu, 
kouluttautumaton, ei-
koulutettu) 
5 “grammatical errors, no division into paragraphs, 
smileys, triple commas” [T3/25] 
simple, not smart, bimbo, 
“hillbilly” (yksinkertaisuus, 
bimbo, ei erityisen älykäs, 
”juntti”) 
4 “‘The university of life’ vibes” (‘elämänkoululainen’-
vibat); “Careless punctuation and grammatical 
errors” [T3/14] 
lazy (laiska, laiskuri) 3 — 53  
childish (lapsellinen) 1 “colloquialisms, smileys, choice of words” [T3/18] 
Table 5. Interpretations of the writer as “uneducated” or “childish.” 
The last text divided the respondents in terms of evaluative stance perhaps 
even more clearly than either of the previous ones. Moreover, precisely the 
same reasons (e.g., colloquialisms, smileys, choice of words) were given for 
negative impressions (e.g., “uneducated,” “childish”) and positive ones (“laid-
back,” “direct”).54 
Finally, we may note that the respondents’ interpretations of the writer’s 
own “belief in the part she is playing” (see Goffman 1990 [1959]: 28) range 
all the way from “sincere expressions” to “faking”: 
  
- “Sincere expressions” (Vilpittömiä ilmauksia) 
- “A persona capable of laughing at herself” (Itselleen nauramaan pystyvä persoona) 
- “Not entirely serious” (ei täysin tosissaan) 
- “Self-irony – – doesn’t take anything seriously” (Itseironiaa – – ei suhtaudu 
vakavasti mihinkään) 
- “Tries to crack jokes” (Yrittää heittää vitsiä) 
- “contradictory” (ristiriitainen) 
                                                 
53 None of the three respondents who had typified the writer as “lazy” gave any explicit reasons, 
but on their answer sheets two of them had underlined the parts that talk about spending time on the 
home sofa and eating and drinking. (The expression “syöpötellen ja juopotellen”:) implies lengthy 
sessions, large quantities, and overindulgence, even compulsion – and can therefore be also construed 
as “laid-back” humor or sarcasm.) 
54 As the appropriateness and effectiveness of texts is evaluated in relation to the participants and 
the norms of the event on numerous levels (e.g., text as the artifactual residue of a process of 
entextualization, as a configuration of selected and addressed linguistic signs, or as a representation of 
states of affairs), it becomes hard to distinguish between different layers of evaluation in the context of 
a relatively simple questionnaire like this. That is, the (even simultaneous) negativities or positivities of 
typifications and reasons may be directed at the appropriateness of the “text” (in relation to stereotypes 
of entextualization and text-artifacts), or the appropriateness of the “choice of words” (in relation to 
registers of conduct), or the appropriateness or the desirability of representations (in relation to 
stereotypes or prototypes of self-presentation and personhood).  
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- “Faking” or “phony” (Teeskentelevä) 
 
The above typifications all project a different kind of reflexive relation 
between the writer as a self (or an ensemble of personae) and the particular 
persona mediated by the advertisement. The ones towards the end of the list 
are more clearly negative. The last one (“faking”) construes the reflexive 
relation as involving deceptive or manipulative intentions on the writer’s 
part. Consequently, there is a projected incoherence between the persona 
mediated by the advertisement and the writer’s other personae. That is, the 
promotional persona is not seen as a representative mediation of the person. 
The preceding one (“contradictory”), on the other hand, focuses more on the 
interpreter’s own problems of aligning to or finding coherence in the 
performance. The ones in the middle take the reflexive relation more or less 
unproblematically as a form of humorous self-presentation. That is, there is a 
projected difference between the “ironic” promotional persona and other 
personae, but that difference is seen as an overt and coherent one and 
motivated by a healthy self-esteem. The first typification, in turn, projects an 
iconicity between the persona expressed in the advertisement and the 
writer’s self-conceptions. In some sense, the writer’s promotional persona is 
seen as a particularly representative one and one that the writer is “seriously” 
committed to. It might be, then, that the salience of the performance makes 
the question of the writer’s own stance towards the persona she is performing 
less easily avoidable and leads to more explicit and definite, even highly 
diverging, interpretations about the writer’s intentions and commitment as 
well as the success of the performance (see also 5.2.2 and 7.2). 
4.2.4 EXPERIENCING AND REPORTING VIEWS OF SUBJECTIVITY 
Even if the examples chosen for the questionnaire were stylistically relatively 
marked and their mutual contrasts were heightened by their indexical 
juxtaposition in this study, it seems clear that writers necessarily give off a 
specific kind of “view of subjectivity” to others, at least when others are asked 
to report one. Indirectly, this section has examined the unfolding of 
intersubjective contacts between minds and social relations between persons. 
The direct object of observation, of course, has merely been how a particular 
group of respondents typifies others and justifies those typifications, when 
prompted to do so in a particular manner in a particular social setting.55 
                                                 
55 That is, the same respondents might have given different typifications and reasons in a different 
context and other respondents would have given different typifications in a similar context. To some 
extent, the language-orientedness of both the respondents (students of linguistics) and the setting (a 
course in discourse studies) probably increased the focus on particular kinds of indices and ontologies. 
For instance, examples of non-lay viewpoints in the respondents’ answers include specific grammatical 
terminology (leksikko “lexicon,” adjektiivit “adjectives,” -kin partikkelin käyttö ”the use of the particle 
-kin”) and exact professional or scientific metalanguage (toiveiden, tahdon ja halujen ilmipannut 
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Social personae and relations, however, reside in such public processes as 
much as they do in any fleeting or private “impressions” that these reflexive 
representational processes may or may not represent with some degree of 
accuracy. It was seen in the analyses that all layers of textual performance, all 
the way to its basic visual aspects (such as graphemic choices and 
orthography) were read relatively directly as signs of personhood (see also 
7.1.2). The analyses also showed that there are clear patterned differences in 
the foci and outcomes of interpretation. That is, different respondents (even 
within a relatively homogeneous group of respondents) paid attention to 
different signs or interpreted the same signs in light of different ontologies. 
As we saw, these ontologies include stereotypes of personhood as well as 
stereotypes of entextualization. 
The questionnaire responses clarify the interplay between two different 
types of events: an (nth) event centered around the online dating 
advertisement and a subsequent (n+1th) event centered around the 
questionnaire, in which the respondent has to publicly commit to an 
interpretation and be able to justify it. There is a two-way dynamic between 
the events. The advertisement text is the basis of the respondent’s 
typification, but once the respondent has committed to the typification, the 
text becomes re-readable as a source of evidence or support for the 
interpretation the respondent commits to. That is, the stances the 
interpreters take towards the writer in another interactional event are social 
statuses for which the interpreters themselves become accountable for. That 
is, each subsequent event, with their own purposes and frames of 
participation, reflexively re-organizes the interpretation of the text (e.g., 
which signs or interpretants become foregrounded or upgraded in terms of 
relevance and which are contrasted with one another). The questionnaire 
data, then, is not a mere representation of some “actual” interpretation but a 
further mediation of the semiotic process. 
Some of the above analyses discussed the possibility that denotationally 
explicit symbolic formulations (“describable” characteristics) as easily 
perceivable, segmentable, decontextualizable, and inferentially articulated 
elements may guide, at the very least, the reportability and typifiability of 
indexical effects (see Silverstein 2001; Agha 1997a; 2007a: e.g. 286–288; cf. 
Sapir 1985 [1927]: 533–534). That is, a particular choice of symbol-tokens 
may increase or decrease the interactions between the “described” and the 
“performed.” When the writers symbolically formulated or implied the effects 
they were striving at, it often showed in one way or another in the 
                                                                                                                                          
ilmaukset, “explicitated expressions of wishes, will and desires”; puhekielisyys kohosteista, 
“salient colloquialisms”; tekstin rakenne, “the structure of the text”; poeettisuuteen ja esteettisyyteen 
nähden, “in regard to [its] poetic and aesthetic nature”). Similarly, the negativity and normativity of 
interpretations may be increased by particular kinds of settings (e.g., the evaluators are outsiders far 
removed from the actual writers and the actual event type of online dating; class-room setting) as well 
as the demographic traits of the respondents (e.g., their relatively young age).  
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respondents’ typifications. Sometimes such symbols seemed to attract the 
respondents’ reported interpretations. On the other hand, excessive 
underlining of one’s intentions was not looked upon favorably by some 
respondents of text 4.5. In any case, the interpretations may always veer 
towards more than one direction, as was seen, for example, in the case of 
qualitative and quantitative or agent-centered and patient-centered 
interpretations of text 4.4. Nevertheless, in the case of contradictions 
between different interpretational possibilities, the respondents may more 
easily opt for such symbol-tokens as more reliable or at least somehow 
inomissible grounds for interpretation. From the standpoint of respondents 
who are accountable for and have to stand behind their interpretations, 
highly emblematic and inferentially articulated signs may feel like a safer 
choice. For instance, in the case of text 4.4 one respondent listed “insecure” 
on the answer sheet, because it was “said directly” by the writer, although the 
typification was not “supported by the rest of the text,” i.e., it did not 
correspond with the respondent’s other impressions (sanoo suoraan 
olevansa epävarma, mutta muu teksti ei tue tätä vaikutelmaa) [T1/22]. The 
“accuracy” of interpretations is, however, also dependent on the interpreters’ 
more timebound and event-specific states and inclinations. Due to the 
relatively narrow time limit, these answers reflect a particular kind of 
preliminary or cursory reading. In actual online dating practices those 
advertisements that appear interesting would probably be re-read and 
scrutinized more carefully before proceeding to, say, writing a reply. That is, 
the efforts of interpretation are relative to the agent’s level of interest and 
desire. 
4.3 CHRONOTOPIC FORMULATIONS 
As was seen in the previous section, “views of subjectivity” or “mind styles” 
involve a particular kind of temporal structuring as well as a particular kind 
of shifting of focus through different domains of experience. In short, there is 
a temporal unfolding of a perspective on the world. Let us now discuss 
matters of time and space from a complementary point of view. The 
emphasis in this section will be not so much on “subjectivity” but on cultural, 
symbolic imagery of personhood situated in time and place. This section 
introduces the Bakhtinian notion of chronotopic formulations, reworked into 
a semiotic frame. The concept refers to semiotic representations of time and 
place inhabited by social types (see Agha 2007b; 2011a; Bakhtin 1986: 25–
54; also Schryer 1999). One of the views that Bakhtin and Peirce held in 
common was that the experience of time and space is not “natural” or 
“transcendental” but semiotically mediated (see e.g. Parmentier 1985b). For 
instance, experiences of the passing of time on interactional time scales as 
well as the sociohistorical eras or biographic phases we inhabit are all 
mediated and reorganized by the signs we interpret in light of various 
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ontologies. That is, humans reside and comport within interpretations of 
personhood, space, and time (see Kockelman 2013a; cf. also Duranti 2010) 
(see also section 4.4.3 on narrative).   
The analyses in this section examine a variety of ways in which the writers 
locate the ongoing intersubjective encounter in time and space. The aim is to 
get an idea of how described figures of personhood and performed “views of 
consciousness” may be located in different chronotopic settings. Let us start 
by having a look at how the semiotic encounter mediated by the 
advertisement is reflexively calibrated with symbolic-indexical expressions of 
time and space (for reflexive calibration, see Silverstein 1993). By looking at 
some common deictic adverbs and pronouns in their co-texts, we can get an 
overview of different orientations. The examples analyzed below have been 
selected among segments that contain one or more of the following forms 
(n=136): the deictic adverbs täällä (“here” [broadly delimited]), tässä (“here” 
[proximal, narrowly delimited]), tänne (“here” LAT, “to this place”), täältä 
(“from here”), nyt (“now”); the related interrogative adverbs missä 
(“where”), minne (”where to”), mistä (“where from”), milloin (“when”); and 
the deictic pronominal forms tällä (“this” ADE), tässä (“[in] this” INE), näissä 
(“[in] these” INE). The focus will be on the interplay between the stereotypic 
denotational schemas of the deictic expressions and various superimposed 
cotextual effects (see e.g. Agha 1996; Schegloff 1972). What is of interest in 
the following examples is where the indexical origo is located, how wide its 
scope or range is, and whether there is a particular kind of directional 
orientation (e.g., away from or towards a place). In short, the following 
writers offer different kinds of answers to the question: “Where are we 
(headed) now?” 
One of the choices a writer has to make is whether or not the online 
dating process itself will figure as an explicit chronotope in the advertisement 
text. Some writers explicitly locate themselves within a virtual online space: 
  
(4.7a) En ole onnistunut vielä löytämään Sinua vaikka olen maailmaa kiertänyt. 
Löytyisitkö sitten täältä, vain me voimme ottaa siitä selvää? 
(4.7a) I have not yet succeeded in finding You although I have been around the world. 
Could you be found here then, only we can find that out? 
 
(4.7b) Täällä päässä bittiavaruutta kirjoittelee vähintäänkin kehityskelpoinen mies, joka 
kaipaisi naisellista seuraa päiviensä piristykseksi. 
(4.7b) At this end of bit space writes a man who is developable at the very least and who 
longs for female company to brighten his days. 
 
In example (4.7a), there is a contrast between “here” and the “world” that 
one can “travel around.” It implies that “here” is the delimited virtual 
environment of the dating forum. The advertisement itself is a point in 
spacetime shared with the reader, a meeting place for “us” (see also 6.14a). In 
example (4.7b), in contrast, the writer and the reader exist at different 
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(broadly delimited) locations within the online space. In this case, the 
advertisement merely serves as a medium that traverses the separating space 
and connects the two persons. 
A recurring way to formulate advertisement titles, which in many services 
will be the first visible part of a profile to someone who has performed a 
search or is browsing through advertisements, is to address targeted online 
daters and persuade them to open (or to enter) one’s advertisement:  
 
- [Title] Peek in here! (Kurkista tänne!) 
- [Title] Here! (Täällä!)  
- [Title] Zoom in here! (Zoomaa tänne!) 
- [Title] Where are you? (Missä sinä olet?) 
- [Title] Nice,smart and decent young men HERE (Mukavat,fiksut ja asialliset nuoret 
miehet TÄNNE) 
 
A built-in feature of online dating web sites, and therefore a shared indexical 
fact for the interactants, is that one has to navigate within the structured 
space of the web site and make selections in order to get access to entire 
advertisement texts. Such directed movements of potential readers can be 
anticipated, represented and guided by the writers. The above examples all 
beckon potential readers, who at this point only have visual contact with the 
title, towards the space where more of the writer can be encountered and 
learned about.56 The selectivity inherent in all online dating interaction 
should also be noted already at this point. Instead of enticing just any kind of 
reader, the last example explicitly addresses criteria of selectivity for ideal 
respondents. That is, it attempts to control the navigations and selections of 
others based on diacritics of personhood. Time and space, then, are 
intimately connected with aspects of social life and personhood. 
The origo of the event can also be a point in the life of the writer. In such 
cases, the here-and-now becomes contextualized as belonging to some 
specific biographic phase:  
 
(4.8a) Olen vastikään eronnut avopuolisostani, eikä erosta ole vielä liikoja aikaa, joten ei 
voi sanoa että varsinaisesti tositarkoituksella tässä liikuskelen, mutta eihän sitä koskaan 
tiedä mitä tähtiin on kirjoitettu minunkin pään menoksi....=) 
(4.8a) I have recently broken up with my partner, and it hasn’t been too long since the 
break-up, so I can’t say that I’d be really seriously moving around here, but you never 
know what has been written in the stars for me….=) 
 
                                                 
56 Similar examples without the deictic adverbs of time or space that were used to select the main 
set of examples are numerous in the data. Titles can also, for example, model a future event in which 
the other has already decided to read the text and evaluate that event positively (“nice of you to take a 
peek!”, kiva kun kurkkasit!) (see also 6.3.2), or they can anticipate and appeal to the other’s processes 
of selection  (“Wouldn’t you take a look after all,” Katsoisit nyt kuitenkin). 
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(4.8b) Elän nyt elämäni parhainta aikaa, kun monet elämän myllerrykset ovat takanpäin 
eikä velvoittavia sidonnaisuuksia juuri enää ole. Tässä tilanteessa tuntuu, että hyvä 
ystävä olisi kullanarvoinen, mutta elämänkumppanillekin olisi tilausta. 
(4.8b) I am now living the best time of my life, when many of the turmoils of life are 
behind and there are not many obligations left. In this situation it feels like a good 
friend would be worth [his weight in] gold, but I could also use a life partner. 
 
(4.8c) Positiivinen eronnut mies jonka aikuiset lapset ovat jo muuttaneet omiin 
oloihinsa, koti ja haastava työ Espoossa ovat tämän ajan tärkeimpiä asioita. Nyt on aika 
ottaa elämässä askel eteenpäin. 
(4.8c) A positive divorced man whose grown-up children have already moved to their 
own homes, a home and a challenging job in [the city of] Espoo are the most important 
things in this phase. Now is the time to take a step ahead in life. 
 
The first example (4.8a) still points to the world of online dating, but the act 
of writing an online dating advertisement is contextualized on a biographic 
time scale (i.e., it belongs to a liminal post-break-up phase) that serves as a 
motivating reason for the act itself (i.e., the writer’s intention is to gradually 
re-inhabit the role of a single looking for a partner) and its more specific kind 
(i.e., she is not necessarily looking for a serious relationship yet). That is, in 
(4.8a) the present is contextualized in terms of a recent past. The effects of 
the past events are still highly palpable in the ongoing event. Other examples, 
in contrast, are more determinedly future-oriented. The last example (4.8c) 
begins with a description of a more distant biographic past. In contrast to 
(4.8a), the described divorce is no longer a recent event but an attribute of 
the person. Similarly, the perfect tense (“children have already moved to 
their own homes”) seems to denote a current attribute of the person rather 
than a past event (see also VISK § 1535). The description of the biographic 
past is followed by a description of the present phase. Together the two serve 
as a contrastive context for a future phase. The here-and-now of the ongoing 
semiotic encounter is marked as the beginning of a transition to a new 
biographic phase. The writer of example (4.8b) in the middle seems to be the 
one most content with the present. Her biographic description merely opens 
up a space for a new significant other to join that present phase. 
For some writers, geographic locations serve as spatiotemporal anchors 
for the ongoing event. In example (4.9), the writer has mentioned earlier that 
she lives in the city of Turku on the west coast of Finland. When describing 
the location of the ideal other, she grounds that description in her own origo 
(“from here, near the west coast”) implying a certain appropriate maximum 
radius from her location: 
  
(4.9) Siis sinä reilu ja hyvällä itsetunnolla varustettu noin 52–56 vuotias kaveri 
mielellään täältä länsirannikon tuntumasta, postia sinulta odottelee 53v, 168cm, 64kg 
nainen. 
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(4.9) So you decent about 52–56-year-old guy equipped with a good self-esteem here 
from the vicinity of the west coast, a 53-year-old 168cm, 64kg woman is waiting for your 
mail. 
 
That is, geographical proximity is used as a criterion of preference. She links 
the event of writing with an ideal event of reading in terms of shared 
geographic space. Example (4.10), in contrast, merely contextualizes the 
event in relation to the capital region of Finland, where the writer currently 
lives because of his work, but without any explicit criteria of proximity for the 
reader. Instead, the writer expresses a strong desire to move somewhere else 
in the future (perhaps towards or with the addressee): 
  
(4.10) Pääkaupunkiseudulle olen yrittänyt kotiutua nyt kymmenkunta vuotta. En ole 
cityihminen, enkä taida koskaan tuntea kaupunkia kodikseni, mutta tänne tässä nyt 
vaan koetetaan tehdä oloa kotoisaksi. Täällä kun on töitä ja mahdollisuuksia edetä ja 
kehittyä ammatissa. Haaveena tietenkin olisi vielä joskus muuttaa vähän rauhallisempiin 
ympyröihin täältä... 
(4.10) I have been trying to put down roots in the capital region for about ten years now. 
I am not a city person and I suppose the city will never feel like home to me, but here 
I’m now still trying to feel like home here. Here there’s work and opportunities to 
advance and develop in [my] profession. The dream of course is to one day move to 
slightly more peaceful circles from here…  
 
Chronotopic formulations like these, then, link geographic places with the 
direction of time (past–future), physical movement (towards–away), mental 
states (alienation–identification/desire) and social statuses (professional 
identity–personal identity). 
Example (4.11) is a short and concise yet very explicit and representative 
example of the ways in which chronotopic formulations can be used to select 
for desirable addressees. The writer formulates a contrast between two 
chronotopes by linking one district of Helsinki (Kallio) with a particular type 
of cultural place and behavior (lähiräkälöitä, “local [rundown] bars”; 
roaming through them) and another one (north Helsinki) with the proximity 
of nature, implying two entirely different lifestyles and sets of values: 
  
(4.11) ¶Jos asut Kalliossa ja koluat lähiräkälöitä, emme elä samassa maailmassa. Itse 
asun Pohjois-Helsingissä ja täällä on luonto lähellä. 
(4.11) ¶If you live in Kallio and roam through local rundown bars, we don’t live in the 
same world. I myself live in north Helsinki and here nature is nearby.  
 
The writer strongly identifies with the latter one, north Helsinki and the 
proximity of nature. The reader is addressed with a combination of 
conditional clause and main clause that formulates the reader’s place of 
residence and patterns of life as a condition for compatibility and as a 
criterion of whether the two participants reside in the same semiotic world or 
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not (cf. also section 6.4). That is, should the respondent reside in the non-
desirable chronotope, then that would be an immediate sign of 
incompatibility and undesirability. 
In the previous examples deictic expressions and their co-texts specify the 
zero point from which the writer addresses the reader in the ongoing event. 
In addition, there are plenty of imagined, simulated, or reported chronotopic 
scenarios (e.g., general habits or possible particular events) (cf. with 
reportive and nomic kinds of calibration, Silverstein 1993). They describe 
and reason about desirable, ideal, or normative forms of personhood in 
spacetime. For instance, the following example operates with two 
complementary dating scenarios, a sophisticated one and a down-to-earth 
one: 
 
(4.12) Joskus voin viedä sinut parempaan ravintolaan syömään kolme ruokalajia ja siellä 
saatan maistaa lasin tai kaksi punaviiniä seurassasi. Oikeasti en kyllä ole mikään viinin 
tuntija, en varmaan erottaisi vuosikertapunkkua rypälemehulla blandatusta pirtusta... 
Mutta miehenhän kuuluukin juoda olutta!? Sinäkin olet sen verran maanläheinen, että 
saan sinusta seuraa pitsalle ja oluelle, tai vaikka torikahvilan pöytään maistelemaan 
paistettuja muikkuja kertakäyttölautaselta. 
(4.12) Sometimes I can take you to a finer restaurant to eat three courses and there I may 
have a glass or two of red wine in your company. In reality I am no expert on wine, I 
probably couldn’t tell apart a vintage red wine [COLL] from a moonshine blended [COLL] 
with grape juice… But a man is supposed to drink beer, right!? Similarly you’re 
sufficiently down-to-earth so that I can have you as a companion for pizza and beer, or 
for example to a table in a market café to taste fried vendace from a disposable plate. 
 
From the standpoint of chronotopes, we may, first of all, note that the writer 
paints an accurate picture of such scenarios by noting details of the 
environment as well as the internal unfolding of the scenario with, for 
example, aspectual modification (e.g., “to a table in a market café to taste 
[durative, atelic] fried vendace from a disposable plate”; torikahvilan 
pöytään maist-ele-maan paistettuja muikkuja kertakäyttölautaselta). 
From the standpoint of personhood, it is noteworthy that the more specific 
episodes in the simulated scenarios are calibrated in relation to actual 
biographic time in terms of frequency or probability (“sometimes I can,” 
joskus voin; “I can [habitually] have you as a companion,” saan sinusta 
seuraa; “I may have a glass or two,” saatan maistaa lasin tai kaksi). 
Moreover, the writer simultaneously negotiates both gender roles and such 
lifestyles that are stereotypically related to particular socioeconomic statuses. 
There is a contrast between stereotypic roles of men and women and a 
contrast between, say, “elitist” and “folksy” patterns of consumption. The two 
become interrelated in many ways. For instance, drinking beer is associated 
by the writer both with conservative gender stereotypes, in which gender 
roles and their boundaries are relatively strictly defined and regimented in 
terms of complementary opposites (“a man is supposed to drink beer”), and 
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with a down-to-earth, informal folk lifestyle that does not require the kind of 
connoisseurship wine does. The higher position of the elitist patterns in a 
social hierarchy is not questioned, as demonstrated, for example, by the 
evaluative and comparative “finer restaurant.” The writer, however, clearly 
identifies with the folksy lifestyle; note also the use of colloquial variants 
punkku (“red wine”) and blandattu (“blended”) when talking about the elitist 
lifestyle. He is nevertheless willing to make occasional compromises, while 
expecting similar concessions from the ideal other, who is presumed to 
identify with the opposite pattern of consumption but required to share 
similar ideas about gender roles. That is, the chronotopic formulation of 
social life is used to illustrate the self’s values and to negotiate mutual 
compatibility and desirability with others.  
The last two examples of this section serve to illustrate how the different 
phenomena discussed so far combine and co-occur in texts. They also serve 
as a lead-in to the more specific textual patterns examined in the following 
section. The deictic-chronotopic calibrations of the interactional event, 
chronotopic scenarios of ideal worlds, different mind styles, and more 
specific described, performed or proposed characteristics of self or others 
usually correlate in many ways. In the following text, such patterns co-
mediate a mode of personhood that might be typified, for instance, as 
“cosmic-spiritual”: 
 
(4.13) [Title] Sielunsisar? ¶Olen tallustanut maaplaneetalla tässä muodossa kohta 28 
vuotta. Kannan harteillani menneisyyden kivirekeä, mutta olen vapautumassa siitä. 
Polkuuni kuuluu niin pimeyttä kuin valoakin, koska omaan keskimääräistä laajemman 
tunneskaalan ja intuition, joiden läpi suodatan maailmaa. On tärkeää pysyä jalat maassa, 
olla tunteva ja kehollinen ihminen, joka kuitenkin on sielu ikuisella matkalla. Arvostan 
sellaisia olentoja, joilla on hyvä sydän, eivätkä juokse karkuun tai paina villasella toisen 
kärsimystä. Sinun kärsimyksesi on minun kärsimykseni.¶Tällä elämänpolulla etsin 
sielunsisarta, jonka kanssa – – Herkkyys, sydämellisyys, lähimmäisenrakkaus, 
henkisyys joka ei ole pelkkää leijumista, ystävyys, kasvissyönti, rakkaus eläimiin, 
musikaalisuus, taiteellisuus, luovuus, elämänmyönteisyys... tässä muutamia avainsanoja. 
– – Ystävyydellä, [pseudonym] 
(4.13) [Title] Soul sister? ¶I have walked on the planet Earth in this form for nearly 28 
years. I bear on my shoulders a burden of the past, but I am liberating myself from it. My 
path includes both darkness and light, because I possess an exceptionally wide range of 
emotions and intuition, through which I filter the world. It is important to keep one’s 
feet on the ground, to be a feeling and corporeal human, who nevertheless is a soul on an 
eternal journey. I appreciate beings who have a good heart and do not run away or 
ignore others’ suffering. Your suffering is my suffering. ¶On this path of life I am looking 
for a soul sister, with whom – – Sensitivity, cordiality, love for one’s neighbor, 
spirituality that is not mere gloating, friendship, vegetarianism, love of animals, 
musicality, artistry, creativity, optimism... here’s a few keywords. – – With friendship, 
[pseudonym] 
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The writer, for example, locates the ongoing interactional event as a step on 
“this path of life,” “on planet Earth,” “in this form” (implying other forms). 
She contextualizes the present biographic phase as being marked by an 
ongoing process of liberation from the “burden of the past.” Self and others 
are typified as “beings.” According to the more general ideological position 
(see 4.4.1) she takes, the ideal in life is to be a “feeling corporeal human” who 
is, however, aware of being a “soul on an eternal journey.” That is, she 
theorizes (see 4.4.1) the corporeal existence of an individual as merely one 
form of existence of some eternal transcendent entity. Such views evoke 
particular Eastern forms of religious thinking. The pseudonym that she uses 
similarly points to Eastern cultures (see 4.4.5). Moreover, in the list of 
described ideal characteristics (see 4.4.2) she includes items such as “love for 
one’s neighbor” and a non-superficial form of “spirituality.” The specific 
person she is looking for is described as a “soul sister.” However, she closes 
the advertisement by bidding friendship non-selectively to anyone who 
happens to read the text (see patterns of addressivity in chapter 6).  
We see, then, that chronotopes overlap with and contribute to views of 
subjectivity (cf. also the “scientific” example 4.5 above). There is also an 
overlap with various enregistered speech styles (see also 4.4.3 and 4.4.4).57 
The following text, for instance, clearly aspires after a recognizable religious 
register (employing a particular meter, rhymes, marked lexemic choices, and 
archaic-sounding 1PL imperatives), while it portrays a chronotope of religious 
life:  
 
(4.14) ¶Raitis, elämä on paras huume. Usko Jeesukseen on enemmän kuin kaikki 
maailman mielipiteet. En halua olla fanaatikko, mutta en kaikkiin entisiin maailman 
rientoihin enää halua palata. Puhukaamme rohkeasti, aratkin asiat suotuisasti. 
Toistemme kunnioittamisessa kilpailkaamme, siitä ystävyytemme ja kumppanuutemme 
kauniimman jaamme. Jos vahingossa toistamme loukkaamme, anteeksi pyytäkäämme, 
siitä riemun ja luottamuksen toisillemme saamme. – – 
(4.14) ¶Sober, life is the best drug. Belief in Jesus is more than all the world’s opinions. I 
do not want to be a fanatic, but I do not wish to return to all the former worldly doings 
anymore. Let us speak boldly, even of the sensitive things favorably. Let us compete in 
respecting one another, that’ll give us a most beautiful friendship and companionship. If 
by accident we hurt the other one, let us apologize, that’ll give us joy and trust in one 
another. 
 
As a result the text mediates a particular kind of first-person perspective on 
the world (e.g., a “peaceful” one yet “determined” to sharply distinguish 
                                                 
57 One might, in fact, say that registers are enregistered (i.e., widely recognized, “conventional”) 
chronotopes. That is, they are stereotypes that, for some community, link perceivable signs with 
particular social statuses, mental states, or cultural settings (with varying focus on time, place, or 
personhood). In a sense, then, chronotope is merely a broader way of parameterizing the reflexive 
relations between enregistered signs and the icons that they are linked to. (Cf. Agha 2007a, b.) 
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“worldly” vices and temptations from a “pious” form of life). This all goes to 
show that types of subjectivities, types of spatiotemporally situated cultural 
behaviors, and types of discourse about such subjectivities or behaviors tend 
to regroup in coherent ways. It is, however, analytically useful to distinguish 
the different dimensions. The next section will now examine a number of 
more specific textual patterns that make use of different combinations of 
such dimensions. 
4.4 TEXTUAL PATTERNING OF ONLINE DATING 
ADVERTISEMENTS 
This section takes a closer look at the ingredients of the online dating 
advertisements in the data. It analyzes more specifically the kinds of 
structural differences that may give rise to different views of subjectivity (see 
section 4.2) and the ways in which chronotopic imagery (see section 4.3) or 
describable, performable, and proposable characteristics (see section 4.1) 
may become organized in text-artifacts. It also introduces some new textual 
patterns. The order of presentation in this section is loosely based on the 
frequency and significance of such patterns in light of the data and the focus 
of this study. The aim of the rest of this chapter 4 as well as chapters 5 and 6 
is to illustrate contrastively the range of different ways in which textual 
patterns can serve as indices of personhood in the data. Although the explicit 
focus in this section tends to be on the writer, it should be emphasized from 
the outset that most of the textual patterns presented here can be applied to 
both selves and ideal or non-ideal others. Furthermore and more 
importantly, any entextualized and addressed pattern of signs in an online 
dating advertisement, regardless of whom or what it is about, always indexes 
relations between selves and others. 
4.4.1 THEORETICAL AND REFLECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS  
Linde (1993: 21–22) distinguishes what she calls “life stories” from other 
kinds of stories on the criterion that life stories have as their evaluative aim 
to “show something about the kind of person the speaker is” (id. p. 22) rather 
than to make some general point about the way the world is. According to 
Linde, the essential question is how the story is constructed, not the nature of 
the narrated events as such. That is, in principle, any event can be narrated 
so that the point becomes either about the narrator or about the events. 
Although this sort of difference in focus is relevant for many types of non-
narrative discourse as well, in online dating advertisements the distinction 
between “the way the world is” and the kind of person who perceives it as 
such becomes much harder to maintain. In online dating advertisements, 
anything a writer does or does not do – even a blank screen – is interpretable 
as being “about” the writer a person, as an indice of personhood. Also, in 
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light of our previous discussions, it is obvious that the “point” of any piece of 
discourse is strongly a matter of co-construction and co-interpretation. For 
instance, for some respondents the “scientific” example (4.5) above seemed 
partly to miss the point of an appropriate online dating advertisement by 
being too general and “theoretical.” For others, it was merely an instance of 
being “reflective” and “bright” about one’s life. One might conceive of a 
continuum that ranges from points that are very explicitly about the writer 
and/or reader as persons towards points that are more explicitly about the 
world and only implicitly about the participants and their mutual relation. In 
fact, there are two interlinked variables here: (1) the overt indexical 
calibration of entextualized contents to the participants of the ongoing event, 
and (2) the level of generalization, abstraction, or naturalization of the 
contents (e.g., how far they have been removed from the actual events that 
served as their roots or the subjects whose perspectives they represent; how 
many indexical and inferential steps away from relatively particular persons 
or perceivable states of affairs they stand). 
This section has two goals. It sketches the more abstract end of the 
continuum, whereas the following sections will deal with the less abstract 
end. The more fundamental goal, however, is to first show that linguistic self-
presentation is a form of theoretical agency (see section 2.1.3). That is, this 
section aims to clarify the fact that writing an online dating advertisement 
essentially consists in theorizing one’s existence and values by characterizing 
them and reasoning about them with cultural symbols, propositions, and 
textual structures. In the advertisement phase the writers also tend to have 
sole theoretical agency. Their representations can only ever become 
contested by others in subsequent phases.  
Any linguistic description of self or others interprets a person’s embodied 
and embedded residence in the world with some set of cultural concepts and 
those knowledge structures that such concepts are grounded in. Let us start 
by having a look at how the following examples thematize, characterize, and 
reason about the physical attributes of the writers (i.e., their material or 
bodily kinds). In the following examples, each sentence is a theoretical 
representation of things that exist as, for example, visually or tactilely 
perceivable objects in the world. They also exist as multiply pre-interpreted 
objects. That is, the writers have internalized the attitudes others have 
previously taken towards them and the representations they have composed 
about them. Now these objects are representationally re-interpreted and 
reasoned about in the text-artifacts: 
 
(4.15a) Naisethan aina arvostavat pitkiä miehiä. Noh, minä en ole sellainen. Pituutta on 
alle 180cm. Kuitenkin yli 175cm, joten ihan kääpiö en kaiketi ole. Painoindeksin mukaan 
olen normaalipainoinen. Hiukset ovat tummanruskeat ja pitkähköt. 
(4.15a) Women always appreciate tall men, right? Well, I’m not one of those. I’m less 
than 180cm tall. Yet more than 175cm, so I suppose I’m not quite a dwarf. According to 
the body mass index my weight is normal. My hair is dark brown and longish. 
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(4.15b) 
Olen             187cm 82 kg 52v   eronnut  liikuntaa    harrastava,  
be:IND.PRS.1SG    187cm 82 kg 52-year-old (ABBR) divorced sports:PTV do:PTCP 
 
hyvällä  huumorilla varustettu pojankloppi uudeltamaalta. 
good:ADE humor:ADE equipped    boy (“cub”)  Uusimaa:ABL 
 
I am a 187cm 82 kg 52-year-old divorced exercising, boyish man from uusimaa 
[province] equipped with a good sense of humor. 
 
The writers’ attributes are thematized and characterized with concepts 
grounded in specific cultural practices of knowledge production or epistemic 
formations that link empirical observations, theoretical representations, and 
practical interventions (see Kockelman 2013b: 182; also chapters 7 and 8). 
Some of the concepts (e.g., “body mass index,” painoindeksi) are clearly 
more technical and specialized than others. To illustrate the difference we 
may note, for example, that the choices for the height of a person and for the 
length of the hair are quite different in this regard. The length of the first 
writer’s hair is characterized with a relative adjective (pitkä, “long”) qualified 
with a moderative suffix (-hkö, “fairly, relatively, -ish”). What “longish” hair 
means in terms of practical consequences is left for the reader to infer. The 
description presupposes some sufficiently shared understanding of a 
stereotypic scalarization of male hair lengths. Height, on the other hand, is 
characterized in centimeters, a universally standardized and measurable 
unit, which allows for considerably less liberty of interpretation than 
typifying one’s hair as “longish” and “dark brown.” There may, of course, be 
differences in, say, the norms that guide the appropriate rounding off of 
measured figures in everyday practices. Still, the leeway for “embellishing” 
descriptions in centimeters without turning them into “lies” is supposedly 
relatively narrow because of the chosen theoretical frame (see also chapter 7). 
It is therefore noteworthy that the first writer characterizes his height merely 
as a range on a scale, despite the choice of a precise numeric unit of measure. 
Similarly, the precise BMI figure is reinterpreted in terms of normative 
statistical ranges (such as “normal” versus “slightly overweight”). The second 
writer, in contrast, gives precise figures of both his height and weight. 
We see here the difference between numerical quantification and 
linguistic grading (Sapir 1985 [1944]; Kockelman & Bernstein 2012; cf. also 
e.g. Martin & White 2004: 135–159). Describing someone’s hair as long relies 
on a specific understanding of when a particular member of the class “hair” is 
relatively longer than other members in that class on average. That is, 
grading predicates, such as “long,” presuppose a comparison class and some 
normative or stereotypic basis of comparison. Consequently, the longness of 
“long” hair and the longness of, say, a “long” road are of entirely different 
magnitudes if reinterpreted in standardized quantifiable units, such as 
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meters. Graders, then, are shifters that are grounded in the context of use 
and in the perspectives of the interpreting agents. Their specific meaning also 
often relates to vectors of expected, hoped-for, or feared change (see Sapir 
1985 [1944]: 125–144). For instance, an expression such as “enough already” 
(see example 5.15) presupposes the growth of some quality, but it can signify 
either a growing satisfaction or a growing dissatisfaction depending on how 
the current quantity of that quality is interpreted in relation to some 
presupposed normative limit (approaching/exceeding a negatively/positively 
valued limit). In example (4.15a), the writer positions himself in a kind of 
neutral space in relation to two different vectors. He describes himself as not 
falling too far from the affectively and socially valued stereotype of height, 
and at the same time he claims to reach a sufficient distance from the non-
appreciated extreme. Such grading discursive patterns, then, are 
representational interpretants that evaluate and organize relations between 
perceived qualities and quantities of those qualities in light of cultural and 
personal assumptions.58   
 We see that the selection of appropriate epistemic formations is guided 
by values on both personal and cultural levels. It seems that the “length” of a 
person is considered more important as a criterion of desirability and 
selection than the length of the person’s hair; hence the former requires a 
more precise theoretical frame than the latter. Consequently, if one 
anticipates a problem with one’s height (as in 3.15a), it takes more rhetorical 
effort to give off enough relevant information about one’s height for the 
advertisement to be appropriate and effective, but not too much in order not 
to reduce the number of favorable respondents at the outset (before getting a 
chance to let one’s other characteristics shine through). The contrast between 
examples (4.15a) and (4.15b) shows that the thematizing and characterizing 
of personal characteristics in promotional discourse is guided by 
understandings about the social desirability of such characteristics both on a 
more general level (cultural hierarchies of characteristics and related 
epistemic formations) and on a more particular level (how to fit one’s self-
perceptions into such general models).  
When moving towards a description of his social attributes, the writer of 
(4.15b), too, resorts to cultural stereotypes of personhood. He denotes 
relatively unambiguous social statuses (“divorced”) as well as more subjective 
traits of personality (“good sense of humor,” “boyish”). His self-
presentational performance, nevertheless, is a relatively neat quantification 
                                                 
58 For instance, height per se is a neutral quality that every person has. It becomes positively 
valued within some specific quantitative range. In that sense, the grading “I’m tall” (= taller than 
average in the presupposed comparison class) and the quantifying “I’m 175 cm tall” are quite different 
kinds of expressions of height. It is noteworthy that the former usage of “tall” often implies a positive 
evaluation. It is closer to such grading predicates as “good” (see 5.2.1) or “beautiful” that only apply to 
objects that have been pre-graded as having a commendable quantity of some quality (“more than 
average” being one example of such commendability). 
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and classification of self without explicitly reflective elements. The writer of 
(4.15a), in contrast, relates the quantified or instrumental self-presentational 
forms with more existential kinds of reasoning about social desirability in 
general. He first formulates a general rule that describes how women 
evaluate height (“Women, as we know, always appreciate tall men,” 
Naisethan aina arvostavat pitkiä miehiä). He then interprets his own height 
in light of that general pattern implying that he might not be appreciated by 
women (“I’m not like that,” minä en ole sellainen). To mitigate the negative 
value that this general pattern of evaluation projects on him, the writer 
explicitly disassociates himself from the non-desirable extreme that he 
denotes with the metaphoric-evaluative designation kääpiö (“dwarf”). Such 
reasoning, then, relates a particular individual to general type-level 
regularities in different ways. 
To clarify the different degrees of theoretical and reflective 
representation, we may also note the difference between the first sentence 
and the last five in example (4.15a). The last five sentences theorize the writer 
as a particular person in terms of relatively representative and stable 
attributes. They employ 1SG deictics and definite nouns denoting inalienable 
attributes of a person (“height,” pituus; “hair,” hiukset) that indexically link 
the representations to the writer. It is formulations like the first one, 
“nomically” calibrated (Silverstein 1993) as general truths about some types 
of persons or events, and here pragmatically presumed as shared between the 
participants, that take theoretical representations to a further level of 
generalization. Such generalizations move from the depiction of the life of a 
particular person with attributes, habits, or experiences (or “simple” 
biography) towards theorizing life and existence in light of types of persons 
and events or general regularities and values (or “reflective” biography). 
More generalizing and reflective theoretical representations allow writers to 
show deeper self-knowledge and understanding of the world as well as to 
justify their “simple” biographic contents and to negotiate compatibility with 
respondents in terms of more general ontologies. Although no particular 
person necessarily appears as a figure in such representations “about the 
world,” such representations are still interpretable from the standpoint of 
what they reveal about the person who is committed to them as the principal. 
That is, the general beliefs or opinions about the world that writers animate 
are grounded in their affective and cognitive processes and are therefore 
revealing of their intentions, values, and perspectives on the world. 
Two kinds of generalization will be examined in the following examples. 
First, there is generalization of experiences on one’s own biographic time 
scale. Second, there is a more normative type of generalization of 
sociohistorical patterns. (Cf. also with the distinction between “therapeutic” 
or self-to-self metadiscourses versus “legal” or self-to-other metadiscourses 
discussed in section 2.3.3.) Let us begin with the former. In example (4.16), 
instead of asserting herself as “balanced” the writer rather assumes the 
characteristic and concentrates on describing its biographic roots. That is, 
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she reasons about the process that led to the emergence of the implied 
characteristic and the concrete methods she uses to maintain it. She also 
describes problematic past characteristics (e.g., “deep loneliness,” 
syväyksinäisyys) that have given way to the new one as well as other positive 
characteristics: 
 
(4.16) ¶Olenj todella tehnyt vuosikausia töitä, että olenj saanut itsenik tasapainoon [PERF 
PFV] ja osaanj keinot millä pidänj itsenik tasapainossa [PRS PROG] ja huomannut sen, että 
aiemmin kokemani syväyksinäisyys ei johdukaan minusta vaan taustastani. Tämä on 
ollut sinällään hyvin helpottavaa ja vapauttanut elämään ja olen yleensä tyytyväinen 
asioihin vaikka mitään ihmeellistä ei tapahdukaan. 
(4.16) ¶I have really worked for years so that Ij have got myselfk into balance [PERF PFV] 
and I know the means with which Ij keep myselfk in balance [PRS PROG] and noticed that 
the deep loneliness I experienced previously did not result from me after all but from my 
background.  
 
In the two underlined subordinate clauses, the animator appears under two 
different figurements, both as the subject and the object of the verb. The 
subject is denoted by 1SG deictics and the object with the reflexive pronoun 
itse (“myself”)59. That is, one constituent process of the person (selfk) figures 
as the object (or “patient”) of another more agentive process (selfj). 
According to the first clause, set in the perfect tense and the perfective 
aspect, the entextualized event, the achievement of balance between selfj and 
selfk, has been accomplished in the past but is still relevant in the speech 
event. According to the second clause, set in the present tense and the 
progressive aspect, it is a state that requires continuous maintenance with 
appropriate means. The person is divided up into (1) a relatively past, latent, 
and problematic constituent and (2) a relatively present, agentive, and non-
problematic one. There are similar contrasts later between mode events and 
content events (“noticed” [MODE] “that” + CONTENT) as well as contrasted 
complements of cause (“not … from me … but from my background”). That 
is, the person also appears both as the one who has noticed a pattern in her 
life and as the one who is implicated in that pattern; as the one who 
experienced “deep loneliness” and as the one who now reports it; as an actor 
in one’s life and as the one who has been acted upon by a “background” of 
events.60 “Being balanced” as a characteristic, then, has an explicitly 
reflective organization in the text: it is the result of an ongoing process in 
                                                 
59 Most instances of itse in the data are contrastive (self or “I” versus other) not reflexive (for the 
difference, see e.g. VISK § 728, 769). 
60 The complex clause “[I have] noticed that the deep loneliness I experienced previously did not 
result from me after all but from my background” is, then, both an instance of theoretical agency (i.e., 
publicly reasoning about one’s residential processes) and a representation of an earlier instance of 
theoretical agency (i.e., privately realizing and conceptualizing a causal pattern in one’s residential 
processes). 
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which the person exercises her capacity to control her own processes. The 
person is here animated and voiced through the non-problematic persona.  
In such “reflective” biography different processes mutually justify one 
another and characteristics are served as still connected to their roots and 
fruits, whereas in “simple” biography the indices (e.g., individual nouns, 
adjectives) that project characteristics tend to enclose them and disentangle 
them from other processes. In example (4.16), the actual characteristic that 
the writer becomes accountable for (e.g., “being balanced”), is relatively 
backgrounded and embedded in ethnopsychological theorizing that operates 
with generalized patterns of cause and consequence on the writer’s own 
biographical time scale. 
The following example discusses the difficulties of finding the “right one” 
through a complex allegory of card games. There is an intricate interplay 
between more generalized and more personalized elements: 
 
(4.17) ¶Onko Sen Oikean löytäminen kuin korttipeli? ¶Haluat jätkän, mutta eteen 
tuleekin toinen akka. ¶Keräätkin tikkejä vain sydämeesi ja välillä ihmettelet, miksi 
sinulle jaettiin kortit paskahousuun. ¶Tarpeeksi monen häviön jälkeen et uskalla enää 
panostaa, vaikka kädessä olikin voittajakortit ja tuntui todella hyvältä. Häviät jälleen. 
¶Joskus peli tuntuu sujuvan, kunnes huomaat kumppanisi pelaavan eri peliä kuin sinä. 
¶Monet pelaavat tietämättään pasianssia. ¶Mikään noista ei kuullosta hyvältä eikä 
tarkoitukseni ei ole pelata mitään peliä. ¶Olen onnellisessa asemassa, sillä tikkejä on 
tullut kerättyä, mutta sydämessä ei ole arpikudosta – – ¶Haluan kokea taas sen 
uskomattoman ihanan tunteen, kun jonain sunnuntaiaamuna herään vierelläni nainen.  
(4.17) ¶Is finding the Right One like a game of cards? ¶You want a jack [also: “a guy,” “a 
fellow”], but you find another queen [also: “old woman,” (pej.) “wife”] in front of you. 
¶You collect tricks [also: “stitches”] in your heart and at times you wonder why you were 
dealt a hand of Shithead [cardgame; lit. “shitpants”]. ¶After enough losses you don’t dare 
to invest anymore, although [you] had winning cards in [your] hand and [ᴓ] felt really 
good. You lose again. ¶Sometimes the game seems to be going well, until you notice your 
partner is playing a different game. ¶Many are playing solitaire without knowing it. 
¶None of these sound good and it is not my intention to play any games. ¶I’m in a happy 
position, since I have collected tricks/stitches, but there is no scar tissue in [my] heart – 
– ¶I want to experience again that incredibly wonderful feeling, when some Sunday 
morning I wake up with a woman beside me. 
 
The text begins with an introductory question that is not addressed to any 
explicitly selected kind of participant. The text then moves on to employ a 
generic or open 2SG reference (see Laitinen 2006). This type of address 
denotes an intersubjectively engaged other, but anyone can step into the role 
of the addressee. That is, it addresses persons in general – but particularly 
someone like “me” or “you” (since it is the interactants of the ongoing event 
that serve as the ground for such generalizations). Next, the sudden break 
into the preterite tense (“although [you] had winning cards in the hand and 
[ᴓ] felt really good,” vaikka kädessä olikin voittajakortit ja tuntui todella 
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hyvältä) implies a specific but indefinite reference to a particular past 
incident. The next sentence returns to the present tense of habit and 
explicitly denotes a recurrence of particular events with the adverb “again” 
(jälleen). The text conveys the impression that the writer is describing, based 
on his experiences, the generalized recurring of such events in the lives of 
someone like “me” or “you.” After describing such patterns, generalized into 
a type of event, the writer dissociates the ongoing event from any of “these” 
(noista) patterns that do not “sound good.” This is where explicit 1SG 
reference first comes into picture. The 1SG figure, then, is inhabited by the 
“self of the interactional microtime” (Agha 1995: 143), who in the here-and-
now is determined to break such patterns. One might think of the writer’s 
past selves (i.e., the ones who had such experiences) as a kind of other 
addressed by the present self in the ongoing event. Such past “selves of 
memory” or “selves of habit” (ibid.) are relatively more abstract, displaced, 
and alienable in the ongoing event and can therefore be figured in 
generalized non-1SG forms. 
Next, let us have a look at forms of reflective theorizing that orient to 
social norms, values, and ideologies rather than biographic experiences. 
Example (4.18) is from the same writer as (4.16) above. She now discusses 
the general principle of interpreting others based on their economic status or 
level of wealth. In fact, the aim of the writer is to deconstruct the relevance of 
such criteria altogether: 
  
(4.18) ¶Minulle on sama onko sinulla varallisuutta vai ei. En ole kiinnostunut hyötymään 
sinusta taloudellisesti. Minulle on sama oletko nyt Nuottaniemessä asuva johtaja vai 
työhakijana vuokra-asunnossa. Kuten tiedämme asemat muuttuvat ja tämän päivän 
johtaja voi olla huomenna työnhakija ja työnhakija johtaja. Rahatilanteet voivat myös 
muuttua, rahaa voi saada lisää tai sitä voi menettää. 
(4.18) It’s all the same to me whether you have wealth or not. I’m not interested in 
profiting from you economically. It’s all the same to me if you are now an executive living 
in Nuottaniemi [a posh neighborhood] or a job seeker in a rental apartment. As we know 
positions change and today’s executive may be tomorrow’s job seeker and today’s job 
seeker tomorrow’s executive. Money situations may also change, one may gain more 
money or lose it. 
 
The writer first states her general point explicitly as an evaluative stance in 
the first sentence, then clarifies the underlying intentions in the second. 
Next, she illustrates the point by describing two imagined extremes. The last 
two sentences describe general assumptions about change (or ontological 
transformativity) in the world, presuming that such assumptions are shared 
by some wider community to which the 1PL points to, perhaps including the 
addressee too. She argues that socioeconomic statuses are susceptible to 
constant change and that one may end up moving from one extreme to 
another. There are, then, different kinds of theoretical representations: 
general principles (“positions change”), such principles applied to more 
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specific social types (“today’s executive may be tomorrow’s job applicant”) 
and such principles applied non-selectively to the respondents of the ongoing 
interactional event (“I’m not interested in profiting from you economically”). 
Such theoretical and reflective commitments themselves become 
characteristics that mediate relations between self and others at the level of 
ideologies, preferences, or values. They also lend coherence and credibility to 
other more specific characteristics or criteria. The deconstructive approach 
in (4.18) is exceptional in that it liberates respondents from criteria instead 
of imposing criteria on respondents. At the same time it, of course, also 
liberates the self from the same criteria (and perhaps even implies a lack of 
wealth). Moreover, such an approach can be used to justify other liberties for 
the self as a trade-in. (She mentions, for instance, that she does not wish to 
have children or commit to a mortgage.)  
The next two examples employ a similar pattern of theorizing ideal 
relationships. They formulate a general principle, ideal, or type, to which the 
writer is committed as indicated by the epistemic and perspectival marker 
mielestäni (“in my opinion,” “to my mind,” “I think”):  
 
(4.19a) Hyvä mies on mielestäni sopiva sekoitus käytännöllisyyttä (pora pysyy kädessä) 
ja analyyttistä älykkyyttä. Alussa huomioni kiinnittää usein pitkähkö varsi ja 
poikamaisen rento ulkokuori. 
(4.19a) A good man is in my opinion a proper mixture of practicality (he can wield a 
drill) and analytical intelligence. In the beginning my attention is often captured by a tall 
figure and a boyishly laid-back exterior. 
 
(4.19b) ¶Mielestäni hyvä parisuhde on ennen muuta ystävyyttä ja kumppanuutta, se 
perustuu toinen toisensa kunnioittamiseen, rehellisyyteen ja avoimuuteen. Hyvässä 
parisuhteessa tuetaan toisiaan kasvamaan omana itsenään ja eletään henkisesti 
lähekkäin. Läheisyys ei kuitenkaan merkitse toisen sitomista vaan – – 
(4.19b) ¶In my opinion a good relationship is above all friendship and companionship, it 
is based on respect for one another, honesty and openness. In a good relationship 
partners support one another in personal growth and live spiritually near one another. 
Intimacy however does not mean tying the other down but – – 
 
Commitment to such ideals easily implies that the writers themselves either 
actually embody the ideal (e.g., by being “honest” or “open”) or at least have 
the intention of attaining the ideal and that they appreciate persons who 
embody or strive towards the same ideal. Such representations per se, 
however, are presented without an explicit link to particular persons or to the 
past experiences of the writer. Moreover, the examples do not only specify 
the kind of ideal respondent that the writers are looking for but represent 
general types that apply non-selectively to all of social reality and enable the 
interpretation of any particular individual in light of these general types. 
Example (4.19a) later turns towards biographic generalization by describing 
the writer’s habits of perceiving and evaluating others. Example (4.19b), in 
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contrast, continues elaborating the notion of ideal relationship and defining 
what is meant by the concepts used (such as “intimacy”). It is, then, a 
prototypical expression of an ideological position or a commitment to a type-
oriented evaluative theoretical representation. 
Finally, there is one more form of theoretical agency, which relates more 
to the interactional time scale than biographic or sociohistorical ones. A 
frequently occurring form of theorizing consists of such explicit 
metapragmatic discourse that reflexively makes sense of what is going on in 
the interactional event. That is, in addition to self-presenting (or indexing 
biographic kinds), writers then attend to the ongoing event and denote the 
structures or intentions of their interactions or the associated participant 
roles. For instance, many advertisements begin with, or otherwise include, a 
sentence that explicitly formulates the general goal of the interactional event: 
  
- “Could we then be just the two who are looking for one another :)?” (Voisimmeko siis 
kenties olla juuri ne kaksi, jotka etsivät toisiaan :)?) 
- “A suitable counterpart is being looked for to bring a little delight into these 
monotonous everyday routines” (Sopiva vastakappale olisi hakusessa tuomaan 
vähän piristystä tähän tasapaksuun arjen viettoon) 
- “I’m a wonderful woman and I long for the company of a wonderful man” (Olen 
ihana nainen ja kaipailen ihanan miehen seuraa). 
- “I’d like to find company with someone who I’d get along well with” (Haluaisin 
löytää seuraa jonka kanssa tulisi hyvin toimeen) 
- “I’m not a lifestyle dater or in need of a pen pal, but seeking a genuine real-life man” 
(En ole elämäntapadeittailija enkä vailla kirjeystävää, vaan haen aitoa elävää 
miesystävää) 
 
In such sentences, some verb (in 1SG with unmarked tense and mood, 
imperfective aspect) and its complements denote a process that links the 
writer-figure to the figure of an ideal other. Clauses like this ascribe 
intentions to the writer and project a purpose for the ongoing interactional 
event and a specific role for the reader (see also e.g. sections 6.3 and 6.4). 
Alternatively, writers may simply rely on implicitly presumed generic models 
and stereotypes. That is, they may rely on the fact that the respondents 
sufficiently agree on the purpose of such encounters and the intentions of 
such participants. However, making such interpretations explicit allows 
writers to specify and to more precisely locate their purposes and intentions 
socially and experientially (cf. e.g. “seeking” versus “longing for”; 
“counterpart” versus “wonderful man”). 
The line between “this” event and others (or interactional and biographic 
dimensions) is, of course, relative and a matter of framing. In fact, 
theorizings of one’s life and the ongoing event are often interlinked so that 
they come to mutually justify one another (see also sections 4.3 and 4.4.3). 
The following example, for instance, links personal characteristics and 
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habitual behaviors (Olen luonteeltani – – minut on helppo saada 
innostumaan) with aspects of the ongoing event (toivonkin tutustuvani):  
 
(4.20) ¶Olen reipas, nuorekas, – – Olen luonteeltani positiivinen ja sen takia minut on 
helppo saada innostumaan erilaisista asioista. Jalkapalloa seuraan tv:stä ja kentän 
reunalta, matkailu on elämän suola ja ja sokerina pohjalla hyvät ihmissuhteet. 
Toivon=kin tutustuvani nuorekkaaseen, rehelliseen mieheen – – 
(4.20) ¶I’m peppy, youthful, – – I’m positive by nature and therefore it is easy to get 
me excited about different kinds of things. I follow football on TV and from the edge of 
the field, traveling is the spice [lit. “salt”] of life and and last but not least [litt. “the sugar 
on the bottom”] are good social relationships. Therefore I hope to meet a youthful, 
honest man – – 
 
The first link (sen takia, “therefore”) can be interpreted either as a 
representation of a causal pattern in the world (i.e., “positivity” indexically 
causes “excitement”) or as an argumentative link composed inferentially by 
the writer for the purposes and addressees of this event (e.g., to ensure that 
the writer will respond favorably to any suggestions made by the addressee-
become-replier-and-suitor). In any case, it weaves different kinds of 
characteristics into coherent relations. The second link, marked by the clitic 
kin, is more clearly argumentative (see Vilkuna 1984: 404; VISK § 842), 
motivated by the ongoing interactional event. It connects the preceding 
description of characteristics and values with the purpose of the current 
encounter. It also makes explicit the representational mode of the 
represented purpose (i.e., the mental state of “hoping [to meet a youthful, 
honest man]”; cf. e.g. “I’m seeking a youthful, honest man”). That is, the 
writer’s intentions and desires in the here-and-now are justified as plausible 
and reasonable by grounding them in her biography. The logical 
argumentation between self and other as participants of the ongoing 
interactional event construes a compatibility between self and other as 
persons with particular characteristics on a biographic time scale. Textual 
coherence, then, becomes an index of intentional coherence. The past, the 
present, and the future become coherently linked on intentional and logical 
levels (in contrast to, for example, narrative coherence, see 4.4.3). 
 
The link between theoretical and practical agency in online dating 
advertisements is tight. The context forces the writers to exert their 
theoretical agency.61 Nothing appears in the dating advertisement without 
the active efforts of the writer.62 Residence in the world via writing-based 
                                                 
61  This then sieves writers in terms of their pre-existing habits or skills of self-theorizing (see also 
chapter 7). 
62 An advertisement without any propositional content does not exist in the data, although 
technically such texts are a conceivable option (e.g., merely a punctuation mark, such as a question 
mark or an exclamation point, or an image drawn with ASCII characters). 
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text-artifacts requires representational contents. In many other semiotic 
modes residential processes do not require similar degrees of active and 
conscious effort but rely on many layers of habitualized embodied behavior 
and the perceivable physical presence of the person. (The reverse, in a sense, 
is that when physically co-present with others, one cannot avoid self-
presentation.) 
The necessity to theorize one’s existence, in order to exist at all, may in 
part explain the following kinds of texts that quite saliently begin with non-
propositional dialogue particles (Jahha?, Elikkäs). Such expressions would 
stereotypically signal, for example, a transition to, or the planning of, a new 
activity (see e.g. VISK § 1031). Here they draw attention to the incipient 
interactional process and seem to imply that it is somehow marked by nature 
(see also sections 4.2.3 and 5.2.2).  
 
(4.21a) [Text begins] Jahha? ¶Minä olen loppujen lopuksi aika monipuolinen kaveri, 
vaikka olen sitten kyllä toiselta puolen ihan tavallinen ja simppeli perusmieskin. 
(4.21a) [Text begins] Alright then? ¶At the end of the day I am a quite versatile guy, 
although on the other hand I am quite an ordinary and simple basic man.  
 
(4.21b) [Text begins] Elikkäs. Kerrotaanpa itsestäni hieman tähän alkuun. Olen 
rauhallinen ja sympaattinen ihminen. 
(4.21b) [Text begins] Now then. Let me [lit. let’s] tell a bit about myself here in the 
beginning. I am a calm and sympathetic person. 
 
In fact, example (4.21b) next describes the action that is about to be 
undertaken (“tell a bit about myself here in the beginning”). That is, the 
theoretical agency that the writer is wielding is brought somewhat explicitly 
and performatively on stage. 
One may choose a more “practical” approach and simply turn one’s (and 
ideal others’) selected kinds into entextualized indices. Or, one can choose a 
more “reflective” approach and also entextualize reasons, motivations, 
intentions, and backgrounds and thereby justify such kind-indice relations. 
Explicit reflective formulations provide access to negotiations of desirability, 
compatibility, and accountability on two levels. They allow respondents to 
assess both (1) to what degree they subscribe to similar principles of 
interpretation as the writer and (2) whether or not the writer appears 
desirable when his or her indices have been interpreted in light of the 
respondent’s own principles. That is, knowing the principles of interpretation 
(semiotic ontologies, epistemic formations) behind an indice allows 
respondents to assess more clearly to what extent a particular designation, 
such as “balanced” or “wealthy,” means the same thing to the writer and the 
respondent. Finally, it should be remembered that theorizing about “doing 
something” or “being someone” is in itself simultaneously “doing something” 
and “being someone” on a further reflexive layer. As was seen clearly in 4.2.2, 
the writers’ degrees of reflectivity are a contributing factor to views of 
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subjectivity (such as “theoretical” versus “spontaneous”). That is, the way one 
theorizes oneself is a further sign of who one is. 
4.4.2 LISTS AND TAXONOMIES 
One of the most pervasive features of the online dating advertisements in the 
data of this study are sequences that list described characteristics of either 
the writer or the ideal respondent. This section examines how such lists 
become taxonomically structured and how such structuring reflects a 
particular understanding of personhood. 
The beginning of example (4.22) illustrates the simplest kind of case, 
which consists of a copula inflected in 1SG and a list of symbol-tokens (nouns 
or adjectives). That is, the list of characteristics is projected on the person the 
subject points to, who in this case is the writer: 
 
 (4.22) ¶Olen urheilullinen opiskelun ohella työssäkäyvä nuorimies, jolle elämässä 
tärkeitä asioita ovat ystävät, luonto ja toivottavasti tulevaisuudessa myös perhe. Olen 
fiksu, mukava, huumorintajuinen ja kuuleman mukaan aika hyvännäköinen. Olen 
ruskeahiuksinen ja ruskeasilmäinen 182 cm pitkä ja ruumiinrakenteeltani jäntevä. Tulen 
hyvin toimeen useimpien ihmisten kanssa, osaan nauraa myös itselleni ja minua on 
hyvin vaikea saada suuttumaan, mutta tarpeen tullen osaan kuitenkin puolustaa itseäni 
ja ystäviäni. 
(4.22) ¶I’m a sporty young man who works alongside studies and for whom the most 
important things in life are friends, nature and hopefully in the future also family. I’m 
smart, nice, with a good sense of humor and they say I’m fairly good-looking. I’m 
brown-haired and brown-eyed 182 cm tall and physically fit. I get along well with most 
people, I can laugh at myself too and it’s hard to make me mad, but when necessary I 
can however defend myself and my friends. 
 
Later, there is a list of denoted verbal processes, similarly deictically 
calibrated to the writer (e.g., “[I] get along,” “[I] can laugh”). We can notice at 
the outset that lists of verbs seem to project habitual behaviors in particular 
settings, whereas nouns and adjectives tend to project more stable physical, 
mental, and social attributes. 
The elements within one list have internal hierarchical structures of 
various kinds. They are organized (see also the examples below) 
typographically with the order of elements (e.g., a descending or ascending 
order of importance, relevance, or inalienability; general versus particular) 
and punctuation (e.g., commas, parentheses, smileys) and syntactically with 
conjunctions (ja “and”; mutta “but”; tai, “or”; or asyndetic coordination) and 
modified with adverbs that denote, for example, source, emphasis, 
motivation, or frequence (kuuleman mukaan, “I hear,” “they say”; tarpeen 
tullen, “when necessary”; yleensä, “usually”; varsinkin, “particularly”). In 
addition, listed elements with their own internal hierarchical structures often 
come organized in overarching hierarchies and groups:  
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(4.23) ¶Minä olen pieni, (yleensä tumma), nauravasilmäinen. Pirteä ja puhelias nainen, 
jolla on aina projekti tai pari menossa, ja vielä muutama muu homma kesken. Minulla 
on myös reilusti luonnetta :) ¶Harrastan puutarhaa (varsinkin pihakeinussa 
lueskelemista), taidetta, joogaa, bodypumppia, sulkapalloa.. Pidän myös luonnosta, 
kulttuurista, matkustelusta (kukapa ei), hyvästä ruuasta ja viinistä. Olen viihtyisän 
elämän ystävä! ¶Jos olet pedantti, askeetti tai muu ekstremisti et ole oikea mies minulle. 
Hilpeä hedonisti on paljon sopivampi :). 
(4.23) ¶I am small, (usually dark), with laughing eyes. A chirpy and chatty woman, who 
always has a project or two under way, and a few other things going on. I also have 
plenty of character. ¶My hobbies include [spending time in] the garden (particularly 
reading in the swing), art, yoga, body pump, badminton.. I also like nature, culture, 
traveling (who doesn’t), good food and wine. I’m a friend of the comfortable life! If you 
are pedantic, ascetic or other [kind of] extremist you are not the right man for me. A 
cheerful hedonist is much more suitable :). 
 
Example (4.23), for instance, begins with a list of relational processes that 
describe relatively publicly perceivable and verifiable characteristics. It then 
moves on to a structure of possession that claims a somewhat more 
subjective attribute of having “plenty of character” (although qualified 
humorously with a smiley). Next, in a new paragraph, the writer moves on to 
the material process of “doing something as a hobby” (harrastaa). Different 
hobbies are stacked one upon another with a list of NPs. Finally, there is a list 
of mental processes or preferences, which also imply that such activities are 
actually engaged in at least sometimes (see also 5.1). Moreover, the writer 
finishes the sequence with a crystallizing exclamation (“I’m a friend of the 
comfortable life!”). 
In such taxonomic structures, the hyperonymous branches (bolded in the 
above examples) reflect an understanding of what types of characteristics 
(and topics of self-presentation) a person can or should be divided into in a 
particular context. The different combinations of tokens of characteristics 
(underlined above), then, are what make up a particular biographic 
individual and, to a relative degree, separate such individuals from one 
another (e.g., different tokens of the type “hobby” such as “art” or “yoga”). 
(Cf. Kockelman 2010: 36–37.) When self-presentation is patterned into 
taxonomic lists of descriptions, personhood becomes manifested as a 
structured collection of distinct, segmentable attributes or habits. Such 
characteristics appear relatively stable, and the figure of personhood they 
mediate becomes relatively abstracted from unfolding spacetime and 
particular environments. The regrouping of tokens under taxonomic 
headings also presumes relatively commensurable frameworks of 
comparison and selectivity between individuals. Since such patterns reflect a 
reflexive process in which a person intentionally and evaluatively organizes 
one’s parts in cultural taxonomies, they may also contribute to particular 
kinds of, say, “structured” views of subjectivity. 
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Patterns like this are reminiscent of the taxonomy approach in twentieth-
century personality psychology. In this approach, individuals as functioning 
wholes are broken down into a set of traits that are defined by single words 
or expressions from natural language so that “the dictionary functions not 
only as a source of material but also as a silent metaphor for the individual 
person” (Danziger 2012: 79). Lists of described characteristics, therefore, 
seem to enable lexicogrammatical forms of selection and aesthetization 
particularly well. By choosing an appropriate vocabulary, one can, for 
example, produce different views of subjectivity and appeal to different kinds 
of respondents. The previous example indicates mastery of the written 
standard language and contains aesthetic stylization such as alliteration 
(Pirteä ja puhelias nainen, jolla on aina projekti tai pari menossa, ja vielä 
muutama muu homma kesken) and scholarly sounding words of foreign 
origin (“pedantic,” “ascetic,” “extremist”). Such sign configurations can be 
used to convey, for instance, particular impressions of the education, cultural 
capital, or sense of humour of the writer and to select for particular kinds of 
ideal respondents. 
Since taxonomies favor NPs and simple clauses that can be easily 
coordinated in hierarchical lists, they have a generalizing and enclosing effect 
on the kinds they project on individuals. That is, they tend to project 
relatively stable and inalienable attributes, preferences, and habits of 
behavior, detached from more complex environments or patterns of life. 
However, lists and taxonomies can also incorporate small-scale chronotopic 
formulations, which often remain closer to particular experiences. Let us 
consider example (4.24): 
 
(4.24) Koiran kanssa metsässä kävely on pitkän päivän jälkeen parasta mitä tiedän. 
Minulla on vihreä vyö karatessa ja budolajit ovat lähellä sydäntäni. Myin viime keväänä 
moottoripyöräni mistä olen vieläkin harmissani. Savonlinnassa olen viihtynyt tosi hyvin. 
Minusta tulee ope ja olen siitä tosi ylpee... 
(4.24) Walking with my dog in a forest after a long day is the best thing I know. I have a 
green belt in karate and budo is a cherished hobby of mine. I sold my motorbike last 
spring and I still regret it. I have really enjoyed living in Savonlinna [a city in eastern 
Finland]. I’ll become a teacher and I’m real proud of it…  
 
In another type of context, the above excerpt might be absurd: the states of 
affairs denoted by the writer in one sentence after another barely seem to 
have any connection. There is little semantic cohesion and few explicit 
connectives. Despite the recurring narrated figure (“I”), there is little 
narrative coherence either in the sense of causal-chronological connections. 
The coherence, then, is of a taxonomic kind. The sentences are in co-
hyponomous relations to one another. That is, they are in a mutually similar 
relation to higher hyperonymous levels. (Cf. also Hoey 2001 on “colony 
texts.”) In contrast to the previous example, such hyperonomous branches 
are not as explicitly named. Some of the elements do resemble such topic 
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formulations (e.g., constituents of life such as “a hobby of mine” and 
preferences such as “the best I know,” “enjoyed”). This particular text, then, 
relies on the readers’ capacity to recognize, in light of their genre knowledge, 
such forms of patterning and coherence, in which the point is not so much 
about the relation of the different facts or even separate facts per se but how 
they are representative of the entextualizing and entextualized persons and 
their values.  
Taxonomies of characteristics gradually shade into more narrative-like 
segments (see section 4.4.3). Once the descriptions start acquiring more 
specific chronotopic content, or descriptions of particular events and 
environments instead of generalized characteristics, and once the 
chronotopes start following one another in thematically and temporally 
connected ways, they are easier to interpret narratively and not merely co-
hyponomously. Consider the following example: 
 
(4.25) ¶Olen jahkailija, joka rakastaa värejä, mielikuvituksellisia asioita ja tarinoita. 
Pidän kasviksista, pyöräilemisestä ja luonnossa liikkumisesta, mutta en halua asua 
maaseudulla. Välillä on ihanaa tanssia vilkkuvien valojen loisteessa, käydä 
artistien keikoilla, ravintoloissa ja teatterissa. En ole koskaan ollut 
valmismatkalla. Nautin omatoimimatkailun vapaudesta, seikkailuntunnusta ja 
haasteesta. Olen usein viettänyt synttäreitäni Lontoossa, jossa eräs suosikkin[i] on 
Tiedemuseon 3D Imax-teatteri. ¶Pelkään kehittäneeni addiktion tummaan 
suklaaseen ja viimeisin keittiötieteellinen kokeeni olikin suklaaleivän 
leipominen. Onneksi arkeeni kuuluu liikkumista sen verran, ettei paino ole minulle 
koskaan ollut mikään ongelma.  
(4.25) ¶I’m a hesitater who loves colors, imaginative things and stories. I like vegetables, 
biking and strolling in nature, but I don’t want to live in the countryside. Every now 
and then it’s wonderful to dance in the glow of flashing lights, go to artists’ gigs, 
restaurants and the theater. I have never been on a package tour. I enjoy the 
freedom of independent travel, the feeling of adventure and challenge. I have often 
spent my birthday in London, where one of my favorite [places] is the 3D Imax Theater 
of the Science Museum. ¶I fear I have developed an addiction to dark chocolate and in 
fact my latest culinary experience was baking chocolate bread. Luckily my 
everyday life involves enough physical exercise so that weight has never been a problem 
for me.  
 
The segment begins with the writer describing herself with a role designator 
(“hesitater”) that is qualified with a relative clause that denotes a “love” for a 
number of things. The following clause picks up from here by denoting a list 
of things she “likes.” The beginning of the segment, then, sets the tone for the 
entire passage that is marked by a continuous chain of evaluative stances (see 
the underlined parts) towards increasingly specific objects. Moreover, there 
is clear lexical and topical cohesion (see the bolded parts) between many 
successive descriptions. For instance, the writer’s unwillingness to live in the 
countryside despite her love of nature becomes justified with an occasional 
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need for urban entertainment. There is an implicit argumentative link 
between the two sentences with complementarily contrasted chronotopic 
content (“countryside” versus “city”). The next link is perhaps inferentially 
less predictable, but there is an intuitively understandable transition from 
forms of urban entertainment to the topic of traveling (as another form of 
entertainment) and “package tours” versus “independent travel.” One might 
even see a loose overarching theme of “preferring an adventurous urban 
independence.” The fact that the sentences are located within one 
typographical unit, a single paragraph, makes it easier to interpret them in a 
thematically coherent manner. Perhaps the most notable leap from one topic 
to another is precisely between the two paragraphs. 
The sentence that informs the readers that the writer has never been on a 
“package tour” breaks, with its perfect tense, the general dominance of the 
present tense. It scans the biographic past up to the present as a sort of lived 
proof for the general preference (“I enjoy the freedom of independent travel”) 
formulated in the following sentence. Analogously, the last sentence of the 
paragraph gives an opposite illustration by describing what the writer 
habitually has done (“often celebrated my birthday in London”). Such linking 
of the past with the present is often seen as an essential trait of narratives 
(see e.g. Linde 1993: 107). That is, throughout the segment the writer moves 
between different dimensions (the past and the present; the habitually 
recurring and the sporadic; the general and the particular) in a relatively 
coherent manner, and formulates evaluative contrasts. 
To sum up, in comparison with the earlier examples, there is more 
perspectival, causal, and logical continuity in the cross-clausal patterning of 
(4.25). The text flows smoothly from one state of affairs to another with only 
occasional breaks between consecutive segments. Nevertheless, despite the 
relative narrative-likeness of the patterning, the excerpt does not quite seem 
like a proper story. It is perhaps more reminiscent of a stream of 
consciousness (cf. section 4.2.3). The point of the segment is more about 
painting a picture of a way of life and a pattern of preferences than describing 
events or following a storyline. For instance, the stance the writer takes 
towards London is used to index and to identify with a particular chronotope 
and way of life, instead of actually reporting or narrating one’s visits to 
London. That is, the goal is to illustrate and evaluate lifestyles, and the 
patterning is still more readily understood in terms of co-hyponomous 
relations of self-presentation than in terms of storytelling with complications 
and codas. The coherence is that of a chronotopic or episodic taxonomy, or 
an evaluative, hierarchical listing of events and environments. 
4.4.3 NARRATIVES AND STORIES 
Although narratives and stories have traditionally been considered and 
studied as one of the most important and typical forms of self-presentation 
and identity construction (see e.g. Linde 1993; Mishler 2006: 36; Schiffrin 
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2006: 104), they are quite rare in the data of this study. This section will pick 
up where the previous one left off and have a look at those patterns that come 
closest to narratives and stories. Fully-fledged stories hardly appear at all in 
the data. Even “small stories” (see e.g. Bamberg 2006) are somewhat rare. 
There are, however, differences in how strictly or loosely “narratives” have 
been defined and delineated from other forms of discourse. As was seen in 
the previous section, the boundary towards chronotopic taxonomies is not 
precise. Frequent or not, the question of narrativity itself, as a particular way 
of organizing experience, is interesting from the standpoint of online dating 
advertisements. One might even ask if there is something about narratives 
that makes them inherently unsuitable for the practice of online dating 
advertisements. 
What precisely those essential traits are that separate narratives from 
non-narratives is, however, a question that is often not very explicitly dealt 
with in either more traditional or more modern approaches to narrative. A 
prototypical narrative can be seen as containing text-segments in which 
descriptions of events are understood to be linked so that latter events 
temporally and causally follow from or grow out of previously described ones 
(see e.g. Mishler 2006; cf. Labov & Waletzky 1967; Linde 1993). The link 
between described events is usually interpreted as “naturally” inherent in the 
states of affairs as if regardless of the emplotment of the narrative – unlike, 
say, argumentative links that are explicitly construed by the writer or the 
speaker in the speech event. That is, there is an attempt to produce iconicity 
between an experience and its description. Therefore, in a “minimal 
narrative,” a temporal juncture, or a non-reversable link between events, can 
be achieved by merely placing two sentences in sequence (Labov 1997) (i.e., 
such events are represented as indexically linked to one another by 
indexically linked sentences). Usually narratives include at least one 
personified figure whose perceptions, intentions, actions, and their 
consequences serve as the more specific link between events and sentences, 
in patterns such as complication-resolution or problem-failure-solution or 
surprise-reaction (see e.g. Labov & Waletzky 1967; Hoey 1983, 2001; Ochs & 
Capps 2001: 130–155, 225). In short, narratives produce coherence of 
experience in light of the narrators’ ontologies and values (see also e.g. Ochs 
& Capps 2001: 201). They enclose and project a particular episodic structure 
onto processes in the world in which states of affairs transform into others. 
To make a sequence of events a meaningful whole (instead of a mere list 
or chronology), narrated events are evaluated and emplotted in terms of their 
relevance for the total organization of the narrative as well as the ongoing 
event of narration. In other words, it is the relation between the story (plot 
and evaluation) and the participation framework of the event of narration 
that yields the significance of the narrative (see e.g. Georgakopoulou 2006: 
101–102). The representations of narrated events are interpreted in terms of 
the narrators’ residence in the event of narration, and the emplotment of 
narrative serves the interpretation of an experience for the purposes of the 
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event of narration. Through narratives we can “restory” our past (Mishler 
2006: 36), for example, by rearranging the temporal structure and relevance 
of a remembered experience (see also Ricoeur 1980), which may be precisely 
the appeal and value of narratives. Narratives are experience under re-
interpretation. It seems, then, that the distinguishing trait of narrative 
accounts is their experience-near organization. Unlike, say, abstract logical 
analyses, narratives aim to retain the structures of the chain-like unfolding of 
particular “real-time” experiences (cf. 4.4.1 and 4.4.2).  
Narratives can be metapragmatically calibrated in relation to the event of 
narration in many different ways. Since narrating involves meaningful 
linking of anterior events to posterior ones, factual narratives are generally 
speaking only possible about past events.63 In factual worlds, the future can 
certainly be anticipated and virtually modeled with narratives in “irrealis” 
modes. In fictive worlds, however, the future can be known in advance so 
that “online” narrating becomes possible. Similarly, in narratives of past 
events, occasional shifts to a “dramatic” present may occur to produce an 
“online” perspective on past events. Narratives can, therefore, be set in 
“historicized,” “online,” or “imagined” pasts, presents, or futures in a variety 
of combinations – which might suggest that they would be considered useful 
by online daters.  
The prototypical narrative tense, the preterite or the “imperfect,” is quite 
rare in the data of this study. There are, for instance, only 16 preterite forms 
of the statistically most frequent verb olla (“to be”), most of them in example 
(4.29) below (versus about 830 present tense forms). The Finnish imperfect 
has been described as a means of definite temporal reference (see e.g. VISK § 
1538; Pallaskallio 2013: 103). If we relate the notion of definite reference to 
online dating advertisements as an event of narration, we begin to see why 
narratives in the prototypic sense may not be considered useful by many 
writers. Whereas, for instance, close friendships are usually marked by the 
sharing of life experiences and histories, in a first encounter between two 
anonymous unknowns, specific accounts of particular past events are less 
relevant. Moreover, in online dating advertisements, part of the audience 
consists of non-ideal respondents that one wishes to sieve off rather than 
share personal experiences with. Negotiations of identity, desirability, and 
compatibility, then, operate with representative habits and generalized, 
recurring patterns of life instead of particular events.  
Let us now consider the following example, which might be seen as 
fulfilling the minimal criteria of a narrative:  
 
                                                 
63 Ochs & Capp (2001: 162–163) classify as narratives cases like sports coverage, in which 
commentators narrate a presently unfolding game. The central question, then, is to what extent 
genuine emplotment (as opposed to mere sequential description of perceived events) is possible in 
real-time conditions. 
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(4.26) Kävin retkellä Seurasaaressa luonnon helmassa. Istuin tuulisilla kallioilla ja 
samosin metsäpoluilla lintujen vienon laulun soidessa lehdoissa. Olen aina löytänyt 
mielenrauhan luonto Äidin yhteydestä. Jos vaikka olisit myös luontoihminen, olisi meillä 
jo jotain mistä keskustella. 
(4.26) I went on a trip to Seurasaari [an island in Helsinki] into the midst of nature. I sat 
on windy cliffs and roamed forest paths as gentle birdsong rang in the groves. I have 
always found peace of mind in contact with Mother Nature. Should you happen to be a 
nature person as well, we would already have something to discuss. 
 
We may, however, note at the outset that the imperfect could easily be 
replaced with the present tense or a modal expression (“I often go,” “käyn 
[usein]”; “I would like to go,” “haluaisin käydä”) without notable changes in 
actual interactional consequences. Notice also the absence of any temporally 
localizing adverbials that would tell the reader when specifically this event 
took place. Also, the plural forms of the adverbials of location carry durative-
habitual aspectual implications (cf. with e.g. past habit “I would sit on windy 
cliffs and roam forest paths” versus a singular event “I sat on a windy cliff”). 
The narrated event, then, remains indefinite and example-like, portraying a 
representative and valued type of behavior, and the factuality of the 
representation as a representation of a particular past event would probably 
not easily come up as relevant among respondents. Moreover, the relevance 
of the narrated sequence is summed up in the third sentence with the perfect 
tense of recurrence or habit (“I have always”). 
Nonetheless, we can see a difference, for instance, in the view of 
subjectivity conveyed by a text that uses the preterite tense. Locating both the 
narrated event (En) and the reference event (Er), the point from which the 
narrated event is reckoned (see 4.2), as anterior in relation to the speech 
event (Es) invites the reader to share or to witness the writer’s act of 
reminiscing. That is, the mode of intentionality is the description of 
memories (or subsequent perceptions), instead of the assertion of general 
beliefs (see Kockelman 2006b: 98–99). The fact that the writer reportively 
represents contents of her event-memory reveals some of the actual structure 
of her past, even if in a relatively indefinite and non-specific way. It gives the 
person a minimal dimension of temporal and historical coherence, which 
may be an efficient technique precisely because it is marked and non-typical. 
Also, evoking memories serves as lived proof for further claims. In the third 
sentence, the writer interprets the narrated events as the cause for a 
particular mental state (“peace of mind,” mielenrauha) and generalizes the 
pattern over biographic time and similar events (“I have always found,” olen 
aina löytänyt). Finally, she generalizes this pattern into a social type 
(“nature person,” luontoihminen) and addresses it to respondents as a 
criterion of identification and compatibility.64 Moods, preferences, and 
                                                 
64 This is the same writer as in the “Kallio” versus “north Helsinki” example (4.11). 
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desires, then, become concretely grounded in patterns of public behavior in 
specific environments. 
Most narrative patterns in the data are, however, in the present tense. The 
most common type of cases consists of short segments that justify and 
biographically contextualize the writing of the advertisement or the process 
of looking for a partner in general. Example (4.27) merely suggests an 
emplotted temporal progression of life events. It is abstract-like (in the 
Labovian technical sense) since it orients to a story and plots the actual 
advertisement event within the episodic structure: 
 
(4.27) [Title] Syksy lähestyy.. ¶Hei! Jotain uutta elämään kaipailee 27-vuotta täyttänyt 
tyttö, jolla jo elämän perusasiat alkaa olemaan kunnossa, vaikka paljon vielä tuntuu 
puuttuvankin. Asunto, auto ja työpaikka on, perhe-elämä vielä perustamatta, sitä oikeaa 
etsiskellessä :) 
(4.27) [Title] Fall is approaching.. ¶Hey! Here’s yearning for something new in [her] life 
a 27-year-old girl who is already starting to have the basic things in life in order, 
although a lot seems to be missing still. Apartment, car and job [I] have, a family life is 
yet to be started [lit. “founded”], waiting for the right one :) 
 
The advertisement text is contextualized both in relation to a cyclic seasonal 
trajectory (e.g., the turning of summer into fall)65 and in relation to a 
biographic trajectory. The writer presumes an ideal model of the progression 
of life in terms of the accumulation of social statuses and possessions. Since 
some things are still considered to be missing (as a kind of “complication” of 
the narrative), the advertisement becomes implicitly contextualized as the 
means of achieving the next step in life (as the “resolution” of that 
complication). Whereas the previous example justifies a need for a partner, 
the following example focuses more on justifying the particular means of 
finding one: 
 
(4.28) [Title] Puuttuvaa kylkiluuta etsimässä ¶Noniin, nytpä sitten päätin kokeilla 
tätäkin mahdollisuutta tutustua hameväkeen. Kapakoissa rymyämiseen alan olla lopen 
kyllästynyt ja lavatanssejakin on kokeiltu taka-aikoina. Töissä ja harrasteissa on kovin 
miesvaltaista, kirjastossa käynnin sijaan tilaan kotiini tai ostan kioskilta lukemista, niin 
mistäpä sitä sitten voisin löytää? Tiedän kyllä että sinä tavallinen kunnollinen 
suomalainen nainen olet jossakin vapaana ja sinäkin kaipailet rinnallesi sitä ihan 
tavallista kunnollista suomalaista perusjätkää. 
(4.28) [Title] Looking for the missing rib ¶Alright then, I have now decided to try this 
way of meeting women [ARCH/COLL PEJ, “petticoats”] too. I’m starting to get tired of bars 
and I’ve tried going to dances as well. My work and hobbies are male-dominated, instead 
of going to the library I order books home or buy them at a kiosk, so where could I then 
                                                 
65 Apparently the time of the year makes such biographic “complications” even more acute for 
many, since similar patterns recur in the data. That is, changes in the seasons are stereotypically 
associated with a yearning for affinal relations and increased efforts at courtship. 
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find it [= the company of women?]? I know well that you, ordinary, decent Finnish 
woman, are free somewhere and that you too are longing for that ordinary, decent 
Finnish guy by your side. 
 
The title intertextually frames the advertisement with a reference to a Biblical 
story, already projecting a storylike interpretation. Online dating is then 
presented as a kind of secondary alternative (tätä=kin, “this too,” “even 
this”) to more primary forms of finding a partner. Online dating is only 
appropriate in a specific phase of life or after other methods have been tried 
or are not a viable option. (Such patterns will be returned to in 7.1.1 from the 
standpoint of negative stereotypic images associated with online dating.) In a 
manner typical of stories, there is a background of past failures to solve the 
complication or problem (see e.g. Hoey 1983: 96–102). The writer mentions 
that she has tried other methods but that process is nearing a sort of 
saturation point (alan olla lopen kyllästynyt, “I’m starting to get tired of”). 
The text at hand, then, is a new attempt with a new kind of tool. Finally, the 
text introduces another protagonist, you, who is described as a person with 
an interlinking perspective and fate (“you, too, are longing for”). (See also 
chapter 6.) 
A few stories in the data are clearly “fictive” in the sense that they contain 
elements that cannot be plausibly interpreted in their prototypic 
denotational senses, such as the writer being a “princess” in example (4.29). 
The inferential mapping of the narrative to the actual person is metaphoric in 
the sense that it requires a process of translation between semiotic frames. 
The following advertisement employs a recognizable fairytale format, which 
is explicitly mentioned already in the title: 
 
(4.29) [Title] Sadun prinssi hukassa.. ¶”Olipa kerran nuori neito, tai nuori ja nuori, ikää 
hänellä oli karvan alle 30, mutta nuoreksi hän vielä itseään kutsui. Neito asui pikku 
kodissaan kahden kissansa kanssa. Nuori neito eli kaikin puolin normaalia elämää, kävi 
töissä ja vietti aikaa ystäviensä kanssa. Aikaisemmin hän oli viettänyt aktiivista 
opiskelijaelämää ja saanut siinä sivussa AMK -tutkinnonkin valmiiksi. ¶Parasta hänessä, 
hänen omasta mielestään, oli silmät, nuo tumman ruskeat napit, jotka uteliaana 
maailmaa tutkaili. Muutenkin kaikin puolin itseään tyydyttäviä kasvoja kehysti pitkät 
tummat hiukset. Olemukseltaan neito muuten oli vuosien saatossa pyöristynyt, eikä 
noista kerääntyneistä kiloista eroon pääseminen ollut enää kovin helppoa. Ulkonäöllään 
hänen oli siis vaikea kilpailla nykypäivän pinnallisilla markkinoilla. Sen sijaan ihmiset, 
jotka pääsivät tutustumaan häneen paremmin huomasivat hänen olevan hyvin 
herttainen ja sosiaalinen ihminen, aina iloinen ja positiivinen. Tosi ystävilleen hän oli 
oikea aarre, niin paljon hän ystävistään välitti. ¶Silti nuori neito kaipasi elämäänsä 
jotain. Hän halusi jakaa arkensa Jonkun kanssa. Hän toivoi arkeensa Jonkun, jolle 
kertoa työpäivästä, jonka kanssa käydä kaupassa, aloittaa vaikka lenkkeilyn ja ennen 
pitkää perustaa perheen ja saada lapsia. Mutta mistä tuon jonkun löytäisi, kun baareissa 
notkuminen ei kiinnostanut, eikä hän Jonkun sieltä löytymiseen uskonutkaan. Oli siis 
kokeiltava muita nykyaikaisia keinoja.. ¶Ja vihdoin eräänä loppukesän kauniina iltana 
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hän tapasi Jonkun..” ¶Kuka ja millainen oli tuo Joku, mitä hän halusi elämältä, mitä hän 
halusi nuoren parin arjelta..? ¶Kerro se minulle, jos ajatuksesi kuulostavat lupaavilta, 
saatat saada myös kuvan paluupostissa ja pääset tutustumaan tähän neitoon 
tarkemmin.. 
(4.29) [Title] The prince of the fairy tale lost.. ¶“Once upon a time there was a young 
maiden, well relatively young, aged just a tad under 30, but she still called herself young. 
The maiden lived in her small home with her two cats. The young maiden led a life that 
was normal in every way, went to work and spent time with her friends. Earlier she had 
had an active student life and in the process she had finished a polytechnic degree. ¶The 
best thing about her, in her own opinion, were her eyes, those dark brown buttons that 
observed the world with curiosity. Her face that satisfied her in every other respect as 
well was lined by long dark hair. Otherwise her appearance had got rounder along the 
years, and it wasn’t easy to get rid of those accumulated extra kilos anymore. So it was 
hard for her to compete with her looks in the shallow market of today. However, people 
who got to know her better would notice that she was a very sweet and sociable person, 
always happy and positive. To her true friends she was a genuine treasure, that’s how 
much she cared for them. ¶Nevertheless, the young maiden was yearning for something 
in her life. She wanted to share her days with Someone. She wished she had Someone to 
whom she could talk about her workday, with whom she could do grocery shopping, start 
jogging and eventually start a family and have children. But where to find that someone, 
when she wasn’t interested in hanging out in bars and didn’t really believe that she’d find 
that Someone there. So she had to try other modern ways.. ¶And finally one beautiful 
late summer evening she met Someone..” ¶Who and what kind was that Someone, what 
did he want from life, what did he want from the everyday life of the young couple..? 
¶Tell that to me, if your thoughts sound promising, you may also get a picture in the 
return mail and get to know this maiden a bit better.. 
 
It is notable that most of the propositional content per se does not really 
require a metaphoric reading. Many of the denoted life events (such as 
getting a college degree) are, in fact, more plausibly interpreted as objects of 
a non-fictive narrated world. The narrative creates a hybrid of two different 
entextualized worlds: the realistic biographic past of the person and the 
superimposed fairytale world. The metaphorical elements include, for 
instance, the princess-prince social relation between the writer and the ideal 
respondent and, in a sense, the preterite tense. Just as fairytales are usually 
situated in a fictive or mythic past, in (4.29) the descriptions of processes 
that are ultimately interpretable in the speech event as future-oriented (“She 
wanted to share her days with Someone” >> “I wish to find Someone to share 
my life with”) are in the past form, as if the chains of events had already 
unfolded and were merely retold here. The sign pattern explicitly sets the 
reference event (Er) in the past of a fictive world, whereas in actuality the 
narrative will be re-calibrated in light of the purposes of the ongoing 
interactional event. 
As in the two earlier examples, the narrative in (4.29) leads up to the 
interactional event at hand (“Tell that to me…”). In this case, the storyline is 
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left open and pitched to the respondents. That is, she invited repliers to co-
construct her metaphorical life story and to expand it with an imagined 
future. The entire co-constructed story and the fictive figure of the replier in 
particular will then be evaluated by the writer in terms of desirability and 
compatibility (see the discussion of proposable characteristics and example 
4.3b in 4.1.1). At the end of the text, when the rest of the story is offered to 
the respondent, the writer phases out of the princess persona and addresses 
the respondent as “you.” The fictive roles, then, are clearly distinct from more 
“real” ones. There is a correspondence between the idealized writer as a 
“princess” or “she” (3SG) and the actual writer as “I” (1SG) and the idealized 
respondent as “Someone” (3SG) and the actual respondent as “you” (2SG). 
From the standpoint of the writer, we can see several different superimposed 
semiotic worlds here: 
 
(1) the “fictive” past (the person as a narrated figure in past events with a fairytale-like 
emplotment and structure of temporality) 
(2) the “real” past (narrated past life events not requiring a metaphoric interpretation or 
translation into non-fictive biography) 
(3) the “ideal” present (the person as the narrator persona who organizes the “fictive” 
narration as a form of “promotional” self-presentation) 
(4) the “real” present (the person as a non-promotional persona, implied by the 
promotional one, and more visible towards the end when phasing out of the 
narrative) 
(5) the actual present (the person as the animator, the epicenter in whom all the figures 
and personae are grounded) 
 
A host of reflexive models of discourse (e.g., an understanding of narratives, 
fairytales, online dating advertisements, and promotional discourse) are 
needed to interpret different layers of signs of personhood and to infer what 
to anticipate in terms of residential consequences. Each contrastively 
segmentable layer of personhood involves a different representational mode 
and can be translated into other modes (e.g., what the “princess” persona 
says can be translated into what the “promotional” persona says and what the 
“real” persona would say, etc.). In a sense, extreme cases such as fictive 
stories and fictive personae merely make such processes (or the inherent 
“fictiveness” of symbolic processes) more visible and tangible. (See also 
section 4.4.4 and chapter 7.) 
When analyzed in relation to the event of narration (see also 
Georgakopoulou 2006: 101–102), the narrative functions as an instrument of 
biography and identity performance. The personae it mediates are embedded 
personae that derive their meaning in relation to another persona within 
which they operate (e.g., a “fictive” princess within a “promotional” persona). 
Embedded personae can serve, for instance, as a way of dealing with 
emotionally challenging or potentially stigmatizing biographical facts (such 
as overweight in 4.29; see also 5.2.2 and 7.2). Similarly, the narrative 
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discourse itself is embedded in the online dating advertisement genre (see 
e.g. Bhatia 2004; Mäntynen & Shore 2014). Some prototypic parts of story 
structure, such as the evaluation of the narrated events or a summarizing 
coda, may, therefore, be absent. The evaluation and summarizing of, say, the 
relevance or “moral” of the story can be left implicit because they can be 
completed by what is known about the purpose of online dating 
advertisements. The storyline itself can be left open as an anticipation of, and 
to be completed by, the residential consequences that are hoped to ensue 
from online dating advertisements. That is, representations of the writer’s 
past life so far and hoped-for actual future events of life become coherently 
linked by such narrative emplotments and trajectories. The instance of the 
online dating advertisement genre, in turn, becomes partly entextualized and 
contextualized by the embedded narrative. There is, then, a functional 
complementarity and a divison of labor between the online dating 
advertisement genre and the embedded narratives in the cases analyzed 
above. 
In narratives, persons appear as evolving figures in biographic and 
sociohistorical sequences of events – in sharp contrast to the taxonomic 
structures analyzed in the previous section. Persons appear as actors and 
patients embedded in environments instead of individual, isolated wholes 
that organize their own parts. As narratives link the here-and-now to 
sociohistorical and biographical chains of past events and expand them with 
imagined future sequences of events, they provide “identity of the self 
through time” (Linde 1993: 107) in controlled ways. Narrative patterns also 
readily enable the treatment of the ideal other as a story character (“you,” 
“Someone”) within the same storyworld. That is, the two persons become 
related to one another in perspectivally and causally coherent ways in 
chronological successions of events, and their mutual compatibility becomes 
something that is rooted in intentional actions and serendipities of life 
instead of, say, a comparison of taxonomized structures of characteristics. 
4.4.4 FICTIVE PERSONAE  
Closely related to the “fictive” narratives discussed in the previous section are 
performances of “fictive” personae. Although there are only a handful of such 
examples in the data, their analysis interestingly illuminates the range of 
possible textual patterns as well as the very nature of self-presentation in 
online dating advertisements – and more generally too. Why and how, for 
instance, is some performance interpretable as “fictive” and some others not? 
As discussed previously (and see also chapter 8), linguistic symbols as virtual 
models of other semiotic modes have an inherent “fictionality” to them. That 
is, it is a complex matter of interpretation and often a matter of degree, 
when, for example, the mapping of a symbol to perceivable human behaviors 
stops being “truthful” or starts being “metaphoric.” In fact, as will be seen in 
chapter 7, some interactants think that all language in online dating 
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advertisements is “embellished” and “unreliable” and should not, therefore, 
be taken at face value. That is, representations embedded in online dating 
advertisements require a metaphoric reading, a mapping from one symbolic 
frame to another. Why, then, is the promotional persona itself not a “fictive” 
mode of personhood? The difference between “fictive” and “non-fictive” 
personae will become more readily understandable in terms of residential 
consequences and accountability. 
In the following two examples of this section, the writers inhabit a more 
or less independently individuable and recognizable person-like entity. The 
fairy tale example in the previous section already included a fictive persona 
superimposed upon the other personae of the narrator. Such fictive personae 
are, however, possible in non-narrative contexts as well, as the following two 
examples illustrate. In example (4.30), the writer likens himself to a bear-like 
figure:  
 
(4.30) nyt olis hakusessa tälle nallulle oma kulta. tää nallu on perusluonteeltaan kiltti ja 
huolehtivainen enkä turhasta mutise mutta osaan kyllä myös [sanoa?] suoraan jos 
tunnen tulleeni kohdelluksi huonosti. – – oon kokopäivä työssä täällä raumalla. 
harrastuksiin kuuluu autojen rakentelu ja prätkä. 
(4.30) now there’s a search for a honeybunch for this teddy. this teddy is gentle and 
caring by basic nature and I don’t grumble unnecessarily but I can also [speak up] if I 
feel mistreated. – – I work full time here in rauma [a city in Western Finland]. my 
hobbies include building cars and my motorbike.   
 
He refers to himself as “this teddy” (nallu being a sort of hypocoristic variant 
of nalle, “teddy bear”) and employs a style of writing and perceiving the 
world that might be characterized, for instance, as a “childlike” or “naivistic” 
view of subjectivity. He describes his personality in terms of pet-like cuteness 
(“lovable unless provoked into grumpiness”). However, the descriptions of 
his profession and hobbies do not really require, or even fit in with, a bear 
persona, and they are also set explicitly set in an actual geographical location. 
Whereas the writer of (4.30) only lightly evokes a personified bear-like 
figure, phasing in and out of it, example (4.31) is a full-blown imitation of a 
popular cartoon character. Example (4.31), in contrast to the previous one, 
involves a specific, recognizable character that has a life of its own outside 
the advertisement. The cartoon character that the writer inhabits is the 
Cursing Hedgehog (Kiroileva siili), a small hedgehog with a nasty attitude. 
Accurate translation and glossing of the character’s speech style is impossible 
here, but it might be characterized as colloquial and miscellaneously 
(pseudo)dialectal, and it contains a host of real and invented swear words 
and profanities: 
 
(4.31) [Title] Kiroileva Siili  
¶Hakusessa: kiroileva siili(tär) ¶No niin, simputin samputti, joko alkavat 
bemaripurjehtijat riittää!? Tulevatko korvista ulos uraohjusten osingot ja alkavatko 
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niiden ”pitkien, tummien & komeiden” urheilevien sporttiadonisten hugobossit tuntua 
lähinnä mummolan lannoitteelta, jumpska! ¶Se on kuule menoa, kissavieköön! Aimo 
annos anarkiaa, sillä saadaan, neiti hyvä, rakkaus roihuamaan ja rääkyviä hunsvotteja 
kasvatustätien kauhuksi. Voihan tuhannen jampettia ja seitkytäyks mersuntähteä, 
mankuna ja vinkuna ja tää törkeä ”tottuuren vääristely” suapi riittää. ¶Se on kato se 
asenne, jota ei viistuhatta tommyhilfigeriä pelasta, eli jos pissiksissä on jotain, niin ne 
vetää ainakin reilusti alkkarit lipputankoo, niinko janhusen pertsa leirillä ysiysi. – – Hra 
Siili, bachelor 
 
(4.31) [Title] Cursing Hedgehog  
¶Looking for: a cursing hedgehog(ette) [FEM] ¶Well now, gosh dang, have you had 
enough of sailors with BMWs!? Are the dividends of high-flyers coming out of your ears 
and are the hugo bosses of the “tall, dark & handsome” sports adonises starting to feel 
like the fertilizer used at your grandmother’s place, crikey! ¶This is it now, jeepers 
creepers! A whole bunch of anarchy will, dear Miss, set our love ablaze and produce 
squalling rascals to terrify educators. Oh thousand popinjays and seventy-one Mercy 
stars, the groaning and the moaning and this outrageous “distortion of the truth” has to 
stop already. ¶You see it is the attitude, which can’t be replaced by five thousand tommy 
hilfigers, so if there’s anything to be said for valley girls, at least they hoist their undies 
honestly up the flagpole, like pertsa janhunen [male nickname+surname] at camp in 
ninety-nine. – – Mr. Hedgehog, bachelor 
 
From the standpoint of identity performance, the first thing to notice is that 
the source domain of the performance is popular youth culture.66 The writer, 
on the other hand, is a middle-aged man who, by showing mastery of the 
interdiscursively sourced character, can plausibly demonstrate his 
identification with this particular form of culture. Fictive personae, then, 
allow the performers to shift the sociocultural origo of the event. Secondly, 
animating a fictive persona brings in a specific representational mode. The 
animated representational contents cannot be directly or straightforwardly 
applied to the biographic individual but need to be mapped onto him through 
a process of inference (e.g., by translating hedgehog-like qualities into 
human-like qualities). As for accountability, part of the responsibility for and 
commitment to the contents one animates is relegated to the imitated 
character, or at least to some degree detached from the self. The properties of 
the character that serves as the model for the speech one animates can be 
appealed to as motivating factors (see also section 5.3 and Haakana & 
Visapää 2005: 456–461). That is, the writer’s more specific commitment to 
the represented contents also becomes a matter of inference. 
                                                 
66 The cartoon was, however, published in the biggest national newspaper and as a popular 
hardcover collection the year the data was collected (2007). In that sense, it was clearly a mass-
mediated cultural phenomenon. Perhaps it is merely the identification with, and the imitation of, a 
cartoon character that is stereotypically easier to associate with youth rather than middle-aged men. 
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In (4.31), the voicing of the fictive persona enables a somewhat 
straightforward commentary of different social types and their habits of self-
presentation. Although there is no explicit reference to reading or writing 
dating advertisements, the questions addressed to the reader in the 
beginning (“have you had enough of…?”) seem to presume a process of 
browsing through advertisements on a dating website. It is implied that one 
will find one polished profile after another, the writers invariably describing 
themselves as “tall, dark & handsome” high-flyers. The writer presumes that 
the reader, like the writer himself, has had enough of such advertisements – 
and sees them for what they really are, a “distortion of the truth.” In other 
words, the writer paints caricatures of social types (e.g., career-oriented 
persons who like to show off their wealth) and, more specifically, portrays 
them as unreliable animators. That is, the writer fosters distrust towards the 
plausibility of their self-presentations. These discredited personae are then 
contrasted with the writer’s own persona and an attitude “that cannot be 
bought.” Interestingly, then, the fictive persona actually becomes a metaphor 
for the “true” self and the “authenticity” of the writer (as it obviates the need 
to resort to ordinary “inauthentic” promotional performances). Moreover, 
the poetic performance of the fictive persona serves as a kind of palpable 
iconic evidence of the validity of the claim that this writer is indeed different. 
The fictive persona in (4.31) is therefore also construable as a strategy of 
“authenticity” (see also section 5.2.2 and chapter 7). 
One might imagine a continuum ranging from, say, clearly fictive context-
specific personae towards imagined alternative or idealized personae towards 
habitually inhabited everyday personae (which are also habitually projected 
on the self by others). The degree of “fictiveness” (not to mention 
“authenticity”) of any particular persona, however, is always a matter of 
specific metapragmatic calibration and ontological framing.67 In the fictive 
performances analyzed above, the interactants seem to become accountable 
for the representativeness of the kinds their performances project on them, 
but not so much for the particular indices they employ. The writer of (4.31) 
would probably not be expected to continue speaking like the Cursing 
Hedgehog on a first date, but he would still be accountable for the 
characteristics the performance projected on him. (In contrast, the writers of 
4.5 and 4.6, for example, might more plausibly be expected to exhibit similar 
indices of “analytical” or “laid-back” speech styles in subsequent events.) In 
some sense, then, the “fictiveness” of a persona is a matter of how disposable 
or alienable (or “instrument-like”) that persona is regarded as, or conversely, 
how near it comes to that which is considered by self and others a necessary 
and inalienable part of the person (or “possession-like”). In some cases, such 
differences have to do with how far a persona is located in a chain of 
interpretation leading from what is relatively directly perceivable towards 
                                                 
67 There may, of course, be movements along the continuum on biographical or sociohistorical 
time scales. A fictive persona can, for instance, gradually become a habitual alter ego, etc. 
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what is highly inferential and symbolic. That is, “fictiveness” is a secondary 
reflexive layer that needs some primary level it can be mapped to. For 
instance, perceiving a person in his daily routines would not necessarily 
entail or require an interpretation of him as a “teddy bear.” A first layer of 
representational interpretants would probably consist of simple typifications 
of appearance and conduct. They might then give rise to more complex 
inferences or metaphoric representational interpretants, in which 
denotational stereotypes are troped upon by re-interpreting first-order 
typifications such as “robust” and “grumpy” with the concept of “bear.” 
Channelling one’s personhood through a “fictive” figure, then, brings out new 
symbolic dimensions. It reorganizes and reinterprets those indexical, iconic, 
and previous symbolic relations that it taps into and makes them 
experienceable in new ways. That is, it interprets the person from another 
point of personspacetime or sociocultural maps. It is, then, a creative process 
of self-invention and, as such, perhaps less susceptible to others’ immediate 
normative regimentation.68 
4.4.5 PSEUDONYMS AND REPLICATED PATTERNS OF DISCOURSE 
One more type of textual patterning merits a closer look. So far we have 
looked at the relation between texts and persons mainly from the standpoint 
of how textual patterns symbolically and indexically mediate and organize 
icons of personhood and social relations. In section 4.4, the focus has often 
been on the capacity of patterns of discourse to representationally 
(re)interpret persons. It is, however, noteworthy that specific patterns of 
discourse per se can be construed as characteristics of persons. That is, 
discursive artifacts can be framed as instantiations or tokens of someone’s 
habits of linguistic action rather than as representations. This section will 
take a look at forms of discourse that are conventionally recognizable as 
habitual speech behaviors (e.g., epithets, mottos, slogans). Finally, to connect 
the different lines of analysis in this chapter, the section will expand the 
discussion towards other patterns of discourse in order to note that, in fact, 
any specific describable or performable characteristic or any type of textual 
patterning itself can become habitually and recognizably characteristic of an 
individual. For instance, a particular view of subjectivity or a general 
penchant for narratives can reflect the habitual speech style of a person, or a 
person may be recognized in some community by some specific description. 
As has been seen in earlier sections, habits as characteristics differ in 
terms of how they can be communicated via a digital text-artifact (cf. e.g. 
describable and performable characteristics in 4.1). For instance, physical 
activities (such as doing sports as a hobby) have to be interpreted in 
linguistic symbols in light of some ontology (e.g., in 1SG PRES IND transitive 
                                                 
68 Or, such “fictive” performances might become more readily evaluated and regimented in terms 
of aesthetics rather than truthfulness (or as a “performable” rather than a “describable” characteristic). 
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clauses with appropriate lexemes and aspectual modifiers, etc.) before they 
are compatible with the communicative infrastructure (e.g., representable in 
the alphabet). As was seen in 4.1, characteristics that are indexed by speech 
behaviors (e.g., being funny or intelligent) can be relatively directly mediated 
via text-artifacts.69 In a similar vein, habitual patterns of speech, in which a 
particular discursive formulation (e.g., a name, an epithet, a slogan or a 
motto, a repetend or a refrain) is habitually associated with a particular 
individual, can be redirected into the channel of digital online dating 
advertisements relatively directly. That is, instances of the same habit can be 
transmitted via new kinds of artifactual residues. In such cases we are 
dealing with replication and recontextualization rather than representation. 
Simultaneously or subsequently, such stretches of discourse can, of 
course, become interpreted as representations too and mapped in various 
inferential and metaphorical ways to other available information about the 
person in question. The recontextualization of, for example, a motto in an 
online dating advertisement first of all makes knowable that the person has 
that motto as a habit of speech. That is, the sign pattern is an icon of the kind 
of thing the person might often be heard saying or writing. Secondly, one 
may infer what sort of worldview or values the motto is indexically grounded 
in.  That is, the motto reflects the characteristics of the kind of person who 
would have such a motto. Thirdly, one may infer or speculate what that 
person would do in some particular situation, were that motto interpreted as 
a representation of that situation and its agentive possibilities. 
Let us first consider the most typical type of speech chain indexicals 
(Agha 2007a: 65–67), i.e., personal names. In the case of online dating 
advertisements the particular subspecies we are most interested in are 
pseudonyms (or “user names” from the standpoint of their function within 
the dating service). Names become originally attached to individuals in 
various “baptismal events” (see Silverstein 2003: 203), and subsequently the 
link between the name and the individual is knowable to those who learn it 
through appropriate chains of semiotic encounters (e.g., introductions, 
observed address behaviors). An online dating advertisement is one such 
encounter, as a reader becomes aware of a person with a set of characteristics 
individuated by a pseudonym. The “anonymity” of the encounter, however, 
means that the person carrying the pseudonym is not (yet) easily linked with 
a particular biographic individual outside the world of that online dating 
service.70 
                                                 
69  In which case the question is how representative they are, i.e., whether or not they are actual 
instances of a genuine habit. 
70 “Anonymity,” then, is not so much a state of “namelessness” (as the etymology might suggest) as 
it is a lack of consistent linking between named personae in different worlds. The world of the 
embodied residence of the biophysical epicenter of the person is particularly crucial, since knowing the 
link between, for example, an Internet-based persona and the body that operates it enables forms of 
regimentation, including physical force, directed straight at that epicenter. – We may even parallel this 
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The focus here is how personal names function as a sign among others as 
part of person reference and self-presentation in the context of online dating 
advertisements. On most sites writers not only can but have to choose a 
pseudonym that will be visible to other users. It is, then, a somewhat marked 
form of “baptism,” since usually and stereotypically personal names are given 
by others. Some writers volunteer what supposedly are their official first 
names or nick names, either as a pseudonym (e.g., Pentti4238, 4rska, 
JukkaElias, jore68, sartsa) or as part of their text (e.g., using -Jussi- as a 
signature). Neither the pseudonym nor the official name enables the reader 
to pick out any actual individual outside the “anonymous” virtual world. That 
is, any name in online dating advertisements only has an individuating 
function in a very specific channel-bound semiotic chain.71 However, since 
names are grounded in and point to some practice of name giving and name 
usage as well as some community of namers and named ones, pseudonyms 
and official names do imply different practices and speech chains (see e.g. 
Alford 1988). The pseudonym points to the writer as a unique individual 
within both the technical world of online dating and the “ideal” semiotic 
world of self-presentation, whereas the official name points to the writer as a 
unique individual in the “real” society in which the ongoing semiotic 
encounter is embedded. “Revealing” one’s real name as a sort of trust-
provoking gesture may, then, imply that the “anonymous” and “promotional” 
persona in the text is securely anchored in the non-anonymous everyday 
world of the writer. 
A small set of names also points to such “real” world demographic data 
that are usually given in the profile anyway, such as age or place of residence 
(e.g., pete39porvoo [Porvoo = a city in southern Finland], Hki29v [Hki = 
Helsinki; v = -year-old]). Such pseudonyms, based on more or less 
recognizable official names or nicknames or other standard information, are, 
however, a minority. Most pseudonyms seem to be clearly communicative in 
the sense that there is some uniquely decipherable meaning and motivation 
behind them (see also Alford 1988: 59–65). Sometimes the full logic of the 
                                                                                                                                          
“rational” notion of anonymity with the “magical” logic(s) of traditional name taboos. In some cases, 
such taboos were based on the belief that revealing one’s “true” name exposes one to dangers (such as 
evil spirits or others’ spells or harmful intentions) – whereas a nickname or a replacement name was 
considered safer. Sometimes an essential difference was drawn between a name uttered by oneself with 
one’s own voice and a name uttered by others. In the first case, the token of the name was regarded as 
an extension of the self, thereby making the person susceptible to the above-mentioned threats, 
whereas the latter was considered a mere referential usage that did not expose one to threats. (See e.g. 
Frazer 1998 [1890]: 198–204; cf. Gell 1998: 102–104; also Alford 1988: 105–118.) That is, different 
names in their specific contexts of utterance localize, and expose, the person differently in relation to 
patterns of life and selfhood, and the self-presentational act of giving one’s own “true” name often has a 
special cultural status.  
71 In fact, last names, addresses, phone numbers, or any other unambiguously individuating 
indices are strictly edited out by administrators on most sites. 
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name remains (and is perhaps meant to remain) privy to the writers 
themselves (e.g., JD0007) (cf. also Hämäläinen 2012: 36; Sjöblom 2004: 
219–225). Some such names include recognizable fragments of the Finnish 
language. They are, in other words, at least partly interpretable in light of 
denotational stereotypes. Many of them have some sort of correlative basis in 
the text. That is, they relate to similar objects or topics or employ the same 
signs as parts of the body text. The name the writer wishes to become 
individuated by and habitually known under, then, relates to other aspects of 
the writer’s biographic and self-presentational performance. Table 6 presents 
a few examples of names and stretches of text they might, for instance, 
resonate with so that the name and the text mutually co-interpret one 
another. 
 
Name Text 
sudenpentu (“wolf cub,” “Cub Scout”) “Surprises and new things can’t be found unless 
you’re open to them. :-)” [cf. the Scout mottos “Be 
prepared,” “always ready”]; Yllätyksiä ja uusia 
juttuja ei löydä jollei niille ole avoin. :-) 
nuorekas69 (“youthful69”) “A man with a capital M I’m not, since I possess 
loads of playfulness and boyishness. Every now 
and then I get all kinds of crazy ideas and I have a 
desire to get to realize them – –” 
Mies isolla M:llä en ole, koska leikkimielisyyttä 
ja poikamaisuuttakin löytyy roppakaupalla. 
Päähäni pälkähtääkin silloin tällöin ihan 
hullunkurisia ideoita ja halu olis päästä 
toteuttaan niitä – – 
Mahdollisuus07 (“Opportunity07”) “I like happy, humorous women who have a 
positive outlook on the future. The kind who are 
able to see life as a great opportunity and gift.” 
Pidän iloisista, huumorintajuisista ja 
tulevaisuuteen positiivisesti suhtautuvista 
naisista. Sellaisista, jotka kykenevät näkemään 
elämän suurena mahdollisuutena ja lahjana. 
_syysmeri_ (“automnal sea”) “I look forward to Fall, I love it. I like to stroll in 
nature and particularly on Fall evenings it would 
be wonderful to go on an evening walk to look at 
the stars, for example by the seaside.” 
Odotan syksyä, rakastan sitä. Tykkään liikkua 
luonnossa ja etenkin syysiltoina olisi ihana 
mennä iltakävelylle katsomaan tähtiä, vaikka 
merenrantaan. 
elinkautiseksi (“a life sentence”) 
 
“If I’m an abomination, then you’ll only lose a few 
minutes when you turn up and find out. – – But if 
it so happens that we are a match then you may 
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lose the entire rest of your life with me, do you 
dare to take such a risk…?? 
Jos olen aivan hirvitys, niin menetät ainoastaan 
pari minuuttia kun käyt toteamassa tilanteen. – 
– Mutta jos sattuukin kolahtamaan niin sitten 
voit menettää koko loppuelämäsi kanssani, 
uskallatko ottaa sellaisen riskin...?? 
kvasaari (“quasar”)  “Smart and peppy woman?” [e.g., one who 
masters astronomical vocabulary?] Fiksu ja 
reipas nainen?  
Table 6. Semantically transparent pseudonyms and examples of correlative segments in the 
advertisement texts. 
Other interpretations are certainly possible too. The aim of Table 6 is merely 
to demonstrate how names can be construed as pointing to contents of the 
text but under more concise and abstract NP formulations that are often also 
modified orthographically or translated into another language. In other 
words, such names reflexively pick out elements from the texts, crystallize, 
emphasize, and aestheticize them and, in a sense, elevate them to an 
aphoristic or metaphorical level (cf. also with views of subjectivity in 4.2.1).  
Sometimes semantically transparent names are not as easily linked to 
segments in the advertisement text. In these cases, too, they can be 
interpreted as evoking imagery and values that are somehow relevant to the 
writer or that he or she identifies with, such as ethnic foodstuffs (with 
metaphorical potential) (pepperooni4644), celestial bodies (aurink0inen, 
aurinko1972, Aurinkotuli, “sunny,” “sun1972,” “Sunfire”), signs of the Zodiac 
(librakuuskyt, “libra” + ”sixty”), or conventional metaphors about life 
(matka_JA_maaranpaa, “voyage_AND_destination”) (cf. 4.32a and 4.32b) 
(cf. also Sjöblom 2006: 210–211, 216–218). Another group consists of names 
that are either proper names or incorporate elements from languages other 
than Finnish or are in some other way less obviously or transparently 
interpretable. In other words, they are more selective and sieving in relation 
to the audience, since understanding the underlying logic requires 
appropriate non-linguistic knowledge or competence of another language. 
Table 7 presents a few examples. 
 
Name(s) Explanation 
Feuillatte A brand of Champagne. The writer explains: 
“In accordance with my pseudonym, I’m a 
high-quality and sparkling specimen of my 
class.” 
cereza74; SolRos75 Cereza is “cherry” in Spanish. Solros is 
“sunflower” in Swedish. 
taikyoku77; aniki3006 Taikyoku is a series of Karate movements. 
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Aniki is a Japanese honorific for a superior 
and the name of a Finnish anime forum. 
Sefadu A town in Sierra Leone, famous for a 
diamond discovery. Also a combat game 
figure. 
livEfOretsiniM “Minister Of Evil” spelt backwards. Perhaps 
a reference to the book The Minister of Evil: 
The Secret History of Rasputin’s Betrayal of 
Russia? 
Table 7. Less transparent pseudonyms 
In a few rare cases, the proper name used as a pseudonym may also be the 
actual spiritual name (e.g., a yoga name) of the writer. Such pseudonyms 
point to particular philosophical frames (remember also example 4.13 
earlier). For instance, a writer called manusham ends her text by noting that 
an “appreciation of Ahimsa [the principle of causing no harm in Indian 
religions] is a big plus.” Often, however, such pseudonyms seem more like 
intentional “Google & solve” tasks. They provide mysterious tidbits of 
knowledge about the preferences and identifications of the writer, which 
might be too specific or narrow as part of ordinary self-presentation (and 
would then lose the aura of mystery anyway), not to mention as requirements 
for others. But on the off chance that a reader would actually recognize and 
identify with them, that would be a special sign of compatibility as well as a 
great conversation starter – in other words, a “big plus” (cf. also Hämäläinen 
2012: 101). In that sense, such characteristics may actually provide the most 
personal and uniquely individuating or differentiating pieces of information 
(compared with, for example, listing “sports” as a “hobby,” found in dozens 
and dozens of advertisements; see section 4.4.2). We may see in these 
naming practices an interplay between two vectors of self-presentation that 
will come up on several occasions later: that of appearing sufficiently similar, 
recognizable, and categorizable (or “normal”) to others and that of appearing 
sufficiently singular (or “unique”) in comparison with others (see e.g. 
sections 5.2.1 and 6.4; also Alford 1988: 69; Sjöblom 2004: 220, 240).  
Let us now move on to a different type of discursive artifact that can be 
habitually associated with a person, namely slogans, precepts, and mottos. 
Some of the names just examined already resembled aphoristic guidelines for 
life. The following two examples are explicitly framed as “mottos.” The first 
motto is presented in one relatively isolated sentence, whereas the latter one 
is followed by an additional explanation and is therefore more tightly 
integrated into the surrounding co-text: 
 
(4.32a) Mottoni on: elämä on elämistä varten- se ei ole suoritus! 
(4.32a) My motto is: life is for living - it is not a performance! 
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(4.32b) Mottoni on : Anna mitä sinulta pyydetään. Sen häpeä=hän se on, joka liikoja 
pyytää. 
(4.32b) My motto is : Give what you’re asked for. The shame, after all, is on the one who 
asks for too much. 
 
Whether the explanation in (4.32b) is part of the motto or not is a matter of 
interpretation. Nevertheless, it further explains the logic behind the core 
sentence and brings it closer to the topics and the participants of the 
interactional event. The clitic -han, for example, presumes a shared 
recognition of such a line of reasoning between the participants. The core of 
the motto (“Give what you’re asked for”) is framed as a relatively fixed 
discursive form that stays the same over time, from one event or encounter to 
another. Mottos, then, can be reflected upon in and applied to a variety of 
events on the biographical time scale of an individual. In that sense, they 
resemble general theoretical formulations or ideological positions (see 4.4.1), 
but mottos are not (merely) representations but habitually recurring 
discursive artifacts that as particular fixed forms are framable as 
characteristics of specific individuals. Moreover, as representations, they are 
more intimately about the particular individual who is committed to them, 
whereas ideological positions often provide guidelines for the interpretation 
and evalution of more general social phenomena and other people, too.  
Next, example (4.33) contains an intertextual reference to a recognizable 
cultural artifact, a pop song (see also section 6.3.3). The writer 
recontextualizes a part of that discursive artifact in her own text, which 
indexes some kind of non-specified relation between the writer in the 
ongoing event and that artifact and whatever forms of life it is associated 
with. Example (4.33) first cites the pop song72 in the title and then returns to 
the same song at the end: 
 
(4.33) [Title] ”tahdon tanssia kanssasi tänään, kuten riemusta tanssia voi, tahdon tanssia 
kanssasi huomenna kun surun sammunut laulu soi...” – – ¶”tahdon tanssia kanssasi 
valssin suuressa salissa kristallikruunujen alla, kiihkosta hehkuvana. Lentää kiiltävän 
parketin halki, kuin ei jalkoja olisikaan, antaa viulujen viedä kauas jonnekin, jonnekin 
vaan” [Text ends] 
(4.33) [Title] “I want to dance with you today, as one can dance out of joy, I want to 
dance with you tomorrow when the faded song of sorrow is playing...” ¶“I want to dance 
with you a waltz in a grand hall under crystal chandeliers, glowing with passion. To fly 
across the dance floor, as if we had no feet at all, let the violins take us far away 
somewhere, just somewhere” [Text ends] 
 
                                                 
72 Googling reveals that the song is Tahdon tanssia kanssasi (“I want to dance with you”) 
performed by Tomi Metsäketo and Johanna Kurkela (2004) – a slow, rhythmic, minor-key pop ballad, 
which might be characterized as “melancholic” and “dramatic.”  
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The recontextualized parts are explicitly marked with quotes as 
interdiscursively sourced segments, but their specific source is not indicated. 
(It may be recognized, Googled, or otherwise figured out by the readers, or 
merely taken as a non-specific quote.) Furthermore, the text contains no 
explicit framing or reasoning about the personal or co-textual meaning of the 
cited passages. Rather, the cited passages seem to implicitly contrast with the 
somewhat ordinary or mundane self-presentational facts of the middle part 
of the text. The quoted passages envelop the self-presentational details in a 
song world chronotope of glamorous dancing, timeless elation, and passion. 
The intertextual framing, then, seems to derive from the writer’s 
“ethnopoetic” vision of composition (cf. e.g. Hymes 2003; Blommaert 2007; 
Bauman 2014 from the standpoint of mainly oral, narrative performances; 
see also section 6.3.3). The writer has controlled the selection and expression 
of the signs and their indexical positioning within the text-artifact. But since 
the quoted passages, unlike the middle part, are only animated but not 
authored by the writer, their representational calibration to the ongoing 
event as well as the writer’s accountability for them remains relatively 
implicit, ambiguous, and inferential. Such quotes can, then, be read in more 
concrete or more metaphorical representational modes with different kinds 
of consequences (e.g., whether we are talking about dancing in a concrete or 
figurative sense). On a scale of tightness of link between the person and the 
recontextualized discursive artifact, intertextual references are likely to be 
understood as more loosely associated with a writer than mottos or 
pseudonyms. In fact, the possibility of two persons making a similar 
intertextual reference or having similar personal commitments to the same 
discursive artifact is probably highest in such cases, since the discursive 
artifacts are pre-existing and public and therefore maximally independent of 
the entextualizer.73 
Finally, let us consider cases in which others’ words (or linguistic signs 
more generally) about the writer are recontextualized by the writer as 
characteristics of self. In the following example, the taxonomized list of 
characteristics is about the writer but attributed to others (“friends”): 
 
(4.34) ¶Ystävät kuvaavat [minua] sanoin: vastuuntuntoinen, mutta nuorekas, iloinen, 
aikaansaava organisaattori, kun jotain hyvää haluaa tapahtuvan...kaipa niitä 
negatiivisiakin ominaisuuksia on...kaikki ominaisuudethan ovat sekä-että, tilanteesta 
riippuen. 
                                                 
73 We could take this line of thought even further to include any attitudes expressed towards 
specific, particular discursive artifacts, such as favorite songs or books (cf. Viimeksi olen lukenut Reko 
Lundanin ”Viikkoja, kuukausia,” “The last book I’ve read is Reko Lundan’s ‘Weeks, months’”), or, in 
fact, any recognizable cultural object or place that is a definitely and specifically locatable referent for, 
and directly experienceable by, any respondent, regardless of whether it is discursive or not or 
embedded in the text or not. Both the animator and the respondent, then, have, at least potentially, 
equal access to such objects from their own perspectives. 
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(4.34) ¶My friends describe [me] with the words: responsible, but youthful, cheerful, 
efficient organizer, when [she] wants something good to happen...I guess there are 
negative characteristics as well...all characteristics (I suppose) are both-and, depending 
on the situation.  
 
The interesting thing about example (4.34) is that it not only represents the 
speech of others about the writer, but it somewhat explicitly frames it as 
speech (“describe with words,” kuvaavat sanoin) that could be, would be, 
and allegedly has been spoken about the writer. (Similar examples will be 
seen in the following chapters too; see e.g. sections 5.2, 5.3 and example 7.19 
in 7.2.2.) That is, the writer animates a sign pattern that has presumably 
been authored by others without taking an explicit personal stance towards 
its representativeness or truthfulness. (And later, in the last sentence, the 
writer provides a very general distancing metapragmatic remark on the 
relative nature of any kind of “characteristic talk.”) The mere fact that the 
writer animates such signs clearly shows some degree of non-specified 
commitment to their meaning and makes her accountable for their general 
relevance for the ongoing event. Nevertheless, the writer primarily commits 
to the existence of such habitual patterns of others’ speech rather than to 
their representational content.  
This discussion evokes more fundamental questions concerning the 
relation between linguistic signs and persons. The previous examples bring 
out a number of important general points that apply to all forms of self-
presentation. First, there is a continuum from more residential to more 
representational framings of discursive artifacts. For instance, instead of the 
conceptual content of a word, we may appreciate the way it sounds (or the 
aesthetic affordance it provides for some purpose). The act of animation can 
be interpreted merely as a commitment to the fact that such and such words 
may be, should be or have been uttered about some person (e.g., an act of 
simulation or imitation). Or, an act of animation can be interpreted as a 
commitment to the representational content those signs convey. 
Characteristics, then, can be interpreted relatively more as words (or sign 
vehicles more generally) indexically linked to some person or as icons of 
personhood predicated about some person. Moreover, we can sometimes 
take the speech act (e.g., “I am cheerful”) either as a commitment to the 
representation itself (a sort of de dicto approach; “I adhere to the description 
‘cheerful’”) or as a commitment to the object it refers to at some particular 
instance of interpretation (a sort of de re approach; “I possess the qualities 
denoted here-and-now by ‘cheerful’”).  
What a person considers an appropriate form of linguistic self-
presentation is often precisely what has proven successful earlier (i.e., what 
has been corroborated by experience and recognized by others) or what the 
person has internalized from others’ speech about her. We develop self-
presentational routines and accommodate to self-presentational registers. In 
other words, regularities and habits of self-presentation form on personal as 
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well as sociohistorical levels. To phrase this differently, rather than being 
emergent theoretical and reflective representations authored in the ongoing 
interactional event, self-presentational forms may be re-animations of habits 
or historical residues on biographical time scales. Such habits may change 
only gradually, for example when their validity becomes questioned and one 
is forced to re-reflect and re-theorize. Online dating advertisements, of 
course, are an example of potential circumstances in which that might occur. 
Between such revelatory moments, at any particular interactional event, the 
calibration of self-presentational forms to extra-linguistic aspects of reality 
may, therefore, be by degrees out of sync. Accordingly, the self-
presentational forms someone animates may be motivated from two different 
directions. They may emanate from the biographical objects (e.g., attributes, 
habits, memories, experiences) that the animator has access to and wishes to 
entextualize (or interpret representationally). They may also emanate from 
existing patterns of speech that the animator wishes to replicate and 
recontextualize in the ongoing event for the sake of some anticipated 
desirable interpretant. (See also 5.2.1.) 
Any described or performed characteristic, then, may become a speech 
chain indexical (see Agha 2007a: 65–67). It may become habitually and 
stereotypically linked to some individual and that individual may become 
recognizable by such descriptions for those interactants who are introduced 
to the link through appropriate semiotic chains or who have been present at 
the baptismal event. The relation of this indexical link to the symbolic 
content of the characteristic is itself a further layer of meaning. Over time the 
relation may begin to seem incomprehensible or outdated and lead to various 
consequences (e.g., self-presentational rebranding). That is, a discrepancy 
between an indexically linked discursive artifact and the representational 
interpretant it projects on the individual may eventually emerge (see e.g. 
example 7.15 in 7.2.1).74 It seems that clarifying the nature of one’s 
commitment to the signs one animates becomes particularly relevant in the 
case of explicit evaluative stancetaking, which will be the topic of chapter 5. 
                                                 
74 And such discrepancies may sometimes be perceived as a problem – and sometimes not (that is, 
Little Steven may grow up or Skinny Joey may become fat without anyone having a problem with it, or 
daring to voice such problems). In order to maintain coherence, the representational mode of such 
seemingly outdated habitual typifications can be reinterpreted as, say, ironic or nostalgic (producing a 
kind of “double exposure”). 
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5 EVALUATIVE STANCETAKING 
This chapter complements the previous one by taking a more focused look at 
evaluative stancetaking. As discussed in the introduction, evaluation is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon. It refers to the value-directed aspect of the human 
mind and behavior and is ultimately grounded in the capacity of selves to 
care for whether things are good or bad, right or wrong, true or false (see 
section 2.3.2). It incorporates an affective dimension (i.e., reacting affectively 
to the unfolding of semiotic processes) and an agentive dimension (i.e., 
exerting agency on semiotic processes to guide them in light of some value). 
In a sense, then, evaluation refers to personal non-indifference in relation to 
reality (or those semiotic objects that reality consists of), which leads to 
preferences and choices of the type “this rather than that.” There are complex 
processes of existential rationality (Kockelman 2013a: 194–196), in which 
persons opt for some patterns of life over others and plot paths through 
worlds in light of their ontologies and evaluative techniques (e.g., practical 
utilities; affects and intentional commitments, such as desires, fears, 
memories, or plans; cultural traditions, norms, and ideals; experience-based 
stereotypes and prototypes). The entextualization of parts of such processes 
in online dating advertisements is what this chapter is interested in. 
Although evaluation is present in virtually all human processes, it does 
not necessarily become recognized by or explicitly communicated to others 
(e.g., in case of affective responses). That is, the signs that mediate evaluative 
processes may remain relatively private. Even when they do enter the public 
sphere, their conduciveness to interpretation may remain relatively low. 
Most evaluative processes, therefore, precede any linguistic formulation. In 
fact, the whole purpose of online dating advertisements as an instrument of 
sieving and selection of persons is evaluative. Moreover, all of the textual 
patterns in chapter 4, even before their formulation, were already multiply 
evaluated in terms of appropriateness, effectiveness, and desirability. That is, 
textual structure itself is a product of evaluative processes. Linguistic 
stancetaking, in which values become explicitly signaled, is, then, a special 
case that makes evaluative processes relatively public and unambiguous and 
speakers accountable for them as interactional positions or social statuses.  
In linguistics, evaluation has sometimes been used as a general umbrella 
term for all those aspects of language – and grammar in particular – that are 
grounded in the perspective of a participant, as opposed to some supposedly 
objective realm of propositional meaning. Outlined this way, evaluation 
covers, for instance, forms of epistemic and deontic modality. (See e.g. 
Thompson & Hunston 1999.) On the other hand, reverse conceptualizations, 
i.e., ones in which modality includes “evaluatives” as one subspecies 
alongside epistemic and deontic modality, have been proposed (see e.g. 
Kangasniemi 1991). That is, the parameters and hierarchies that evaluation is 
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analyzed into and the descriptions such parameters are given are ontology-
specific (e.g., Thompson & Hunston’s “positive” vs. “negative,” “certain” vs. 
“uncertain,” “expected” vs. “unexpected,” “important/relevant” vs. 
“unimportant/irrelevant”; cf. e.g. Martin & White 2004). This applies to local 
sociocultural ontologies as much as it does to scientific ones. The relation 
between practices of evaluation and those practices that reflexively represent 
and evaluate such practices of evaluation should, then, be placed at the 
center of inquiry (Kockelman 2010: e.g. 201; and see also chapter 7). 
Ultimately, the evaluations a speaker can communicate or become 
accountable for depend on the participants’ local models of what kinds of 
evaluative processes there are and how they manifest themselves.75 
All linguistic meaning is perspectival (i.e., grounded in speech events and 
their participants) and involves evaluation on many layers. One can, first of 
all, evaluate some perceivable state of affairs from one’s perspective and in 
light of one’s values by a linguistic representation either privately or publicly. 
Secondly, one can evaluate that linguistic representation as a representation 
in terms of different ontology-specific parameters, such as accuracy or 
aesthetic value. Thirdly, one can evaluate the act of expressing or repressing 
that representation in some event as, say appropriate or inappropriate. (Cf. 
also Cortazzi & Jin 1999.) To illustrate, someone can, for instance, evaluate 
the appearance of a person as unappealing with a colorful linguistic 
expression (e.g., sairaalloisen ylipainoinen siideri valas, “morbidly obese 
cider whale,” see chapter 7) that one may privately consider brilliantly 
incisive and humorous. Simultaneously, however, one may regret and 
apologize for having said it out loud at the wrong time in the wrong place. 
That is, the animation of, the authorship of, and the commitment to linguistic 
evaluations are all distinguishable and themselves distinctly evaluable 
dimensions. However, in most events, some of these dimensions remain 
private, fleeting, ambiguous, or contradictory. Still, for such evaluations to 
make sense in the long run, others are needed to recognize, to endorse, to 
contest or to appreciate them. It is ultimately – on longer time scales – in or 
in relation to the public sphere that enduring evaluative processes and norms 
of evaluation are negotiated, controlled and internalized by interactants. 
The focus of this chapter is on prototypic evaluative stances, i.e., those 
semiotic processes that make evaluation emblematic in some interactional 
                                                 
75 That is, what can be understood by participants as a speaker’s personal stance (or intentional 
status) is related to ontologies of personhood and epistemic formations that may vary considerably 
between different cultures (see e.g. Rosaldo 1982; Kockelman 2006b: 112–114). This is not to contest 
the fact that many basic categories (e.g., expression of epistemic and deontic stances or mental states of 
desire etc.) seem more or less “universal” or cross-linguistically recurring – but rather to broaden the 
scope of what can be understood as a stance and how stance is related to local typologies of events and 
personae (cf. also footnote 30 in 2.3.2). In other words, in addition to attending to e.g. lexico-grammar, 
discursive patterns, and participant roles, stances should also be accounted for as a form of 
ethnopsychological interpretation in light of local cultural understandings (see Kockelman 2004: 144). 
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event.76 With regard to the data of this study, we are mainly interested in 
phenomenological emblematicity. Phenomenological emblematicity refers to 
the degree to which the signs that index a stance are public (i.e., perceivable 
and interpretable) and unambiguous. The more emblematic (i.e., maximally 
public and minimally ambiguous) a stance is, the more saliently it brings an 
evaluative process into the sphere of intersubjective negotiation. An 
emblematic evaluative stance expresses a commitment to the value of an 
object and makes the one who took the stance accountable for that value as 
an interactional position or social status. Emblematic stances also serve to 
mobilize responses from other participants. They bring forward some value 
as a matter of alignment77 between the participants. This entails possibilities 
of endorsement, empathy, and affiliation but also risks of conflict and 
judgment. In a context that is “anonymous” like online dating 
advertisements, the risk of overt conflict is relatively low, which may, for 
instance, make some participants’ stances more acrimonious. One way or 
another, then, stancetaking is guided by an anticipation of others’ possible 
reactions. 
We have established that evaluative stances as social or intentional 
statuses stand inherently in relation to others’ actual or possible competing 
stances as well as one’s own or others’ reflexive stances towards those first 
stances, whether they are explicitly formulated in the ongoing event or 
elsewhere, or merely assumed, implied or presupposed. That is, the relation 
of what is symbolically figured and indexically presumed, or semantically 
encoded and pragmatically implied, is a necessary part of the analysis of 
stancetaking. In fact, the motivation behind making a stance explicit may be 
precisely to invite the addressees to infer contrary commitments (e.g., who or 
what kind of person would disagree) and take them into account in their 
alignment (e.g. how they evaluate such commitments and which side they are 
on). Therefore, evaluative stances are fruitfully analyzed in terms of 
metastance relations (see Kockelman 2010: i.a. 161–162). Any first-order 
                                                 
76 Another way of clarifying the division of labor between the two concepts, as they are understood 
here, is to say that evaluation is a metaphysical or metatheoretical concept that refers to our belief that 
humans by nature have certain properties. That is, they are understood as intentional and value-
directed in a variety of more detailed and ontology-specific ways. Stance approaches the question from 
the standpoint of the signs by which evaluative processes become knowable and empirically 
investigatable in particular contexts. Stances may be more or less emblematic along different 
dimensions of emblematicity. The particular mode and degree of emblematicity of a stance in many 
ways correlates with its possible roles in social life. As was argued previously, highly public stances 
have particular importance. 
77 Alignment is here used as an encompassing basic-level term to refer to the relation between an 
utterance and its responses (or signing behaviors and others’ behaviors that can in whatever way be 
calibrated to them as responses) (see e.g. Agha 2005). Affiliations, endorsements, agreements, and 
disagreements, for instance, would all be particular types of alignment. (Cf. with e.g. conversation 
analytic or systemic-functional usages; see Lindström & Sorjonen 2013; Martin & White 2005: 95.) 
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stance is inseparable from second-order stances, i.e., one’s own or others’ 
stances toward first-order stances. It is in metastance relations that complex 
forms of subjectivity and selfhood reside. (Kockelman 2004: 142–144; also 
2006b: 109.) 
Denotationally explicit linguistic evaluative stancetaking is not the most 
frequent type of evaluative process by far, but, in a sense, it has a special 
status. It is a form of theoretical agency, in which evaluative processes are 
represented with linguistic symbols embodying cultural knowledge. 
Linguistic stancetaking brings evaluative processes on the symbolic stage by 
theorizing value and the objects it relates to or those evaluative techniques 
that produce value. That is, a linguistic stance (e.g., “quick-tempered women 
scare me”) would typically be framed as a relatively self-controlled 
representational interpretant of previous phases in an evaluative process 
(e.g., a habit of mental or bodily reactions). In contrast, a gesture, such as 
flinching, would be framed as a more direct and less self-controlled sign of 
the same object.78 Such theoretical representations, on which online dating 
advertisements heavily rely, tend to invite representational interpretants 
from respondents as well (i.e., others’ theoretical representations of the same 
or similar objects). That is, they elicit cultural negotiations of value. 
Furthermore, online dating advertisements as written digital text-artifacts 
have the additional feature of allowing the linguistic stances to be 
anonymously displaced from the participant who is committed to them. In 
short, the evaluations of social reality examined in this chapter are mediated 
by a very specific and marked kind of infrastructure. 
Finally, to link the previous discussion to the question of classifying and 
parameterizing evaluation or stancetaking, the focus of this chapter will be 
on what is theorized by online daters as “positive” versus “negative,” 
“desirable” versus “undesirable,” or “ideal” versus “non-ideal.” Epistemic and 
deontic stances, for instance, are employed as auxiliary analytic dimensions 
where they are relevant (see also section 6.3.2).79 In the very general sense in 
                                                 
78 To put it slightly differently, to say that one has theoretical agency over one’s evaluative 
processes means that one is evaluating in a more controlled and more conceptual manner one’s less 
controllable and  more practical evaluative processes. From the standpoint of affect, for instance, this 
means that online dating advertisements constitute an implicit or explicit metaemotional practice (see 
e.g. Wilce 2009a: 128, 161, 171), in which one has the possibility or the obligation to reflexively deal 
with one’s affect. From normative standpoints ethical or moral questions can be raised: e.g., how well 
does one make use of the increased possibility of self-control. 
79 Whereas epistemic modality might be characterized as indexing the representational perspective 
of some subject(ivity), distinctions of the kind “good” versus “bad” or “right” versus “wrong” most 
distinctly index the values of some self (cf. second-order desires or preferences in Kockelman 2013a: 
188–194 or strong evaluation in Taylor 1989: 25–52). In a sense, the “positive”-“negative” variable is 
the most abstract conceptual reflection of the “this rather than that” kinds of judgments that selves 
make in relation to the relative desirability of outcomes of processes. “Positive” and “negative” are 
abstract metarepresentational interpretants that through complex sense-relations regroup more 
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which the terms are understood here, “desirability” refers to the symbolic 
theorization of value by drawing on affective unfoldings (see 2.3.2, footnote 
30), or personal experiences more generally, and “ideality” by drawing on 
social norms and stereotypes. As a third type one might include theorizing 
that draws on strictly “practical” means-to-an-end functionality (e.g. Mutta 
parisuhteen en uskoisi toimivan tässä tilanteessa, “But I don’t believe a 
relationship would function in this situation”).80 The way value is theorized 
is, then, already a form of justification and persuasion, as it selectively 
approaches value from a single or limited perspective, whereas the actual 
evaluative processes that lead to linguistic stancetaking would involve many 
kinds of interpretations and evaluative techniques. As a special case, 
“argumentation” refers to those textual patterns that, in addition to making 
value emblematic, reason about the stance by, for example, making explicit 
the type-level or ideological basis of the stance or other evaluative techniques 
on which the value is based (see also 4.4.1) or the responses the writer is 
committed to. Finally, those others’ interpretants (or metastances) that the 
writer is committed to may themselves be theorized as being in the realm of 
“ideal” (e.g., the other’s esteem of the self), “practical” (e.g., the other’s co-
operation with the self), or “desirable” (e.g., the other’s desire or empathy 
towards the self) (see e.g. 5.4).   
Evaluative stancetaking in different forms has already figured importantly 
in many of the analyses seen previously. The goal of this chapter is not to 
enumerate different patterns and structures of evaluative stancetaking in the 
                                                                                                                                          
specific cases (e.g., “good” versus “bad”; “right” versus “wrong”; “pleasant” versus “unpleasant,” etc.) 
that, in turn, stereotypically relate to events in the world. That is, a particular semiotic community 
would more or less agree on which words or concepts are more specific instances of “positive” (such as 
“pleasant”), what a “pleasant” thing would stereotypically be like, or what would count as a prototypic 
instance of a “pleasant” thing. Similarly, different semiotic communities would disagree on some of 
these aspects. (Cf. Agha 2007a: 84–144.) Such general labels can, then, be used to interpret and 
negotiate the relative desirability of particular experiences or patterns of life. What is described, for 
example, as “unpleasant,” is of course not necessarily linked to an actual feeling of unpleasantness on 
interactional time scales. The two are, however, linked via cultural and experiential knowledge. 
Committing to the “unpleasantness” of something makes the speaker knowable and interpretable 
(with, say, empathy or words of encouragement) from that perspective and accountable for such a 
feeling and whatever further inferences it may enable. That is, symbols and affect are related by a 
complex two-way dynamic of determination and mediation on different time scales. On sociohistorical 
time scales, the reality of human experience of particular communities and persons gradually works its 
way into cultural models (e.g., denotational stereotypes) and discursive behaviors (e.g., activity types). 
On interactional time scales, general cultural models contribute to the mediation of particular 
intersubjective experiences. And, as discussed in 2.3.4, on biographic time scales the ways in which the 
usage of symbols (re)structures experiences may gradually restructure the underlying habits of the 
persons involved. 
80 “Ideal” and “non-ideal” are also used in this study as default terms, when it does not really 
matter what more specific kind of “positivity” or “negativity” is in question. 
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data. Rather, the aim is to get at the norms and habits of evaluative practices 
associated with this type of event and personae by looking at some of the 
most revealing contrasts. As was discussed earlier, context-specific 
ontologies and models specify, for instance, who can (not) or should (not) say 
negative or positive things about whom and how. There are types of events in 
which communicating one’s evaluative stances is expected, and contexts in 
which they are supposed to be held back. There are alters in the presence of 
whom one wishes or feels obliged to disclose one’s evaluative stances, and 
alters in the presence of whom one wishes or feels obliged to conceal or even 
feign them. There are many kinds of empathy-seeking, consensus-seeking, or 
even conflict-seeking stancetaking behaviors, and so on. The point here is to 
get to the logic of evaluative stancetaking in online dating advertisements by 
analyzing different kinds of metastance relations and metapragmatic cues: 
What kinds of “positive” or “negative” stances are signaled as appropriate, 
inappropriate, or problematic? When and how is value explicitly theorized 
and addressed to others? How does stancetaking relate to the ongoing event 
and the textual patterns presented in chapter 4? To quote Goffman (1990 
[1959]: 26), it is the “dramaturgical problems” of the presentation of self 
before others that this chapter is interested in.  
5.1 EVALUATIVE STANCETAKING AS SIGNS OF 
MENTAL STATES 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 compare some of the most prominent ways in which the 
writers of online dating advertisements in the data perform evaluative 
stances towards selves, others, or patterns of life. The aim is to illuminate 
qualitative contrasts between different forms of stancetaking. This section 
takes a look at stances that can be seen as explicitly denoting the writers’ 
mental states or mental habits by using a number of complement-taking 
predicates (CTPs). These CTPs, then, are emblematic signs of “mental states” 
(or intentional statuses), which in turn are indicative of personal preferences 
and values (see Kockelman 2006b; 2010: 52–84).81 Section 5.2 contrasts 
                                                 
81 “Wishes” and “desires” have been theorized in relation to action as pro-attitudes (see Brandom 
1994). Pro-attitudes are intentional statuses (like perceptions, beliefs, and intentions) in the sense that 
they, too, are signified by intentional roles and interpreted by intentional attitudes. They, too, acquire 
propositional content when representational intentional roles, such as utterances containing CTPs like 
haluta, “to want,” or toivoa, “to wish,” are used to ascribe them to someone. They do, however, differ 
from perceptions, beliefs, and intentions in a number of ways. (For a more detailed discussion, see 
Kockelman 2006b: 101–102, 116–117; 2013a: 188–190; also section 2.3.2.) For instance, their indexical 
articulation in relation to states of affairs differs from that of perceptions or intentions. That is, a desire 
is not causally coherent with (caused by or causal of) a state of affairs in the same sense as a perception 
or an intention. Pro-attitudes are, however, essential ingredients in inferential chains that link, for 
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these kinds of stances with “naturalizing” ones that build on the use of lexico-
grammatic symbols with positive or negative connotations. 
Let us begin by contrasting the following two examples. The first one (5.1) 
is a line recycled from the previous example (4.4). It represents a state of 
“wanting” or “desiring” directed at a type of person (a man who wants to 
love) who, in turn, is characterized by his mental habits (who wants [to 
love]): 
 
(5.1) Haluan miehen joka haluaa rakastaa  
(5.1) I want a man who wants to love 
 
That is, the writer announces a desire towards (finding) a type of person, 
from whom, similarly, a particular habit of desire (“wanting to love”) is 
expected. The formulation implies that there are men who might perhaps 
seemingly “love” but do not have the right kind of attitude or commitment 
towards loving (i.e., who do not “want to love”). At the same time the writer 
implies that she too is committed to the latter kind of desire (i.e., that she 
“wants to love” too). Moreover, “loving,” the object of the latter desire, is 
itself stereotypically understood as involving a mental component. There is, 
then, a relatively high degree of reflexivity in the representation of mental 
states (e.g., her mental states towards his mental states towards his own 
mental states). The writer’s evaluative stance incorporates the stance of a 
desirable other and implies (1) the stances of undesirable others (“Some men 
do not want to love”) and (2) the self’s additional stances (“I want to love 
too”; “I do not want men who do not want to love”). That is, both the writer 
herself and ideal and non-ideal others become figured as highly intentional 
and value-directed and implicated in complex metastance relations. 
The following example, in contrast, relates the ongoing event to a 
biographic trajectory (“something still lacking from life”). The described 
mental state (tuntuu puuttuvan jotakin), which may be interpreted as either 
affective (“feels to be missing”) or epistemic (“seems to be missing”), is 
directed at the lack of a biographic constituent, not a type of person per se as 
in the previous example. 
  
(5.2) Elämän perusasiat kohdillaan, yksin asustelen koirani kanssa – – ¶Vielä kuitenkin 
tuntuu puuttuvan jotakin, eli etsin elämääni maksimissaan noin 35-vuotiasta, 
miehekkään oloista, rehellistä ja mielellään sporttista yhdenmiehen miestä, joka 
uskaltaa ja haluaa sitoutua yhteen ihmiseen jos kemiat osuvat molemmin puolin 
kohdalleen. 
(5.2) Basic things in life in order, I live alone with my dog – – ¶However, something still 
feels/seems to be missing, that is, I’m looking for a max 35-year-old, manly appearing, 
                                                                                                                                          
example, beliefs (or epistemic commitments) and intentions (or practical commitments) with one 
another. 
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honest and preferably sporty one-man man, who dares and wants to commit to one 
person if chemistries match mutually. 
 
The motivation for writing the advertisement is represented as a feeling 
caused by an interpretation of one’s life in relation to a presumed biographic 
model. What the writer is looking for, then, seems to be an “ideal” scenario in 
life involving an “ideal” person, rather than a “desirable” person. In other 
words, in this latter case “positivity” and “negativity” are grounded in a 
combination of sociocultural ideals (or value rationality) and affect (or 
affective rationality) (cf. Kockelman 2013a: 193). 
The writer’s evaluative stance in example (5.2) does not seem to be quite 
as explicit or clearly localizable as it is in the previous example (5.1). 
However, with an understanding of the context, the textual patterns in both 
examples might easily be glossed as more or less similar in meaning (e.g., 
“this is the kind of man that I want”). In (5.2), the text ascribes an intention 
to the writer (seeking P), which implies that the achievement (finding P) is a 
desirable option. In addition, some of the lexemes used to describe P have 
mild positive connotations (“manly,” miehekäs; “honest,” rehellinen; “to 
dare,” uskaltaa). In short, the text describes a felt absence of P, an 
intentional process of seeking P, and the positive attributes of P. 
Furthermore, what is explicitly figured in the text (I’m seeking P) is 
sufficiently iconic with the stereotypic event structure provided by the genre 
model (“In online dating advertisements the writer’s intention and desire is 
usually to find a desirable or ideal person of the type X”). The text fills in the 
general stereotype with particulars that specify what is wished for (X=P). 
When different denoted partials of the text are interpreted in light of the type 
of event in question, they can be construed as an entextualization of 
existential rationality. That is, they theorize the writer’s preferred and hoped-
for paths through social worlds. This kind of less localized theorizing of one’s 
preferences can be called textually distributed evaluative stances. In fact, the 
overall organization of many types of texts conventionally relies precisely on 
such evaluative patterns, such as Problem-Solution or Goal-Achievement 
(see e.g. Hoey 2001). 
Many of the textual patterns examined in chapter 4 might be regarded as 
textually distributed stances. In fact, the voluntary description of one’s 
attributes and habits in a context in which selection and control is possible 
readily implies that the selected ones are viewed as “desirable” or “ideal.” 
That is, in addition to having been evaluated in terms of interactional 
appropriateness and effectiveness, such textual patterns (e.g., taxonomies, 
narratives, fictive personae, chronotopic or ideological formulations) are 
evaluative stances towards social reality, as they figure selected, preferred 
patterns of life against the backdrop of all other biographic possibilities. This 
bigger picture is what should be borne in mind, when we examine more 
specific cases, in which value receives its most explicit expressions. The next 
section will take a look at the use of some of the most common mental CTPs 
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focusing on the expression of desire and other “psych-action” (see 
Kockelman 2010: 56).  
5.1.1 COMPLEMENT-TAKING PREDICATES AND THE EXPRESSION 
OF DESIRE 
Formulating and communicating one’s wishes and desires is a salient part of 
online dating advertisements. In fact, the writer of (5.3) emphatically 
explains in his advertisement that one of the reasons why he is writing in the 
first place is to be able to articulate what he wants: 
 
(5.3) Miksikö sitten tänne kirjoittelen? Ainakin haluan päästä kertomaan, mitä haluan. 
(5.3) Why, then, am I writing here? At least I want to get to say what I want. 
 
In this formulation the voicing of one’s desires is itself an object of desire (I 
want [to get to tell what I want]). The comment seems to imply that 
having an occasion to communicate one’s desires cannot be taken for granted 
and that a specific context is usually needed for that to be possible. As will be 
seen in this section and later ones, online dating advertisements seem to be 
particularly fit for such purposes. Expressions of desire are in relation both to 
the object of desire (e.g., whether it is an existent state of affairs in the world 
or merely a narrated ideal scenario) and to the speech event in which such 
desires are expressed. The aim of this and the following section is to see how 
such relations can be managed in online dating advertisements. The main 
focus in the following sections will be on the verb haluta (“to want,” “to 
desire”), which will be contrasted to a number of other CTPs. 
Instances of both haluta (“to want,” “to desire”) (n=97) and toivoa (“to 
hope,” “to wish”) (n=64)82 are among the most frequent mental predicates in 
the data and have relatively similar patterns of usage. Their differences will 
be returned to shortly. Most instances of haluta (“to want”) have as their 
grammatical object a complement clause, an infinitive clause, or an NP that 
denotes one of the following: the self’s behaviors towards others and the 
consequences of such behaviors (5.4a), the behaviors of others towards the 
self and the consequences of such behaviors (5.4b), ideal or desirable events 
that lead to biographic turning points (5.4c), or the reflexive behavior of the 
self towards the self (5.4d). All sorts of combinations are also possible. For 
instance, in example (5.4c) the object of the writer’s desire is to encounter 
some other whose behavior towards her causes a particular kind of desirable 
feeling.  
 
(5.4a) Haluan ottaa ihmiset ympärilläni huomioon ja sen teen ainakin jos on uskomista 
perheeseeni ja ystäviini.  
                                                 
82 The numbers of occurrence in the data (e.g., n=97) are noted here so that different CTPs can be 
roughly compared to one another and to the total number of texts (111) and sentences (2,010). 
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(5.4a) I want to take people around me into consideration and that I am doing at least if 
my family and friends are to be believed.  
 
(5.4b) Haluan että mies saa minut tuntemaan itseni naiseksi, siihen on monia keinoja 
mutta oikea asenne vie pitkälle. 
(5.4b) I want a man to make me feel like a woman, there are many ways to do that but a 
right attitude will take [you] far. 
 
(5.4c) Haluaisin oikeasti tutustua rakastavaan ihmiseen ja kokea taas rakastumisen 
huuma. 
(5.4c) I would really like to get to know a loving person and to experience the thrill of 
falling in love again. 
 
(5.4d) Harrastan lisäksi lenkkeilyä ja punttisalilla puuhastelua vaikka ne eivät aina ole 
sitä mielekkäintä hommaa. Haluan kuitenkin pitää itseni kunnossa. 
(5.4d) I also go jogging and to the gym although they aren’t always the most meaningful 
things to do. I do however want to stay in shape. 
 
In example (5.4d) the stance expressed with haluan (“I want”) is used to 
balance the writer’s own negative stance in the previous clause. That is, a 
relatively undesirable habitual behavior is justified with a desire to aspire 
towards a more fundamental ideal. In all of these examples the mode of 
commitment (a mental state of wanting or desiring) is explicitly denoted by 
the CTP and deictically calibrated to the writer via 1SG inflection. (The 
voicing of others’ desires is possible in some cases too; see chapter 6.) Both 
the personal source of the value (mode event Em) and the object in the world 
(content event Ec), then, are explicitly figured in the speech event (Es).  
Unlike its main rival toivoa (“to hope”), the verb haluta (“to want”) can 
take an infinitive complement (see example 5.4c; cf. *toivon tutustua 
rakastavaan ihmiseen; for toivon tutustuvani see 5.1.2). That is, it can be 
used to formulate tighter interclausal relations between mode events and 
content events than toivoa (“to hope”). Hence, if the tightness of the 
interclausal relation is iconic to the distance or overlap between the denoted 
events (see Givón 1980; Kockelman 2010: 52–84; 2006b: 91–92), then 
haluta (“to want”) in combination with an infinitive complement can be used 
to formulate content events that are causally and logically more dependent 
on self’s stance (i.e., would not exist without the self’s desiring or wanting 
them). Such linguistic formulation, then, can be used to specify to what 
extent the object of the desire is understood as ontologically distinct and 
independent from the act of desiring.83 The high frequency of haluta may in 
part be explained by its syntactic flexibility, i.e., the fact that the tightness of 
                                                 
83 In more specific terms, this notion of ontological distance refers to the degree to which such 
events (or intentional statuses and their objects) are iconically overlapping in phenomenological 
quality and indexically related through causality (see Kockelman 2006b: 93). 
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the interclausal relation can be scaled to the exigencies of a given point in the 
text. Such expressions of wish or desire are inferentially linked to values and 
current or future intentions (see also footnote 81 and section 4.4.1). Instead 
of highly mental or affective construals of the denoted process, in online 
dating advertisements the verb haluta (“to want”) might be understood as a 
somewhat general marker of ideal worlds that (a) are relatively dependent on 
the self and (b) to the actualization of which the self is relatively strongly 
committed. In other words, haluta (“to want”) can be used to mark explicitly 
the act of modeling and committing to an ideal or desirable world so as to 
mobilize an equivalent commitment from the respondent. This is in strict 
contrast to such cases, in which ideal worlds are naturalized by fading out 
their author (the one who composed the evaluative representation) or even 
their principal (the one who is committed to the evaluative representation) 
(see section 5.2). 
Before moving on with haluta (“to want”) and toivoa (“to hope”), let us 
compare them to a set of other frequent CTPs in the data that denote mental 
processes, beginning with the verbs pitää (“to like”)84 (n=44), nauttia (“to 
enjoy”) (n=25), and rakastaa (“to love”) (n=12). In contrast to haluta (“to 
want”), they usually presuppose the existence of their objects in the world 
(whether persons, habits of behavior, places, or periods of time). Their 
grammatical objects therefore tend to be NPs. As was seen in chapter 4, a 
typical use of these verbs is in taxonomies that hierarchically list attributes or 
habits: 
 
(5.5a) Pidän syksystä, sateesta, merestä, teestä, kirjoista ja pitkistä keskusteluista. 
(5.5a) I like the fall, rain, the sea, tea, books and long conversations. 
 
(5.5b) Rakastan lapsiani, pidän työstäni, nautin harrastuksistani ja ystävistäni. 
(5.5b) I love my children, like my work, enjoy my hobbies and my friends. 
 
Of the three verbs, nauttia (“to enjoy”) seems to be more flexible than the 
others. As seen in example (5.5b), like pitää (“to like”) or rakastaa (“to 
love”), it can be used to denote a habitual affective stance towards objects in 
the world. However, it often appears in the data embedded in verbal chains 
(e.g., osata nauttia, “to know how to enjoy”; lähteä ~ päästä ~ olla valmis 
nauttimaan, “go to enjoy” ~ “get to enjoy” ~ “be ready to enjoy”) and 
representations of shared activities (olisi mukava nauttia kanssasi, “it would 
be nice to enjoy with you”; joista mielelläni nautin myös mieh[e]n kanssa 
“that I gladly enjoy with a man too”; nainen, jonka kanssa nauttia elämästä, 
“a woman with whom to enjoy life”). That is, nauttia (“to enjoy”) is involved 
in denoting more concrete and temporally bounded states, which seem to be 
understood as more “energetic” or “material,” interpersonal, and attainable 
                                                 
84 Another frequent sense of the verb pitää (+ ESS) is “to regard something as something.” Such 
epistemic usages have not been included in the frequency count here. 
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by free will and conscious effort. Because of the syntactic flexibility of the 
verb, it can be used to insert a dimension of personal affect into 
representations of more concrete processes. Or, to put it differently, it can 
perhaps be used to give a positive prosody to “promotional” representations 
of concrete habits or goals (cf. hyvä, “good” in 5.2.1). 
The relative distinction between “desirability” and “ideality” can be seen 
in the usages of the most common CTPs in the data too. For instance, the 
verb arvostaa (“to appreciate”) (n=30) denotes the kind of value that is 
primarily based on some internalized social norm, stereotype, or prototype 
rather than affect. It, therefore, naturally lends itself to evaluations that are 
directed at social types, such as types of persons or types of characteristics: 
 
 (5.6a) Arvostan myös itseluottamusta, aloitekykyä, kunnioitusta, luotettavuutta ja 
rehellisyyttä.  
(5.6a) I also appreciate self-confidence, initiative, respect, reliability and honesty.  
 
(5.6b) ¶Arvostan miestä joka on aktiivinen, osaa pitää hauskaa ja on 100% uskollinen. 
(5.6b) ¶I appreciate a man who is active, knows how to have fun and is 100% faithful. 
 
What is common to all the previously examined CTPs as opposed to haluta 
(“to want”) and toivoa (“to hope”) is that they take an evaluative stance 
towards objects that are construed as existing relatively independently of the 
self’s stance. That is, the writer is not so much modeling an ideal world to be 
actualized as he or she is selecting, theorizing, and committing to such 
objects in the world that he or she most cares for. Now that this distinction 
has been sketched, let us get back to haluta (“to want”) and discuss the 
choice of grammatical mood. 
5.1.2 INDICATIVES VERSUS CONDITIONALS 
In the questionnaire data examined in chapter 4, one of the respondents 
drew special attention to the contrast between the indicative and conditional 
moods. According to the respondent, the image of the writer as someone who 
“knows what she wants” was enhanced by the fact that the writer had used 
the word halua-n (want-IND.PRS.1SG), which was “stronger” than halua-isi-n 
(want-COND-PRS.1SG) (käyttää sanaa HALUAN, mikä on vahvempi kuin 
esim. HALUAISIN [T1/20]). It is, first of all, noteworthy that this particular 
respondent did not frame the difference in terms of, say, (im)politeness or 
other kind of (in)appropriateness but merely in terms of the “strength” of the 
expression of desire. Moreover, we can note that the indicative (n=78) form 
is, in fact, considerably more frequent in the data than the conditional 
(n=19). This suggests that a strong expression of one’s desires is considered 
appropriate for the “promotional” persona in online dating advertisements, 
at least in actual practice (cf. however, the ideological metadiscourses in 
chapter 7). 
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The Finnish conditional marks a variety of non-factive modes, such as 
intentions, volitions, and predictions (see Kauppinen 1998: 156–167). The 
conditional mood itself, then, is often an index of desired or predicted states 
of affairs (cf. 5.1.1). Both in the indicative and in the conditional cases, the 
predicate haluta (“to want”) explicitly specifies a particular mode of 
commitment, but the choice of mood locates that commitment event (Ec), or 
the world in which the speaker is committed to the content, differently. That 
is, the choice of mood modifies the status of the commitment (see Kockelman 
2010: 124). The unmarked IND.PRS.1SG form locates the commitment in a 
non-specified world but implies that that world is coextensional with the 
ongoing speech event (Es). The commitment is construable as factive, as 
located in the actual world of the speech event.85 The conditional mood 
operator (-isi), however, shifts the commitment event towards a wished-for 
(or optative) semiotic world or some other merely possible (or afactive) one 
so that Ec ≠ Es (see Kockelman 2004: 141; 2010: 127; also Kauppinen 1998: 
224). The conditional mood seems to signal that the speaker has less control 
over the realization of the content of the commitment (cf. Kockelman 2010: 
134). In that sense, the conditional perhaps brings haluta (“to want”) closer 
to the meaning of toivoa (“to hope”) that stereotypically denotes a situation 
in which the person denoted by the grammatical subject is waiting for some 
desired state of affairs to actualize as a result of or as permitted by relatively 
external circumstances. In other words, the conditional of haluta (“to want”) 
distinguishes the speech event (Es) and the commitment event (Ec) from one 
another as ontologically separate events. Also, it more clearly distinguishes 
the animator and the principal from each other as separate personae. In a 
conditional framing, the realization of one’s desire is in a more complex 
relation to the world of speaking. That is, it more explicitly takes into account 
and leaves room for aspects of the speech event that the self is dependent on, 
including social relations (e.g., the participant roles) and others’ stances (e.g., 
the addressee’s desires) (see also Kauppinen 1998: 218–223).  
If the conditional mood brings the meaning of haluta (“to want”) closer to 
toivoa (“to hope”), then we might argue that the conditional of toivoa (“to 
hope”) further extends a fictive continuum into a direction in which the self’s 
desire is construed as more dependent on the external world. It is, first of all, 
noteworthy that, with the exception of two 3SG forms, all instances of toivoa 
(“to hope”) in the data, both conditional and indicative forms, are in 1SG 
(toivo-n, wish-IND.PRS.1SG; toivo-isi-n, wish-COND-PRS.1SG). Unlike haluta 
(“to want”), the verb toivoa (“to hope”) is not used to denote others’ stances 
                                                 
85 This is, however, subject to many other layers of interpretation based on the co-text of the CTP 
and related ontologies. For instance, as was seen in example (4.4), the same metrical pattern in which 
seven CTPs were embedded was interpreted by some respondents in a “qualitative” way (implying a 
commitment in a possible world) and by some in a “quantitative” way (implying a commitment in this 
world). Such differences in genre models and ideologies will be discussed in chapter 7. What this 
section deals with are some of the very basic distinction between the indicative and conditional forms. 
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(see chapter 6). As was noted earlier, toivoa (“to hope”) cannot take a direct 
infinitive complement, in which the process denoted by the infinitive would 
be controlled by the subject of the matrix clause. However, toivoa (“to hope”) 
can be complemented by a non-finite clause with independent subject 
marking (as well as taxis or “relational tense” and the choice of active and 
passive voice) (see e.g. VISK § 538). When the subject is co-referential with 
the matrix clause, it is marked in the non-finite clause by a possessive suffix, 
as in the following example (-ni):  
 
(5.7) 
¶Toivoisin                   löytäväni                  itselleni                 kumppanin, joka  
   wish:COND.PRS.1SG find:PTCP.1SG.POSS self:ALL.1SG.POSS companion    who   
 
arvostaa                           itseään,   on rohkea ja  itsenäinen.  
appreciate:IND.PRS.3SG self           is  brave   and  independent 
 
(5.7) ¶I would wish to find myself a companion, who appreciates herself, is brave and 
independent. 
 
In (5.7), the writer is hoping to find a partner with the kinds of characteristics 
he intensionally specifies, but without presupposing her actual existence. 
There is a tone of hoping for external circumstances to allow the desired 
biographic turning point to take place. (Cf. the strict contrast with e.g. the “I 
want a man who” example in section 4.2.1.) 
Most of the toivoisin (“I would wish”) cases, however, take as their 
complement a subordinate että (“that”) clause. The issue is then further 
complicated by the fact that in subordinate complement clauses there is 
another predicate, whose choice of mood is relatively independent of the 
choice of mood in the matrix clause. Different mood choices in the matrix 
and complement clauses, in combination with other semantic and pragmatic 
factors, yield slightly different nuances. A conditional in the complement 
clause underlines that the denoted event is a mere possibility and more 
clearly links it with the intentional and evaluative stance of the matrix clause 
(see e.g. VISK § 1596; Peltola 2014). 
If we now, somewhat simplistically, combine the semantic, 
morphosyntactic, and pragmatic considerations discussed above (even if they 
at times diverge), we might arrange the cases in the data on a rough 
continuum with haluan (“to want”) + INF/NP at the leftmost extreme. The 
other extreme, then, would consist of cases of toivoa (“to hope”) in the 
conditional mood complemented by a subordinate clause with a conditional-
form predicate (toivoisin että -isi-, “I would wish that + COND”): 
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haluan     haluaisin 
IND.PRS.1SG  COND.PRS.1SG 
    toivon   toivoisin        -vAni / että + IND / että + COND 
     IND.PRS.1SG   COND.PRS.1SG     NFIN   /        C + IND  /        C + COND 
 
Among the toivoisin että (“I would wish that”) (n=11) cases in the data, eight 
complement clauses are in the conditional mood, only three in the indicative. 
Interestingly, in all of the cases the subject, or similar subject-like argument 
(e.g., the animate possessor in example 5.8), is in the second person (2SG 
pronoun or inflection). That is, the wished-for process is controlled by the 
kind of other (“you”) who is, in some sense, maximally presupposed as 
existing independently of the self’s desires, since that person can be picked 
out as the addressee.  
 
(5.8) ¶Etsin – – miestä, joka olisi – – rehellinen ja luotettava, keskustelutaitoinen ja 
urheilullinen. 
Toivoisin,             että sinulla            olisi                         aikaa        parisuhteelle,  
wish:COND.PRS.1SG C       you:ADE[POSS] COP:COND.PRS.3SG time:PTV relationship:ALL  
 
et=kä              olisi                                  sitoutumiskammoinen. 
NEG:2SG=CONJ COP:NEG.COND.PRS.3SG  with_a_fear_of_commitment  
 
(5.8) ¶I’m looking for – – a man who would be – – honest and reliable, conversationally 
talented and sporty. I would wish that you had time for a relationship and did not fear 
commitment. 
 
To put it another way, a construction that imposes as little as possible on the 
person-referent can be addressed to an actual reader without risk of conflict. 
In cases like (5.8), then, one might argue, the self’s desire is maximally 
submitted to others’ recognition and regimentation and reconciled with the 
limitations of the “real” world. (Cf. also chapter 6.) 
A more detailed analysis would probably reveal more intricate patterns 
and regularities in the division of labor between different structural variants 
(e.g., when they are used and by whom). The point here, however, was to 
draw attention to the possibilities and concrete means of modifying the 
ontological relation between one’s stance and its object as well as the status 
of one’s commitment in relation to the speech event and its participants. The 
conclusion is that in online dating advertisements the communication of 
desire is frequent and unproblematic and it is relatively appropriate for the 
promotional persona to theorize and to communicate one’s desires even 
without explicitly concerning oneself with the actualities of the speech event. 
The weight is clearly on the leftmost half of the continuum, and examples like 
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(5.8) are less typical. Strong stances are often expected from others as well.86 
As was noted earlier, most instances of toivoa (“to hope”) in the data are in 
1SG, whereas haluta (“to want”) can also be used to represent others’ stances 
(see also chapter 6). Others’ desires, then, are not as readily represented as 
diminished in degree or as dependent on external circumstances or chance. 
In a sense it is logical, since, from the standpoint of the promotional persona, 
the self is the object of, and already the answer to, an ideal other’s desires (cf. 
however 6.3.4).  
The question of commitment relates importantly to the management of 
the relation between “real” and “ideal” worlds in online dating 
advertisements. In what world is the event of speech located? And in what 
worlds and under which personae are the participants committed to the 
contents? For instance, many haluaisin (“I would want to”) cases sketch an 
“ideal” world as something separate from the “real” world of the speech 
event. In some haluan (“I want”) cases, on the other hand, the writer fully 
inhabits an “ideal” world and a desiring promotional persona in the speech 
event. The effect was particularly salient in example 4.4, in which the speech 
event was, for some interpreters, contextualized in a “dramatic” world by the 
writer’s performance. In other words, the actual world of the interactional 
event may itself be localized, by degrees, in different semiotic worlds. The 
writer may be speaking in the ideal world (perhaps with an occasional sotto 
voce of “reality” as in example 4.4, and see also section 5.2.2), or the writer 
may paint a picture of an ideal world from the real world. 
As a final remark, to link the discussion of CTPs to questions of polarity 
that will figure prominently in subsequent sections, it should be noted that a 
clear tendency towards unipolarity can be seen in the CTPs. Negations of 
haluta (“to not want”) (n=16), pitää (“to not like”) (n=4) and toivoa (“to not 
hope”) (n=0) are far less frequent than the corresponding affirmative forms 
and appear in very specific usages as will be seen later. Antonymous verbs 
like vihata (“to hate”) (n=1) or inhota (“to dislike”) (n=1) are practically 
absent. The following sections will take up the issues of commitment and 
polarity from other standpoints, and the cases of negated haluta (“to not 
want”) and pitää (“to not like”) will be dealt with in section 5.4. 
5.2 THE NATURALIZATION OF EVALUATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 
The examples analyzed in this section do not explicitly denote a mode of 
representation or a source of evaluation. Rather, value in these cases tends to 
be treated as “naturalized” and “objectified” (cf. Parmentier 1994: 175–192; 
                                                 
86 As one writer notes: “And since I’m aware of the fact that there are demands on the other side as 
well, it’s probably reasonable to tell a bit more about myself” (Ja koska tiedostan, että vaatimuksia on 
toisessakin suunnassa, niin lienee vähintään kohtuullista kertoa vähän enemmän itsestäni). 
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also Irvine & Gal 2000: 37–38; Agha 2007a: 241–242). Such stances are 
communicated with the denotational or connotational evaluative dimensions 
of lexical items embedded in their co-texts. What becomes theorized is not 
the mental state of some actor directed at some object, as in the previous 
section, but the object as if it self-evidently embodied the value. In addition, 
there is often little or no reasoning about the bases of the value. 
Naturalization, then, can be seen as a specific manifestation of the more 
general (and unavoidable) phenomenon of projection, in which the 
properties of signs become taken as properties of the object they stand for 
(Kockelman 2006b: 106–107; Kockelman & Bernstein 2012).87 
To illustrate the difference between the two patterns of evaluative 
stancetaking, let us compare an example already seen in the previous section, 
here repeated as (5.9a), with the kind of case dealt with in this section (5.9b): 
 
(5.9a) Haluan ottaa ihmiset ympärilläni huomioon ja sen teen ainakin jos on uskomista 
perheeseeni ja ystäviini.  
(5.9a) I want to take people around me into consideration and that I do at least if my 
family and friends are to be believed. 
 
(5.9b) Olen huomaavainen, lämmin ja intohimoinen. Minulle rehellisyys, 
uskollisuus ja terve asenne ovat must.  
(5.9b) I am considerate, warm and passionate. To me honesty, faithfulness and a 
healthy attitude are a must. 
 
In example (5.9a), the writer first commits to a will to take others into 
consideration. Then he presents an epistemic appraisal of how well that 
commitment has so far translated into concrete action. That is, he explicitly 
recognizes the difference between a desire to behave in a particular way and 
actual habitual behaviors. Furthermore, he cites a group of others as a source 
in whose opinions his epistemic stance is grounded. Example (5.9b), in 
contrast, consists of a copula and a set of adjectival complements. The 
IND.PRS.1SG form of the copula indexically calibrates the imagery conveyed by 
the adjectives to the writer. The adjective huomaavainen (“considerate”), for 
instance, stereotypically denotes a person who takes others into 
consideration (cf. 5.9a). In any widespread, non-marked ontology of 
personhood it would probably be considered an ideal characteristic and 
therefore carries a positive connotation (i.e., a stereotypic indexical value). 
                                                 
87 Kockelman & Bernstein (2012: 340–343) distinguish a number of different types of projection – 
many of which are relevant for the analyses in this study – such as grammatical projection (properties 
of grammatical categories transposed on referents), evaluative projection (qualities of value projected 
onto evaluated objects; or properties of valued objects taken as properties of value), metrical 
projection (the object taking on the organizational characteristics of the technology used to “measure” 
it; cf. e.g. taxonomies vs. narratives in section 4.4), and technological projection more generally 
(properties of a semiotic technology projected on the the object it interprets). 
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The writer, then, is theorized as embodying a valued characteristic, but no 
specific mode of representation or source of value is made explicit. Whose 
perspective or opinion are we dealing with? Who has authored the 
typifications and who are committed to their truth? The inference readily 
available is that the representation reflects the evaluative processes of the 
writer himself, but his perspective has been generalized and objectified. (See 
also Heikkinen 1999: 207–211, 282; Solin 2009: 263–266; and cf. also 4.4.5.)  
In both examples, the writer is the animator (i.e., the one who controls 
the expression of signs and has allowed the physical manifestation of the 
particular segment of writing in the text-artifact), which inevitably brings a 
degree of accountability. In the former example, however, the representation 
virtually models (see Agha 2007a: 72) itself as co-authored by others 
(“friends and family, too, say I ‘take others into consideration’”) or at least 
corroborated by others (“friends and family say something similar”). 
Moreover, in addition to the writer himself, a group of others is represented 
as principals (i.e., as ones who are committed to the truth of the content). 
There is, then, more or less explicit intrasubjective coherence (between the 
intentions and the behaviors of the self), intersubjective coherence (between 
the self’s and others’ interpretations), and distributed coherence (what the 
self thinks or says originated as others’ interpretations). That is, the first 
example explicitly distributes the self-presentational forms between 
intentions, behaviors, and others’ testimonies. Or, from the standpoint of 
discursive agency, the first example explicitly acknowledges that controlling 
(by an animator), composing (by authors), and commitment (by principals) 
are distinguishable semiotic dimensions and may involve multiple agents – a 
matter which will be of importance for the remainder of this chapter.  
Regardless of whether there is any possibility of actual empirical 
verification of the claims, the differences in the formulations alone affect the 
structures of accountability. In the case of (5.9b), the reader can only infer to 
what extent the animator coincides with the author of any particular 
typification and what the more specific nature of his commitment to the 
typification is (i.e., in what worlds and under which personae he is 
committed to the truth of the content). This implicitness leaves a lot of 
playroom for interpretations of intentions and coherence. It can even give 
rise to highly mistrustful and unempathetic interpretations, in which the 
writer is regarded, for instance, as “self-opinionated” and “delusional” (see 
chapter 7). That is, in such interpretations the writer is taken to be the 
willing, sole author of the positive typifications of self and to commit to them 
unconditionally. Simultaneously, it is often assumed that more objective 
others would probably disagree and use other kinds of typifications. The 
following section takes a look at cases in which these kinds of problems are 
dealt with more or less visibly. 
The aim here is to underline the fact that the ways in which “signs of the 
self” are formulated have real and significant effects on how they mediate 
personhood in particular intersubjective contacts. However, it is equally 
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important to take into account the type of event and the kinds of epistemic 
formations and inferential practices that are made use of. In some 
circumstances, the two examples (haluan ottaa ihmiset huomioon… “I want 
to take people around me into consideration”… ~ olen huomaavainen “I am 
considerate”) might communicate the “same thing” and be mutually 
glossable by one another. In other circumstances, the first example might be 
seen as describing some of the general conditions of the appropriate usage of 
the latter one. Or, the latter one might be seen as a generalization or a 
habitualization into a speech chain indexical (see 4.4.5) of instances of the 
former one (see also the analysis of 4.16 in 4.4.1), and so on. That is, the two 
cases seem to emblematize a similar process in different phases and from 
different perspectives. The way such theoretical representations 
appropriately and effectively relate to one another and to practical 
consequences is a matter of complex contextual and genre-specific 
interpretation (see also sections 5.4, 6.4 and chapters 7 and 8). Stancetaking 
strategies of the latter kind are highly common, even stereotypic, in online 
dating advertisements, but they are also problematic – for reasons that will 
become more evident as we approach chapter 7. 
5.2.1 REDUNDANT AND RELATIONAL POLARITIES 
Let us now move on in the discussion of naturalized evaluative stances by 
taking a look at the usages of the adjective hyvä (“good,” n=92; n=130, with 
the comparative and superlative forms included). Besides its high frequency, 
it is one of the most stereotypic and general ways of expressing a positive 
evaluative stance. It can be used to evaluate all sorts of objects (persons, 
things, states of affairs). As an adjective it is relatively flexible and can be 
used in a variety of syntactic and discursive positions. We can use hyvä as a 
sort of heuristic aid to point out some of the most relevant kinds of positive 
evaluation in the data. We can also note at the outset the low frequency of the 
antonym huono (“bad”) (n=5). Similarly, in negative clauses hyvä mainly 
appears in general type-level or ideological principles (Yksin ei ole hyvä olla, 
“It is not good to be alone”). 
The adjective hyvä denotes a positive evaluative stance, rather than 
connotes one. It has relatively little additional information content in most 
usages (in contrast to adjectives such as “beautiful,” “considerate,” or 
“bright”). “Good (person)” in a moral sense (Olen kaunis, hyvä ja 
empaattinen olento, “I am a beautiful, good and empathetic being”) and 
“good (feeling)” in an affective sense (rakastan sitä, että saan toiselle hyvän 
ja turvallisen olon, “I love it that I can make the other [person] feel good and 
safe”) are probably the ones with most independent denotational content. 
Otherwise hyvä has a sort of shifter-like placeholder usage. It marks a 
relevant grammatical position in a representation and makes an evaluative 
stance emblematic and alignable, but the more specific nature of the 
“goodness” in question (e.g., the techniques of evaluation; or the specific 
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qualities that are being graded and the comparison classes and standards 
that the grading is based on, see 4.4.1) as well as the source (i.e., the one 
whose evaluation is at stake) have to be inferred from the context. In 
contrast, adjectives like “beautiful,” “considerate,” and “bright” provide more 
accurate sketches of particular kinds of “goodness” in terms of appearance, 
personality, and intelligence respectively. 
The objects of hyvä (“good”) can be roughly located on a sort of parabolic 
curve ranging first from larger personable entities towards smaller 
constituents and then towards ever more abstract non-persons.88 There are 
stances towards entire communities (Olen hyvästä, välittävästä perheestä, 
“I am from a good, caring family”), social types (Hyvä mies on mielestäni 
sopiva sekoitus käytännöllisyyttä – – ja analyyttistä älykkyyttä, “A good 
man is in my opinion a proper mixture of practicality and analytical 
intelligence”), social relations (Parisuhteelta toivon luottamusta ja hyvää 
yhteispeliä, “I expect trust and good team play from a relationship”; niitä on 
paljon mukavampi tehdä hyvässä seurassa “those things are much nicer to 
do in good company”), self or other as individuals (Olen kaunis, hyvä ja 
empaattinen olento, “I am a beautiful, good and empathetic being”), in 
particular social statuses (En etsi heille täältä isäehdokasta, sillä heillä on 
hyvä isä, “I’m not here looking for a father candidate for them, since they 
already have a good father”; Sukkaa minä en osaa kutoa, mutta muuten olen 
ihan hyvä mummo, “I can’t knit a sock, but otherwise I’m a pretty good 
grandmother”), as analyzed into constituent processes (Elämäni yksin 
asuvana on riittävän hyvää, “My life as someone who lives alone is 
sufficiently good”; Pidän työstäni ja olen siinä oikeastaan aika hyvä, “I like 
my work and I’m actually quite good at it”) or specific kinds or attributes 
(Liikuntaharrastusteni takia olen hyvässä kunnossa, “Because of my sports 
hobbies I’m in good shape”; sinä reilu ja hyvällä itsetunnolla varustettu – – 
kaveri, “you fair-minded guy equipped with a good self-esteem”). The other 
end covers stances towards concrete or abstract non-personal entities 
(Elämääni sisältöä tuovat – – musiikin kuuntelu ja hyvä ruoka, “Listening 
to music and good food bring content to my life”; joka arvostaa – – hyvää 
koulutusta, “who appreciates a good education”; Pidän hyvästä huumorista, 
“I like good humor”), states of affairs (Yksin ei ole hyvä olla, “It’s not good to 
be alone”; Hyvä kuitenkin, että niitä on tullut, sillä kipeät hetket ne 
opettavat paljon varsinkin itsestäsi, “It’s good though that I’ve had them, 
since painful moments teach a lot particularly about yourself”), as well as 
abstract conceptual constructs (hyvässä mielessä, “in a good sense”) and 
temporal, causal, or logical relations (Hyvä alku olisi, että et tarvitsisi 
                                                 
88 One-dimensional distinctions like this are, of course, always highly relative and depend on 
particular framings and ontologies. Human worlds are inherently (inter)personal and personified so 
that all roads eventually lead to persons. That is, persons as agents or as merely imagined others are 
never many indexical or inferential steps away from even the most abstract or inanimate 
representations. 
Evaluative stancetaking 
164 
minua, vaan haluaisit minut, “A good beginning would be that you didn’t 
need me but wanted me”; Siltä pohjalta olisi hyvä jatkaa ja hyvässä 
tapauksessa rakentaa parisuhdekin, “On that basis it would be good to 
continue and in a good case even to build a relationship”). Section 5.2.2 will 
continue the discussion of naturalized evaluative stances focusing 
particularly on stances towards the self as an individual or as analyzed into 
constituents. First, however, based on the hyvä (“good”) cases and their co-
texts, a few general remarks about polarity in online dating advertisements 
are made in this section. 
From the standpoint of information value, one might claim that hyvä 
(“good”) is altogether one of the more useless words in online dating 
advertisements. What is the point of saying that one is “interested in good 
company,” “has a good sense of humor,” or “likes good food,” for instance? 
To quote the writer of (5.11): “Who doesn’t?” In a sense, the co-occurrence of 
like and good is redundant in the first place. What one “likes” is “good,” at 
least in one sense of the word. Unless the more specific nature of “goodness” 
is clarified, statements like these provide little knowledge about the writer as 
a person. On the other hand, the cited examples are more or less idiomatic 
expressions that are interpreted as a single construction. They point out 
domains of life that are, for example, “of interest or importance” or “like a 
hobby” to the person. For example, “I like good food” will probably not quite 
be interpreted as “I’m into gastronomy” – but something to that effect. Also, 
in cases like “I like my work and I’m actually quite good at it” it is relatively 
easy to infer some general ways in which one can be “good” at one’s work 
(e.g., “efficient,” “thorough,” “creative,” or “persistent”). More importantly, 
the stance implies that there is (a) some particular socially shared set of 
criteria in one’s work community, and (b) that there are others who are 
equally committed to the same evaluative stance and, if necessary, would 
back the writer up. It is also noteworthy that the writer takes a double stance 
towards her work, both in terms of desirability (“like”) and ideality (“good at 
it”). It is perhaps not the specific nature of “goodness” that is relevant but the 
fact that the two co-ordinated stances and their implied metastance relations 
point to a domain of life in which one’s own and others’ positive evaluations 
coincide, a sort of high point where the writer is at her best. 
Moreover, the mere phenomenological presence of particular words and 
classes of words may have a purpose in itself. When positively evaluating 
lexemes accumulate textually, their indexical linking becomes a mutually 
intensifying force. That is, the fact that such lexemes are members of the 
same semantic class (e.g., pointing superlatively to the positive ends of 
various semantic scales and gradings) becomes a more prominent sign in 
itself. The recurrence and accumulation of even redundant instances, then, 
underlines the fact that one has criteria in the first place and points out those 
domains and processes in which one has particularly high criteria. Such 
textual webs remind that we are dealing with a world of ideals (cf. with the 
“prosodic” uses of nauttia ‘to enjoy’ in 5.1.1). In other words, explicit and 
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textually distributed stereotypic positivity has functions on more than one 
layer in promotional discourses. Using particular kinds of words to point to 
particular kinds of worlds and modes of personhood may be just as 
important as or more important than the more specific denotational 
information they may convey about the writer. 
The issue of redundancy also applies more generally to any such positive 
characteristics that are understood by the participants as very general in 
nature or as widely shared among persons. If one were to imagine the 
description “I like good food” on a scale of relevance, then somewhere closer 
to the irrelevant extreme one might find truisms such as “I eat food.” 
However, where the line between relevant and irrelevant information is 
drawn is a context-specific question. In another context the latter might be a 
perfectly valid self-presentational contribution. In the following examples the 
writers themselves clearly acknowledge the relatively low news value of parts 
of their descriptions:  
 
(5.10) Pidän myös luonnosta, kulttuurista, matkustelusta (kukapa ei), hyvästä ruuasta 
ja viinistä. 
(5.10) I also like nature, culture, traveling (who doesn’t), good food and wine. 
 
(5.11) ¶Etsin tositarkoituksella, mutten hampaat irvessä noin ikäistäni miestä, joka olisi - 
yllätys, yllätys! - rehellinen ja luotettava, keskustelutaitoinen ja urheilullinen. 
(5.11) ¶I’m looking, seriously but not desperately, for a man about my age, who would be 
- surprise, surprise! - honest and reliable, conversationally skilled and sporty. 
 
The question then is: Why say things that are explicitly regarded as self-
evident or not useful in selecting for ideal persons? In the first example, the 
redundancy seems to point to the type of information itself (i.e., liking 
traveling is considered self-evident), whereas in the latter one the sarcastic 
comment may be more specifically targeted at the specific linguistic 
typifications. That is, the problem in the latter example is the fact that the 
ideals of honesty and reliability are entextualized with symbol-tokens that 
are worn-out and perhaps somewhat naïve (since dishonest people usually 
have little regard for such requirements nor any intention to obey them). In 
fact, in some stereotypes of dating advertisements, rehellinen (“honest”) and 
luotettava (“reliable”) are placed among the most clichéd and useless 
typifications (see also chapter 7, e.g. 7.21).89 Nevertheless, both writers above 
still regard these as things that they wish to or are supposed to say. That is, 
the felt need to say such things overweighs their low news value, their low 
verifiability, and their relative insufficiency in distinguishing one person 
from another. These sorts of descriptions, then, seem to denote 
                                                 
89 In terms of actual frequence too, rehellinen (“honest”) and luotettava (“reliable”) were found to 
be among the most common adjectives in dating advertisements in two Finnish newspapers between 
1951 and 2001 (Muikku-Werner 2009: 62–65). 
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characteristics that are seen as necessary constituents of a proper person and 
thereby index “normal” personhood (in the sense of non-abnormal or non-
stigmatized but not necessarily in the sense of “ordinary”) (cf. Sacks 1985). 
Committing to such characteristics explicitly is like proving one’s personal 
instantiation of normative cultural models of personhood. Even if “interested 
in good company” may not be highly positive in any selective sense, at least it 
makes a promise that the person is not, say, “antisocial” (a characteristic 
often stereotypically associated with online dating, see 7.1) and that the 
person is aware of such norms and such risks. “Positivity,” then, has two 
faces in online dating advertisements. One dimension is to appear “positively 
normal,” preferably in some non-common or non-boring way (e.g., with 
humorous comments like in the above examples). Another dimension is to 
appear “positively unique,” to selectively appeal to particular social types and 
preferably more so than those others that one competes with.  
This discussion brings us back to some of the issues dealt with at the end 
of chapter 4. On the one hand, writers have access to biographic objects that 
they know about themselves and can represent in various linguistic sign 
patterns (e.g., remembered or habitually or perceptually present attributes or 
events). On the other hand, there are circulating cultural metadiscourses and 
ontologies of personhood, which the writers may find desirable or ideal and 
therefore attempt to calibrate with the objects in their lives. Some of these 
patterns are normative for communities (cf. “positively normal”), some 
prestigious (cf. “positively unique”) (see e.g. the analysis of prestige wine 
talk, or “oinoglossia,” in Silverstein 2003). Participating in such discourses 
allows signers to access the worlds and modes of personhood these signs 
index – but it also makes them accountable in new ways. In the composition 
of “promotional” self-presentation, then, there are in principle two possible 
directions. One can start from those biographic objects that one considers 
ideal or desirable and compose appropriate and effective textual patterns for 
them. Or, one can start from those symbols that one considers ideal or 
desirable and find some way to make them fit one’s objects (see also 7.2.1).90 
In the latter case, the resulting discursive formulations are distinctly co-
authored by particular sociohistorical discursive formations (such as 
“promotional discourses”), which, from the standpoint of self-presentation 
and individual agents, can be viewed as kinds of generalized other (i.e., they 
                                                 
90 One is reminded of Hyacinth Bucket’s [bu:'keɪ] habit of introducing her sister Violet as “the one 
with a Mercedes, swimming pool, sauna, and room for a pony” in BBC’s Keeping up Appearances. 
Apparently, in light of the cultural models she orients to, the prestige of owning a pony is so high that 
she feels the need to find whatever way she can of fitting the relevant symbols into the description. 
That is, the point of the joke is the way in which the lack of something, or mere empty space, is 
discursively interpreted so cleverly that it actually sounds like a valued possession comparable to, say, 
a Mercedes or a sauna. Wiktionary explains the idiom “room for a pony,” introduced by the series, as a 
humorous reference to the “minimum trappings [‘status symbols’] of the minor landed gentry” in the 
UK. 
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specify what is expected from the self by others and how the self will be 
interpreted by others). One’s agency as an interpreter and communicator of 
one’s own life melds with the agency of specific sociohistorical traditions as 
forces that fit particular lives into general models. 
To get back to the case of “honest” (rehellinen) and “reliable” (luotettava) 
discussed above, we can now see more clearly into the different kinds of 
relations that these symbols organize and are organized by. “Honest” and 
“reliable” (as linguistic expressions) are first of all in relation to the actual 
‘honest’ and ‘reliable’ behaviors that these words are used to refer to in 
discourse. These relations become in time generalized into denotational 
stereotypes. Second, “honest” and “reliable” stand in relation to those 
discursive events in which they are used to refer to such behaviors. That is, 
they live through particular tokens that are embedded in entextualized sign 
patterns used to mediate discursive acts. These relations become in time 
generalized into indexical stereotypes. Since ‘honest’ and ‘reliable’ behaviors 
per se are probably considered “positive” in most cultural ontologies, in most 
discursive events the tokens of the corresponding symbols are embedded in 
acts that confer “positive” connotational tones on them (e.g., complimenting 
someone for their honest behavior or condemning someone for the lack 
thereof). As will be seen in chapter 7, there are, however, more specific types 
of discourse, in which the use of these symbols is seen in a more problematic 
light. We can think of, for instance, narratives about new acquaintances who 
were, after a while, exposed as having faked ‘honesty’ or “honesty” all along 
or warnings according to which it is easy to falsely claim “honesty” in online 
communication, since the speech events are displaced from those actual 
behaviors in which ‘honesty’ or ‘dishonesty’ could be verified (see e.g. 
examples 7.2b, 7.6, 7.24b). Such conflicting indexical values can, then, 
complicate the use of these signs as instruments of self-presentation in 
particular settings, even if the represented behaviors themselves are not 
problematic but, rather, a default requirement for any “normal” person.  
Self-presentational value can emanate relatively more from some object 
itself or from the linguistic signs that object is interpreted with. That is, a 
linguistic description can be a valuable or non-valuable interpretation of 
some valuable object or a valuable interpretation of some valuable or non-
valuable object. Sometimes such evaluative relations converge, sometimes 
they conflict (e.g., when “[I’m] honest” is a problematic interpretant of one’s 
‘honesty,’ a valuable object as such). It is possible to disambiguate and clarify 
one’s relations to different value-conferring sources by making one’s 
metastances more explicit (e.g., yllätys, yllätys, “surprise, surprise” as a way 
of showing one’s metapragmatic awareness of what “honest” and “reliable” 
are like as representational interpretants). What is essential, then, is not any 
single stereotypic value but how it relates to and is dealt with in the context 
of use.  
Let us finish this section by having another look at the relational nature of 
evaluative polarity from a slightly different standpoint. The following two 
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contrasting examples employ the same lexical symbol (snobi, “snob[by]”) in 
opposing self-presentational polarities:  
 
(5.12a) Olen älykäs idealisti ja romanttinen haaveilija. Luonnonlapsi ja snobi kulttuurin 
ystävä. Viihdyn taidenäyttelyissä, museoissa, kirjakaupoissa. Olen kaunis, hyvä ja 
empaattinen olento. 
(5.12a) I am an intelligent idealist and a romantic dreamer. A child of nature and a 
snob[by] friend of culture. I feel at home in art exhibitions, museums, book stores. I am 
a beautiful, good and empathetic being. 
 
(5.12b) Ehkäpä kerron ensin itsestäni. – – Fiksu ja filmaattinen - tarvittaessa. 
Äijämäinen - joskus. – – Suhteellisen sivistynyt, ei missään nimessä snobi. Eikä edes 
trendikäs. – – Vahva ja miehekäskin olen, joidenkin mielestä vaikeasti lähestyttävä. 
Mutta myös keskustelutaitoinen. Herkkäkin. 
(5.12b) Perhaps I’ll describe myself first. – – Smart and stylish - when necessary. 
Ruggedly manly - sometimes. – – Relatively civilized, by no means snobby. And not 
even trendy. – – Strong and masculine I’m too, according to some inaccessible. But also 
conversationally skilled. Sensitive too.  
 
To clarify this opposition, we might approximate the stereotypic meaning of 
“snob” by saying that it denotes a type of other from the standpoint of their 
cultural preferences and patterns of consumption. “Snobs” are people who 
are interested in what they consider quality and sophistication, and they are 
also self-assertive about the fact and like to show it off to others. The lexeme 
is also linked to stereotypes of symbolic and socio-economic power: a “snob” 
is how a proponent of “elitism” might be described by proponents of, say, 
more “populist” views. That is, “snob” is stereotypically a part of outgroup 
discourse and linked to an outgroup perspective: it denotes a type of person 
from the perspective of those who do not regard themselves as instances of 
the type. When a symbol already denotes an evaluated social relation like 
this, the user necessarily has to take a stance towards that configuration.91 
In examples (5.12a) and (5.12b), both writers typify themselves both as 
“intelligent” (älykäs; fiksu) and “civilized” (sivistynyt; kulttuurin ystävä, 
“lover of culture”), which are in a sense prerequisites for “snobbiness.” 
However, the former writer, female, animates the typification “snob” to claim 
                                                 
91 To reformulate this point from the standpoint of personhood, a persona is always a reflexive 
concept (a character or a social type from someone’s perspective). Specific perspectives may 
themselves become more or less enregistered: [[a character from someone’s perspective] from 
someone’s perspective] and so on. For instance, secondary foreign talk, or the natives’ way of imitating 
foreigners’ speech for some (e.g. derogatory) purpose, may ultimately give rise to a tertiary form of 
foreign talk, or the foreigners’ way of imitating the natives’ way of imitating foreigners, used by 
foreigners themselves for some novel but dialogically related (e.g. empowering or strategic) purpose. 
(See Lehtonen 2015: 211–224 for an analysis of stylized “huono Suomi,” “bad Finnish,” registers, and 
the references therein.) 
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it, whereas the latter, male, animates it to reject it, thereby presuming it as a 
possible interpretation. The latter writer further associates “snob” with 
trendikäs (“trendy”), which figures as a sort of less negative option on the 
same scale implied by the scalarizing (eikä) edes (“not even”). He also 
contrasts “snob” with äijämäinen (denoting a rugged kind of manliness), and 
later miehekäs (“masculine”). These relations, then, imply those aspects of 
personhood that the writer considers problematic. “Snobbiness” for him 
seems to entail a kind of “superficial flamboyance” and “unmanliness.” 
Gender, then, might be a contributing factor in these cases. The stereotypic 
load of negativity carried by “snob” may be heavier for those committed to 
particular models of masculinity. Throughout his entire text the writer is 
careful to balance sophistication (e.g., sivistynyt, “civilized”; 
keskustelutaitoinen, “conversationally skilled”; herkkä, “sensitive”) with 
manliness (e.g., vahva ja miehekäs, “strong and masculine”; äijämäinen). 
Within that scheme of balance, even the negative typification “inaccessible” 
or “not approachable” (vaikeasti lähestyttävä) seems almost like a positive 
characteristic in contrast to the evoked stereotype of a “snob.”  
The writer of (5.12a), in contrast, identifies with the typification despite 
the fact that it bears a negative stereotypic tone, at least for some. She evokes 
a conflict between two separate lines of authors and principals: the ingroup 
and the outgroup. That is, by (a) selecting a typification authored by others in 
the outgroup and by (b) using that typification to compose her own ingroup 
self-presentation, she raises the question of the complex metastance relations 
between such groups (e.g., the question of her stance towards the outgroup 
and her stance towards their stance towards her). In short, she appropriates 
the outgroup perspective in her ingroup self-presentation to suit her own 
purposes. Since the text is one of the most openly self-eulogizing ones in the 
data, it is hard to construe the use as, for instance, a form of self-criticism or 
even sarcasm. She is recognizing the fact that others have negative stances 
towards the social type she identifies with but does not ratify those stances 
per se. Rather, she seems to embrace and reinforce the social contrast. She 
can be interpreted as openly committing to and normalizing an “elitist” 
stance and refusing to recognize the power of others’ negative regimenting 
interpretants. (Cf. also section 4.4.) 
The previous discussion illustrated how metastance relations are 
entextualized and emblematized in online dating advertisements and how 
naturalized evaluative stances can implicitly conjure up complex relations on 
cultural stages. The next section will now explore the questions of polarity, 
authorship, and commitment more specifically from the standpoint of self-
directed evaluative stances. 
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5.2.2 PERFORMANCES OF “HUMAN(E)NESS”: METAPRAGMATICS 
OF EVALUATIVE POLARITY 
This section deals with textual patterns in which the writers describe 
themselves using stereotypically negative or positive expressions and in some 
way, however implicitly, comment on such practices of evaluative 
stancetaking and evaluative polarity. In all of the cases below, the writers 
presume the idea that self-presentation in online dating advertisements 
generally speaking should be unipolar. That is, one is expected to focus on 
“positivity” and actively evade “negative” voices. Some of the writers, 
however, also appear to presume models in which persons are ideally seen 
through more balanced models with strengths and weaknesses (“nobody’s 
perfect”). Many such patterns seem like more or less conscious performances 
that aim at an impression of, say, “honesty” or “humaneness,” or other 
modes of personhood that are more nuanced than a stereotypically 
“promotional” one. The performances, then, reflect a preoccupation with 
reconciling the presumed norms of “self-promotion” with other models of 
personhood, including one’s internalized self-conceptions.  
In order to better understand the examples in this section, let us first 
discuss the different dimensions of the concept of “performance” from the 
standpoint of linguistic signs. For a linguistic sign to be effective in 
interaction it needs to be performed, given a perceivable form (e.g., through 
writing or oral articulation), by a participant. Once interpreted by others, 
performed signs mediate various social effects. That is, they are socially 
consequential or performative. (See e.g. Agha 2007a: 6, 55–64.) In its most 
marked sense, the term performance refers to a particular reflexive and 
poetic mode of communication, or: 
 
a specially marked, artful way of speaking that sets up or represents a special interpretive 
frame within which the act of speaking is to be understood [and] puts the act of speaking 
on display – objectifies it, lifts it to a degree from its interactional setting and opens it to 
scrutiny by an audience. (Bauman & Briggs 1990: 73.) 
 
Performance in this restricted sense refers to a reflexive mode of discursive 
behavior in which either the process of producing language (i.e., the 
performing of signs) or the social action mediated by language (i.e., the 
performativity of signs) is explicitly signaled and drawn attention to. That is, 
the semiotic activity itself is brought on the stage. (See also Coupland 2009.) 
The salience of a performance can, in Bauman & Briggs’s (1990: 74) phrasing 
“vary along a continuum from sustained, full performance to a fleeting break-
through into performance.” Performance, then, draws attention to different 
aspects of semiotic behavior and, as will be seen shortly, is naturally fit to 
mark distinctions between animators, authors, and principals.  
There seems to be a tendency for the performance aspect of online dating 
advertisements to increase in saliency when writers formulate naturalized 
evaluative stances that are directed at the writers themselves. This increase 
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can be seen in both to positive (e.g., 5.14) and negative (e.g., 5.13) stances. 
The common feature of the cases analyzed below is that the texts draw 
metadiscursive attention to the forms, functions, and motivations of the 
activity being performed, i.e., the evaluative presentation of self. In many 
examples the focus of attention ultimately seems to relate to models of 
polarity. 
Example (5.13) shows a particularly sharp orientation to negative self-
presentation. What makes the example particularly interesting is the very 
explicit way in which the writer relates her discursive behavior to a presumed 
stereotype of the activity type: 
 
(5.13) ¶Katsotaas miten rehellisyys uppoaa teihin, arvon herrat: ¶olen yliherkkä, 
taideopiskelija, paniikkihäiriöinen, entinen syömishäiriöinen, piiitkällä matkalla kohti 
itsensä hyväksymistä mutta kuitenkin jo oikella suunnalla, epäitsenäisempi kuin 
kuvittelen, sosiaali huorampi kuin haluaisin, empaattisempi ja sydämellisempi kuin 
viisasta olisi. Ja varmasti turhan suora deitti-ilmoituksen kirjoittajaksi. ¶Niin. 
Jos siis et halua ongelmia, et takuulla tahdo minua. ¶Jos naisihanteesi on on normaali ja 
harmiton, minusta ei beibi siihen ole. – – ¶Ihmisenä lukuisista häiriöistäni huolimatta 
olen mukiinmenevä, jos päätän ottaa sinut siipieni suojaan, siellä sitten ollaan. – – 
(5.13) Let’s see how honesty goes down with you, gentlemen: ¶I’m oversensitive, an art 
student, suffering from a panic disorder, used to have an eating disorder, on a loooong 
journey towards accepting myself but already moving in the right direction, less 
independent than I think, more of a social whore than I would want to be, more 
empathetic and cordial than would be wise. And surely too outspoken to be writing 
a dating ad. ¶Yeah. So if you don’t want trouble, you sure don’t want me. ¶If your ideal 
of a woman is normal and harmless, baby, I ain’t up to it. – – ¶As a person I am ok in 
spite of all my faults, if I decide to take you under my wing, that’s where you’ll stay. – –  
 
The negative elements include, for example, evaluative adjectives 
(“oversensitive,” yliherkkä), descriptions of mental disorders (“suffering 
from a panic disorder,” paniikkihäiriöinen), and comparative structures that 
portray the writer’s characteristics as falling short of her ideals (“less 
independent than I think,” epäitsenäisempi kuin kuvittelen; “more 
empathetic and cordial than would be wise,” empaattisempi ja 
sydämellisempi kuin viisasta olisi). What is particularly noteworthy is that 
she evaluates herself negatively as a writer of a dating advertisement (“too 
outspoken to write a dating ad,” turhan suora deitti-ilmoituksen 
kirjoittajaksi).  
The metadiscursive framing that the writer begins the text with typifies 
the subsequent sequence as an instance of “honesty” (rehellisyys). “Honesty” 
explicitly evokes a model of language use in which what is publicly said 
corresponds to what one privately believes. Here “honesty” seems to entail 
that negative aspects of personhood are made public too. The negative in the 
text is, then, framed as a product of a stereotypically positive human 
characteristic. The segment incorporates complex metastance relations. 
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There are (1) the writer’s explicit first-order stances towards herself (e.g., 
being “oversensitive”), (2) the writer’s explicit second-order stances towards 
her own stances (e.g., “honesty,” rehellisyys; “too outspoken to be writing a 
dating ad,” turhan suora deitti-ilmoituksen kirjoittajaksi), (3) the writer’s 
explicit anticipation of readers’ stances towards herself (“you sure don’t want 
me”), and (4) implicit stances towards other writers and the activity type in 
general. The writer implies that (i) in a dating advertisement one is not 
supposed to be as “honest” and “outspoken” as she is (as a general norm), (ii) 
most other writers are usually not as “honest” and “outspoken” as she is (as 
particular individuals), and (iii) being “honest” and “outspoken” is related to 
the polarity of evaluation: “honesty” entails an evaluative balance in 
stancetaking, whereas unipolar positivity is “dishonest” and means that one 
is intentionally retaining negative facts in the private realm. The heart of the 
matter, then, is not about “positivity” or “negativity” as separate aspects but 
about the balance of evaluative polarities in the entire text-artifact and the 
distribution of metastance relations between private and public realms. 
In (5.13), explicit signals of performance include, for example, the fact 
that the selected strategy of self-presentation (“honesty”) is named and 
addressed to respondents (“you, gentlemen,” teihin, arvon herrat) and 
attention is drawn to their anticipated reactions (“Let’s see how honesty goes 
down,” Katsotaas miten rehellisyys uppoaa). In a sense, then, the 
respondents are explicitly made accountable for their responses to the 
writer’s “honesty.” Such dialogical elements combine with poetic elements 
(e.g., “Yeah,” Niin; “on a loooong journey,” piiitkällä matkalla kohti; “baby, I 
ain’t up to it,” minusta ei beibi siihen ole) that contribute to the particular 
mind style and narrative style conveyed by the text. In fact, one might say 
that she is aestheticizing the negative and the problematic in quite the same 
way as many other texts deal with positivity. In a specific framing, this could 
be interpreted as just another “promotional” strategy (cf. response T1/20 in 
table 1 in 4.2.1). Nevertheless, the performance enables the writer to confess 
particularly sensitive pieces of information in a controlled manner. This 
“honest” confession and the criticism of other writers’ motivations may also 
be interpreted as lending credibility and authenticity to the writer’s moderate 
positive evaluation of self (“honest,” “ok”). 
The following two examples illustrate the fact that positive evaluation can 
be equally challenging. If the previous example dealt with “honesty,” example 
(5.14) can be seen as orienting to an ideal such as “modesty,” even if it is not 
explicitly mentioned in the text. Instead of merely describing positive 
characteristics, the writer fames them with explicit metapragmatic cues: 
 
(5.14) olen 165cm ”pätkä” normaali naisen kokoinen nainen, hiukseni ovat tummat ja 
lyhyet. parhaat puoleni, hm, no ainakin olen erittäin sosiaalinen ja asiani helposti 
ulos tuova ihminen. 
(5.14) i’m 165 cm “short” normal woman-sized woman, my hair is dark and short. my 
best sides, hm, well at least I am a very sociable and communicative person. 
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A detached NP (“my best sides,” parhaat puoleni) explicitly formulates the 
topic and the purpose of the framed segment (“I am a very sociable and 
communicative person,” olen erittäin sosiaalinen ja asiani helposti ulos 
tuova ihminen). It acknowledges the fact that the writer is oriented to 
presenting positive, and only positive, biographic contents. A similar “my 
worst sides” sequence, for instance, is not included in the text. That is, the 
unipolarity of the task is understood as relevant and appropriate in the 
context without any explicit justification. It is explicitly brought on the stage 
though. In fact, the instructions on the dating forum as well as many 
guidebooks advise writers to “be honest” and “focus on their best sides” (see 
also chapter 7). The kinds of framings seen in (5.13) and (5.14) may also be 
seen as recontextualizations of such official norms in one’s own text, as if to 
show to respondents that one is merely following the rules. The framed 
segment (“I am a very sociable and communicative person”) is thus implicitly 
framed as the kind of act required by this type of event. The interjections and 
reactive particles evoke a process of thinking and responding to the task set 
by the genre context. There is a kind of dramatization of the task at hand (cf. 
Goffman 1990 [1959]: 40). Furthermore, the scalarizing focus particle 
ainakin (“at least”) frames the positive description as a sort of minimal or 
most accessible response. 
By drawing attention to and showing a heightened awareness of (a) the 
type of ongoing social activity, (b) the frame of participation, and (c) the 
concrete process of entextualization, the writer implicitly motivates and 
justifies the explicit positive stance towards self. The performance tones 
down both one’s stakes of authorship and the intensity and scope of one’s 
commitment to the truth of the presented information. That is, in a world in 
which one is obliged to commit to positive self-appraisal, this would be one 
possible formulation.  In a sense, then, the positive stance towards self in the 
text is performed as a kind of “spontaneous” ad hoc response to the 
requirements of the event type, and not as a voluntary, calculated discursive 
act. 
Example (5.15) similarly comments on the quantity and motivation of a 
list of positive attributes. The beginning of the segment sets up a double 
perspective:  the writer is looking for a person who shares his criteria for an 
ideal partner. That is, the ideal self and the ideal other (as well as the self as 
the ideal other of the other, and so on) are described using the same 
typifications: 
 
(5.15) Haen varmaankin ihmistä jolla omat tunteet tallella, jonka sydän läpättää kuin 
omani joskus edes toivosta tutustua ihastuttavaan, ”hyvin käyttäytyvään”, 
keskustelutaitoiseen, urheilulliseen, älykkääseen, kauniiseen, pirteään, uskolliseen 
(jo=ko riittää) [already=Q suffice:IND.PRS.3SG] ihmiseen. 
(5.15) I’m seeking for a person who has his own feelings left, whose heart flutters like 
mine from the hope of at least eventually meeting a lovely, “well behaving,” 
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conversationally skilled, sporty, intelligent, beautiful, lively, faithful (is [this] enough 
already) person. 
 
After listing eight typifications, the writer asks in parentheses whether this is 
“enough already” (joko riittää). The grammatical subject of the question 
remains implicit, but an obvious inference is that it points to the unfolding 
sequence of positive typifications. Whether the question is construed as being 
about the temporal duration of the sequence or about the accumulated 
number of typifications, it one way or another brings into focus the quantity 
of positive stancetaking (see also 4.4.1). The question, then, simultaneously 
shows that positive stancetaking is considered relevant and necessary with 
respect to the norms of the event but not entirely unproblematic in terms of 
its more specific nature. It is also implied that the positive presentation of 
self is, in fact, performed for the sake of the addressee, to whom the question 
is, at least figuratively, addressed and who is presented with the power to 
decide the appropriate quantity of positive description. That is, as in the 
previous example, the writer is portrayed as a self-aware and considerate 
animator and author, and his commitment is specifically related to the 
activity type and the needs of the respondent. This sort of strategy limits the 
interpretations that can be plausibly made about the writer’s intentions 
(making interpretations such as “complacent” or “delusional” less 
sustainable; cf. chapter 7).  
A typical co-text for the kinds of stances we are dealing with in this 
section is in taxonomies of characteristics (see 4.4.2). The gradual piling up 
of naturalized evaluative typifications in such structures easily evokes 
questions such as: Who is the author? What is his/her mode of commitment? 
What is the empirical validity of such typifications? It would seem that many 
performances attempt to deal with questions like this. In example (5.16), the 
writer presents a list of typifications that according to her own description 
have mainly been initiated by others, but partially by herself as specified in 
parentheses. Such framing implies that the taxonomy consists of or is 
centered around a set of speech chain indexicals (see 4.4.5). The exact degree 
of distribution of authorship is implicit, and no specific locatable sources are 
mentioned: 
 
 (5.16) ¶Lopuksi muiden mietteitä (ja joitakin omia) itsestäni: fiksu ja hyvännäköinen, 
kaunis ja suloinen, viehättävä, tyylikäs (ainakin ajoittain, toim. huom.), hauska, 
huumorintajuinen, huumorintajuton, erittäin kiltti, toisia ajatteleva, toisten 
puolesta uhrautuva, toiset edelleen laittava, monipuolisesti lahjakas, itsekäs, 
avarakatseinen, tiukkapipo, upea muodokas nainen, pepsodent-hymy ;), loistava 
lasten kanssa, kärsimätön, eteenpäinpyrkivä ja ihana. 
(5.16) ¶Finally others’ opinions (and some of my own) about me: smart and good-
looking, beautiful and sweet, charming, stylish (at least occasionally, editor’s 
remark), funny, has a good sense of humor, has no sense of humor, extremely 
kind, thinks about others, sacrifices herself for others, puts others before herself, 
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versatilely talented, selfish, broadminded, strait-laced, a stunning curvy woman, 
pepsodent smile ;), great with children, impatient, aspiring and wonderful. 
 
The clearest instance of the writer’s authorial intervention is on the second 
line where she adds, in parentheses, an “editor’s remark” to a typification. 
The addition brings out a contrast between two authorial voices, and 
identifies the writer more with the one in parentheses. The “editor’s voice” 
adds a temporal qualification “at least occasionally” to the supposedly other-
initiated typification “stylish.” That is, a positive typification is modified so 
that the writer can better commit to its truth. Similarly, two appearance-
related typifications, “pepsodent smile” (pepsodent-hymy) and “a stunning 
curvy woman” (upea muodokas nainen), are followed by a winking smiley 
that shows the writer’s qualified commitment to their truth (e.g., an 
awareness of their slightly “exaggerated” nature). 
Another recurring pattern is the juxtaposition of antonymous or 
otherwise contradicting typifications. The most visible instance in the 
previous example is the juxtaposition of huumorintajuinen (“having a sense 
of humor”), a stereotypically positive lexeme denoting a particular capacity, 
and huumorintajuton (“without a sense of humor”), a stereotypically 
negative lexeme denoting the lack of the same capacity. A similar but more 
implicit case is the contrast between itsekäs (“selfish”) that is preceded 
earlier in the text by three consecutive typifications that all begin with a form 
of the lexeme toinen (“other”) and denote some form of considerateness 
towards others. As the animator, it is the writer who has allowed the 
contradicting typifications to appear in the text. Even if these formulations 
were supposedly produced by others, as a co-author it is the writer herself 
who has composed the text so that, for instance, the two follow one another 
in the list and clearly contrast with one another. The fact that the writer 
publicly contrasts others’ contradicting stances towards herself can be 
construed both as an implicit metastance towards those others’ stances and 
as an implicit first-order stance towards herself. As a principal, then, the 
writer shows a relativized commitment. It is as if committing simultaneously 
to the relative truth of contradicting typifications implied a critical self-
awareness of and a distancing from these simple representational 
interpretants altogether. It prompts from the respondent the inference of a 
suitable, more complex representational mode and an interpretation that 
reconciles the apparent contradictions. (See also the explicit relativizing 
metadiscourse in example 4.34 in section 4.4.5.)92 That is, a contradiction 
between two sets of others’ stances becomes the intermediary of the writer’s 
and the reader’s alignment in relation to one another. The previous example 
                                                 
92 A “humorous” impression is, obviously, also part of the anticipated effects. In a sense, then, each 
reader can decide for themselves which description (“having a sense of humor” or “without a sense of 
humor”) they choose to side with, since an example of the writer’s sense of humor can be experienced 
and evaluated relatively directly by them (see also sections 4.1 and 4.2). 
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illustrates particularly well how a kind of staged dialogue (hence 
“performance”) between self as animator and self as principal mediates a 
dialogue between self and others. This is relatively typical of self-
presentational patterns in the data of this study. As the analysis shows, that 
dialogue has relatively more explicit and relatively more implicit branches 
that are equally important.  
Let us now return to the example that was first analyzed as (4.4) in 
chapter 4. It resembles in many ways both the previous example and the first 
example (5.13) of this section. The first paragraph of excerpt (5.17) lists both 
positive and negative characteristics. Their authorship is, however, not 
attributed to others. In fact, the typifications in the first paragraph are 
calibrated to the writer very loosely with spatial deictics (“Here is X”) leaving 
questions of authorship and commitment even more implicit than in 1SG 
cases (“I am X”).  
 
(5.17) Täällä rehevä, kaunis (kauneus on katsojan silmissä), tumma, itsenäinen, 
työssäkäyvä, neuroottinen, epävarma ja päivästä riippuen joko iloinen ja hauska, 
tai väsynyt ja kärttyinen.¶En väitä olevani täydellinen (sellaista ei ole), mutta 
olen mukava, pidetty, ystävällinen, kiltti, aktiivinen ja sosiaalinen nainen joka haluaisi 
löytää juuri minulle oikean ihmisen. 
(5.17) Here is a luscious, beautiful (beauty is in the eye of the beholder), dark, 
independent, employed, neurotic, insecure and, depending on the day, either happy 
and funny or tired and cranky. ¶I don’t claim to be perfect (that does not 
exist), but I’m nice, liked, friendly, kind, active and sociable woman who would like to 
find the one who’s just right for me. 
 
There are no obvious contradictions between the typifications either. Rather, 
they explicitly hang together as alternating or complementary options (and 
not as differences of perspective between different subjects like in the 
previous example). As in the first example, there is an explicit framing that 
seems to justify the negative typifications. Instead of “honesty,” this writer 
picks out “(impossible) perfectness” as a criterion that allows her to reflect 
upon and justify her own evaluative processes. 
The typification “beautiful” (kaunis) is followed by an ideological 
formulation or a type-level theoretical representation (see 4.4.1) (“beauty is 
in the eye of the beholder”) that justifies the first-order theoretical 
representation. It claims that the perception of “beauty” is incontestably 
subjective and individual and, thereby, shields the typification “beautiful” 
(and, in fact, all such typifications) from others’ contradicting stances. The 
second paragraph begins with a metapragmatic comment (“I don’t claim to 
be perfect”) that metarepresents the writer’s speech acts and intentions (i.e., 
she does not consider herself “perfect” and does not intend to communicate 
such with her text). This comment, too, is justified with a parenthetic 
addition (“that does not exist”) that grounds it in a general truth (saying that, 
in fact, no claim of “perfectness” can ever be valid). In other words, the writer 
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interprets her own first-order stances in light of ideological principles 
concerning the appropriate distribution of metastance relations. The latter 
principle that postulates the general implausibility of “perfectness,” a state 
with only positive aspects, justifies the writer’s own negative self-
presentational forms. Somewhat paradoxically, then, the comment states 
that “perfectness” is impossible and in contradiction with the writer’s self-
conceptions, but at the same time it implies that the notion is nevertheless 
somehow relevant in the context. Once again, it seems that stereotypic 
assumptions about “self-promotion” serve as the source of such presumed 
norms of perfectness. Finally, the comment serves as a lead-in for the 
following list of positive typifications, which now perhaps appear more 
believable as they are grounded in such demonstrated critical self-awareness. 
The performance in (5.17), then, seems to deal with a friction between 
different presumed models of evaluation (unipolar versus bipolar) – giving 
off a mixed impression, which may be interpreted positively as a kind of 
humanity (“authenticity,” “honesty,” or “openness”) or negatively as 
“insecurity” or “low self-esteem” (see the analysis of questionnaire responses 
in 4.2.1).93  
A final point to be made in this section concerns the use of the CTP 
väittää (“to claim”) in the metadiscursive formulation in (5.17) and in the 
following example (5.18). We can compare the use of väittää (“to claim”) 
both with the other examples in this section and with the expression of desire 
analyzed in section 5.1. In contrast to naturalized evaluative typifications, 
väittää (“to claim”) brings the 1SG figure more prominently on the stage as a 
principal, as the CTP explicitly denotes a mode event (a particular kind of 
speech act implying a corresponding epistemic belief) and a (relatively 
factive) status of commitment. Let us consider the following example with an 
affirmative form of the CTP: 
 
(5.18) Aktiivisen harrastamisen pohjalta väittäisin olevani hyvässä kunnossa ja 
ulkonäkö on kohdallaan (tämähän on tietysti täysin objektiivinen arvio :). 
(5.18) Based on active exercise I would claim to be in good shape and [my] looks are in 
order (and this is of course a completely objective assessment :). 
 
The positivity of the description is still conveyed by the positive typifications 
(e.g. “in good shape,” “looks are in order”), as in the previous examples of 
this section. The difference, however, is that the CTP explicitly denotes the 
“I” figure as the one who has assessed and is committed to the truth of the 
content in the actual world of the speech event. As evidence for the claim, the 
writer cites his past behaviors and their cumulative effects (“active [sports] 
                                                 
93 In fact, the two kinds of interpretations may not be far apart in the process of interpretation for 
some. One of the respondents in the questionnaire had initially typified the writer as “honest” 
(rehellinen) but had later crossed it out and replaced it with “insecure” (epävarma), a word also used 
by the writer herself (Epävarma rehellinen [T1/17]) (see also 4.2.4). 
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hobbies”). Since both the claim and the evidence are grounded in the writer’s 
perspective and no other sources are even implied, it is inferable that the 
writer is also the source of the positive value and the author of the signs that 
express it. As the writer’s own sarcastic comment (“and this is of course a 
completely objective assessment”) suggests, the empirical verifiability of such 
self-initiated evaluative descriptions and their evidence is very limited. 
Expressions of desire, such as haluan (“I want”) and haluaisin (“I would 
want”), in contrast, are future-oriented and model a wished-for world of 
desires and ideals to the actualization of which the writer is committed and 
are therefore less easily contestable (cf. e.g. 5.4d). The modes and statuses of 
commitment, explicitly formulated or implicitly inferred, then, are essential 
for the consequences of evaluative stancetaking in online dating 
advertisements.  
5.3 THE POETICIZATION OF EVALUATIVE STANCES 
AND THE RELATIVIZATION OF COMMITMENT 
Let us now summarize and elaborate the discussion above, starting with an 
additional example that is slightly more explicit in terms of metapragmatic 
commentary. It crystallizes some of the questions above. The comment in 
excerpt (5.19) is situated towards the end of the text. It follows the writer’s 
first segment of self-description and precedes a latter, shorter one: 
 
(5.19) Enkäj todellakaan ole niin mukava kuin minkälaisen kuvan tässä ehkä annank :D¶ 
(5.19) And Ij am certainly not as nice as the kind of image Ik may give here :D¶ 
The comment typifies the anticipated effect of the self-presentation as “nice.” 
The latter 1SG reference (annank) points to the main animator of the speech 
event, i.e., the specific persona that gives the impression of niceness “here” in 
this event. It contrasts with the former 1SG reference (Enkäj – – ole), which 
points to a broader persona that has the power to evaluate and contradict the 
animator. That is, selfj does not entirely commit to what selfk has 
communicated “here.” The two personae are, however, linked to each 
another on an evaluative scale. Selfj is not as nice as selfk, but not unrelated 
or entirely dissimilar either. The latter embodies a kind of idealized high 
point of selfhood on the presumed evaluative scale, a “promotional” persona. 
To summarize some of the intricacies from the standpoint of discursive 
agency, we may note that the writer-person simultaneously: 
 
(a) is the animator of the “nice” self-presentation  
(b) is the author of both figure selfj and figure selfk in the above comment 
(c) is, as its voluntary animator, at least in some non-specified way 
committed to the truth of the “nice” self-presentation 
(d) is, as figure selfj, explicitly not committed to the “nice” self-
presentation 
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How to interpret the apparent contradiction of commitments here? We may 
note the “very happy” smiley at the end of (5.19), which indicates that the 
writer’s comment about the discrepancy between the two personae should be 
taken “humorously.” Humorous effects require some presupposed common 
ground between participants as the basis of humor. In this case, that basis 
may be, for instance, common beliefs about particular forms of idealized self-
presentation that are only true in a specific mode and are to be interpreted 
with a pinch of salt (see also chapter 7). We might, for instance, conclude that 
the writer-person appears in (5.19) as a mere co-author of the “nice” self-
presentation. It is equally co-authored by those presumed cultural norms of 
self-presentation that can lead to the kind of self-presentation that one both 
animates and contradicts. In other words, reflexive models of semiotic 
behavior (such as “promotional” discourses or the online dating 
advertisement genre) function as the voice of generalized others that project 
entitlements and commitments on the self and that one can also distribute 
agency and accountability to (see also Mead 1934: 156–158). Commitment to 
the truth of the presented content is, then, narrowed towards a specific 
persona in a specific world. That persona is grounded and embedded in 
another one, who is well aware of the complex relation between the two 
personae. That is, the previous example brings on stage the same friction 
between animators, authors, and principals that we saw in earlier examples 
but in a more explicitly figured way.  
All of the examples above seemed to acknowledge the challenging nature 
of both (a) the self-authoring of naturalized and objectified evaluative stances 
and (b) the unipolarity of the presumed model of self-presentation. Some 
saw it relatively more as a problem, some relatively more as a possibility; 
some as something to avoid, some as something to engage in.94 Such 
strategies can be seen as different kinds of individual stances towards the 
same cultural practices. Citing individual negative facts among positive ones 
as well as animating a secondary authorial voice in parentheses recurred in 
several examples, which suggests that such patterns of evaluative 
stancetaking may be relatively “conventionalized” traits of the genre. The 
performances that such features were part of relativize the writer’s 
commitment so that it mainly applies in the ideal world inhabited by the 
promotional persona. In a sense, then, the “poeticization” of evaluative 
stances through such performances may to some effect counterbalance the 
“naturalization” of evaluation in this type of stancetaking (cf. Parmentier 
1994; also Fairclough 2003: 182–184). 
The analyses above point to the complicated nature of the presentation of 
self in this context: How to conform to several divergent norms at once? How 
to fulfill the goal of the genre and appeal to ideal respondents but still appear 
                                                 
94 It is also noteworthy that the problematic aspects only seem to apply to “positive” evaluative 
stancetaking. That is, such practices are asymmetric in relation to polarity. The higher the stake one is 
claiming at a social game, the more susceptible it seems to be to suspicion. (See also chapter 7.) 
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human(e)? How to simultaneously avoid braggadocio and self-deprecation? 
How to aspire to ideal forms of personhood and stay true to one’s own and 
others’ perceptions of oneself? The choice between a unipolar and a bipolar 
model of evaluative stancetaking is in itself an act of identity. The writers can 
be interpreted differently by respondents on the basis of that choice. 
Awareness of such social consequences may increase the need to justify the 
choice and to execute it with heightened precision and control. The 
“performances of human(e)ness” analyzed above seem to open a space of 
self-awareness between the texts and the presumed stereotypes in order to 
reconcile “promotionality” with other models of personhood. The 
performances and their explicit or implicit metadiscursive commentary on 
evaluative stancetaking seem to mediate between different personae and 
conflicting models (cf. Holmes 2004; Ben-Ze’ev 2004: 173; Korobov & 
Laplante 2013). The implicit model of personhood that such examples seem 
to point to, referred to here as “human(e)ness,” not only approves of but 
almost seems to necessitate certain negative traits, a few rough edges. The 
performances of “human(e)ness” in a sense deconstruct the difference 
between unipolar and bipolar models of evaluation. They set up an 
interpretative frame in which, for instance, isolated negative characteristics 
become positively valued in light of the total effect or the ultimate 
consequences. 
A heightened reflexive awareness of and orientation to the relationship 
between the person and the personae performed in the text leads to texts in 
which the problem of performing one’s personhood also becomes performed 
in the text – distinguishing more clearly, for instance, between animators, 
authors, and different kinds of principals or the person-as-promoter and the 
person-as-promotee. Interpretations of coherence between such fractions of 
personhood will be returned to in chapters 7 and 8. Such distancing 
performances could be seen as one way of resisting the threat of 
“commodification” – or the reduction of the self to a mere list of positive 
characteristics – that has been associated with “promotional” discourse (see 
Coupland 1996; cf. however Agha 2011a). That is, the above examples could 
be seen as the writers’ attempts to assert their agency against commodifying 
social practices through their metadiscursive capacity (or as just a conscious 
form of succumbing to those practices).  
5.4 ANTICIPATING OTHERS’ INTERPRETATIONS 
This section expands the previous ones by looking at the writers’ anticipation 
of others’ interpretants of the signs they have animated. The patterns of 
evaluative stancetaking in this section orient to possible but non-desired or 
non-ideal interpretations. They reflect the writers’ commitment to particular 
interpretants and their wish to reject other interpretants, which they are 
nevertheless able to anticipate based on, for instance, an understanding of 
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others’ partly differing ontologies, epistemic formations, or denotational 
stereotypes. This section, then, focuses on the writers’ attempts to control 
sign-interpretant relations, or the consequences of their signs. (A particular 
focus will be placed on representational interpretants; chapter 6 will take 
notice of affective and energetic ones.) In a sense, the cases dealt with in this 
section are at the heart of selfhood, as they make visible the reflexive 
processes of caring about and committing to others’ interpretants of one’s 
signs.95 In many cases, others’ interpretants figure as internalized, i.e., as 
belonging to the self and having been taken into account in one’s behavior 
(see the discussion of Me-self in 2.3.1). In some cases, however, non-ideal 
interpretants are explicitly dialogized and othered as belonging to a type of 
addressee, not the self. (See Kockelman 2010: 128; Wilce 2009a: 59.)  
The writer in such cases is primarily taking a negative stance towards 
others’ acts of interpreting him or her with a particular representational 
interpretant, not necessarily the content of the interpretant as such. For 
instance, in the following example, the writer rejects an interpretation that 
could be made on the basis of what was said earlier about her hobbies. The 
negation and the contrastive structures clearly dissociate the unwanted 
description (“a bundle of energy brimming with endless drive and dashing 
forward all the time”) from the writer, and contrast it with the ensuing 
hedonistic imagery that she does commit to: 
 
 (5.20) Harrastukseni ovat urheilullisia, mutta kropan kurittamisen ohella myös 
pääkopan sivistäminen on minulle tärkeää. En kuitenkaan ole koko ajan eteenpäin 
säntäävä, loputonta energiaa pursuava tehopakkaus, vaan sohvalla makoilu ja hyvän 
ruoan ja juoman nauttiminen ovat myös arjen kohokohtia. 
(5.20) My hobbies are athletic, but in addition to tormenting my body I also find it 
important to educate myself. I am not, however, a bundle of energy brimming with 
endless drive and dashing forward all the time, but lying on the sofa and enjoying good 
food and drink are also highlights of my everyday life. 
 
The formulation of the rejected social type itself, however, might also be 
understood as relatively positive (“a bundle of energy brimming with endless 
drive…”). The connotation of sännätä (“to dash”), implying a sort of rash and 
irrational movement, is the only clear sour tone.96 Writers may perfectly well 
                                                 
95 In another (pragmatist) terminology, we are dealing in this section with discursive 
manifestations of what Charles H. Cooley (1956 [1902]: 184) named the “looking-glass self,” a self-
conception consisting of three elements: (1) the imagination of our appearance to others, (2) the 
imagination of their judgment of that appearance, and (3) a self-feeling (such as pride or shame) 
resulting from that imagination. 
96 And, in fact, the scope of the negation and the position of the adverb koko ajan (“all the time”) in 
the clause structure could be construed in two different ways. In one construal, the writer merely 
temporally restricts the appropriateness of the description: “However, I am not all the time a bundle of 
energy… [but I am sometimes].” This would also change the construal of the additive relation 
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wish to reject such interpretations that either they or others do consider 
positive on the level of desires or ideals – but that the writers are either not 
willing or not able to pull off. They are, then, problematic only as 
interpretants of the self in the context of a particular social relation. One 
may, for instance, reject an anticipated interpretation, if one considers it “too 
good” from the standpoint of oneself or “too demanding” from the standpoint 
of others (e.g., “I don’t mean that you should be a runner-up of some beauty 
pageant, quite the contrary,” En kuitenkaan tarkoita, että sinun olisi oltava 
joku missikisojen perintöprinsessakaan, päinvastoin). Usually, however, it 
is quite clearly a negative stance towards some social type that leads to the 
rejection of an anticipated interpretation (e.g., “If the first things that came 
to your mind are trendy clothes, a convertible, and a high education then 
please move on to the next advertisement,” Jos mieleesi tuli ensimmäiseksi 
trendikkäät ryysyt,avoauto ja korkea koulutus niin ole hyvä ja hiihdä 
seuraavaan ilmoon). In short, the particular reasons for and the complex 
metastance relations behind the negative stances taken towards 
representational interpretants vary in the following examples – and are 
sometimes more, sometimes less recoverable empirically from the data 
available. 
Another specification is in order as well. The cases in this section deal 
with non-desired interpretations of one’s own signs. A closely related set of 
cases in which the writers orient to types of non-desired interpreters, i.e., 
types of persons whom the writer wishes to exclude from the group of 
respondents altogether, will be examined in chapter 6. It is in such cases, 
when the writers explicitly address and reject non-desired alters, that the 
self-other disjuncture receives its fullest extent. The examples examined in 
this section deal with stereotypic, inferable, or otherwise anticipatable links 
between positive and negative characteristics. The general pattern is as 
follows: some characteristic (C1) described by the writer (e.g., a role name, an 
attribute, or a behavior) is explicitly or implicitly dissociated from one or 
more other characteristics (C’1...C’n) that are somehow incompatible with the 
writer’s ideals. There is, then, some presupposed general cultural or 
experiential link between the ideal interpretations and the rejected ones, but 
in the case of the particular figures at play (the writer, ideal readers) that 
link is severed. This section, therefore, also relates to the concerns of the 
previous chapter, since the cases examined make explicit the writers’ 
understandings of alternative inferences and alternative theoretical 
representations of the same processes. That is, they make visible the writers’ 
own orientations and attitudes towards social and linguistic realities as well 
as the writers’ understandings of others’ corresponding orientations and 
attitudes. 
                                                                                                                                          
expressed by myös (“also”), i.e., whether the state of affairs that “lying on the sofa…” is paralleled with 
is “[being] a bundle of energy…” or “tormenting my body” and “educat[ing] myself.”  
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The rejection of non-desired interpretations is a pervasive phenomenon 
in the data. Table 8 illustrates some of the simplest kinds of cases. Most of 
the examples are textual patterns in which the writers either describe the 
attributes or habits of themselves or others (adjectives, VPs) or identify 
themselves or others with a role name (NPs). These different kinds of 
typifications are closely related via cultural knowledge and stereotypes. One 
enables inferences about the other: role names allow inferences about the 
typical attributes and behaviors of that type of person and, vice versa, 
descriptions of attributes or behaviors point to a set of appropriate noun 
phrases that could be used to designate that type of person. In the examples 
below, the writers explicitly reject negative role names, attributes, or habits 
suggested by the descriptions they formulate. They may also specify the 
proper degree of some characteristic by renouncing descriptions of excessive 
or insufficient degrees of the characteristic. These patterns, then, point to the 
kinds of diacritics that separate ideal and non-ideal personae from one 
another. 
 
Textual pattern Presented information 
and allowed inferences 
Examples of 
rejected inferences 
 
(5.21a) 
My favorite character in Winnie the 
Pooh is Eeyore, but I am still 
capable of (sometimes even 
unfounded) optimism concerning 
my future  
Suosikkihahmoni Nalle Puhissa on 
Ihaa, mutta pystyn silti (joskus 
katteettomaankin) optimismiin 
tulevaisuuden suhteen — tässä minä 
nytkin olen kirjoittamassa treffi-
ilmoitusta :) 
 
(5.21b) 
I’m no sports enthusiast, but I try 
to keep fit. 
En ole mikään himosporttailija, mutta 
yritän pitää kuitenkin kuntoa yllä. 
 
(5.21c) 
I am quite the romantic but still a 
reasonable, down-to-earth 
Karelian-born woman. 
Olenkin melkoinen romantikko, mutta 
silti jalat maassa oleva, järkevä 
karjalaissyntyinen nainen. [See 
example 4.1.] 
Role name 
 
[Identifies metaphorically 
with] “Eeyore” > [has some 
of the characteristics of 
Eeyore] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“not a sports enthusiast” > 
“does not particularly enjoy 
sports” 
 
 
 
“a romantic” 
Attribute or habit 
 
“Eeyore” > “pessimist” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“not a sports 
enthusiast” > “does not 
do sports a lot” > “not 
fit” 
 
 
“a romantic” >  
“impractical, 
daydreamer” 
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Textual pattern Presented information 
and allowed inferences 
Examples of 
rejected inferences 
 
(5.21d) 
Because of my sports hobbies, I 
stay fit, both mentally and 
physically. – – As for my looks, I 
could say that I look quite nice. I 
have even been complimented as 
being handsome, and not just by 
my girlfriends and my mom. Still, 
I am not the Mister Finland type. 
Liikuntaharrastusteni takia olen 
hyvässä kunnossa, sekä henkisesti että 
fyysisesti. – – Ulkonäöstäni voisin 
sanoa olevani ihan kivannäköinen. On 
minua joskus komeaksikin kehuttu, 
muutkin kuin tyttöystävät ja äiti. En 
kuitenkaan ole mikään Mister Finland 
-tyyppi. 
 
(5.21e) 
I hunger for romance and like to be 
petted and pampered. Even so, I 
am not a princess who cries about a 
pea under the mattress. 
Olen romantiikannälkäinen ja 
tykkään, että minua hellitään ja 
hemmotellaan. En silti ole prinsessa, 
joka itkee herneitä patjan alla. 
Attribute or habit 
 
“fit mentally and physically, 
handsome” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“likes romance and 
pampering” 
Role name 
 
“The Mister Finland 
type” [Refers to a 
stereotype of the 
contestants of male 
pageants.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“A princess who cries 
about a pea under the 
mattress” > “spoiled” 
[Refers to a fairy tale 
character.] 
 
 
Textual pattern Presented information 
and allowed inferences 
Examples of 
rejected inferences 
 
(5.21f) 
I want a man who is satisfied with 
what he sees in the mirror but 
without being too vain. 
Haluan miehen joka tyytyväinen 
siihen mitä näkee peilistä olematta 
kuitenkaan liian itserakas 
 
(5.21g) 
I hope you are fairly uninhibited 
but not ‘pervy’, whatever that 
means… 
Olethan suht estoton, et kuitenkaan 
’pervo’, mitä ikinä sekin tarkoittaa... 
Attribute or habit 
 
“satisfied with one’s own 
physical appearance” 
 
 
 
 
 
“uninhibited” 
Excessive degree of the 
attribute or habit 
 
“vain” 
 
 
 
 
 
“’pervy’” 
 
Table 8. Rejecting unwanted interpretations. 
Some of the examples in the table explicitly coordinate two or more ideal 
characteristics and merely imply that their co-occurrence is somehow 
unexpected. In such cases the rejected inference (C’1) remains relatively 
implicit. Example (5.21c), for instance, claims that the writer is a “romantic” 
(C1) and implies (“but still”) that the characteristic does not stereotypically 
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combine with attributes such as “reasonable” (C2) or “down-to-earth” (C3). 
The implicitly rejected characteristic (C’1), then, is some stereotypic 
characteristic of “romantics” that somehow contradicts the kind of practical 
reasonability described by C2 and C3 (such as “daydreamer” like qualities). 
The decribed characteristics (C2, C3) serve directly as proof against the 
implicit rejected characteristic (C’1). The rejected characteristic is merely 
implicitly projected both by stereotypes of personhood (i.e., knowledge about 
what “romantics” can or cannot be like) and the (antonymous) sense-
relations of C2 and C3 (e.g., C’1 ≠ “down-to-earth”; C’1 ≠ “reasonable”). With a 
pattern like this, the writer does identify with the stereotype of “romantics” 
but only in a modified form (i.e., building a new emergent configuration of 
diacritics).  
Other examples formulate the rejected characteristic more explicitly. 
Example (5.21d), for instance, first describes characteristics such as 
“physically fit” (C1) and “handsome” (C2). After that, the writer dissociates 
himself from what he calls the “Mister Finland type” (C’1), an interpretation 
activated by C1 and C2. The use of the role name presumes that the social type 
is to some degree recognizable for the addressee and locatable on a map of 
the social world. Both in example (5.21d) and the following example (5.21e), 
the rejected role names (“the Mister Finland type”; “a princess that cries 
about a pea under the mattress”) point to either completely fictive realms or 
such social realms that are somewhat remote from the everyday life of an 
average person. That is, they would probably be interpreted relatively 
metaphorically (cf. sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4) and might be given adequate 
paraphrases with more everyday designations (e.g. “macho” or “exceptionally 
fit and good-looking”; “spoiled,” “cry-baby,” etc.). In fact, once again the 
stereotypic connotations of the symbolic designations (“the Mister Finland 
type”; “a princess that cries about a pea under the mattress”) are not highly 
negative in any unanimous sense. Rather, it is the negation and distancing 
from the self that imply an evaluative stance. However, the rejection of “the 
Mister Finland type” as an interpretant of the self might as easily be 
motivated by a negative stance towards that social type (e.g., not liking “the 
Mister Finland type”) as  by a fear of promising too much in a positive sense 
(e.g., not claiming to be that fit or good-looking). One might argue that, from 
the standpoint of the respondent, the interpretation of the text requires some 
inference about the writer’s stance towards the social type as such to properly 
motivate the rejection of it as an interpretant of the self. As will be seen later, 
in many cases the formulation of the rejected representational interpretant is 
much more revealing of the writer’s stance. 
The last example (5.21g) in Table 8 is particularly interesting, since the 
rejected designation (“‘pervy’”, ‘pervo’) is explicitly singled out with quotes to 
draw attention to it as a word (see also section 4.4.5). In addition, the writer 
explicitly notes that the meaning of the word is somewhat unclear or 
disputable (“whatever that means...”). The example makes visible the 
distinction between ‘uninhibited’ behaviors as such and the symbols that 
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denote such forms of “unhibitedness.” The designation for the excessive 
degree (“‘pervy’”) is animated by the writer with a certain insecurity and 
distanced from the self as the word of others and as pointing to others’ 
behaviors. That is, the writer orients to two kinds of diacritics: embodied 
social behaviors and discursive practices. The line between the acceptable 
and the excessive is drawn both at the level of behavior (not behaving in too 
‘uninhibited’ ways) and discourse (not behaving in ways that are talked about 
as “perviness”). The example makes explicit a more general concern, the 
calibration of symbols to actual embodied behaviors (see also sections 5.2.1 
and 7.2). It is probably safe to say that in most cases the writers are 
controlling representational interpretants precisely in order to control 
consequences at the level of actual embodied behaviors. That is, they are 
ultimately not interested in representations or words per se but in how 
others actually look or behave or what others expect them to actually look or 
behave like. Many of the cases in this section simultaneously deal with both 
levels: (1) how the same linguistic signs can be differently interpreted and (2) 
how the objects made knowable by the interpretation of linguistic signs can 
be further interpreted as signs of personhood.  
Let us now take a look at two more complex cases. The first might be 
regarded as relatively more “dialogized” and the latter as relatively more 
“internalized.” In example (5.22), the writer first approaches a description of 
his persona by positing it in a middle ground between negative extremes (C’1 
and C’2). After that he presents a general ideological formulation (C1) that 
applies to all individuals and crystallizes his ideal of personhood (“one must 
have self-esteem and honesty”). It is inferable that C’1 and C’2 are particular 
examples of cases that fall outside the ideal. Furthermore, it is strongly 
implied that the writer himself does, in fact, fulfill or instantiate the ideal and 
that ideal respondents should too:  
 
(5.22) En ole avaruuteen kurkottaja (C’1) mutten myöskään pidä siitä että ”tässä 
maan matosena kuljen” (C’2) itsetuntoa ja rehellisyyttä pitää olla (C1).  
(5.22) I am not one who reaches for space but I don’t like it either that “here I walk as a 
worm of the earth” one must have self-esteem and honesty. 
 
With the initial negation the writer dissociates himself from the kind of 
persona designated by the NP avaruuteen kurkottaja (“one who reaches for 
space”). The attributes and habits associated with this role name are left for 
the respondents to infer based on general cultural knowledge, and might be, 
for instance, along the line of “excessive ambitiousness” or even “arrogance.” 
Secondly, within the same sentence the writer dissociates himself from 
another kind of social persona by denoting a negative stance towards a 
quoted segment of their speech (“here I walk as a worm of the earth,” “tässä 
maan matosena kuljen”). The represented speech can be interpreted as the 
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kind of thing the non-ideal type of other would say or think.97 That is, the 
indexical origo of the 1SG and spatiotemporal deictics (“here,” tässä) in the 
quote is an imagined typical event in the life of the non-ideal type. The 
reported speech itself interdiscursively sources from Biblical discourse an 
idiomatic expression of humility and insignificance (“a worm of the earth,” 
maan matonen), which is projected as a self-initiated designation (i.e., as if 
the quoted person himself had used that designation about himself). These 
elements suggest an exaggerated or ironic voicing. That is, there is a 
superimposition of the writer’s voice and the figure’s voice so that the signs 
are at least partly composed by the writer to serve his interests. In other 
words, the persona of the other is inhabited not to represent it realistically 
(i.e., as they would actually speak) but to caricature aspects of it so that their 
speech would maximally correspond with and justify the writer’s negative 
interpretation of them (see also section 7.1.2). In a sense, then, the writer is 
speaking his own mind with another person’s mouth, or invading the persona 
of an other to make a point about himself. For instance, a particular kind of 
(“Biblical”) humility is caricatured, dissociated from characteristics such as 
“self-esteem,” excluded from ideal types of personhood, and described as the 
object of negative affect. Moreover, the writer’s stance is naturalized by 
grounding it in the others’ own purported speech behaviors. 
The text carves out a model of ideal personhood in the social space by 
delineating the ideal from the excessive and the insufficient. All this happens 
within a single orthographic unit (which is unorthodox from the standpoint 
of official norms of writing but makes sense functionally). The text starts by 
setting points of reference in the non-ideal extremes and by distancing the 
self from non-ideal others (“one who reaches for space” <> “a worm of the 
earth”). What lies between in the middle ground is represented as the 
domain of “self-esteem” and “honesty” in which the self resides and others 
should as well. Even such a short segment of text diagrams a relatively 
complex set of social relations. There is a core set of diacritics that the writer 
uses to evaluate persons. They might be described as, say, a balance between 
assertion of oneself and accountability to oneself. These diacritics are then 
layered with more specific emblematic values and justified ideologically (e.g., 
described symbolically as “self-esteem” and “honesty” that one “must have” 
in order to avoid the excesses of individual hubris or Biblical humility). 
Similar patterns are common in the data (see also example 5.23). It is also 
noteworthy that, in this case, the diacritics are relevant for the ongoing 
interactional event as well. That is, the described ideals of personhood also 
implicitly regiment the ongoing evaluative self-presentation as one kind of 
practice in which the general characteristics of “self-esteem” and “honesty” 
                                                 
97 Strictly speaking, there is nothing in the example that forces one to attribute the voice to another 
person. It might also be understood as a voicing of another, non-ideal or imagined, persona of the 
writer himself. Nevertheless, it is not the actual persona currently inhabited by the writer and, 
therefore, an other. 
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should be manifested. (For the more general relationship between 
description and performance, see sections 4.1 and 4.2.) 
The writers can also undertake the task of deconstructing or modifying 
the stereotypes they orient to. That is, while they presume and reparticularize 
such stereotypes in their text, they simultaneously attempt to change or 
reorganize them. Instead of merely rejecting potentially negative 
interpretations, they can use them as building blocks and useful contrasts for 
new, emergent figures. Such textual patterns then function as metasemiotic 
constructs that re-regroup the diacritics associated with a stereotype and give 
them new emblematic values. In example (5.23), the writer orients to the 
disclosure of his profession as an act with potentially negative consequences 
because of the interpretations he assumes others might make. At least in 
light of his performance, the writer has thoroughly internalized others’ 
interpretants of his profession. It is considered a stigmatizing part of the self 
that the writer has to somehow explain and deal with:  
 
(5.23) ¶Oman ammatin myöntäminen pelottaa aina, mutta tulisi sekin kai jossain 
vaiheessa ilmi. Olen insinööri-ihmisiä [be:IND.PRS.1SG engineer_person:PL.PTV] 
ja ihan vakituisissa oman alan töissä. En todellakaan ole mikään 
elämäntapainsinööri, enkä tuo töitä kotiin, vaan jätän ne toimistolle. Työt töinä ja 
oma elämä omana elämänä. Tiedän, kuinka paljon insinöörejä karsastetaan, ja 
ihan aiheesta. Ei meikäläistäkään kiinnosta kun esimerkiksi työpaikan 
saunailloissa jotkut nörtit kertovat naama vaahdoten muutaman oluen jälkeen 
rakentelemistaan ihmeellisistä vempaimista... Tyylinsä kullakin. Noh, alaa tuskin 
vaihdan, pidän vaan elämää tasapainossa sitten muulla tavalla. Ai niin, en pukeudu 
kauluspaitoihin ja kainaloihin asti vedettyihin suoriin housuihin, vaan rock-
henkisemmin. Joku onkin sanonut, että näytän enemmän teinirock-bändin rumpalilta 
kuin keskimääräiseltä diplomi-insinööriltä. :) Noh, mielestäni en kyllä näytä 
kummaltakaan. :)¶ 
(5.23) ¶Admitting [my] own profession frightens [me] always, but I suppose it would 
come up at some point. I am an engineer [”an engineer person,” “of the category of 
engineer persons”] and I have a permanent job in my own field. But I’m certainly no 
lifestyle engineer [i.e., being an engineer is certainly not a way of life for me], and I 
don’t bring work home, but leave it at the office. Work as work and own life as own 
life. I know how engineers are shunned, and quite rightly so. I’m not interested 
either when, for example, during company sauna nights after a few beers some nerds 
start ranting about the weird contraptions they’ve built… To each their own [lit. 
“everyone has their own style”]. Well, I doubt I’ll be changing fields anyway. I’ll just try 
to keep my life in balance in other ways. Oh yeah, I don’t wear dress shirts and straight 
trousers pulled up to my armpits, but in a more rock-oriented way. In fact, someone has 
said that I look more like a drummer of a teen rock band than like an average engineer. :) 
Well, in my own opinion, I don’t look like either one. :)¶ 
 
Before revealing his profession (“I am an engineer person” or “of the category 
of engineer persons,” Olen insinööri-ihmisiä), the writer describes that act as 
 189 
something that “frightens” him and names it as “admitting,” i.e., as an act 
stereotypically caused by an external pressure. An example like this might, 
then, be considered as an orientation to a “feared self” (see section 2.3.1). In 
fact, in many ways the writer agrees with the generalized other. The 
underlined parts are examples of points where the writer clearly ratifies 
others’ negative stances towards engineers. For instance, he represents a 
general stance without an explicit source (“engineers are shunned”) and 
supports it with his own stances (“quite righly so”; “I’m not…either”). 
The writer’s defensive strategy is to first split the problematic type of 
personhood in two: into “lifestyle engineers” (negative) and an initially 
unnamed type of non-lifestyle engineers (non-negative) that the writer 
identifies with. He then attempts to demonstrate that the latter is, in fact, a 
type of engineer that the common stereotypes do not apply to. Part of the 
writer’s strategy is to maintain a clear distinction between his professional 
and personal life (“work as work and own life as own life”). That is, 
regardless of what the respondent is or is not willing to believe about 
engineers, that is only one fraction of his identity. The second step of the 
strategy is to personally ratify many of the presumably common prejudices 
about engineers – that is, to join the attack along with the generalized other. 
Several negatively portrayed attributes and behaviors (working hours, 
interests, conversational habits, clothing) are redirected specifically towards 
the category of “lifestyle engineers” that are now also referred to as “nerds,” 
here used as a negative outgroup designation (cf. section 5.2.1). Finally, the 
writer replaces some of the refuted stereotypic images with more suitable 
ones. The appearance of a non-lifestyle engineer is dissociated from that of a 
“lifestyle engineer” (e.g., trousers up to the armpits) and linked to positive, 
“rock-oriented” images.  
What links this example with all the others in this section is the fact that 
there is explicit negative stancetaking towards something that is considered a 
possible but non-desirable interpretation of the self’s signs. Therefore, in 
many cases, the object of negativity is something close to or easily 
associatable to self. If no conceivable link existed, such dissociative patterns 
would be pointless. Like the earlier examples (5.20) and (5.22), the previous 
one exhibits an intricate pattern of diacritics that distinguish the self from 
some closely associated other in terms of more or less perceivable signs. 
Example (5.23) also gives an overarching representational interpretation of 
the distinction: “lifestyle engineers” versus a kind of “rock drummer 
engineer.” We can, then, view this as an example of stereotypical dualism 
(see e.g. Hall 1992: 215–216) and dissociative argumentation (Perelman 
2002: 159–171). Other examples of the kinds of symbolic oppositions that 
such self-other dissociations are based on in the data include, for instance, 
“traditional” versus “modern” (grandmotherhood), “deep” versus “shallow” 
or “materialistic” versus “spiritual” (values); “authentic” versus “inauthentic” 
(attitudes). Finally, one might conclude that the previous example is clearly 
stigmaoriented (i.e., it treats some of one’s characteristics as contradicting 
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with one’s own and others’ norms or ideals) but not exactly stigmaphilic as 
one might think, for instance, example (5.13) is in section 5.2.2 (cf. Goffman 
1990 [1963]: 21–22, 31–32, 44). The previous example combines 
confessional and defensive strategies, whereas in example (5.13) the writer is 
not even attempting to pass as “normal,” gain acceptance, or explain away 
the stigma but, rather, revels in the fact and uses it to select for respondents 
who could accept her regardless of the stigmatizing characteristics (i.e., the 
“own” or the “wise” in Goffman’s terms).98 
5.5 DEFENDING ONE’S ACT OF PARTICIPATION 
AGAINST NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES 
This section takes a look at a special case of evaluative stancetaking, in which 
the writers defend themselves against presumed negative stances towards 
online dating and online daters in general. The issue will be taken up again 
from the standpoint of the metadiscourse data in section 7.1.1 and summed 
up in the discussion in chapter 8. This section takes a look at the 
advertisement texts alone. In these cases, compared with the previous 
section, the negativity or potential stigma that the writers orient to derives 
not from their described characteristics but from the participation in the 
practice of online dating – which, of course, is one kind of sign of the self too. 
Presuming that a negative image of personhood befalls anyone who merely 
takes up the genre implicitly also projects a similar stigmatizing image onto 
the respondents, who are in a similar or intimately related role. Such aspects, 
however, are never explicitly dealt with in the data. The examples in this 
section focus solely on the writer.  
About 10–15 % of the texts, depending on the strictness of the criteria, 
include a pattern that explicitly explains or justifies the motives and reasons 
for engaging in the activity of online dating. Usually it is located towards the 
beginning of the text. In the first example (5.24a), for instance, the writer 
makes his point very explicit. According to him, all people encountered on 
                                                 
98 Another writer first describes his text as “not much of an advertisement” (Eipä tämäkään teksti 
toisaalta ole kummoinen ilmoitus, cf. example 5.13 in 5.2.2) and continues: “To make sure that no one 
contacts me, let me add that I have mental problems” (Jotta kukaan ei varmasti ottaisi yhteyttä niin 
kerrotaan vielä, että olen mielenterveysongelmainen). That is, he presumes that (a) in the context of 
online dating advertisements stereotypically non-positive information is automatically problematic 
and leads to negative responses from others, and (b) his self-presentation is so stigmatizing that it 
completely sieves off all respondents. Reveling in the futility of the effort can, of course, be interpreted 
as one more strategy that may appeal to a particular type of respondent. In fact, the ending of his text 
clearly betrays a personal tone of bleak humor: “I watch porn daily and I don’t like morning shows on 
the radio. Amen. Oh, and I’m an atheist too” (Katson pornoa päivittäin enkä pidä radion 
aamuohjelmista. Aamen. Niin ja ateistikin olen). 
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the Internet should be treated with initial caution (see also 7.1.1), which is 
why he takes the time to assure his readers that he is not a threat: 
 
(5.24a) ¶Hei, Kiitos kun avasit tämän lukuisten ilmoitusten joukosta. Toivo[i]nkin, että 
runsaasta valikoimasta valitsisit juuri tämän. Ihan aluksi totean, että tämän ilmoituksen 
takana on ihan täyspäinen mies. Sanon näin, koska netissä varmasti liikkuu monenlaisia 
viheltäjiä. 
(5.24a) ¶Hi, Thanks that you opened this [one] among the many ads. I [am/was] hoping 
that out of the wide selection you would choose this one. Let me start by saying that 
there is a completely sane man behind this ad. I’m saying this, because there are for sure 
many kinds of questionable persons [litt. whistlers] on the move on the Internet. 
 
In the second example (5.24b), in contrast, the writer focuses on the 
consequences of online dating by expressing a lack of faith in “virtual 
worlds,” echoing similar negative stereotypes as were seen in the previous 
example. That is, she does not really believe that online dating would work. 
Simultaneously, however, she leaves a door open for a change of attitude: 
 
(5.24b) [Title] Vastauksia vienoon toiveeseen... ¶Pimeän Syksyn lähestyessä rohkenen 
kokeilla onneani täällä.. vaikken juuri tällaiseen virtuaalimaailmaan uskokaan.. kerta se 
tosin voi olla ensimmäinenkin kun mieli kääntyy:) 
(5.24b) [Title] Replies to a modest wish… ¶As dark Fall approaches I venture to try my 
luck here.. although I don’t quite believe in a virtual world like this.. there’s a first time 
for everything though and I may change my mind:) 
 
The title of the text (“Replies to a modest wish…”) metapragmatically typifies 
the advertisement as a “modest wish” and implicitly encourages respondents 
to produce desired responses (“replies”). That is, the writer’s wishes and her 
anticipation of actual consequences seem to contradict. Nevertheless, making 
that contradiction explicit seemingly reduces the writer’s stakes in the game 
and shows that she has a realistic awareness of the situation (i.e., she is 
prepared for the worst-case scenario too). Example (5.24b) also makes a 
dramatized reference to the approaching season (Pimeä Syksy, “dark 
Fall”).99 As was seen in section 4.4.3, online dating advertisements are 
sometimes contextualized in light of biographic or seasonal trajectories. That 
is, the interactional event is explicitly located as a point on a biographic time 
scale. When such contextualizations include explanations of why one is single 
and looking for a partner through online dating, they have the additional 
function of justifying why it is “normal” or appropriate to engage in online 
dating in the kind of biographic situation the writer is in (e.g., if other 
methods are not available or have not been successful; see example 4.28 in 
4.4.3).  
                                                 
99 “Dramatized” because in Finnish the names of seasons (as well as days of the week, months) are 
not normally spelled with capital letters. 
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Negative general preconceptions can also be turned into the virtues of the 
particular writer. Like example (5.24b), the following two examples strongly 
imply that the consequences of online dating advertisements are rarely 
desirable and therefore engaging in the activity requires a suitable attitude. 
In the following cases, the focus is on the formulation of that attitude in a 
positive light, for instance, as “optimism”: 
 
(5.25a) ¶Kokeilenpas nyt sitten tätä nettihakuakin… – – [M]utta pystyn silti (joskus 
katteettomaankin) optimismiin tulevaisuuden suhteen — tässä minä nytkin olen 
kirjoittamassa treffi-ilmoitusta :) 
(5.25a) ¶Well, I’ll give this net search a try too now. – – [B]ut I am still capable of 
(sometimes even unfounded) optimism concerning my future – see, here I am writing a 
dating ad just now :) 
 
(5.25b) ¶Olen avoin, empaattinen, elämästä utelias, innostuva ja toivoton optimisti 
(siksi täälläkin).  
(5.25b) ¶I’m open, empathic, curious about life, enthusiastic and a hopeless optimist 
(that’s why [I’m] here too). [--] 
 
Let us now take a look at two more examples that discuss such negative 
stereotypes more specifically in the light of texts and interaction. The writer 
of (5.26), first of all, claims that he has read a number of women’s 
advertisements and, therefore, has an empirical grasp of what women are 
saying they are looking for. He can, therefore, plausibly typify himself as 
“tolerable” or even “desirable” from the women readers’ perspective. The 
formulation of his next move, however, implies that such men should or 
would not normally be writing an online dating advertisement. The 
combination of a question word and an interrogative clitic implies that the 
utterance is a reformulation of someone else’s actual or potential question. It 
confirms one’s understanding of the other’s interrogative intentions. That is, 
the writer animates a question as if it was asked by the respondent (“Why am 
I writing here then, one might ask?” or “Why am I writing here then? Is that 
what you’re asking?”). In the writer’s underlying interpretation, then, the 
kinds of desirable men women are looking for on online dating forums are 
not usually found there – because they have “normal” options for courtship 
available – and women know and expect that – otherwise they would have no 
reason to ask why such a desirable man is writing there:  
 
(5.26) ¶Sikäli kuin luin ilmoituksia ja yhtään maailmasta tai naisista ymmärrän, olen siis 
varsin siedettävä mies. Haluttava jopa.  
Miksi=kö sitten tänne kirjoittelen? 
[why=Q  then  here  write:1sg.ind.pres] 
Ainakin haluan päästä kertomaan, mitä haluan. – – Kyllästynyt odottelemaan, että satun 
tutustumaan oikeanlaiseen naiseen. 
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(5.26) As far as I read from these ads and understand anything about the world or 
women, I’m a fairly tolerable man. Desirable even. 
Why am I writing here then, you/one might ask? 
At least I want to get to tell what I want. – – Tired of waiting that I’ll just happen to meet 
the right kind of woman. 
 
The writer’s view seems to implicitly resonate with and recycle common 
images of, for instance, the “desperation” of online daters (see also 7.1.1). The 
writer’s reply to the question is equally interesting. As in many of the 
biographic narratives examined earlier, the writer underlines that online 
dating is not his only option but merely an appropriate instrument with 
respect to his particular interests. According to him, the interactional 
structure of online dating enables particular kinds of discursive acts (“telling 
what one wants”) as well as fast access to particular kinds of selected 
respondents (“the right kind of woman”) (see also example 5.1 and section 
7.1.1). 
Finally, the last example locates the problem specifically in the semiotic 
behaviors of the writers of online dating advertisements (see also 7.2.2). 
According to him, it is the strict demands and the high degree of selectivity, 
which seems to increase according to the type of social relation one is looking 
for, that give online daters a bad name: 
 
 (5.27) ¶Mikä ihme näissä deittipalveluissa oikein on... ¶Olen lueskellut ”ystävää 
etsitään” ja ”ei luokitusta” -ilmoituksia ja niistäkin tuntuu löytyvän vaan vaatimuksia 
toisen perään. – – Itse en vaan sellaista ymmärrä. 
(5.27) ¶What is it with these dating services… ¶I have been reading “looking for a friend” 
and “no classification” ads and they too seem to be filled with nothing but 
requirement after requirement. – – Personally I just cannot understand that. 
 
Rather than attempting to refute some negative stereotype, the writer in fact 
ratifies and reinforces one, but attempts to dissociate himself as an individual 
from it. In that sense, this example is akin to earlier examples (5.13) and 
(5.22). 
To sum up, we have seen that many writers presume and more or less 
explicitly orient in their writing to negative stereotypes of online dating and 
online daters (e.g., “online dating requires optimism because it’s a hopeless 
task,” “online dating is appropriate only after normal methods have been 
tried or are not a viable option,” “people reading and writing dating 
advertisements are often suspicious, have undesirable characteristics, and 
online dating is probably their last or only hope”). To refute negative 
interpretations of themselves, some writers take explicit counter-stances that 
rationalize and justify why others should not interpret them in the light of 
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negative stereotypes.100 That is, there are systematic relationships between 
stereotypes of personhood and stereotypes of discursive action that manifest 
themselves in actual discourse. The conclusion that we can draw is that for 
some interactants, there are stigmatized default personae attached to the 
genre itself. That is, in addition to dealing with one’s own values as an 
individual self, one has to deal with the value that threatens to fall upon one 
as an instance of a type of participant. Similarly important – and an 
additional challenge to self-presentation – is the fact that the stereotypes of 
personhood associated with a particular communicative practice may differ 
considerably between semiotic communities, as will be seen more clearly 
later in chapter 7. 
5.6 STANCE, EMBLEMATICITY, AND POLARITY IN 
ONLINE DATING ADVERTISEMENTS 
In this chapter, we have seen examples of how writers publicly theorize their 
values in evaluative stances and how different kinds of reflexive models (e.g., 
notions of “self-promotion” or “honesty” or “modesty”) regiment the 
distribution of metastance relations. If we now compare chapters 4 and 5 
with each other, we can see that any process of idealization or “promotion” of 
self involves much more than evaluative stancetaking. In fact, the 
formulation of explicit stances might be one of the more challenging aspects 
of self-presentation in the context of online dating advertisements. Negative 
stances in particular make self-other disjunctures and social boundaries 
clearly visible – and therefore make or break social relations with a certain 
severity. That is, negative stances sieve and select efficiently. Whether that is 
a problem or a prospect, depends on a particular participant’s purposes. 
Evaluation manifests itself in online dating advertisements as much 
through the selection of those “signs of the self” one chooses to entextualize 
(i.e., as practical agency) as it does through explicit evaluative stancetaking 
(i.e., as theoretical agency). For instance, the composition and hierarchical 
structuring of the taxonomies discussed in 4.4.1 can be regarded as a prime 
example of evalution in biographic discourse. What is included and what is 
excluded, communicates the values of the writer. The included biographic 
contents signal which constituents the writers value in their own lives and 
what types of constituents they consider important in general. The implicit 
reverse is the enactment of privacy or biographic control. The exclusion of 
biographic contents signals what types of constituents are considered less 
                                                 
100 For some writers in the data (collected in 2007), such suspicious attitudes may at least partly be 
explained by the relative newness of the cultural practice and a lack of prior personal experience. 
However, even a brief look into brand new advertisements will show that similar phenomena abound 
eight years later. Most likely, then, such sterotypic conceptions are continuously re-motivated by 
features of the instrument and its relation to social life (see also chapter 7). 
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valuable or relevant. Moreover, the more specific organization of whatever is 
revealed can be interpreted as a sign of the relative importance of individual 
constituents. That is, the textual patterning is interpretable as iconic to how 
one evaluates one’s kinds (in terms of, say, inalienability and desirability). 
More important constituents can be, for example, located higher and earlier 
in such taxonomies. 
It is important to note the role of the genre of the ongoing event. For 
instance, the meaning of such taxonomic structures could be quite different 
in other contexts. In online dating advertisements, one tends to expect 
relatively polished and premeditated contributions (see also section 4.2 and 
chapter 7) so that one can expect such taxonomies to be intentionally and 
purposefully organized. A particular genre model may, then, increase the 
epistemic emblematicity of particular linguistic patterns. That is, the genre 
increases the degree to which a sign pattern is considered a sufficient and 
reliable basis for some inference (see Kockelman 2013a: 77). The epistemic 
salience of particular linguistic patterns can, then, change between types of 
events, even if their phenomenological form remains constant. If we 
understand stance as whatever can, in light of local models, be interpreted as 
a speaker’s personal contribution to event construal (Kockelman 2004: 144), 
then such taxonomies of privacy and disclosure might indeed be understood 
as genre-specific forms of stance. 
The patterns of stancetaking examined in this chapter are (also) marked 
by phenomenological emblematicity. That is, they make the writers’ values 
maximally perceivable and minimally ambiguous with symbolic 
representations. Of the two different types of stancetaking discussed, CTPs 
explicitly denote some mode of commitment (e.g., desiring, liking, 
appreciating) towards some content. They explicitly theorize selves or others 
as value-directed entities and locate the source of the evaluation in these 
entities. That is, they figure some mental process against the background of 
the entire person. As we saw, the “promotional” persona is allowed to be 
highly explicit and direct about one’s desires and need not necessarily relate 
them to concerns of the actual world or actual others. The other pattern of 
stancetaking discussed in this chapter consists of “naturalized” value based 
on lexical symbols with evaluative connotations and of such textual and 
grammatical relations (e.g., negation) that direct the value to or dissociate it 
from selves or others. In self-directed (or egocentric) cases, the writer 
appears as a 1SG figure (via pronouns and inflection), but no mode of 
commitment is denoted and the source of the value is left implicit. 
Authorship can, therefore, be partly relegated to particular or generalized 
others. In other-directed (or altercentric) cases, the writer is typically not 
symbolically represented at all but merely indexically linked to the utterance 
as its animator. The positive or negative evaluative tones necessarily index 
someone’s perspective and therefore raise the question of the animator’s 
commitment to that perspective. That is, even though such utterances are not 
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about the writer as a self, they are necessarily understood as grounded in the 
writer as a self.  
The term “naturalization” here indicates that value is theorized as if 
questions of authorship and commitment were self-evident or irrelevant and 
left on an inferential plane. That is, an evaluative typification embodies some 
agent’s perspective and values, but it is predicated about some object as if the 
link between the object and the value existed relatively independently of any 
agent. Naturalized value is ostensibly “aperspectival.” It is projected on some 
object on a public stage as its inherent quality. Such stances, then, easily 
imply that only one perspective can apply at a time. The simultaneous 
attribution of a characteristic (C1=huumorintajuinen, “with a sense of 
humor”) and its opposite (C2=~C1=huumorintajuton, “without a sense of 
humor”) seems, on the face of it, like a contradiction – that can serve as the 
basis of, for example, humorous performances leading to inferences of 
relativized commitment, as in example (5.16). The respondent of a 
naturalized stance has to either accept the speaker’s interpretation or 
explicitly challenge it. Consequently, naturalized evaluative stancetaking 
easily leads to a battle for a figured cultural stage. Naturalized stances figure 
selves’ stakes in a game of symbolic representation of the world, whereas 
CTPs such as want, wish, love, and appreciate commit selves to their own 
processes directed at the world. From the standpoint of personhood, 
naturalized stancetaking is oriented to the present and the past that the 
present embodies. A person appears as an accumulation of possession-like 
properties that one holds onto on a public stage. The CTP-based cases 
examined earlier, in contrast, emphasize the future-oriented aspect of 
personhood. A person appears as the locus of appreciation, wish, or desire, or 
other aspirations towards particular kinds of future selves and worlds. The 
two models of evaluative stancetaking, then, represent two quite different 
approaches to the description of ideal patterns of life.  
It is noteworthy that the model of evaluative stancetaking that was 
dubbed unipolarity relates slightly differently to the two kinds of stances. 
The most prototypic form of unipolar stancetaking is perhaps the case in 
which all “naturalized” evaluative stances towards the same object exhibit 
similar polarities (e.g., only “positive” stances towards self or ideal others). 
That is, there is an active effort to control the entextualization of existing 
metastance relations so that only specific kinds of stances appear in the text-
artifact – a kind of fight against “evaluative entropy.” Unipolarity, then, is an 
additional layer in the more general process of biographic control in which 
only particular biographic contents are selected and only particular 
interpretants of one’s contents are committed to. A secondary dimension of 
unipolarity is that all stances taken by an interactant exhibit similar 
polarities (e.g., only saying “positive” things about others or the world). Such 
a tendency, too, can clearly be seen in the data, although there are specific 
functions for negative stances towards others, as was seen in section 5.4 and 
will be seen in section 6.3.4. In such cases, negative stances are secondary 
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and correspond to primary positive ones in a coherent way (e.g., if one 
desires something, then one can dislike its opposite). Explicit negativity is 
used as an aid to positive self-presentation, as it clarifies the boundaries 
between the ideal and the non-ideal. 
The unipolar model of stancetaking is linked to specific images of 
personhood. For instance, in the questionnaire data one of the respondents 
criticized the writer of text (4.5) for his “self-praise & expectations from the 
other” and also noted that he was “lacking in healthy self-criticism” (Itsekehu 
& odotukset toiselta. Myös terve itsekritiikki puuttuu [T2/17]). In contrast, 
the writer of text (4.4), who did employ negative typifications of self, was 
indeed interpreted as “honest” by many – but also as “contradictory,” 
“insecure,” or “desperate” by some, because she “mixed positive and negative 
choices of words” (positiiviset ja negatiiviset sanavalinnat sekaisin [T1/9]; 
esittää positiivisiakin ominaisuuksia, mutta – – kumoaa ne jollain tavalla 
esittämällä negatiiv. ominaisuuksia perään [T1/18]). There is, in other 
words, a risk that the signer’s and a particular interpreter’s ontologies do not 
match. For the reasons discussed above, “naturalized” stances seem to be 
more risky in this regard. As will be seen in chapter 7, the negative 
stereotypes of personhood associated with online dating advertisements in 
the metadiscourse data are often linked precisely to what is viewed as 
excessive and unfounded positive evaluation of oneself and disproportionate 
negative evaluation of others (sometimes described as characteristics such as 
“complacency” or “pickiness”). The expression of desire or appreciation as 
such (particularly when they are not understood as “expectations from the 
other”) are rarely noticed in such stereotypes. 
One way of interpreting the analyses, then, is that, for many writers, 
idealization or “self-promotion” is a stereotypic feature of online dating 
advertisements and unipolarity is a stereotypic feature of such idealization or 
“self-promotion.” Many texts, however, seem to exhibit an acute awareness of 
the problems related to unipolarity (e.g., its unidimensionality or its 
apparent conflict with models such as “honesty” or “modesty”). We saw a 
number of more or less marked ways to break or even deconstruct the norm 
(while nonetheless presuming it). As the following excerpt (5.28) crystallizes, 
there are complex contrasts between stereotypes of positivity and negativity 
and actual positive and negative stances at play on many levels:  
 
(5.28) ¶En kaipaa sixpackin omaavaa kesäkollia vaan ihmistä kumppaniksi. Siihen 
kuuluu mansikoiden ja kuohuvan lisäksi myös astianpesukoneen täyttöä. (Siis 
henkisesti. Oikeasti olen tottunut hoitamaan omat tiskini itse) 
(5.28) ¶I do not need a summerboy with a six-pack but a human for a partner. In 
addition to strawberries and sparkling wine, that also includes loading the 
dishwasher. (Mentally, that is. In reality I’m used to taking care of my dishes myself) 
 
In (5.28), the writer first rejects a particular type of person as non-ideal and 
something that she does “not need.” The description (“a summerboy with a 
Evaluative stancetaking 
198 
six-pack”) reduces the type of person to a limited set of diacritics: a well-
trained body parts and an uncommitted, careless attitude. In another context 
these might be considered positive characteristics, but here the distancing of 
them from the self and the contrast with the ideal of being “human” clearly 
marks them as non-ideal (and even non-human). We may interpret the 
description as not only the writer’s self-authored description of the type of 
person but as her caricature of the exaggerated, superficially “positive” self-
presentation of this type of person (cf. the “worm of the earth” in example 
5.22). What she, in strict contrast, is looking for is a “human for a partner.” 
The ensuing ideological formulation explains that being a “human” is itself 
divided into a balance of “festive” and “mundane” chronotopes. The order 
(“in addition to strawberries and sparkling wine, that also includes…”) 
implies that descriptions of festive imagery is what is primarily expected or 
encountered in this kind of context. Being “human(e),” however, also 
includes mundane activities such as “loading the dishwasher” – both in a 
concrete sense and as a metaphor of moods and atmospheres. There is, then, 
both an exclusive contrast (ei–vaan, “not X–but Y”) and an inclusive 
complementarity (lisäksi myös, “in addition, also”) between the “positive” 
and the “negative.” The former one distinguishes the ideal (or what is 
positive for the self) from the non-ideal (or what is “positive” for others), and 
the latter one applies within one’s own ideal (“festive” versus “mundane,” cf. 
“uniquely positive” versus “normally positive” in section 5.2.1). In a sense, 
the writer expresses a negative stance towards what some might consider 
“positive” self-presentation and a positive stance towards “mundane” things 
that in light of the presumed unipolar model might be regarded by some as 
more or less “negative.” That is, the writer is simultaneously evaluating the 
presumed stereotypes of evaluation. In some ways this is a more explicitated 
version of what seemed to be the point behind some of the performances of 
“human(e)ness” examined in 5.2.2 (i.e., allowing oneself or others to be non-
unipolarly typified). 
The underlying problem is not always so much about the balance of 
“positivity” or “negativity” as such as it is about the problematic nature of 
self-initiated and self-directed naturalized evaluation in the first place. (See 
also section 7.2.) We saw examples of attempts at source-based stancetaking, 
in which (co)-authorship and (co)-commitment is explicitly attributed to 
others (e.g., friends, family, ex-partners). Secondly, we examined 
performances that, instead, perform a particular kind of attitude towards the 
norms of the ongoing event. They manifest an awareness of the “part one is 
playing” (Goffman 1990 [1959]: 28) and imply a particular kind of (lack of) 
belief in that role. For instance, by showing, through a performance of 
“human(e)ness,” that one is aware of the game being played one may imply 
that one is only committed to it as a game or that one is only committed to 
the promotional persona in that specific world and not in all worlds. 
Performances of “revealing” or “confession” can also contribute to the 
“intimacy” of the intersubjective contact and social relation (see Goffman 
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1990 [1963]: 94, 108–110; Wilce 2009a: 171; see also 7.3).101 However, as we 
have seen, such attempts can always be interpreted in a number of ways. 
They index different social statuses and mind styles to different respondents. 
In an early pilot of the questionnaire used in this study, the writer of one of 
the then included advertisements had spent a lot of effort in rejecting all 
kinds of inaccurate and undesirable interpretations but ended up being 
bluntly interpreted by one respondent as “not really being anything” 
anymore. Sometimes the more one tries to control, the further one’s goal may 
slip away, which testifies to the indeterminate, fractionated, and distributed 
nature of social reality. 
We have now sketched a number of genre-specific models of evaluative 
stancetaking that specify who can or should say negative or positive things 
about whom and in what way. Later in chapter 7, we can compare these 
patterns to explicit metadiscourses that take place outside the actual 
advertisements and see how they relate to one another. That will provide 
additional viewpoints on the interpretation of such patterns (i.e., how others 
align themselves with promotional personae). For instance, views on how 
much positivity or selectivity a promotional persona is allowed to exhibit 
seem, indeed, to be points of conflict and contestation. As we saw, selectivity 
in the form of negative stances towards non-desired others, for instance, 
seems to be relatively common in actual practice. In part this might be 
explained by the fact that in the context of online dating advertisements one 
necessarily evaluates others more as a type of person, whereas to oneself one 
is (more of) a particular person. Chapter 6 will now take a closer look at how 
the ingredients discussed in chapters 4 and 5 are employed in relation to 
actual readers, i.e., how figures of personhood are mapped onto roles of 
participation. In such cases others are not merely described as non-present 
others-in-the-world but become explicitly addressed as alters.  
                                                 
101 The appeal of such acts of confession and hierarchies of privacy was understood on the 
American dating service OkCupid, where one of the standard questions on the profiles used to be “The 
most private thing I’m willing to admit.” The fact that in such games of confession more is not always 
better and that there is, indeed, an “art of revealing” things about oneself in an appropriate and 
effective manner is evidenced by the large number of Internet memes that consist of collections of 
strange and alarming examples of apparantely real online daters’ replies to this question. (Cf. also 
Korobov & Laplante 2013.)  
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6 ADDRESSING OTHERS  
This chapter is about how desires meet reality. It examines the different ways 
in which the symbolically figured ideal worlds discussed in chapters 4 and 5 
are mapped onto the participation frameworks of actual interactional events. 
Regardless of whether an advertisement ever leads to any subsequent 
encounters, such as e-mails or first dates, it will mediate an experience of 
social reality every time it is read. Any text is likely to address many more 
people than the writer will ever be aware of. The question then is: how do you 
make your text-artifact address others in your name? 
The chapter explores the different ways in which writers can select for 
specific types of addressees and control the interactional consequences of 
their texts. From another standpoint, the question is how the sieving of 
others into types of persons relates to the sieving of others into types of 
participants, or how the group of respondents relates to the group of 
addressees. The analytic focus will be on person reference, particularly on 
first-person and second-person person deictic elements and their modal 
cotexts, as well as such stretches of explicit metapragmatic discourse that 
denote aspects of participation. (See e.g. Jakobson 1957; Benveniste 1971: 
217–222; Silverstein 1993; Hanks 1992, 1996; Agha 1996; 2007a: 278–339; 
Goffman 1981; Stivers & Enfield & Levinson 2007; Larjavaara 2007: 316–
319.) 
The role of such emergent and genre-specific patterns of address, as one 
dimension of the management of “ideal” and “non-ideal” self-to-other 
relations, will be approached from three perspectives. The main analytic 
section (6.3) examines various types of “I”-“you” relations. They emerge from 
an interplay between deictic elements, symbolic figurements, and the 
indexical facts of participation – or the relations between specific referential 
figures and their dynamic indexical backgrounds (including, for example, 
perceptual and cognitive or corporeal and social fields) (see Hanks 1992, 
1996). Section 6.4 explores one particular, recurring genre-specific pattern 
(jos “if” clauses) that is specialized in modeling the readers’ interpretative 
processes and linking them to social-interactional consequences. Finally, 
section 6.5 looks at the modeling of self-to-other interactions beyond the 
current event or the writers’ attempts to contextualize the ongoing event as 
part of a longer semiotic chain of interactional events. 
6.1 OF “I’S” AND “YOU’S” 
The functioning of personal pronouns in discourse depends on metaindexical 
(or metapragmatic) frameworks that guide the interpretation of indexical 
signs (see Silverstein 1993; also Urban 2001). The pronoun “I,” for instance, 
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stereotypically points to the producer of the utterance containing the sign-
token.102 This stereotypic referential indexicality can easily be cancelled or 
redirected in any actual instance of use in which the sign-token appears as a 
part of a text segment consisting of an array of co-occurring signs (see e.g. 
Urban 1989; Agha 2007a: 51–52). For instance, in direct or quoted speech, 
such as “He said: ‘I will do it!’”, the “I” becomes anaphoric, i.e., co-referential 
with “he.” The matrix clause functions as a metapragmatic device that 
“reportively” calibrates the signaling event and the textualized event-
structure in relation to one another (Silverstein 1993: 49). That is, the 
indexical origo is transposed so that the one who is speaking is understood to 
voice what another self uttered previously (see e.g. Agha 2007a: 52, 324–
325). There are also forms of open or generalized reference in which any 
participant is invited to inhabit the perspective of the “I” (see e.g. Helasvuo 
2008). On the other hand, there are cases such as myth narrations in which 
the performer is understood to really inhabit the “I” of some other (e.g., by 
assuming, or being assumed by, the self of an ancestor) or theatrical 
performances in which actors inhabit the “I” of a fictive character (for more 
detailed examples, see Urban 1989; 1991; 2001: 109). If explicit verbal 
framings (such as the constructions used in reported speech) are absent, 
there are other co-present metaindexical cues that signal to interactants how 
to interpret the relation of the “I” to the utterer. 
In discursive behavior, the pronoun “I” works simultaneously at two 
different semiotic-functional levels. It is “indexical-referential” (i.e., pointing 
to a participant in the speech event) and “anaphoric” (i.e., pointing to 
symbolic co-texts) (Urban 1989: 31). It is this dual functioning of “I” that 
allows individuals to assume cultural roles and inhabit semiotic personae by 
stepping into an “I” of other selves or cultural traditions — making discourse 
“the fulcrum between self and culture, between individual and society” 
(Urban 1989: 50). The relative divergence of the two “I’s” can vary. Midway 
between “everyday” selves and strictly “fictive” ones we might situate 
narrative characters, i.e., speakers as represented by themselves as particular 
figures of personhood (“‘I’, the good father”; “‘I’, the brave cancer patient” 
etc.). A metapragmatic awareness of the functioning of the two “I’s” can also 
be linked to “depth psychological” phenomena (or reflexive subjectivity or 
selfhood), such as the interplay between the self and various ego ideals (ibid.; 
also Piers & Singer 1971 [1953]; Goffman 1990 [1963]; Markus & Nurius 
1986). It opens up a space of inner dialogue between, for instance, “real” and 
“ideal” or past and imagined future selves. As a symbolic sign, the first 
person pronoun resides with the organized web of the totality of linguistic 
symbols and cultural knowledge. As an indexical sign, it points to an 
                                                 
102 In such cases, the one speaking and the one spoken about are the same. Since speakers are part 
of their own audience too, the same person is also one spoken to. The performer, the character, and the 
audience all overlap. (See e.g. Kockelman 2013a: 177; Cf. also with the notion of self-to-self interaction 
in sections 2.1.3 and 2.3.3.) 
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individual of flesh and blood as a self-aware entity. That is, it enables the 
indexical mapping of symbolic and logical structure onto selves.  
The question of the two “I’s” relates to a more general phenomenon, 
namely, the performance of participation roles (i.e., persons seen from the 
standpoint of their relative access, entitlements, and contributions to the 
performance and construal of discourse in an interactional event) (see e.g. 
Goffman 1981; Levinson 1988; Irvine 1996). Participation roles, in turn, are 
specific kinds of social roles (i.e., persons seen from the standpoint of any 
particular status or persona). Any segmentable stretch of semiotic behavior 
can be interpreted, by participants and analysts alike, as a sign of who the 
actor is, either biographically (i.e., as a recognizable individual) or socially 
(i.e., as a type of person). Similarly, segmentable alignments between persons 
can be interpreted as signs of social relations between these persons. (See 
Agha 2005; Kockelman 2013a: 70; cf. Goffman 1981: 144.) Instead of reifying 
particular kinds of role fragments, the focus should be on the processes of 
fragmentation of participation roles and on the interplay of such processes 
with other layers of interpretation (see also Irvine 1996; cf. Levinson 1988). 
The performance of most social roles involves other layers of semiosis 
besides discursive ones. They may incorporate many forms of semiotic 
behavior, such as gesture, posture, or various appurtenances. Many of these 
signs, such as wearing a particular kind of clothing, are by nature actor-focal 
indexicals. That is, they point to and give off information about the one 
performing them. Many roles are effortlessly performed without a 
denotationally explicit, symbolic reference to the person or self they are 
about. To clarify the distinction and interplay between symbolic and non-
symbolic actor-focal indexicals, let us have a look at the 2SG counterpart of 
“I,” the “you” to which the “I” is stereotypically related. “You” – discussed 
here only as the 2SG form, “thou” – stereotypically denotes an addressed 
other self. It presupposes an established indexical contact with that other. 
The addressee can be, for instance, the previous speaker, or the one gazed or 
gestured at, the one called by name, or the one motivated by the ongoing 
action, or the one institutionally ordained. To determine who, among all 
potential candidates, the addressee is, interactants need to be able to read the 
complex semiotic co-texts in which the symbol-token is grounded (e.g., visual 
and auditory cues, interactional history, established social relations and 
knowledge of the other, cultural metapragmatic models, choice of register, 
etc.). (See e.g. Goffman 1981; Goodwin 1981, 2003; Agha 2007a.) In other 
words, entextualized pronouns explicitly model the participation framework 
by denoting participant relations, but the mapping of the denoted “I”-“you” 
relation to the ongoing event is an inferential process that requires a variety 
of indexically co-present signs. The projected symbolic model can have a 
complex, dialectic relation to the independently established and indexically 
presupposed relations between the interactants. 
Take the seeming paradox “I’m not talking to you” as an example. First, 
one has to figure out whom “I” and “you” point to. Second, what is denoted 
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obviously cannot be taken as a simple diagram of the moment of uttering 
(when the “I” is necessarily talking to the “you”), but a more complex 
inferential process (involving, for example, knowledge about the social 
statuses and mental states of the interactants) is needed to link the denoted 
model to actual consequences in the speech event. Furthermore, the 
addressee of a token of “you” might not even be any of the physically or 
virtually co-present existent individuals. Just as “I” enables persons to 
assume fictive roles, “you” can be used for fictive addressees. 
6.2 THE INTERACTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ONLINE 
DATING SERVICES 
When an online dating advertisement is being read, the reader will know that 
some real person somewhere has written the text. The writer, likewise, knows 
at the time of writing that there will eventually be some real person or 
persons reading the text, insofar as it is ever to be actualized as interpersonal 
interaction. In other words, every time an advertisement actually mediates 
an interactional event between two persons, the two interactants will be 
mutually aware of one another in a minimal sense. They are aware of each 
other’s existence – but not of each other’s biographic identity (i.e. who the 
other one is as a recognizable, individuable human being) (see Agha 2005). 
As for social and personal characteristics, the situation is asymmetrical. In 
the beginning, both interactants may have some idea of who the other one 
probably is in terms of demographic variables (such as age, sexual 
orientation, geographic location etc.), since they will normally have 
encountered one another through a search or matching function provided by 
the dating service. At the end of the encounter, however, the reader will know 
some purportedly genuine biographical facts about the writer as well as other 
characteristics (such as “views of subjectivity”), whereas the writer can never 
know anything about a particular, actual respondent before a subsequent 
interactional event (such as an e-mail reply). The writer will have modeled an 
ideal respondent, but it is the readers that align themselves with that model 
and decide whether or not there is a sufficient degree of mutual 
“compatibility” or “desirability” (or whatever other relevant reason) for a 
subsequent semiotic encounter.   
These are some of the indexical facts of participation that are established 
independently of the advertisement text. They are based on what has 
necessarily happened before the encounter mediated by the advertisement or 
what is generally known or inferable about the type of interaction. To the 
extent that actual participants are aware of such facts (e.g., based on 
inferences or genre knowledge), they form an implicit interactional structure 
that is present at every reading of an advertisement text. In addition to such 
indexical facts, there are many ways of explicitly denoting, or figuring, 
participants and their relations in the advertisement text. The texts can 
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similarly virtually model their own history and future, i.e., the ways in which 
they are related to other interactional events along semiotic chains (see Agha 
2007a: 71–73; also Irvine 1996). It is the interplay between the two 
dimensions – what is explicitly signaled in the text and what is contextually 
known – that enables the performance of a variety of different participation 
roles between the interactants (see Irvine 1996: 138–139; Hanks 1996: 176–
184). 
On the one hand, then, the interactants are actual persons of flesh and 
bone connected by a text-artifact. As described above, they already stand in 
an indexically presupposed interactional relation. On the other hand, the 
interactants appear as semiotically formulated figures in the text. As the text 
unfolds, there is a serial refigurement103 of reader-writer relations that 
continuously shapes role configurations. Section 6.3 will examine the 
cumulative effects of such processes and the different ways of relating actual 
and figured persons in order to select for a particular kind of audience. 
Tokens of 1SG and 2SG pronouns can be used to point to different semiotic 
worlds (“real” or “ideal” and actual or possible) with different kinds of 
consequences for the participation roles in the interactional event. The 
writers can, for instance, non-selectively address everyone (“you,” the actual 
reader, regardless of what kind you are) or merely the ideal subset of all 
readers (“you,” insofar as you are of a certain kind) or even a purely fictional 
figure (“You,” the man or woman of my desires). The following section 
explores such genre-specific patterns of pronoun usage and the 
metaindexical frames that guide them (see Urban 2001: 93–144; also 
Heikkinen & Lounela 2009). 
6.3 PATTERNS OF ADDRESSIVITY 
The built-in interactional structure of online dating services typically means 
that there is a kind of “many-to-many” flow of interactional events going on. 
Each advertisement may be read by many readers. Each reader usually reads 
many advertisements. Some writers also read and reply to advertisements — 
and so on. However, each advertisement is always read by one person at a 
time. That is, each encounter mediated by an advertisement sieves one 
person at a time into categories such as “desirable” or “undesirable.” From 
the standpoint of the writer, the text needs to address both the entire 
audience of anonymous readers and the limited subset of one or more ideal 
respondents that are potential objects of one’s romantic desires. How to 
handle a situation like this rhetorically? 
The most impersonal solution would be to treat others as third-person 
figures and not to explicitly address them at all. Excerpt (6.1) is from a text 
that systematically employs an “I”-“He” pattern. That is, the self is denoted 
                                                 
103 This term was suggested by Asif Agha in personal communication. 
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with 1SG inflection and the ideal other with NPs that describe social types and 
attributes of persons:  
 
(6.1) ¶Etsin vapaata aikuista miestä, jonka silmät tuikkivat iloisesti ja joka suhtautuu 
uteliaasti elämään ja sen käänteisiin. ¶Arvostan aitoutta ja odotan rehellisyyttä ja 
vastuuntuntoa. – – ¶Etsin miestä, jonka kanssa voi olla olla ystävä ja keskustella kaikesta 
maan ja taivaan väliltä, harrastaa mitä milloinkin, käydä konserteissa ja näyttelyissä 
sekä matkustella lähelle tai kauas. 
(6.1) ¶I’m looking for a free adult male, whose eyes twinkle cheerfully and who has a 
curious attitude towards life and its twists. ¶I appreciate authenticity and expect honesty 
and a sense of responsibility. – – ¶I’m looking for a man who I can be friends with and 
discuss everything between heaven and earth, take up all kinds of things, go to concerts 
and exhibitions and travel near and far. 
 
The readers are not explicitly picked out as addressees with expressions such 
as 2SG pronouns that stereotypically denote some co-present other. The sign 
configurations per se are, however, addressed (in the sense discussed in 
2.1.3) to readers in a particular manner. That is, they have been expressed for 
the sake of specific kinds of responses that the writer is committed to. The 
strategy of not directly engaging the readers leaves the readers the role of a 
kind of active, co-present onlooker and the process of sieving respondents is 
left relatively implicit in the event. 
Only a handful of texts, however, use third-person patterns exclusively 
throughout the entire text. Of the 111 texts in the data, only 17 (15 %) contain 
no second-person deictics at all.104 As the next example (6.2) illustrates, even 
the self can be denoted in the third person. Not one single text, however, 
completely lacks first-person deictics. The “I” is always explicitly present, if 
only fleetingly. Different combinations of deictic and non-deictic forms of 
person reference along the unfolding of a text, then, allow for a wide range of 
participation roles and social relations. 
Example (6.2) illustrates the division of labor between different kinds of 
self-to-other formulations. The writer initially describes himself as “a man 
from Tampere” (tamperelaismies) looking for companionship. Gradually, the 
text moves from a “He”-“Her” pattern towards an “I”-“You” pattern: 
  
(6.2) ¶Tamperelaismies haeskelee seuraa arjen aherrukseen. Toiveissa olisi [wish:PL.INE 
be:COND.PRS.3SG] löytää samoilla linjoilla oleva neitokainen, jonka kanssa jakaa elämän 
tarjoamat haasteet ja mahdollisuudet. ¶Töitteni [work:PL.1SG.POSS] puolesta olen 
                                                 
104 Even some of these texts still contain other constructions that somewhat less explicitly or 
specifically address some co-present other, such as greetings (e.g., Terve!, “Hi!”; Moikka kaikki ihanat 
urokset!, “‘Hey, all lovely males!”), questions (e.g., Miksi on niin vaikeaa löytää molemminpuolista 
rakastumista?, “Why is it so hard to find mutual love?”), or zero person constructions (jos löytyy 
halua tutustua ni en jätä kylmäks: if be_found:IND.PRS.3SG wish:PTV get_to_know then NEG.1SG 
leave:NEG.IND.PRS ᴓ cold-TRANSL, “If [you] wish to get to know [me], then I won’t leave [you] cold”). 
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[be:IND.PRS.1SG] tekemisissä tietokoneiden kanssa, joten suotavaa olisi ettet ainakaan 
kauheasti kammoaisi kyseisiä aparaatteja. – – 
(6.2) ¶A man from Tampere is seeking companionship amidst everyday toil. It is [my] 
wish to find a like-minded miss, with whom to share the challenges and opportunities 
that life offers. ¶ In my work, [I]’m involved with computers, so it would be desirable if 
you did not terribly dread these apparatuses.  – – 
 
There is, in other words, a particular pattern of focalization in the text. The 
third-person reference to a “man from Tampere” in the first sentence is 
followed by a reference to “wishes,” i.e., the subjective state of mind of some 
person. The obvious contextual inference here is that that person is as the 
man from the previous sentence. The next sentence introduces an explicit 1SG 
possessive suffix and, later, a 1SG inflectional suffix, the use of which then 
continues throughout the text. Similarly, there is a progression from 
“companionship” and “miss” to “you,” which first appears as a 2SG 
inflectional suffix and later as a full personal pronoun. That is, the narration 
breaks into the writer’s own subjectivity from the outside, through the 
particular figurement formulated in the first two sentences. The self and the 
other are first socioculturally anchored in particular kinds of roles in a 
particular type of process to which the later “I”-“you” relation corresponds. 
To deal with the dilemma of addressing a lot of anonymous people 
personally, another interactional option would be to address the respondents 
simultaneously as a group. However, the data only contains two instances of 
the 2PL personal pronoun (te), illustrated by (6.3a) and (6.3b), and two 
instances of 2PL (imperative) inflection, illustrated by (6.3c): 
 
(6.3a) ¶Katsotaas miten rehellisyys uppoaa teihin, arvon herrat:¶ 
(6.3a) ¶Let’s see how honesty goes down with you, gentlemen:¶ 
 
(6.3b) Viestini teille [you:2PL] seksiseuraa vonkaavat varatut miehet [man:NOM.PL] on: 
ole [be:IMP.2SG] mies, eroa ensin, hanki uusi seura sen jälkeen.¶ 
(6.3b) My message to you taken men angling for sex is: be a man, break up first, get a 
new partner after that.¶ 
 
(6.3c) – – elikkäs heinäkuun leijonia ollaan (ja uskon vakaasti horoskooppeihin, älkää 
naurako [NEG.IMP.2PL laugh:NEG.IMP.2PL] :D). 
(6.3c) – – so I’m a Leo of July (and I believe firmly in horoscopes, don’t laugh :D).   
 
The first writer addresses a list of her own characteristics that she treats as 
stigmatizing to the whole audience with the 2PL pronoun and an appositive 
NP (“gentlemen”).105 When she then moves on to discuss the readers’ 
                                                 
105 It is, in fact, slightly surprising that 2PL forms are not more common, since such patterns of 
address should be relatively easy to recycle from, for instance, popular or classic courtship-related 
 207 
anticipated reactions to the list she just presented, she switches to 2SG (see 
earlier example 5.13). The second writer addresses a group of non-ideal 
respondents collectively. The ideal respondent in the same text is addressed 
in 2SG. Also, in the ensuing list of imperative clauses (“be a man” etc.), she 
switches to a 1SG-to-2SG perspective. The last writer humorously anticipates 
and scolds others’ affective interpretants (i.e., laughter) towards what she has 
just revealed. All cases, then, in some sense deal with more or less 
problematic aspects of the ongoing or anticipated interactions. Although 
there are not enough cases to say anything substantial about 2SG~2PL 
variation in online dating advertisements, at least in this particular set of 
data all prototypic instances of “promotional” address of ideal others are of 
the 1SG-to-2SG type and 2PL address only occurs in contexts that are 
somehow marked (i.e., where the writers imagine themselves in relation to 
respondents that are somehow problematic either by being “non-ideal” or by 
taking a “non-ideal” stance towards the writer).106 
We have now established that the writers’ relations to the respondents are 
most of the time handled on a one-to-one basis in the data, as a dialogue 
between an “I” and a “you” (or a “thou”). However, as we have already seen, 
there are many different kinds of “you’s” that the writers can address and 
consequently many different kinds of “I”-“you” relations. 
6.3.1 “YOU” REGARDLESS OF WHAT KIND YOU ARE  
This section deals with cases in which 2SG deictics are used in non-selective 
formulations that point to whoever happens to be reading the text. That is, 
they address the actual interactants who are reading the text in any 
actualized interactional event regardless of what kinds of persons they are 
(though presupposedly they are within the predefined demographic criteria, 
such as age, gender, sexual orientation, and location). Consider first the 
beginning of text (4.5) from 4.2.2 here repeated as (6.4). The excerpt begins 
with a philosophical musing concerning the status quo of human relations in 
today’s world: 
 
(6.4) ¶Tuntuu=ko [feel:IND.PRS.3SG=Q] sinusta=kin [you:ELA.SG=PTCL], että 
nykymaailmasta olisi rakkaus vähentynyt / vähentymässä? Minusta ainakin tuntuu ja se 
                                                                                                                                          
television programs, such as Unelmien poikamies (The Bachelor) or Napakymppi (The Dating Game). 
The form used in (5.3a), for example, is something one might expect to hear often in Napakymppi. 
106 It should also be noted that the 2SG personal pronoun appears mainly in its full standard form 
sinä (over a hundred tokens in the data), which is also frequent in some regional varieties of Finnish. 
In many varieties of colloquial speech and writing, however, a predominance of the contracted variant 
sä would probably be more predictable. The advertisement text data contains only 5 tokens of sä 
(including one quote from a popular song). The corresponding contracted 1SG form mä is considerably 
more frequent (several dozens of tokens). 
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ilmenee monessa seikassa. Toivon löytäväni naisen, jonka kanssa rakkautta voisi ainakin 
paikallisesti lisätä ;) 
(6.4) ¶Do you too feel that in today’s world love has decreased / is decreasing? I at any 
rate do feel so and it can be seen in many things. I am hoping to find a woman with 
whom love could be increased at least locally ;) 
 
The 2SG pronoun is the second word-token of the entire body text (i.e., it has 
hardly any preceding discursive co-text) and is not modified syntactically 
(i.e., it is not narrowed down in terms of intension). The question is 
ostensibly addressed to any reader. That is, all readers are equally 
acknowledged as co-participants in the reflective experience mobilized by the 
question. Only later does the writer proceed to characterize the kind of ideal 
person he is looking for. This is done entirely through third-person figures 
(e.g., “a woman with whom “). The criteria of compatibility are, in a sense, 
negotiated with the actual person spoken to, whether she fulfills those 
criteria or not. 
Let us look at three more examples of non-selective address. Example 
(6.5a) opens with a greeting and a thank you (see also 5.24a). The description 
in which the 2SG deictics are embedded in the subordinate clause (“you 
opened this”) directs the greeting and the thanks at anyone who has chosen 
to open the advertisement. That is, the description applies to anyone who is 
reading it and therefore is not selective in terms of address. In (6.5b) open 
address is achieved by the initial greeting, which contains the explicitly non-
selective indefinite plural pronoun kaikki (“all”) pointing to all conceivable 
participants. The next sentence, however, begins a movement towards a 
radically more selective form of address (see sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3). 
Similarly, in (6.5c) the 2SG figure (“would you smile at me”) is grounded in 
the plural pronominal expression muut (“others”) of the previous sentence, 
which indicates that the “you” in the latter sentence is anyone from the group 
of  “(all) others.” It is also the only explicit 2SG reference in the text. That is, 
no preceding or subsequent criteria that would narrow down the address are 
set.  
 
(6.5a) ¶Hei, Kiitos kun avasit tämän lukuisten ilmoitusten joukosta. Toivo[i]nkin, että 
runsaasta valikoimasta valitsisit juuri tämän. 
(6.5a) ¶Hi, Thanks that you opened this [one] among the many ads. I [am/was] hoping 
that out of the wide selection you would choose this one.  
 
(6.5b) ¶Kaunista kesää kaikille! ¶Sattuisikohan tämä tekstini juuri sinun silmiisi.. 
¶Sinun, joka olet mukava, sosiaalinen – – Voisimmeko siis kenties olla juuri ne kaksi, 
jotka etsivät toisiaan :)? 
(6.5b) ¶Beautiful summer to all! ¶I wonder if this text of mine would happen to catch 
your (very) eyes… ¶You, who are nice, sociable – – Could we then perhaps be precisely 
those two who are looking for one another :)? 
 
 209 
(6.5c) Kiva saada aina muitakin hymyilemään, kun (ᴓ) katsoo [look-IND.PRS.3SG] (ᴓ) 
silmiin:) hymyilisitkö sinä minulle jos katsoisin silmiisi:) 
(6.5c) Nice to make others smile too, when [one] looks [them] in the eye:) would you 
smile at me if I looked into your eyes:) 
 
In the last set of examples (6.6a–d), the process of relating “ideal” or 
other selective symbolic figures of personhood to actual respondents is itself 
more or less explicitly denoted in the text and addressed to all readers. The 
examples are analyzed in terms of the more specific type of stance they take 
towards that relation. There are, for instance, interrogative structures that 
ask the addressee (i.e., any respondent) whether they match the writer’s 
ideal (“Are you [= whoever is reading] a nice-looking well-groomed single 
man from the capital region [= the writer’s ideal]”). There are also 
conditional structures (“If you, whoever you are, are [IDEAL], then…”), 
exemplary or illustrative structures (“You, whoever you are, might, for 
example, be [IDEAL]…”), and evaluated structures (“Should you, whoever you 
are, be [IDEAL], that would be [EVALUATION]”). The evaluation can relate more 
specifically, for instance, to feelings (affect), social appropriateness 
(judgement), or esteem or social worth (appreciation) (see e.g. Martin & 
White 2005: 45 and chapter 5). (See also example 5.8 for a “desiderative” 
case: “I would wish that you, whoever you are, would be [IDEAL].”) 
  
(6.6a) [Interrogative] ¶Olet=ko [be:IND.PRS.2SG=Q] kivannäköinen itsestäsi huolta pitävä 
sinkkumies pääkaupunkiseudulta? 
(6.6a) [Interrogative] ¶Are you a nice-looking well-groomed single man from the capital 
region? 
 
(6.6b) [Conditional] ¶Jos olet etsimäni henkilö, olet siis nainen, ikää voisi olla luokkaa 
25–30 vuotta. 
(6.6b) [Conditional] ¶If you are the person I’m looking for, then you are a woman, you 
could be aged around 25-30 years. 
 
(6.6c) [Evaluated: affect] ¶Olisin [be:COND.PRS.1SG] iloinen, jos sinä olisit 
[be:COND.PRS.2SG] kaltaiseni romantikko, joka pitää myös koti-illoista ja mökkireissuista. 
(6.6c) [Evaluated: affect] ¶I would be glad if you were a romantic like me who also likes 
evenings at home and trips to the cabin. 
 
(6.6d) [Evaluated: judgement] ¶Hyvä alku olisi [be:COND.PRS.3SG], että et tarvitsisi 
[need:COND.PRS.2SG.NEG] minua, vaan haluaisit [want:COND.PRS.2SG] minut. [Evaluated: 
appreciation] Mahdottoman hienoa on [be:IND.PRS.3SG], jos osaat [can:IND.PRS.2SG] 
asennoitua elämään siten, että osaat [can:IND.PRS.2SG] olla tosissasi olematta 
vakavissasi. 
(6.6d) [Evaluated: judgement] ¶A good beginning would be that you didn’t need me but 
wanted me. [Evaluated: appreciation] It is truly wonderful if you can take life so that you 
can be earnest without being serious. 
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(6.6e) [Illustrative] Voisit olla [can:COND.PRS.2SG be] hieman määrätietoinen, 
johdonmukainen, nuorenoloinen ja tempperamenttinen hieman. [Evaluated: 
judgement] Olisi suotavaa myöskin että tulisit hyvin toimeen ihmisten kanssa. 
[Unmarked] Olet myös mukava kaikintavoin oleva nuori mies. 
(6.6e) [Illustrative] You might be a bit determined, consistent, youthful and 
temperamental a bit [sic]. [Evaluated: judgement] It would be appropriate also that you 
would get along well with people. [Unmarked] You are also a young man who is nice in 
every way. 
 
The previous examples, then, illustrate more specific modes of 
correspondence between actual persons and figured ideals. In these 
examples, such modes are explicitly denoted and addressed to respondents. 
As we can see, different modes can appear in varying combinations. They 
may also “prosodically” extend to subsequent unmarked stretches of text (see 
e.g. the last sentence of 6.6e). On the other hand, the texts can gradually slide 
towards more selective criteria (see e.g. 6.5b). The next section will discuss 
patterns of addressivity in which selectivity for addressees and selectivity for 
ideal persons are interwoven more tightly. 
6.3.2 “YOU” INSOFAR AS YOU ARE OF A CERTAIN KIND 
This section discusses utterances that cannot be construed as addressing 
whoever happens to be reading the text. Only a particular kind of person is 
able to appropriately and effectively inhabit the role projected by the 2SG 
deictics in their co-texts. Who exactly is being addressed, and in what kind of 
act, is often a matter of complex contextual inferences. In excerpt (6.7), for 
instance, the writer starts describing in explicit detail the mental and verbal 
capabilities and biographic facts of the person addressed as “you”:  
 
(6.7) Negatiivinen asenne vie ilon elämästä. Osaat asettaa selvät rajat ja avoimesti 
keskustella arjen aiheista. Olet jo työurallasi pitkällä ja et uhraa jokaista päivää työllesi 
vaan osaat nautti[a] elämästä!  
(6.7) A negative attitude takes the joy out of life. You are able to set clear limits and 
openly discuss everyday topics. You have advanced far in your career and do not devote 
every day to work but know how to enjoy life!  
 
The descriptions are embodied in a declarative sentence set in the indicative 
mood. That is, in terms of stereotypic morphosyntax, they are presented as 
factual. From the standpoint of any actual reader, however, the denotata are 
things that the writer can have no knowledge of, access to, or control over, 
not to mention the fact that they are far too specific to apply to all readers. A 
logical interpretation is that they, in fact, point to the writer’s ideal 
respondent. That is, the denoted figure of personhood consists of 
characteristics that the writer can only imagine, desire, and expect from 
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others. The specific mode of correspondence between the ideal and the actual 
person is left relatively implicit, and the utterance is directly addressed only 
to those who match the ideal. 
Any social relation mediated by a semiotic encounter consists of a number 
of more specific constituents, one of which is the cognitive and epistemic 
symmetry between the participants (see Goffman 1983: 4). In the example 
above, there is a tension between the writer’s epistemic stance (what the 
writer more or less explicitly claims to know) and the writer’s epistemic 
status (knowledge about the writer’s access and rights to knowledge) (see e.g. 
Heritage 2012; 2013). To rephrase this in the terminology used in chapter 5, 
such epistemic statuses point to a particular subset of metastance relations 
(e.g., others’ stances towards someone’s knowledge; knowledge about what 
someone could or should know, etc.) (see also Kockelman 2004). The tension 
in metastance relations in the above example functions as a metaindex that 
redirects the “you” to a particular semiotic figure (i.e., the “ideal” other) and 
contributes to a particular act of addressivity (i.e., only acknowledging “ideal” 
others with one’s speech). We can see, then, that epistemic performances 
both depend on and contribute to the personae the interactants currently 
inhabit. The kind of performance seen in (6.7), for instance, is possible 
because the writer is allowed to and intends to inhabit a “promotional” 
persona. An epistemic status, then, is not only dependent on the knowledge 
that some biographic individuals have but also on cultural modes of 
personhood with associated entitlements and commitments to use 
knowledge in particular ways to achieve particular ends. 
The “ideal” audience segment that the writer addresses does not exist 
before the act of addressing. The example above is a performative act that 
creates an interactional asymmetry among the respondents. It creates a 
divide between addressees and onlookers. Explicitly, the writer is only 
acknowledging the “ideal” respondents. However, not acknowledging 
someone is often a relatively perceivable act as well. Implicitly, the “you” also 
points to those who are excluded by the symbolic co-text. There is, then, a 
kind of “shadow” address of the “non-ideal” respondents (implying that “I 
am talking to those people, not you”) (cf. Irvine 1996). The cumulative serial 
refigurement of “I”-“you” relations (e.g., many cases like 6.7 over longer 
stretches of text) has the effect of gradually pushing respondents off the role 
of an addressed, ideal respondent and ratified replier to the role of non-
addressed, non-ideal respondent. In other words, the epistemic performance 
is an ingredient in a performance of interpersonal power and control. 
Example (6.8) represents, in a sense, a deontic parallel to the previous 
epistemic case. Here the description of the addressed other gets a directive-
like or request-like tone from the clitic particle -han added to the predicate:  
 
(6.8) 
¶Olethan                       sinut       itsesi       kanssa, onnellinen yksin=kin,  
be:IND.PRS.2SG=PTCL 2SG:ACC  yourself  with        happy         alone=too 
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arvostat   elämän arkeen=kin      kuuluvia  asioita,  
appreciate:IND.PRS.2SG life:GEN everyday=too belong:PTCP.PTV.PL thing:PTV.PL 
 
osaat                nauttia  läheisyydestä,      nautit                        aikaan saamisesta  
know:IND.PRS.2SG enjoy      intimacy:ELA        enjoy:IND.PRS.2SG  accomplishing:ELA  
 
ja tekemisestä, ja edelleenkin tutkit maailmaa ihmeellisenä paikkana etkä pidä elämääsi 
jo valmiina omassa uomassaan kulkevana.  
 
(6.8) 
¶[I hope/request/expect that] you are familiar with yourself, happy alone too, you 
appreciate even everyday things in life, you know how to enjoy intimacy, you enjoy 
accomplishing and doing things, and you still explore the world as a wondrous place and 
do not regard your life as already ready-made in its track.  
 
In its typical uses, the particle -han appeals in one way or another to the 
reasoning processes of an other (e.g. reminding of presupposed shared 
knowledge or goals or expressing a sense of pondering) (see e.g. Hakulinen 
1976; Carlson 1993: 79; VISK § 830). In the co-text above, the total effect of 
the particle might be approximated as something like “I hope/request/expect 
that you make sure you are [IDEAL].”107 But how to interpret a directive that 
contains such detailed denotational information but is addressed to an 
unknown, anonymous person? The only things that the writer can 
realistically control, or has deontic authority over, is the kind of respondent 
who is 1) ratified as an addressee, 2) authorized to reply and 3) whose 
communicative efforts will, in turn, be reciprocated by the writer. That is, the 
respondents are invited to participate in the evaluation of the relation of the 
entextualized figures to the actual participant in the event of speech (PtEt/Ps) 
but requested to comply with the ideal figure of personhood, insofar as they 
wish to appropriately and effectively inhabit the role of addressee or replier. 
The following example is otherwise similar but shows a more explicit 
orientation to the respondents’ subsequent actions after the ongoing 
encounter (nth). It contains an explicit reference to the reader’s reply (“your 
message”) (n+1th) combined with a predicate that expresses the writer’s 
future-oriented commitment (“I promise to be”), which implies an even 
further subsequent encounter, such as the writer’s reply to the reader’s 
message (n+2th) or a first date (n+xth): 
 
(6.9) 
Olet=han   luotettava ja avoin,  minä lupaan  
be:IND.PRS.2SG=PTCL  reliable  and open  1SG promise:IND.PRS.1SG  
                                                 
107 It is noteworthy that in the English translation the mode of correspondence between the ideal 
figure and the actual person has to be more explicitly denoted with, for example, some CTP 
construction. The translation, in some sense, is closer to the kinds of cases examined in section 6.3.1.   
 213 
 
olla viestisi   arvoinen.¶ 
be  message:2SG.POSS  worthy 
 
(6.9) 
[I hope/request/expect that] you are reliable and open, I promise to be worthy of your 
message. 
 
The actual respondent (Ps) of the ongoing speech event (Es) (i.e., the reader 
reading the advertisement) is, then, modeled in the entextualized event (PtEt) 
already as a replier in a subsequent interactional event (Ps+1Es+1). That is, the 
respondent is addressed with reference to a future event (“should you write 
to me, I request you to make sure that you are like my ideal”). The 
correspondence of the ideal figure to the actual respondent is seen by the 
writer as relevant only in relation to subsequent interactional phases.  
Let us now take up a different kind of deontic case, which allows us to link 
the concerns of this chapter with some of the themes discussed in chapter 5. 
In the following example, the writer formulates a deontic obligation for the 
addressed other by using a construction that includes the copula, the noun 
pakko (“must”), and an infinitive. This formulation allows the writer to use 
the abbreviation ns. (abbreviated from niin sanotusti, “so to speak”) before 
the noun “must”: 
 
(6.10) 
¶Luonteestasi olisi      ns.    pakko  löytyä  seuraavia  
personality:ELA.2SG.POSS be:COND.PRS.3SG ABBR must be_found:INF following 
 
luonteenpiirteitä:  Asiallinen, reilu, fiksu, hyväkäytöksinen, – – 
characteristic:PTV.PL decent, fair, smart, well-behaved 
 
(6.10) 
Your personality, so to speak, must include the following characteristics: Decent, fair, 
smart, well-behaved, – –  
 
The abbreviation frames the expression of obligation as a recognizably 
conventional or habitual act in such contexts. The combination of the 
abbreviation and the conditional mood (olisi) distinguishes the speech event, 
the commitment event, and the deontic event to a degree from one another. 
That is, the writer’s commitment to the obligation is relativized as applying 
only under particular conditions, and the writer is relatively distanced from 
the source of the deontic obligation (cf. section 5.2.2). Such relativizing 
indices suggest that the writer is merely animating the kinds of discursive 
and social patterns that are expected in an event like this. She commits to the 
addressed demands only under a particular persona. At the same time, then, 
the relativizing indices implicitly point to another set of social relations 
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outside the ones being performed right now. Just as the formulation splits 
the audience in two (i.e., into those who can comply with the obligation and 
therefore can inhabit the role of addressee and into those who cannot), it also 
implicitly splits the writer in two (i.e., into the one who is committed to 
enforcing the obligation and into the one who is not). There are 
simultaneously more explicitly figured and more implicit (or “shadow”) 
relations between the writer and readers.  
To illustrate the interplay between different kinds of “I”-“you” relations 
and the various combinations and hierarchical patterns they enable, let us 
consider the following example: 
 
(6.11) 
Minusta saat                       erityisen   uskollisen kumppanin. 
1SG:ELA   get:IND.PRS.2SG especially faithful       companion 
 
¶Haluan                 löytää miehen,  joka on suurin piirtein ikäiseni, 
want:IND.PRS.1SG find     man:GEN who  is  approximately aged:1SG.POSS 
 
kykenevä keskustelemaan, joka on uskollinen ja   rehellinen – – 
able           converse:INF     who  is  faithful      and honest 
 
¶Olet                   kiltti ja    huomaavainen, todellinen herrasmies. – –  
be:IND.PRS.2SG kind and considerate         true             gentleman 
  
[O]saat                    hymyillä valloittavasti, pukeudut                hyvin – – 
know:IND.PRS.2SG smile       charmingly,     dress:IND.PRS.2SG well 
 
¶Ehkä  suhtaudut             elämään  hieman huvittuneesti ja  
Maybe view:IND.PRS.2SG life:ILL     slightly amusedly        and 
 
olet  kenties   nähnyt                   sen  nurjemman=kin     puolen. – – 
AUX  perhaps see:IND.PERF.2SG its   reverse:COMP=too  side 
 
(6.11) 
You will get an especially faithful companion of me.  ¶I want to find a man who is 
approximately my age, able to have a conversation, who is faithful and honest – – ¶You 
are kind and considerate, a true gentleman. – – You know how to smile charmingly, you 
dress well – – ¶Maybe you view life with a slight amusement and perhaps you have seen 
its uglier side too. – – 
 
The first sentence in the excerpt is the first explicit 2SG reference in the text. 
It is of the non-selective kind discussed in section 6.3.1. It is, however, special 
in the sense that it turns around the typical self-to-other orientation into a 
kind of other-to-self approach (see also 6.3.5). It represents a process of 
transformation of the “I” into something beneficial (a “faithful companion”) 
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in the life of the “you” (for the clause type, see VISK § 904). Syntactically 
speaking, the 1SG pronoun is an adverbial in the clause and the 2SG inflection 
occupies the subject position, but the 1SG pronoun remains in the theme 
position. That is, the topic is still the self, but it is approached from the 
perspective of the addressee. In such a formulation the question of 
participation roles becomes not so much whether a particular respondent is 
able to inhabit the role of addressee but whether he wishes to do so. The 
balance of agency shifts towards the respondent. Next, the writer describes 
with a CTP her desire to find a particular kind of ideal person, who is 
described in a third-person formulation (“a man that…”). That is, at this 
point, the addressee and the ideal other are separate figures. Implicitly, the 
second sentence begins to narrow the segment of addressees. Then, in the 
third sentence of the excerpt, there is a move to explicitly selective address of 
the kind discussed in this section. At this point, the writer is only addressing 
those who match the ideal. The “you” here, then, is different from the “you” 
in the first sentence. Some earlier addressees may still be able to inhabit the 
more narrowly defined role; others may have been sieved off. 
Finally, in the last sentence, the writer switches into a new kind of address 
(that will lead us to the concerns of the next section 6.3.3). She begins to 
conjecture about things that “perhaps” pertain or “may” pertain to the ideal 
addressee. That is, such formulations no longer narrow access to the role of 
addressee. Rather, the criteria are now fixed, and the writer is merely 
speculating about optional characteristics or illustrating ideal possibilities 
(cf. 6.3.1). Let us take a look at another example from a different text: 
 
(6.12) Työelämässä olet kaiketi kunnianhimoinen, mutta työ ei ole koko elämäsi. 
(6.12) In working life you are probably ambitious, but work is not your whole life. 
 
Both (6.11) and (6.12) combine an epistemic certainty (i.e., the addressee is 
presumed to be an existant person with certain required characteristics) with 
epistemic uncertainty (i.e., wondering or guessing what the addressee is like 
more specifically). These epistemic stances have deontic and evaluative 
implications: saying “you probably are (ambitious)” can be interpreted as 
implying that “you are allowed to not be (ambitious) although that would be 
preferred.” Nevertheless, in cases like this, the ideal other appears both (a) as 
a specified type of person that the writer has total epistemic and deontic 
control over and (b) as an actual person somewhere out there who 
instantiates the ideal type but also has singular characteristics that the writer 
does not know but can guess, conjecture and evaluate. That is, in example 
(6.11), those addressees who make it thus far, become secured in their role of 
addressee and become the object of a game of guessing and conjecture 
concerning their more personal and unique characteristics. 
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6.3.3 A FICTIVE “YOU” AS THE ADDRESSEE 
Further along on the continuum of gradually narrowing address, we have 
cases in which the writer seemingly addresses as “you” – or “You” – only one 
specific person. One of the recurring ways to do it is to use the Finnish 
adverb juuri (“precisely,” “specifically,” “the very [one],” “just the [right 
one]”) as in the first example: 
 
(6.13) 
¶Rankka suhde          takana   ja  jälleen yritän                   päästä    
  rough  relationship behind and again try:IND.PRS.1SG  get:INF  
 
jaloilleni.                     Siihen    tarvitsen                 juuri Sinua. 
foot:PL.ALL.1SG.POSS that:ILL need:IND.PRS.1SG ADV    You:PTV 
 
(6.13) 
I have a rough relationship behind [me] and I’m trying to get on my feet again. For that I 
need You, of all people. 
 
The adverb juuri (“precisely”) and the capitalized 2SG pronoun (Sinä) imply 
that the ideal other, whom the writer is looking for, is specifically the 
addressee. The indexical fact, however, remains that there are numerous 
actual respondents and the writer is not aware of their biographic identities. 
This tension, then, points towards the interpretation that the writer is, in 
fact, not directly addressing actual respondents at all but an imagined ideal 
person in a kind of dramatized dialogue. Similar forms of address are, of 
course, a familiar convention from literature and popular culture. 
The following examples emphasize the process of locating that specific 
individual within the world. Both of the examples below simultaneously 
employ or imply both a “You” that points to the ideal individual and a “you” 
that points to the actual respondent of the ongoing interactional event and 
link the two with one another: 
 
(6.14a) ¶Hei! En ole onnistunut vielä löytämään Sinua vaikka olen maailmaa kiertänyt. 
Löytyisitkö sitten täältä, vain me voimme ottaa siitä selvää? 
(6.14a) ¶Hi! I have not yet succeeded in finding You although I have been around the 
world. Could you be found here then, only we can find that out? 
 
(6.14b) 
[Title] Huhuilen                      ja     etsin..                    ¶Olet=ko                 
             call_out:IND.PRS.1SG and seek:IND.PRS.1SG   be:IND.PRS.2SG=Q 
 
se sinä, joka et             ole           vielä tullut                           minua  vastaan,  
it  you   who  NEG:2SG AUX:NEG yet   come:IND.PERF.2SG 1SG:PTV against 
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vaikka      tiedän,                    että olet                       siellä jossakin..?  
although know:IND.PRS.1SG that be:IND.PRS.2SG there somewhere  
 
¶Tiedän,                   että olet                       noin   32-38-vuotias   vapaa 
  know:IND.PRS.1SG that be:IND.PRS.2SG about              year-old free 
  
suomalainen mies. Olet huumorintajuinen, hauska, puhelias, – – 
Finnsih           man    
 
(6.14b) [Title] I’m calling out and looking for... ¶Are you the one who I have not yet met 
although I know that you are out there somewhere..? ¶I know that you are about 32–38-
year-old free Finnish man. You are humorous, funny, talkative, – – 
 
In (6.14a) the first “You” points to the ideal person the writer has been 
looking for previously and in many places (see also 4.7b). The following 
sentence links the process of seeking one’s ideal companion to what is going 
on “here,” in the ongoing event. The ideal “You” that the 2SG deictics point to, 
then, is different from the “you” embedded in the 1PL pronoun (i.e., “we” = 
actual “I” + actual “you” in this event “here”). The opening sentence of 
(6.14b) (“Are you the one who I have not yet met although I know that you 
are out there somewhere”) in some sense it asks if “you are You.” That is, the 
2SG indices in the main clause (“Are you the one”) and the subordinate 
clauses (“I know that you are out there somewhere”) point to different 
objects (the actual respondent and the ideal individual respectively). The 
writer presumes the existence of an individual (“you are out there 
somewhere”), whom she has not located yet. Whether or not the actual 
reader could be that ideal individual is what is being investigated by the 
sentence and by the entire online dating event. The sentence, then, is a kind 
of metapragmatic icon of the entire ongoing activity. The latter sentences 
address the fictive, ideal person that the writer “knows” to be “somewhere 
out there” with particular characteristics.  
Most of the examples we have seen so far in the previous chapters have 
formulated idealized types of persons (or icons of personhood) that can be 
calibrated to actual respondents to see whether they match the ideal type. 
What is common to the examples in this section, in contrast, is that they 
address one specific individual that is presumed to be “out there” but whose 
definite identity or specific whereabouts the writers are not fully aware of. 
That is, such a model of address indexically presupposes the existence of an 
individual (in the sense discussed in 2.1.3) who embodies the ideal. The 
individual is “fictive” in the sense that there is no relation to any actually 
existent person (yet). In such forms of address, then, ideal personhood is 
oriented to in terms of an ideal individual (who exists or could exist) rather 
than in terms of ideal kinds and indices (that existent individuals can have to 
various degrees). In such cases, instead of being a token of an ideal type of 
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person, an actual respondent can be (sufficiently similar to) the ideal 
individual. 
It is noteworthy that some examples that employ this type of address 
undertake various poetic or aesthetic efforts or forms of dramatization. In 
fact, the whole model of “fictive” address might be seen as as a form of 
dramatization. Instead of, say, a “realistic” cultural model of courtship (in 
which one is oriented to delineating an ideal subset of dateable candidates), 
such patterns of address presume a “romantic” ontology, according to which 
there is one and only one special person for everyone (e.g., se oikea, “the 
right one; Mr./Ms. Right,” n=9). Some examples include segments that have 
been borrowed from sources that characteristically take similar perspectives 
on reality, such as pop songs or literary fiction (see also section 4.4.5). In 
examples (6.15a) and (6.15b), there is a recognizable108 interdiscursive link to 
the genre of pop songs and its stereotypes of pronoun usage: 
 
(6.15a) Kahden toisilleen vieraan ihmisen kohtaamisessa kemioiden yhteensopivuus tai 
joku seikka ulkoisessa olemuksessa voi heti aikaansaada mukavan huomion: se jokin 
Sinulla on.... ¶  
(6.15a) In an encounter between two persons unfamiliar to one another the compatibility 
of chemistries or some trait in outward appearance may instantly bring about a nice 
observation: You’ve got that something… 
 
(6.15b) ¶”Jos Sua ei ois ollut, olisin keksinyt sut. Ois susta samanlainen tullut, mitään en 
ois muuttanut” Ilmoita toki itsestäsi, muuten en tiijä missä oot:) [Text ends] 
(6.15b) ¶If You hadn’t existed, I would have invented you. You would have become the 
same, nothing would I have changed” Please do let me know about yourself, otherwise I 
won’t know where you are:) [Text ends] 
 
Both examples recontextualize a pattern of address from pop songs into the 
dating advertisement genre. In such cases the “fictiveness” of the addressee 
seems even more obvious. In the metaindexical frame of pop songs there is 
no expectation that the object of a token of “you” actually exists in the realm 
of the physical world. That is, 1SG and 2SG deictic elements do not, by default, 
point to events of performance but only to the fictive narrated worlds. 
However, when such a pattern of address is recontextualized in an online 
dating advertisement, it has to be inferentially re-mapped to the 
metaindexical and participatory frames of the ongoing event by the 
respondents (e.g., whether such quoted pronouns have a pointing function at 
all in the speech event; whether the object is the reader or a fictive addressee; 
how actual respondents should align to the fictive addressee). Such 
inferences also depend on how the function of the intertextual reference itself 
                                                 
108 Example (6.15a) refers to Ronny and The Loafers’ “Se jokin sinulla on” (1964) (a cover of Gerry 
& The Pacemakers’ “You’ve Got What I Like”) and example (6.15b) to Kaija Koo’s “Jos sua ei ois ollut” 
(2000). 
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is interpreted (see also section 4.4.5). One might suggest that such quotes are 
distancing, poetic reflections on the general nature of dating advertisements 
and courtship. Moreover, dating advertisements are much like pop songs in 
the sense that “You” and “I” are generalized and idealized performances 
somehow relatable to real life through complex inferential and even 
metaphoric processes. 
The cases discussed in this section represent the other extreme of the 
continuum we have been looking at. Despite the immediate stereotypic 
capacity of 2SG pronouns to point to whoever encounters them, no actual 
respondent can entirely plausibly inhabit the role of addressee in these cases, 
when the discursive co-text and sociocultural context is taken into account. 
Whereas in the most non-selective type of address discussed in section 6.3.1 
all respondents were addressed equally, in this type all respondents are 
equally excluded. It is not used to select a subset of addressees out of all 
respondents. Rather, it is more like a simulated dialogue with a fictive figure 
that the actual respondents are invited to follow (cf. also Hanks 1996: 259–
260). In a sense, as we move along the continuum, the actual respondents 
become more and more depersonified and the writer’s ideals and desires 
more and more personified. 
6.3.4 “YOU” AS NON-IDEAL 
Finally, there is an altogether different type of address in which the focus of 
address shifts from the usual target, ideal respondents, to non-ideal 
respondents. As was seen in the previous sections, their destiny is usually to 
be effaced from the interactional event. Some exceptions, however, are found 
in the data. Occasionally the writers address in explicitly negative terms 
persons that represent undesirable social types: 
 
(6.16) ¶Viimeisin asia maailmassa mistä olen kiinnostunut on varattujen miesten 
viihdyttäminen. Jos olet varattu tai olet näitä- laitan avioeron juuri vireille miehiä, älä 
missään nimessä edes harkitse vastaamista. Viestini teille seksiseuraa vonkaavat varatut 
miehet on: ole mies, eroa ensin, hanki uusi seura sen jälkeen.¶ 
(6.16) ¶The last thing in the world that I’m interested in is entertaining taken men. If you 
are taken or one of these- I’m about to file for divorce men, do not on any account even 
consider replying. My message to you taken men angling for sex is: be a man, break up 
first, get a new partner after that.¶ 
 
Cases like this are related to rejections of unwanted interpretations examined 
in 5.4. In cases like (6.16), however, the writers orient to types of non-desired 
persons whom they wish to exclude from the group of ratified respondents 
altogether (i.e., rejecting individuals instead of kinds or indices). In (6.16), 
the writer first formulates the basis of the exclusion of a type of respondent 
as a general principle in third-person terms, which is then followed by 2SG 
address and finally widened into a 2PL address (which was already discussed 
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in the beginning of section 6.3). The direct 2SG address serves to maximize 
the effect of such disjunctures between selves and undesirable others.  
An inverse kind of non-ideal addressee is someone who regards the writer 
as non-ideal.  In example (6.17), the writer imagines herself as undesirable, 
and her self-promotion as unsuccessful, from the perspective of the 
addressee: 
  
(6.17) Ja, jos nyt sitten kuitenkin kävi niin, etten onnistunut herättämään 
mielenkiintoasi, niin hei, onneksesi maailmassa on naisia enemmän kuin puolet. Onnea 
etsintään. 
(6.17) And, if it so happened that I didn’t succeed in raising your interest, well hey, 
luckily more than half of the people in the world are women. Good luck for the search. 
 
From the writer’s standpoint, the respondent is not necessarily non-ideal as a 
person but merely as a respondent. Perhaps precisely because of that, in 
strict contrast to example (6.16), the respondent is not addressed with the 
purpose of harsh rejection but, rather, to acknowledge him and to write him 
off as a ratified interactant, even wishing him luck in subsequent interactions 
with others. (For the most part this analysis applies even if one interprets the 
writer’s comment as sarcastic.) The contrast between the two cases, then, 
goes to show that non-ideality and interpersonal conflict can be managed in 
highly different tones with different patterns of addressivity. In part, the 
choice of direct address in cases of potential interpersonal conflict may be 
facilitated by the anonymity of the encounter as well as the presumed right of 
the “promotional” persona to be highly selective (see also e.g. sections 5.1.2, 
5.6 and 7.2). 
6.3.5 WHAT ABOUT “WE” AND “I”? 
In a conceptual sense, the idea of “we” or “us” is prominently linked to the 
activity type of online dating, as the stereotypic goal is to accomplish a 
sustained romantic relationship with some other (i.e., a social relation that 
can be referred to as “we” in two ways, as “I” + “him”/”her” in outgroup 
settings and “I” + “you” in ingroup settings). It also figures prominently in 
conventional cultural discourses related to dating and relationships, 
including the advertisements themselves (e.g. Olisihan se kieltämättä 
mukavaa jos voisi alkaa jonain päivänä puhumaan meistä eikä aina musta, 
“It would admittedly be nice if [one] could some day start talking about us 
and not always about me”) (see also Muikku-Werner 2009: 159–161). That is, 
the pronoun itself has become a stereotypic emblem of a particular (Western) 
kind of romantic relationship. Actual tokens of inclusive 1PL deictics, forms 
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that specifically point to the writer and some addressed other (“I” + “you”), 
are, however, not very frequent in the advertisement text data (n<40).109  
As has been seen in passing in previous examples (see e.g. 4.14, 6.14a), 1PL 
deictics can point either to the actual interactants in the ongoing 
interactional event or more selectively to ideal figures. A particularly relevant 
type of usage relates to the addressing of chronotopic scenery to respondents. 
In examples like (6.18), the writer models the ideal self and ideal other as 
already dating or in a relationship (i.e., “I” and “you” as “we” would or should 
be in “our” relationship): 
 
(6.18) ¶Minulle riittää pääasiassa ihan hyvin se, että käy kävelemässä ulkona, välillä 
katsomassa kirahveja Korkeasaaressa ja se, että välillä voimme [can:IND.PRS.1PL] auttaa 
toisiamme miten milloinkin. Jos olet loukkaantunut onnettomuudessa, voin tulla 
katsomaan sinua sairaalaan ja tuoda omenapiirakkaa. 
(6.18) ¶In principle it suffices quite well for me that one goes out for a walk, sometimes 
going to see the giraffes at Korkeasaari [a Zoo in Helsinki] and that every now and then 
we can help each other in different ways. If you’ve got injured in an accident, I can come 
and see you in the hospital and bring apple pie. 
 
Cases like this link “proposed” characteristics (discussed in 4.1.1) with 
addressivity. To be effective, “proposed” characteristics require other’s co-
operation and commitment to the chronotopic imagery. That is, they 
distribute the characteristic between the self and others and assign more 
agency to respondents than, for example, “described” characteristics or 
requirements. Cases like (6.18) address “proposed” characterics personally to 
respondents. In addition to commitment and co-operation then, in order to 
be effective, they also require the respondent’s willingness to inhabit the 
proposed role of addressee (cf. also example 6.11). 
In the cases examined in sections 6.3.1–6.3.3 the focus was heavily on the 
addressee. The use of “we” highlights the “I”-“you” relation and construes 
that relation as a connection rather than a disjuncture. It also brings the 
addressor more clearly as a figure on the stage. That is, it distributes the 
focus of attention to both to the addressor and the addressee. The latter part 
of this section makes a few more observations about such less frequent 
patterns in which the explicit focus turns more on the “I” and the “you” 
becomes a relatively indirect addressee.110 The following two examples (6.19) 
                                                 
109 All sorts of general and idiomatic formulations, such as “As we know,” “We all have our 
traumas,” or “We only live once,” have been excluded from the count, although technically they can be 
construed as inclusive too (“I” + “you” + everyone else). 
110 In many ways, cases like this are akin to the kinds of internal fractionation of the writer that has 
already been dealt with extensively in previous chapters (particularly from the standpoint of managing 
the relation between “real” and “ideal” personae). That is, the writer is split into the animator, the 
author, and various principal personae, from which others can be addressed (or in which any forms of 
addressivity are grounded). We have also touched upon (e.g., in chapter 1) the idea that the texts are 
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and (6.20) are from the same text, which suggests that they might be part of 
a relatively intentional strategy of using unusual patterns of addressivity. In 
previous examples, we have seen patterns of focalization that gradually move 
from a 3SG perspective to a 1SG perspective. The following example, in 
contrast, employs a reverse technique, a sort of “3SG-ization” of 1SG (cf. also 
example 4.29): 
 
(6.19) 
¶Minä lyhyesti: Polttaa  tupakkaa,              juo             ajoittain  
 I           briefly:    smoke:IND.PRS.3SG  cigarette:PTV.SG drink:IND.PRS.3SG sometimes  
 
itsensä       humalaan     ja     kiroilee=kin. – – 
self:POSS.3SG drunkenness:ILL.SG and  swear:IND.PRS.3SG=PTCL 
 
¶Edellisistä         huolimatta olen                      kiva kaveri,  
previous:ELA.PL despite         be:IND.PRS.1SG nice guy  
 
mahdottoman hauska, romanttinen höpsö sekä miehekäs mörri ja ihan tajuton 
rakastaja. 
 
(6.19) 
¶I briefly: Smokes cigarettes, gets drunk from time to time, and even swears. – –
¶Despite the previous I’m a nice guy, terribly funny, a romantic fool and masculine and 
an insanely good lover. 
 
The interplay of three elements is of interest here: 1) the 1SG pronoun (minä) 
as a deictic element that stereotypically points to the animator, 2) the way it 
is textually used as a third-person figure by superimposing 3SG verbal 
inflection on it, and 3) the writer as the animator of the entire sign pattern. 
In the first sentence, the writer does not fully inhabit the “I” but merely 
characterizes it as a third-person figure. That is, the symbolic figure is 
distinguished and displaced to a degree from the self as the animator. Such a 
third-person perspective is used in a particular kind of act: to present a list of 
characteristics oriented to as potentially non-ideal. Later, when describing 
ideal characteristics, the writer does fully inhabit the 1SG figure (“I’m…”). The 
writer’s commitment to the ideal figure, then, is different from his 
commitment to the previous “realistic” one. The first figure is displaced 
farther from the self than the latter one. That is, they both point to the self 
but at different distances. The first figure, in a sense, reduces the writer into 
an outside observer of himself. Both the writer and the readers share the 
same viewpoint and look at the figure from a third-person perspective. (See 
                                                                                                                                          
often addressed to self as well (e.g., in self-to-self or “I-self” to “me-self” dialogues). The self is, 
however, not symbolically formulated as a direct addressee in any of the texts (although that would be 
a conceivable rhetorical possibility).  
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also Raevaara 2015.) Moreover, the mutual interplay of the two figures (i.e., 
the fact that the writer has the capacity to take two different kinds of stances 
towards himself) is itself a further sign of the self.111  
In keeping with this “outside observer” perspective, the first set of 2SG 
deictics that the writer employs are the possessive suffixes in the excerpt 
(6.20), in which the writer situates himself as a figure in an imagined future 
scenario that includes the parents and friends of the addressee (“your 
mother,” “your father,” “your friends”): 
 
(6.20)  
Äitisi                   hullaantuu                                luonnollisesti minuun heti 
mother:POSS.2SG  be_taken_with:IND.PRS.3SG naturally         1SG:ILL    instantly 
 
ja      isäsi                             kanssa ollaan                             heti           parhaat kalakaverit. 
and  father:GEN.POSS.2SG with     be:PASS(IND.PRS.1PL) instantly  best:PL  fishing_pals:PL 
 
Tyttökaverisi                            ovat             tietysti     kateudesta   vihreitä -- 
Female_friend:PL.POSS.2SG be:PRS.2PL of course jealousy:ELA green:PTV.PL 
 
(6.20) Your mother will naturally be instantly taken with me and with your father we’ll 
instantly be best fishing pals. Your female friends will of course be green with jealousy -- 
 
Here, the writer models himself from the addressee’s point of view (i.e., how 
“you,” “your” kin, and “your” friends would see the ideal “me”). That is, it 
continues the writer’s use of an other-to-self perspective. Moreover, the 
addressee is not fully denoted (e.g., with a personal pronoun) but serves 
merely as a reference point (i.e., the possessor of social relations) for 
directing joint-attention to the simulated perspectives of the addressee’s kin 
and friends. The combination of the features of the two examples, then, 
contributes to a pattern of addressivity in which the addressee is engaged 
with in a considerably more indirect manner than in the cases examined in 
sections 6.3.1–6.3.4. 
As has been seen in numerous analyses, it is understood as the right of the 
“promotional” persona to be highly selective. There is a certain 
correspondence between the addressing and addressed personae so that it is 
the ideal “I” that is usually understood as the one who addresses an ideal 
“you.” That is, a certain degree of selectivity implies the kind of persona that 
has the right to and the interest for such a degree of selectivity. There is one 
                                                 
111 The superimposition of the 1SG pronoun and the 3SG verbal inflection also makes visible the 
writer’s double role as the animator and the 1SG figure. By detaching oneself from the “I,” the writer 
draws attention to object-sign and sign-interpretant relations. He makes transparent the fact that the 
“I” and any characateristics predicated about it are merely particular kinds of symbolic constructs and 
virtual models. In a sense, then, there is some level of “denaturalization” of self-presentation and 
evaluative stances here – contrary to the kinds of cases discussed in section 5.2. 
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recurring genre-specific pattern in which the writers phase out of the 
“promotional” persona and simultaneously shift their address from more 
selective to less selective. The next section will discuss this pattern. It also 
leads us further in the examination of how writers can control their 
interactions with others even beyond the ongoing encounter. 
6.4 JOS (“IF”) CLAUSES AND ONTOLOGIES OF 
COMPATIBILITY 
This section examines a pattern of addressivity that makes visible the writers’ 
reflexive awareness and purposes regarding the interpretation of their signs. 
The pattern also further illuminates the managing of the relations between 
“ideal” and “real” intersubjective contacts and forms of personhood. In its 
prototypic form, the pattern consists of two parts: (1) a sentence-initial jos 
(“if”) clause that describes the addressee’s response to the writer’s signs in 
the ongoing event and (2) a main clause that models the further interactional 
consequences of that response: 
 
(6.21) 
IF [ADDRESSEE’S RESPONSE IN THIS EVENT] THEN [INTERACTIONAL CONSEQUENCES] 
E.G. 
Jos tunnistat    itsessäsi          jotakin    
if     recognize:IND.PRS.2SG self:INE.POSS.2SG something:PTV  
 
samankaltaista sieluntoimintaa, toimi. 
similar:PTV          soul’s.workings:PTV.SG act:IMP.2SG  
 
(6.21) If you recognize within yourself some similar workings of the soul, act. 
 
The jos (“if”) clauses include some metasemiotic typification of the preceding 
text and of the specific nature of the reader’s anticipated ideal response. The 
previous example, for example, typifies the preceding text segment as a 
description or a manifestation of the workings of the writer’s “soul.” The 
modeled ideal response is the recognition of something similar within 
oneself. Insofar as that condition is fulfilled, the appropriate course of action 
is to “act,” which presumes an understanding of the typical action in this kind 
of event (i.e., replying in one of the ways enabled by the online dating 
service). The jos (“if”) clause, then, is usually addressed non-selectively to 
any respondent (see 6.3.1) and the main clause to that subset of respondents 
that fulfills the formulated condition. This pattern, then, sieves respondents 
into addressees and non-addressees based on their interpretations of and 
alignments to the writer’s signs, not based on their personal characteristics 
(cf. 6.3.2). 
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The jos (“if”) patterns typically embody an ontology of “compatibility” or 
“match” between persons. That is, they denote a particular kind of logic that 
links others’ responses to self’s signs with the possibility of subsequent 
semiotic encounters and a sustained interactional relation. Recognizing 
similarities or equivalencies of various kinds, as in example (6.21), seems to 
be the most common type of “compatibility.” In that example, the similarity 
is located at the level of mental processes or “workings of the soul” (i.e., the 
readers perception of their soul corresponds to their interpretation of the 
workings of the writer’s soul as mediated by the text). Similar examples 
abound: 
 
(6.22a) 
Jos koit                                    samankaltaisuutta, kirjoitat=han? 
if    experience:IND.PST.2SG similarity:SG.PTV      write:IND.PRS.2SG=PTCL 
 
(6.22a) If you experienced similarity, will you write me? 
 
(6.22b) 
On=ko                        Sinulla   samanlaisia     haaveita.  
COP:IND.PRS.3SG= Q you:ADE similar:PL.PTV dream:PL.PTV  
Jos on                         niin  avataan                                     peli! 
if    COP:IND.PRS.3SG then open:PASS(1PL.IMP).IND.PRS game 
 
(6.22b) Do You have similar dreams. If you do then let’s open the game! 
 
It is noteworthy that these examples contain no expressions that explicitly 
refer to the text-artifact or the signs it carries. They employ 2SG address, 
verbs that denote mental processes (“recognize,” “experience”), the pronoun 
sama (“the same”) or derivatives (samankaltaisuus, samanlainen, 
“similarity,” “similar”) that point to non-specified earlier phases of the 
ongoing semioc process, and noun phrases that name the objects mediated 
by the text (“workings of the soul,” “dreams”). That is, the writers operate 
directly at the level of intersubjectively experienced objects (e.g., experiences 
of kinship between souls; similarity of dreams or views of subjectivity, etc.) 
effacing the process of textual mediation. The following examples, in 
contrast, locate the equivalency more specifically between the reader and the 
writer’s text: 
 
(6.23a) 
¶Jos tunnistat                        yhtään itseäsi                      ylläolevassa  tekstissä,    niin  
   if   recognize:IND.PRS.2SG at_all   self:PTV.2SG.POSS above:SG.INE text:SG.INE then 
 
laita=han                   tulemaan  rohkeasti viestiä,                   niin kurkistetaan,  
send:IMP.2SG=PTCL come:INF   bravely     message:SG.PTV  so     peek:PASS(1PL) 
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jos=ko puhuisimme   suurin piirtein  samaa             kieltä                     keskenämme. 
if=Q     talk:COND.1PL  approximately sama:SG.PTV language:SG.PTV between:1PL.POSS 
 
(6.23a) 
¶If you recognize at all yourself in the above text, then go ahead and bravely send me a 
message, so we can see if we happened to speak approximately the same language with 
each other.  
 
(6.23b) 
Eli jos olet                      sitä          mitä kerron                  hakevani,    
so  if    be:IND.PRS.2SG that:PTV what tell:IND.PRS.1SG  look_for:PTCP.1SG.POSS  
 
vastauksesi      ei              mene                  hukkaan. 
reply:2SG.POSS NEG:3SG go:NEG.IND.PRS waste:ILL.SG 
(6.23b) In other words, if you are what I say I’m looking for, your reply won’t go to waste. 
 
Example (6.23a) models a feeling of recognizing oneself in other’s semiotic 
artifact (which is described as situated “above” the current focus of attention) 
and in the representations the artifact mediates. That is, the similarity is 
projected between the reader’s self-conceptions and the figures mediated by 
the writer’s textual patterns. Example (6.23b), on the other hand, models a 
more straightforward equivalency between the reader’s “being” and the 
writer’s discursive act of “telling what I’m looking for.” That is, it does 
acknowledge the role of language in the mediation of actions but directly 
compares the writer’s representation and the reader’s being as if they were 
one-to-one commensurable without intermediate phases of interpretation. 
To take up a few more cases, example (6.24a) refers to the respondent’s 
evaluation of his “capability” to fulfil the writer’s criteria. Example (6.24b) 
draws attention to both the positive affective impact felt by the respondent 
and the respondent’s capacity to imagine shared future activities: 
 
(6.24a) ¶Jos kykenet kaikkiin noihin ja tämä teksti tuntuu kertovan myös sinusta, niin 
ota yhteyttä ja edetään siitä sitten ties minne asti. :) 
(6.24a) ¶If you’re capable of all those and this text feels/seems to talk about you too, 
then contact [me] and let’s proceed from there up to who knows where. :)  
 
(6.24b) ¶Jos kolahti ja tuntuu että voitaisiin keksiä kaikkea hauskaa yhdessä älä epäröi 
hetkeäkään kirjoittaa mulle. Jään jännityksellä odottelemaan.. 
(6.24b) ¶If [this] struck a chord and it feels/seems like we could think of all kinds of fun 
things to do together don’t hesitate for a moment to write me. I will be waiting with 
excitement.. 
 
Example (6.24a) explicitly mentions the text(-artifact) and points to a set of 
more specific individual objects (“all those”) accessible in the event. Those 
objects can be either previously experienced effects (“all those things I 
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described to you earlier”) or, more concretely, spatially contiguous visible 
signs (“all those things we can still see above”).112 The beginning of example 
(6.24b) (“If [this] struck”), instead of merely focusing on the content of the 
respondent’s experience, specifically implies the cause of the affective impact 
(i.e., that in the writer’s performance which “struck”).  
In short, the jos (“if”) clauses denote authoritative, regimenting virtual 
models of actual responses. They sieve actual responses into ones that 
comply with the model and into ones that do not. This effect is based on a 
cross-modal and intersubjective iconicity in which self’s and other’s 
processes in different semiotic modes correspond to one another in some 
relevant way and both are aware of this correspondence (e.g., whether the 
respondent’s feeling is understood as sufficiently similar to the animator’s 
representation; or whether the respondent’s abilities match up to the 
animator’s desires) (see also Urban 2001: 146; Agha 2007a: 22; Kockelman 
2005: 253). Where that iconicity is explicitly located in the model both 
reflects and creates an understanding of the nature of the intersubjective 
contact (i.e., which processes of self and other are connected and how 
directly) and what kinds of further interactions that can lead to. 
There are also a few cases in the data in which “compatibility” is modeled 
as a form of complementarity or other non-similarity. In (6.25), the jos (“if”) 
clause anticipates an interpretative approach in which the respondent is 
making an active effort to find something non-appealing in the 
advertisement: 
 
(6.25) Jos oikein suurennuslasilla haet, niin varmasti löydät tästä ilmoituksesta ”jotain ei 
niin sinun juttua”, eikös juu?? Minua ei häiritse ollenkaan jos en jaksa kiinnostua aivan 
kaikista sinun jutuistasi, tai jos kaikki minun juttuni eivät iske sinuun. Ole sinä Nainen, 
minä olen Mies!! ;-) 
(6.25) If you look with a magnifying glass, then surely you will find “something not so 
much your thing” in this ad, isn’t that right?? I’m not at all bothered if I’m not able to get 
excited about all of your things, or if all of my things don’t spark your interest. You be a 
Woman, I am a Man!! ;-) 
 
The writer signals with quotation marks that he is voicing, in a kind of free 
indirect speech, the respondent’s negative evaluative stance, which is based 
on an idiomatic expression (“not someone’s thing”) describing otherness and 
non-identification. The writer, however, rejects the problematic nature of 
such a stance by superimposing on it a further layer of interpretation. He 
claims that a certain degree of non-similarity is the natural result of ideal 
gender roles, which should be based on complementary opposites. To take up 
another example of such less frequent ontologies of compatibility, let us 
                                                 
112 The difference, in fact, may not be practically relevant in such short digital text-artifacts in 
which all the signs are continuously perceivable and meaning (qua object-sign-interpretant relations) 
may appear relatively spatially fixed (versus e.g. oral conversations). 
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consider example (6.26), which does not involve a jos (“if”) clause. The 
excerpt seems to demonstrate a naturalized understanding of which 
characteristics require similarity and which complementarity: 
 
(6.26) ¶Sopiva vastakappale olisi hakusessa – – Itse olen aika ujo, huumorintajuinen ja 
kiltti metalistityttö, joten vastapuolelta odotan puheliaisuutta ja aloitekykyä sekä tietysti 
hyvää (ja/tai kieroa) huumorintajua. 
(6.26) ¶Looking for a suitable counterpart – – I myself am a quite shy and kind 
metalhead girl with a good sense of humor, so from the counterpart I expect 
talkativeness and initiative and of course a good (and/or twisted) sense of humor. 
 
According to her own description, the writer is “shy” and has “a good sense of 
humor.” The causal consequence, expressed by joten (“so, hence”), is that the 
characteristics required from the other are, on the one hand, a “good sense of 
humor” (similarity) but, on the other hand, “talkativeness and iniative” 
(complementary opposition). That is, there is an implicit logic that dictates 
when an “opposites attract” kind of complementarity is desirable and when 
similarity is the ideal alternative. Textual coherence overlaps with a kind of 
biographic coherence, an understanding of how personal characteristics are 
appropriately organized in relation to one another. 
As was already seen in earlier examples in this section, the interactional 
consequences modeled in the main clauses that follow the jos (“if”) clauses 
vary in scope and in the degree to which they are removed from the ongoing 
event. Some concentrate on relatively immediate next phases (such as 
“replying” or “contacting”), others point to even further subsequent events 
(e.g., “If you are like that, then contact me - in my life there is a space just 
your size to be filled!,” Jos olet sellainen, niin ota yhteyttä - elämässäni on 
juuri sinun kokoisesi tila täytettävänä!; “Your reply won’t go to waste,” 
Vastauksesi ei mene hukkaan [implying that the writer will reply to the 
reader’s reply, and so on]; “Let’s open the game,” Avataan peli). In other 
words, the main clauses model participant-linked semiotic chains (see Agha 
2007a: 67) of various kinds and lengths. In its most typical form, the entire 
pattern, then, links the ideal respondents’ feelings (affective interpretants) 
with their actions (energetic interpretants). 
 
            Feeling ?      Action 
(6.27) Jos [tämä yhtään tuntuu miltään], niin [tavataan]. 
(6.27) If [this feels like anything at all], then [let’s meet].  
 
They model a transition from an ideal affective response to an ideal concrete 
action. As was noted earlier, such patterns sieve respondents into “ideal” and 
“non-ideal” based on their responses to the writer’s text or their evaluations 
of the writer’s performance, whereas the patterns discussed in previous 
sections sieve based on the respondent’s personal characteristics. An overlap 
of the two kinds of sieving is naturally what is expected. That is, “ideal” 
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respondents should be “ideal” both at the level of personal characteristics 
and at the level of their responses to the writer’s performance (including, for 
example, evaluations of views of subjectivity, see section 4.2). Such 
constructions, then, make particular kinds of (meta)evaluations (e.g., how 
the writers evaluate the readers’ evaluations of them) public and 
unambiguous and are another candidate for genre-specific forms of 
stancetaking (see section 5.6). 
Within one single text, a jos (“if”) pattern often marks a shift from more 
“ideal” to more “real” figures and implicitly relate the two worlds with one 
another. The pattern functions as a junction in which writers phase out of 
their earlier performances and negotiate those performances with actual 
respondents with the purpose of deciding the future course of their social 
relation. This explicitly contextualizes and grounds the “ideal” persona in 
relation to other aspects of personhood and other biographic processes (e.g., 
more general, stable, or widely recognized personae). As exemplified by 
(6.28), some writers end their texts with less selective figurement and 
encounter the reader under a “real” persona as well. Sometimes these 
transitions even divide the writer’s self-presentation into two parallel 
sections: 
 
(6.28) 
jos  tuntuu                             siltä    että haluaisit                      tutustua  
if    feel:IND.PRS.3SG.IMPRS it:ABL that want:COND.PRS.2SG get_to_know 
 
niin  heitä                  viestiä.            oon                                 ihan  mukava heppu  
then throw:IMP.2SG message:PTV be:IND.PRS.1SG.COLL quite nice        guy 
 
ja     mun            kaa            on                         helppo tulla toimeen :) 
and I:GEN.COLL with:COLL be:IND.PRS.3SG easy     get_along 
 
(6.28) 
if it feels like you’d like to get to know [me], throw [me] a message. i’m a pretty nice guy  
and it’s easy to get along with me :) 
 
In (6.28), the writer has already amply described himself (see example 4.30). 
Regardless of these earlier descriptions, after the jos (“if”) pattern he goes on 
to add one more line that emphasizes that he is, in fact, a “nice guy.” That is, 
he adds a very general evaluative characterization to a previous sequence of 
detailed self-presentation. It seems that such parallel descriptions have 
altogether different functions and relate to different personae. The latter one 
is oriented to the actual participants under more “real” figurements 
negotiating the possibility of further interactions (see also example 6.24b) 
Also, his speech of “getting along” implies a more sustained chain of 
interactions over a longer stretch of time. There is, then, a clear contrast to 
the preceding “ideal” persona. This contrast entails a tone of persuasion, as if 
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the writer was convincing the respondent that he actually is “nice” and that 
the previous performance has actual validity. In a similar vein, the writer of 
example (5.23), the engineer afraid of admitting his profession, after his 
previous stigmaoriented performance, assures in a jos (“if”) pattern that he 
is, in fact, “a quite nice guy” despite the things that came up in the 
performance (“Go ahead and send me a message if something common was 
found. I’m actually a quite nice guy despite everything,” Ei muuta kuin 
laittamaan viestiä, jos jotain yhteistä löytyi. Olen tosiaan ihan kiva tyyppi 
kaikesta huolimatta).  
As a final example, let us have a look at a case in which the writer also 
explicitly addresses the reader under a different persona in the jos (“if”) 
pattern. The writer of example 4.6 in 4.2.3 incorporates additional criteria of 
“normality” towards the end of her text: 
  
(6.29) Jos kiinnostuit ja olet suhteelllisen normaali kaikin puolin, eli olet muuttanut 
kotoa pois ja työpaikallekkin on raahauduttava, otappa yhteyksiä:)  
(6.29) If you got interested and you’re relativelly normal in every way, that is you have 
moved away from home and have to drag yourself to a workplace, get in contact;) 
 
Whereas the main part of the text deals with “ideal” personhood in the sense 
of personal characteristics and individual uniqueness, the movement towards 
a more “real” world adds to the picture the level of compliance with social 
norms (see also sections 5.2.1 and 7.1.1). The jos (“if”) pattern, then, ensures 
that the respondent fulfills the basic requirements of “normality” 
(exemplified by the writer with housing arrangements and employment 
status). 
The previous sections of this chapter has further shown that there is an 
orientation to two distinct (“promotional”) roles or personae in online dating 
advertisements. There is a more “real” figure that is in charge of managing 
actual social and interactional relations with (any kind of) others and a more 
“ideal” figure that conveys a sense of identity and is used to sieve others into 
“ideal” and “non-ideal.” Those writers who do not employ the multifunctional 
jos (“if”) pattern examined in this section or some similar construction, 
either rely on the fact that the respondent shares similar ontologies of 
compatibility or do not see a reason to explicitly regiment and narrow the 
scope of acceptable response. Even among those that do thete are difference 
in the specificity and rigidity with which further interactions are controlled. 
The next section takes a look at even further attempts to control the 
unfolding of interactional chains. 
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6.5 MODELING INTERACTIONS BEYOND THE 
ONGOING SPEECH EVENT 
So far our main focus has been on the selection for addressees and the 
sieving of respondents and responses in the ongoing event. This section takes 
a look at how even further subsequent events and interactional consequences 
are controled and how the “promotional” personae inhabited in the 
advertisement event are related to such subsequent events. The first example 
(5.31) starts with a jos (“if”) pattern and then continues with a sequence that 
describes in some detail a progressing chain of interactions that could 
potentially follow from the respondent’s reply: 
  
(6.30) Jos – –, niin kirjoittele toki minulle. Aloitetaan vaihtamalla pari viestiä ja 
tapaamalla vaikkapa leppoisan tee-/kahvituokion merkeissä ja katsotaan olisiko 
mahdollista löytää se yhteinen sävel pikkuhiljaa. Mitään tässä ei menetä, mutta voitto 
voi olla arvokkain mahdollinen :-) 
(6.30) If – –, then please do write me. Let’s begin by exchanging a couple of messages 
and by meeting say over a nice cup of tea/coffee and let’s see if it would be possible to get 
in tune with one another gradually. Nothing can be lost here, but the prize may be the 
most valuable possible :-) 
 
Sequences like this model ideal semiotic chains and specify the kinds of 
consequences the writer is willing or not willing to commit to. Such 
commitments may concern, for instance, specific semiotic modes of 
interaction or particular kinds of social relations (e.g., continuing writing-
based encounters in 5.32a versus 5.32b; or being just friends instead of 
having a romantic relationship in 5.32c): 
 
(6.31a) Haluan aluksi tutustella ihan vaikka kirjoittelemalla, mutta jos jutut menee 
yksiin niin treffeillekin lähden oikein mielelläni. 
(6.31a) For a start I want to get acquainted just by writing, but if our talks prove 
compatible then I’d love to go out on a date too. 
 
(6.31b) Kirjeenvaihtoseuraa minusta et valitettavasti saa: jos mielestäsi jätin jotain 
oleellista kertomatta, se selviää minuutissa puhelimessa. 
(6.31b) You won’t unfortunately get a pen pal out of me: if you think I left something 
essential untold, it can be clarified over the phone in a minute. 
 
(6.31c) Minusta saa kyllä ihan kaverinkin jos se paljon puhuttu rakkauden liekki ei 
jostain syystä roihahdakkaan..  
(6.31c) You can also get just a friend out of me if the famous flame of love won’t blaze up 
for some reason. 
 
The previous cases concentrate on the writer rather than the readers and are 
somewhat concessive and optimistic in nature. In fact, the writer in example 
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(6.30) explicitly mentions that there is “nothing to lose” here, only to gain. 
However, it is not uncommon for the writers to anticipate more adverse 
consequences and to attempt to shield themselves from unwanted responses 
and non-ideal respondents (cf. also sections 5.4 and 6.3.4). Example (6.32), 
for instance, sieves respondents into non-ideal repliers based on the way they 
evaluate persons in general and self in relation to others in particular (cf. 
5.3.2). It also explicitly treats particular linguistic typifications (e.g. “reliable” 
and “honest”) as unimpressive (cf. 5.2.1):  
 
(6.32) ¶On mielestäni matala standardi luokitella ihmisiä varallisuuden, vallan tai 
julkisuuden perusteella. On myös helppo omassa päässään ylentää itsensä ihan vaan 
alentamalla muut. Toivon kyseisten henkilöiden jättävän vastaamatta minulle. 
Luotettavina, rehellisinä ja huumorintajuisina itseään pitävät ei myöskään tee minuun 
suuremmin vaikutusta. 
(6.32) ¶It is in my opinion a low standard to classify people based on wealth, power or 
publicity. It is also easy to exalt oneself in one’s own head just by demeaning others. I 
hope those persons won’t reply to me. Also those who regard themselves as reliable, 
honest and having a good sense of humor do not impress me much. 
 
Some texts even explicitly formulate concrete sanctions that will befall those 
respondents that do not abide by the authoritative model laid down by the 
writer:  
 
(6.33) ¶Todettakoon lisäksi, että minä heti deletoin vastaukset, joissa m.m. tarjotaan 
seksiseikkauluja ja isoja varustuksia nuorilta tai vanhemmilta tai tilataan salarakkaaksi. 
(6.33) ¶I should also mention that I will instantly delete replies that offer for example 
sexual adventures and large equipments from younger or older or look for secret lovers. 
 
In (6.33), the writer both commits to a particular form of sanctioning (i.e., 
the instant deletion of replies) but already anticipates and imagines specific 
ways in which some repliers might not comply with the writer’s ideals. 
Analogously to the jos (“if”) patterns in the previous section, the cases in 
this section are authoritative, regimenting virtual models of the interactional 
consequences of the advertisement text beyond the respondent’s initial 
reaction in the ongoing event. That is, they specify what is ultimately at stake 
in the ongoing interactional event and what replying to the text requires and 
may lead to. As was seen in the examples, such models may be formulated as 
more “imperative-like” (i.e., focus on regimenting others’ behaviors) or 
“promise-like” (i.e., focus on committing self to particular behaviors). In any 
case, they model an ideal chain of events between self and others, grounded 
in norms of personhood and interaction, and make self and others 
accountable for compliance with the model. Such examples are, then, linked 
to wider metacultural questions, such as agency in relation to the 
regimentation and transmission of culture (e.g. who has the authority to 
issue commands or other norms of behavior to others; what is the range of 
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appropriate responses; what are the consequences of disobedience) (see 
Urban 2001: 145–163). 
The more problematic aspects of such questions tend to become more 
visible in “backstage” conversations where one need not maintain the 
“promotional” front. The following Internet conversation (6.34) is from the 
external metadiscourse data (see 3.2). It discusses the social and moral 
implications of the “disobediance” of some repliers (i.e., what do with 
responses that do not conform to the modeled ideal response). It also touches 
upon similar sanctioning behaviors as example (6.33) as well as the more 
general entitlements and obligations that writers of advertisements have 
towards repliers. The following excerpt has been cut down to the most 
essential fragments of the thread (i.e., the original post, two replies, and the 
original poster’s later reply):  
  
(6.34)  
[Original post from a woman] 
Mulla on ollut pari kertaa ilmoitus, johon olen saanut oikeastaan aika paljonkin 
vastauksia. Mutta minkälaisia.... huh huh. [– –] Ukkkomiehiltä tulee aina epätoivoisia 
treffiehdotuksia, vaikka ilmoituksessani on ollut aina maininta, että miehen täytyy olla 
ehdottomasti vapaa. Ikätoivomustakaan ei yhtään kunnioiteta, vastauksia tulee myös 10-
15 v nuoremmilta miehiltä.... [– –] 
[Reply from a man] 
Joo-o.Osaan kyllä kuvitella,että naisen laittama deitti-ilmoitus kerää paljon enemmän 
vastauksia kuin miehen.Vaikka laittaisit siihen mitä tahansa rajoituksia esim. ”Vain 
meilikaveri”,”Olen varattu” tai mitä tahansa ikärajoituksia viestiä sataa solkenaan.Ja 
suureen määrään mahtuu varmasti myös näitä ”akanoita”. [– –]  
[Reply from a woman] [– –] Naikkoselle... olen törmännyt samaan.. valitettavasti.. 
sinkkut-sivuilla löytyy edes jotain tasoa, mutta deitti on puhtaasti päiväkahvimesta ja 
pervojen pelleilykenttä. :)  
[Original poster again] 
Kiitos kommenteista :) Vastauksia tippuu edelleen ja oikeastaan poistan niitä sitä 
mukaan. Yksi aika mukavakin kirje tuli, kokeilen nyt kepillä jäätä, lähetin vastauksen. 
Jutun juju lienee siinä, että vastausmeilissä täytyisi olla ”se jokin” joka herättäisi 
ilmoituksen laatijan mielenkiinnon.  
(Suomi 24: Jul 17, 2002.) 
 
(6.34)  
[Original post from a woman] 
I’ve posted an advertisement a couple of times, and I’ve actually got quite a lot of replies. 
But what kinds of replies… ugh [– –] Marrried men always send desperate invitations for 
dates, although my advertisement has always included a mention that the man 
absolutely has to be free. The age request is not respected at all either, replies come from 
men who are 10–15 years younger.... [– –] 
[Reply from a man] 
Addressing others 
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Yea-a.I can imagine that a woman’s dating ad will get much more replies than a man’s. 
Even if you put in it whatever limitations e.g. “Only a mail friend,””I’m taken” or any age 
limits at all messages will rain down non-stop. And the large number of replies will 
certainly include some of this “chaff”. [– –]  
[Reply from a woman] [– –] To Naikkonen [= the original poster]... I’ve encountered the 
same.. unfortunately.. The singles pages [at Suomi24] have at least some class, but deitti 
[= Deitti.net] is purely a place for people looking for sex and a playground for pervs. :) 
[Original poster again] 
Thanks for the comments :) Replies keep pouring in and as a matter of fact I delete 
them as they come in. One pretty nice letter arrived as well, I’m now testing the 
waters, I sent a reply. The trick seems to be that the reply mail should have “that 
something” that would rouse the interest of the writer of the advertisement.  
(Suomi 24: Jul 17, 2002.) 
 
The participants of the conversation somewhat unanimously agree that non-
compliant replies are inappropriate and therefore sanctionable. There is a 
progression from relatively neutral terms of non-compliance (e.g., wrong 
demographic parameters, such as marital status or age) to, first, the “chaff” 
(i.e., non-desirable individuals) and, later, to “pervs” (which specifically 
targets the users of the Deitti.net service). That is, the focus gradually moves 
towards more problematic types of disobedient repliers and the judgements 
become harsher. The agreement and support of the other participants, for 
which the original poster later thanks them, seems to vest authority into the 
original poster’s acts of sanction. The negotiated consensus in the 
conversation is that non-compliant repliers need not be taken seriously and 
their replies can be deleted without a second thought – just like example 6.33 
warns. In other words, even what may feel like a relatively slight breach of 
the authoritative virtual model formulated by the writer (e.g., the replier 
being 10 years younger than the age range specified in the advertisement) 
can give rise to dramatic social-interactional consequences. The breach can 
be interpreted as “disobedience,” and disobedient replies need not be 
handled according to the same social and moral norms as obedient ones. In 
such “backstage” conversations, then, interactants negotiate defensive and 
protective practices aimed at excluding those who do not play by the rules 
and therefore threaten others’ performances (see Goffman 1959 [1990]: 207–
230). 
Towards the end of the excerpt, it is, in fact, made explicit that replying to 
others’ replies is considered optional even in the case of “obedient” replies, 
although for different reasons. To be more precise, as the reasoning of the 
original poster shows (“the reply must have ‘that something’”), the same 
criteria of selectivity that apply for imagined ideal respondents and 
addressees in the advertisement event apply for actual repliers (i.e., those 
actual persons who have taken interest in the advertisement writer and made 
the effort of producing a personal interactional contribution). This kind of 
selective behavior, then, is the uptake of the promotional persona in a 
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subsequent event with different stakes and a different frame of participation. 
The promotional persona is entitled to sieve actual replies, too, into those 
that are acknowledged and those that are ignored. Or, in a sense, the 
promotional persona has the right to evaluate actual persons based on their 
performances in the same way as they previously evaluated the promotional 
persona. The tables have turned. 
This chapter has shown a variety of different orientations of the 
“promotional” persona towards others in online dating advertisements. It has 
shown different, more or less strictly selective, ways of relating “real” and 
“ideal” others in terms of addressivity, compatibility, and appropriate 
responses. The next chapter will explore the external metadiscourse data 
more systematically from the standpoint of how the patterns examined in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6 are interpreted and dealt with in those metadiscourses. It 
will also delve deeper into the question already raised in this chapter, 
namely, how the text-mediated encounter is understood as a type of 
intersubjective contact.  
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7 ONLINE DATING ADVERTISEMENTS AS 
AN OBJECT OF CULTURAL 
METADISCOURSES 
The previous chapters have focused on patterns of entextualization that 
instantiate online dating advertisements as a particular type of interactional 
practice. The data that will be examined in this chapter consist of a variety of 
other types of discourse that talk about online dating advertisements as a 
type of interactional practice (see section 3.2). That is, we are dealing with 
metapractices, forms of metasemiosis that have another practice as their 
object. Online dating advertisements seem to have given rise to an 
exceptional amount of, often heated, metapractices that debate the nature of 
online dating advertisements as a semiotic encounter and the interpretation 
of others’ signs in such an encounter. The sections of this chapter will explore 
online dating guidebooks (7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.2.1, 7.3), Internet writings and 
conversations about online dating advertisements (7.1.1, 7.2.2, 7.3), and a 
segment of a television program (7.3), in which online dating is discussed. 
Some of the data, then, have been produced by “experts” (persons who claim 
some degree of expertise in the matter, such as guidebook authors; see 2.1.5), 
some by “peers” (persons who merely have personal experiences or opinions 
concerning online dating). Some of it is fragmentary (e.g. anonymous 
commentaries on Internet discussion forums or comment sections); some of 
it is relatively systematic and intricately elaborated (e.g. online dating 
guidebooks). Some of it takes a narrative approach and focuses on particular 
experiences; some of it is more normative and generalizing in nature. As 
explained in chapter 3, the external metadiscourses can be seen both as 
sources of normative or prestige models and as “backstages,” in which the 
object-performances can be freely discussed and negotiated (see Goffman 
1990 [1959]: 114, 129). Each source of external metadiscourses, then, has its 
own frames of circulation and participation and is produced by particular 
kinds of interactants and only consumed by particular types of interactants. 
That is, they relate to the semiotic division of labor (see 2.1.5) in different 
ways and constitute an unevenly distributed set of interpretants. None of the 
interpretations examined in this chapter, then, can apply to all online dating 
advertisements or all online daters. Furthermore, the external metadiscourse 
analyses here cannot be causally or sequentially linked to the advertisement 
data examined in earlier chapters. Rather, this chapter explores general 
tendencies, cultural prerequisites, and possible points of contention in the 
interpretation of online dating advertisement practices. The goal is to 
illuminate further layers of semiotic ontologies involved in such practices.  
The data examined in this chapter could be even more specifically dubbed 
“external metageneric discourse,” since it is discourse that is about a 
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recognizable genre but not located within an instance of the genre (but, 
rather, in another genre with its own purposes and frames of participation 
and interpretation). That is, unlike the kinds of text-internal metapragmatic 
comments discussed in previous sections, the “external” metadiscourses and 
the ideological views of language use they embody do not co-occur with the 
objects they refer to. They are not reflexively calibrated to the ongoing 
interactional event in which they are entextualized. They are displaced 
discourses about another practice that occurs somewhere else. (See 
Silverstein 2003: e.g. 196.) The assumption in this chapter is that the 
interactants in the two sets of data (actual advertisements and external 
metadiscourses) are – to a sufficient degree – dealing with the same cultural 
practice. The very fact that online dating advertisements can be discussed 
and modeled in a detailed but totally decontextualized manner (e.g., in 
guidebooks or newspaper articles) shows that there is a recognizable, 
culturally motivated reflexive model of semiotic behavior that can be jointly 
oriented to across events.  
There are many forms of metasemiotic regimentation of social life. Online 
dating advertisements, for instance, are checked prior to their publication by 
online dating service providers for violations of rules and regulations. That is, 
such forms of “legal” metadiscourse are enforced instantly and directly. The 
kinds of “ideological” metasemiotic discourses examined in this chapter, in 
contrast, are highly decontextualizable and more loosely calibrated to the 
actual events they regiment. They are made to bear on actual online dating 
events by those participants whose assumptions and interpretations they 
affect. (See Parmentier 1994: 128, 142–155.) They laminate more displaced 
and implicit additional layers of experience on the online dating process. In 
fact, the very existence of such metadiscourses and their mutual differences 
is interesting as a form of metaculture that interprets and evaluates other 
forms of culture shaping the future unfoldings of those object-processes. (See 
Urban 2001; Wilce 2009b: 171–180.) As will be seen in this chapter, different 
metacultural discourses tap into the features of their object in different ways 
and project different kinds of meanings on them. Insofar as such 
metadiscourses coherently link empirical investigations (what we observe) 
with theoretical representations (how we theorize what we observe) and 
practical interventions (how we act on what we observe based on our 
theories), they constitute epistemic formations, or cultural practices of 
reasoning that link perceptions with beliefs, beliefs with other beliefs, and 
beliefs with intentions (Kockelman 2006b: 111–112; 2013a: 142, 169, 182).  
To sum up, the points of interest in this chapter are the semiotic 
ontologies and epistemic formations that the external metadiscourses 
embody and disseminate. The focus will be on those segments of 
metadiscourse that most specifically and concretely deal with language and 
text-artifacts and their role in the mediation of personhood. In a sense, the 
approach here is comparative and contrastive. The online dating 
advertisement genre functions as a cultural arena that brings different kinds 
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of people with different ontologies in contact with one another. The aim is to 
tease out relevant positionalities and points of contention that are crucial to 
an understanding of the dynamics of the genre and how the “promotional 
persona” is interpreted as a mode of personhood.  
7.1 STEREOTYPES OF ONLINE DATERS AND THEIR 
LANGUAGE USE  
Sections 7.1–7.3 explore from different perspectives how the external 
metadiscourses in the data model the relationship between signers, text-
artifacts, and interpreters in the context of online dating advertisements. 
They examine ethnotheoretical notions of how particular kinds of signs can 
be used to infer information about persons. At the same time, they imply 
wider language ideologies and reveal how the “thing called language” (Agha 
2007c) in general is understood and approached by particular communities. 
This first section starts off by looking at some general stereotypic links 
between online dating as an interactional practice and stigmatized forms of 
personhood. 
7.1.1 THE STIGMATIZATION OF AN INTERACTIONAL PRACTICE 
As promised in section 5.6, this section takes up the question of 
stigmatization from the standpoint of the external metadiscourse data. 
Section 5.6 showed that many writers orient to fighting off negative default 
images of personhood stereotypically attached to online daters. This section 
further illuminates the contents of such negative stereotypes and clarifies 
how they are motivated by the interactional structure of online dating. These 
stereotypes attribute to online daters characteristics that contradict cultural 
models of “normality” (see e.g. Goffman 1963 [1990]). Although clearly not 
everyone commits to such views, they are nevertheless widely recognized as 
opinions that others may have and therefore need to be taken into account. 
That is, such generalized others and their default interpretations have to 
some degree become part of the genre knowledge for some interactants. As 
was seen in 5.6, from a writer’s standpoint the problem is about convincing 
others that the stereotype does not apply in his or her particular case. This 
section approaches the question more from the standpoint of an interpreter. 
A large amount of metadiscourse portrays online daters as more or less 
non-ideal or abnormal kinds of persons. Let us first take a look at a few 
examples from Internet conversations. Often such conversations are 
polarized: some participants warn others based on the experiences they claim 
to have access to and others try to balance the picture by recounting more 
“normal” or “ideal” experiences. The negative images of personhood that 
frequently occur in the discussions could be divided into three groups based 
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on the quality and quantity of the “non-ideality” in question. All groups make 
an appearance in the first example (7.1): 
 
(7.1) Itse myös n. 1,5v vuotta kävin treffeillä ja myös kahdenlaisia naisia tuli vastaan. 
Sellaisia joita kukaan ei tunnu kelpuuttavan (fyysisesti normaalista poikkeavia, matala 
koulutus, huono maine, lääkitys ei kunnossa, eksyksissä vailla päämäärää yms.) ja 
sellaisia jotka oli ns. liian hyviä (korkea koulutustaso ja palkka, normaalia parempi 
ulkonäkö yms.) joilla kriteerit aivan tajuttoman tiukat. – – Monet treffatuista häpesivät 
nettitreffejä ja keksivät aina jonkin muun tarinan miten on tavattu. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.1) I myself also went on dates for about 1.5 years and also encountered two kinds of 
women. Ones that nobody seems to want (physically deviant, low education, bad 
reputation, medication not right, lost without a purpose etc.) and ones that were so to 
speak too good (a high level of education and salary, better looking than the average) 
who had insanely tight criteria. – – Many of the ones I met were ashamed of net dates 
and would always come up with some other story of how we met. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
The first group depicted in the metadiscourse consists of persons who are 
socially abnormal in the fullest pathological sense of the word, such as 
cheaters, fakes, perverts, sociopaths, narcissists, and the mentally ill. The 
second group consists of persons who are merely physically undesirable or 
socially inept but who are seen as closer to the confines of “normal” and 
usually without deceitful or harmful intentions. The third group consists of 
people who are “too good” and have unattainably high criteria. All of these 
forms of “non-ideality,” then, are relative to the interpreter’s own position on 
social maps. The last group is problematic because of its higher status and 
presumed negative stance towards the interpreter. Both of the first two 
groups are lower in status in relation to the interpreter, albeit each of the two 
has a different kind of statistical distribution in society. That is, the first 
group consists of forms of personhood that are regarded as truly marginal 
and stigmatized instead of merely “non-desirable.” 
From the point of view of the interpreter, who is usually presumed as the 
baseline for normal personhood in such comparisons, the challenge is to 
avoid these problematic types of persons. Few pieces of metadiscourse, 
however, offer concrete instructions on distinguishing between the normal 
and the problematic beforehand. Rather, the choice of interactional 
infrastructure (i.e., the choice of the online dating advertisement genre as a 
channel) alone is the sign that becomes indexically linked to negative 
stereotypes of personhood with a certain probability. The epistemic 
emblematicity of the sign, then, is understandably only of a certain degree, as 
exemplified by the percentages offered by the interactants themselves (e.g., 
99 % in 7.2a or 30 % in 7.2b): 
 
(7.2a) Naiset todella saavat enemmän yhteydenottoja kuin miehet -mutta millaisia! 99% 
viesteistä on joko vonkausviestejä ukkomiehiltä tai suorasukaisia pervoja ehdotuksia 
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kirjoitustaidottomilta peräkammarinpojilta. Nämä siitä huolimatta että naisen profiili on 
asiallinen ja kaikkea muuta kuin provosoiva. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.2a) Women really do get more contacts -but what kinds [of contacts]! 99% of the 
messages are either messages from married men asking for sex or blunt pervy 
propositions from illiterate elderly bachelors. All of this despite the fact that the woman’s 
profile is decent and anything but provocative. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.2b) Pettäjiä joilla onkin oikeasti vielä perhe vaikka ovat siellä statuksella ”eronnut” on 
n. 30 %. Mielenterveysongelmaisia n. 30% käyttäjistä ja loput 30% on sekalaista sakkia 
joiden joukossa voi olla jokunen pervo. (Vauva Mar 23, 2012.) 
(7.2b) Cheaters who really still have a family although their status there [in the dating 
service] is “divorced” constitute ca. 30 %. Ca. 30% of the users are mentally ill and the 
remaining 30% are a random bunch who may include a few pervs. (Vauva Mar 23, 2012.) 
 
Examples like this foster a general attitude of wariness: online daters should 
not expect too much from repliers and, at some point, repliers may turn out 
to be something else than they first appeared. The problem from the 
standpoint of the “normal,” then, is twofold. First, statistically, the 
interactional infrastructure is understood to attract stigmatized persons 
(7.2a, 7.2b). Second, it may allow for such stigmatized persons to pass as 
normal (7.3, 7.6) with, for instance, entirely faked profiles: 
 
(7.3) Nettitreffaamisessa on nykyisin niin paljon feikkejä, että ei herätä enää juurikaan 
uskoa. – – Onneksi ihmiset ovat heränneet tälle scam-ilmiölle ja ovat nykyisin erittäin 
varovaisia. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.3) There are so many fakes in net dating nowadays that it doesn’t inspire much trust 
anymore. – – Luckily people have awakened to this scam phenomenon and are 
nowadays very careful. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
Perhaps the most relevant division among “non-ideal” respondents, then, is 
between those who have deceitful intentions and attempt to mask them and 
those who have more or less acceptable intentions and need not mask them 
in any marked sense. Similarly, there are two kinds of passing based on an 
understanding of the person’s intentions and motives.  The different groups 
of “non-ideal” respondents differ in terms of what exactly it is about online 
dating advertisements as a semiotic encounter that makes it possible for 
them to pass as “normal” in the advertisement event. That is, each negative 
stereotype relates differently to the interactional and infrastructural features 
of the online dating advertisement genre. In the first group, it is the fact that 
anonymous online dating advertisements detach persons from everyday 
metastance relations and semiotic chains. There are no third parties with 
previous interactional histories with the new person who could vouch for 
their normality or warn about their abnormality. In the second (and the 
third) group, however, the problems relate more directly to the lack of a 
visual and conversational contact. For instance, a lack of looks and 
conversational skills can to some degree be compensated for with a careful 
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composition of the written text-artifact. From the standpoint of the 
interpreter, the icon of personhood mediated by the advertisement may not 
be entirely reliable, but it can hardly be regarded as intentionally insincere of 
deceptive either (and as will be seen in example 7.4, for some, this feature of 
the encounter is seen precisely as its main advantage over other techniques 
of courtship). The two kinds of passing, then, differ in terms of accountability 
and regimentation. In fact, in the case of non-deceitful stigmatization, we can 
even find the following kinds of ingroup perspectives in the metadiscourse 
data: 
  
(7.4) Meille vähemmän ulkonäöllisille ja enemmän introverteille netti on se parempi 
vaihtoehto yrittää onneaan (Vauva Mar 23, 2012.) 
(7.4) To us less good-looking and more introverted the net is the better option for trying 
our luck. (Vauva Mar 23, 2012.)  
 
In (7.4), the interactant himself claims membership of the described non-
ideal category (“us less good-looking”), and rationally explains why people 
like him would opt for online dating. Whereas the earlier examples 
concentrated on interpreting others negatively, the previous interactant, in 
fact, seems to personally testify that such stereotypes indeed have a certain 
validity.113  
One of the consequences of such stereotypes is that, in light of them, each 
indice in an online dating advertisement basically becomes interpretable 
both in a “trusting” mode (i.e., what kind of person would express herself like 
this) and in an “exposing” mode (i.e., what kind of person would feign or 
mask like this). To give a few examples of how such stereotypes become 
involved in the interpretation of concrete textual patterns in online dating 
advertisements, let us first consider the following excerpt from a comment 
section discussion. The discussion is related to a newspaper article that itself 
quotes opinions from actual online daters. The topic of the debate is strict 
selectivity. The more specific focus is criteria related to outward appearance. 
Throughout the metadiscourse data, strict selectivity is given competing 
negative and positive rationalizations. The animator of the comment below 
quotes a remark from the article (“At least my interest flags already at the 
point when the advertisement says right away that the criteria are related to 
appearance”), according to which advertisements that set strict criteria for 
outward appearance are off-putting: 
  
                                                 
113 In spite of being aware of stereotypes that are potentially stigmatizing for oneself, individuals 
may not identify with such sterotypes or stigmas. They may even bear the stigma in the eyes of others 
without being “impressed or repentant about doing so” (Goffman 1990 [1963]: 17). Some minorities 
may even thrive because of a reflexive contrast with other (semiotic) communities (ibid.; see also 
Kockelman 2005: 262). In other words, you can relish the fact you are “abnormal” in the eyes of some 
community of others, whose values you consider questionable. 
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(7.5) ”Minun kiinnostukseni saa ainakin lopahtamaan jo siinä vaiheessa, jos 
ilmoituksessa lukee että kriteerinä on heti ulkonäköasiat”.. Mitä muutakaan voi jos on 
ruma ja pullukka? Normaalit mukavat ja hyvännäköiset ihmiset saavat seuraa vaikka 
yleisestä unisex-vessasta. Ei tarvi alentua chatteihin. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.5) “At least my interest flags already at the point when the advertisement says right 
away that the criteria are related to appearance”.. What else can [one do] if [one] is ugly 
and a fatty? Normal nice and good-looking people find company even in public unisex 
restrooms. [They] do not need to lower [themselves] to chats [sic]. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
The original remark downplays both the importance of physical appearance 
and the problems related to a lack of face-to-face contact. The remark itself 
then becomes interpreted by the commenter (in an “exposing” mode) as a 
sign of the remarker’s own stigmatizing appearance. That is, the 
interpretation implies that strict criteria are only problematic for those 
respondents who cannot fulfill them. Strict criteria concerning physical 
appearance in advertisements can be interpreted either as (1) a sign of a 
“superficial” writer’s excessive focus on outward appearance or as (2) a sign 
of the writer’s own valued appearance (and wish to sieve off those for whom 
he or she is “too good”). Correspondingly, defending a lack of emphasis on 
such criteria, or an actual lack of such criteria in one’s advertisement, can be 
interpreted either as (1) a sign of a “deep” person or as (2) a sign of the 
writer’s own stigmatized appearance (and wish to elude the topic). On the 
one hand, then, high selectivity is seen as a relatively reliable sign of a non-
“cheater” and non-“fake,” since they would hardly intentionally narrow the 
range of repliers, but the risk of a “too good” or “narcissist” case similarly 
increases. On the other hand, some interactants suggest that, for a writer, 
strict criteria are a problem, since the stricter one’s criteria are, the more 
likely the replier will be a “fake” (“if the demands are excessive then the 
replier is a fraud,” jos vaatimukset suhteettomat niin vastaaja on huijari, 
ND: 55). That is, the “too good” tend to attract repliers with deceitful 
intentions, since the latter need not really care about the criteria at all.  
In a similar vein, the following commenter deplores the effect of such 
negative stereotypes on the performances of “normal” and “decent” men: 
 
(7.6) Kunnollisia miehiä löytyy kyllä sivustolta [Suomi24], mutta ne urpot jotka ovat 
pilanneet sivuston maineen, ovat myös aiheuttaneet sen että kunnollisten, etenkin 
sellaiset ilmoitukset jotka tuntuvat liiankin hyviltä, naisten mielestä 
vaikuttavat ”pelimieheltä” tai huijaukselta. (Vauva Mar 23, 2012.) 
(7.6) Respectable men can really be found on the site [Suomi24], but those idiots who 
have ruined the reputation of the site, have also caused the fact that the 
advertisements of the respectable, particularly those that seem even too good, 
seem like a “player” or a hoax to women. (Vauva Mar 23, 2012.) 
 
According to the comment, “normal” participants become affected in more 
than one way. Firstly, a general shadow of suspicion is cast on any online 
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dater. Secondly, those who succeed in fighting off that suspicion and giving a 
good impression of themselves are at risk of appearing suspiciously good. 
They may be taken as “players” or “fakes.” That is, there is a risk of being 
mistaken both for a stigmatized person and for a stigmatized person trying to 
pass as normal (i.e., faking their way through the advertisement phase). One 
must simultaneously avoid appearing socially inept and “too good.” The 
comment also points to those cultural norms that regulate the kinds of lives 
and personae “ordinary” people are entitled to (see Sacks 1985 [1970]). 
Unless one is a celebrity or some other type of person with special biographic 
rights (e.g., rights to a seemingly “glamorous” or “glorious” life) (see Marshall 
2010), it may be problematic to appear too ideal, for this might be taken as a 
sign that you do not fully understand the appropriate reality of your social 
type and are, therefore, either a fake or otherwise suspicious. That is, “ideal” 
personhood has to feel sufficiently “real” and “normal,” too, to be effective 
(cf. also sections 5.2.1 and 6.4). 
The stigmatizing metadiscourses also have counterforces. That is, the 
negative stereotypes of personhood associated with online dating are actively 
fought against by a number of parties. Unsurprisingly, a positive only 
imagery of online dating is disseminated by the online dating service 
providers with commercial interests. The branding and advertising of dating 
services follows clear patterns in terms of slogans and pictures. The icons of 
online daters disseminated by the services invariably include, for example, 
attractive couples in amorous poses (see e.g. figure 2 from Match.com). 
 
Figure 2 Attaching positive imagery to an interactional practice. 
However, in the Internet discussions themselves, negative images of 
personhood often become balanced by participants who have had or have 
heard of positive experiences: 
 
(7.7) Olenkohan ollut jotenkin poikkeuksellisen onnekas, kun olen päätynyt 
nettitreffeille ainoastaan normaalien ja mukavien naisten kanssa? (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.7) I wonder if I have been somehow exceptionally lucky, as I have only ended up on 
net dates with normal and nice women? (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
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The guidebooks, for their part, usually present a relatively balanced and 
diplomatic picture. They do warn their readers about possible risks but, on 
the other hand, take a clearly positive stance towards online dating practice 
in general. For instance, the preface of Nettideitit – Uusi onni verkosta? 
(“Net dates – A new happiness from the web?) (ND), published in 2011, ends 
with a kind of mission statement in which the writers acknowledge the 
problematic imagery associated with online dating but argue against it: 
 
(7.8) Yhä edelleen nettideittailua hieman hävetään, se salataan, sille naureskellaan ja 
siitä varoitellaan. Turhaan: nettideittailu on vain yksi tapa muiden sosiaalisten 
nettipalveluiden joukossa hyödyntää verkon tarjoamia kontaktimahdollisuuksia. Jos 
suhtautuu nettideittailuun sopivalla yhdistelmällä avoimuutta, kepeyttä ja järjenkäyttöä, 
se on mitä kätevin tapa löytää (monenlaista) seuraa. (ND: 6.) 
(7.8) Still today people are ashamed of online dating, it is kept a secret, it is laughed at 
and warned about. Unnecessarily: online dating is just one way among other social net 
services to take advantage of the contact possibilities offered by the Internet. If one views 
online dating with an appropriate combination of openness, light-heartedness and 
presence of mind, it is a most convenient way to find (all kinds of) company. (ND: 6.) 
 
The starting point for ND, then, is that such a stigma should not exist 
anymore. The preface, like many comments in Internet conversations, 
attempts to substitute rational reasons for the stigma-oriented ones. It 
emphasizes the interactional possibilities offered by online dating. A typical 
sales pitch for the guidebooks is that, as long as one has the right attitude and 
the right techniques, such as the ones offered by the guidebook, one can 
better anticipate and avoid the minefields of online dating and it becomes a 
“practical” instrument. Both the stigmatization and the “rational” advantages 
of online dating, then, are in part based on the same features of the 
interactional infrastructure. 
7.1.2 METASEMIOTIC MODELS OF LANGUAGE AND PERSONHOOD 
This section compares the three guidebooks in the data (Sinkkunaisen 
käsikirja, Nettideitit – Uusi onni verkosta? and Nettideittailijan 
eloonjäämisopus, see Data sources and section 3.2) from the standpoint of 
the kinds of relations between language use and personhood they direct 
attention to. Similar viewpoints do appear in various feature articles and 
Internet discussions in the data too, but in a more fragmentary and passing 
form. Let us begin with Sinkkunaisen käsikirja (literally “A single woman’s 
handbook”114,  2006), which is a chronologically organized, diary-like guide 
                                                 
114 The author herself calls it a “Girl’s Survival Book” in the English section of her website, also 
characterizing it as “The bachelorette’s Bible” and “Sex in the City meets Bridget Jones” 
(http://viiviavellan.com/blogi/?page_id=170) [Nov 30, 2013]. 
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to living the life of a single woman, written by a Finnish, then 29-year-old 
female celebrity reporter. In this particular guidebook, online dating is just a 
subplot but the way social types of people are treated makes it especially 
interesting. The writer groups men into ten different types (see Table 9) that 
systematically appear in different contexts throughout the book. In a number 
of tables, the types are associated with a wide range of behaviors and 
attributes, including drawn pictures and real-life icons (i.e., celebrities who 
embody one of the ten types): 
 
Designation Translation or explanation 
renttu misbehaving, good-for-nothing 
filosofi philosopher 
jäkkis hockey guy, jock 
Herra Näsä Mr. Wiseguy 
rokkari rocker 
silkkisukka silk socks 
surffari surfer 
runopoika poem boy 
teekkari engineering student, gearhead 
äijä macho 
Table 9. Types of men according to “A single woman’s handbook” (SK) 
The focus in this section will be on a table called “How to analyze men on 
the Internet” (SK: 198–201), since it most explicitly discusses the 
relationship between linguistic self-presentation and the ten social types. For 
each type, the table presents five kinds of data: 1) typical “code names” used 
by the type; 2) what a representative of the type tells about himself; 3) what 
they wish or expect from “you” (i.e., their female respondents); 4) a drawn 
picture; and 5) a representative sample of discourse (i.e., typical comments 
or slogans or habitual patterns of self-presentation). Earlier in the book, 
when the types are originally introduced, each type is specifically assigned a 
“motto” (SK: 50–60). Each type is, then, known both by the author’s 
descriptions of their characteristics (some of which are discursive habits) and 
by their own direct speech (some of which represents their own 
characteristics). That is, three representational perspectives are co-present: 
the author’s representations of the type’s (habitual) behaviors or attributes, 
the type’s own (habitual) linguistic representations of those behaviors or 
attributes, and the author’s representations of the type’s own (habitual) 
linguistic representations. (Cf. also section 4.4.5.) 
One of the ten types departs clearly from all others. For the crude-looking 
macho guy, no information is provided in any column. Instead, his whole row 
is replaced by one capitalized statement: “online dating is for gays” 
(NETTIDEITTAILU ON HOMOJEN HOMMAA). The rocker’s comment is in English 
(“Let me be your light and smile, somewhere, someday, somehow… It’s your 
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turn”), but all others are in Finnish. Let us take a closer look at the 
“philosopher” and the “surfer” (see Table 10). 
 
Type Code-
name 
Tells about himself 
(e.g.) 
Wishes from you 
(e.g.) 
Comments 
Filosofi Stratagem, 
Pietro-
maria, 
Jekyllhyde 
Harrastaa – –
kirjallisuutta, pseudo-
tieteitä – – Kertoo 
leipovansa ja laittavansa 
ruokaa mielellään. 
“Nalle-karhuksikin ovat 
sanoneet.” 
Etsii sievää, 
sopusuhtaista, 
humoristista naista, 
joka ottaa täysin 
rinnoin vastaan kaiken 
mitä karuselli eteen 
heittää. 
”Tiedän, että sinä 
lymyilet siellä 
jossain, vaikka 
sitten 
bittiavaruudessa.” 
Philo-
sopher 
Stratagem, 
Pietro-
maria, 
Jekyllhyde 
Hobbies include – – 
literature, 
pseudosciences – – Says 
he bakes and cooks with 
pleasure. “They have 
called me a teddy bear 
too.” 
Looks for a pretty, 
normally built, 
humorous woman, who 
takes in fully all that the 
carousel throws in front 
of you. 
“I know that you are 
hiding somewhere 
out there, if only in 
bit space.” 
Surffari Goodbye-
porkpie, 
Arizona, 
Cod 
Kertoo olevansa 
rauhallinen sekoilija ja 
harrastavansa musiikkia 
ja extremeurheilua. 
Haluaa hauskuttajaksi 
elämäänsä jonkun, jota 
voi ihailla, kannustaa, 
kiusoitella, rutistaa, 
tukistaa, peitellä, tukea, 
piristää, naurattaa, 
suudella, nipistää, 
tanssittaa, halailla, 
hemmotella ja 
rakastaa. 
”Olen makoillut 
koko päivän 
sängyssäni ja 
fiilistellyt vanhoja 
legendakappaleita. 
Mahtavaa!” 
Surfer Goodbye-
porkpie, 
Arizona, 
Cod 
Says he is a calm freak-
out and does music and 
extreme sports. 
Wants an entertainer in 
his life, someone whom 
he can admire, 
encourage, tease, 
squeeze, pull by the 
hair, tuck in, cheer up, 
make laugh, kiss, pinch, 
dance with, hug, pamper 
and love. 
“I have been lying in 
my bed all day 
enjoying old 
legendary songs. 
Great!” 
Table 10. Two types of men and some of their self-presentational characteristics. 
We might first of all note that the philosopher, who is represented as an 
ensemble of various intellectual, elitist, and even relatively effeminate 
characteristics, employs the kind of “fictive” 2SG address examined in 6.3.3 
and alludes to the kind of “teddy bear” persona, an example of which was 
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examined in 4.4.4. In light of the advertisement data, the pattern of 
addressivity in question is relatively frequent and used by many kinds of 
writers. In this metasemiotic taxonomy, however, it is attributed only to a 
very specific social type.  
Although each type’s own comments are presented in quotes, somewhat 
obviously they are not plausible direct representations of the style of writing 
of the type in question. First of all, they exhibit a normalized register that 
does not differ markedly from the narrator voice. Those comments that 
include the 1SG pronoun do use, unlike the narrator voice, the colloquial 
variant (mä), but otherwise they conform fairly systematically to standard 
orthography and morphosyntax, which, of course, might reflect ideologies of 
publication. Secondly, “old legendary songs” is probably not the level of 
specificity at which an actual “surfer,” a connoisseur of music according to 
the description, would speak. Rather, the patterns of speech of the characters 
are generalized and represented from the perspective of a single woman. 
That is, the bits of direct speech are recognizably a single woman’s voicing of 
the speech of each type. This is even more obvious in the case of the “hockey 
guy” who bluntly declares: “my charisma grows in step with my arms [i.e., 
muscles].” The comment seems like a humorous parody of the denotational 
and interactional tendencies of the social type from the standpoint of a single 
woman, drawing attention to the type’s allegedly self-absorbed speech style 
and excessive focus on muscle growth. We can see, then, that there are 
several different layers of voicing operating in the examples: the characters’ 
behaviors and their own speech about their behaviors are all seen through 
the lenses of the narrator figure, a young, urban female, who is the 
professional writer of a commercially published work. The focus in the 
discourse samples is mainly on denotational patterns and some very general 
interactional patterns, such as patterns of addressivity or the use of 
exclamations (“Great!”). In short, rather than conveying an accurate image of 
ten different speech styles, the table conveys the general idea of the social 
indexicality of language: namely, that language use reflects the 
characteristics of the writer in relatively specific and fine-grained ways and 
that the interpretation of others’ language use is relative to the interpreter’s 
social type.  
A fair number of dating and lifestyle guidebooks on the market seem to 
have a more or less light, humoristic, and playful tone (perhaps because, 
according to these very same guides, lack of humor or playfulness is not 
exactly an asset in the dating game). The stereotypes in SK clearly have a 
dimension of humorous exaggeration. That, however, does not stop them 
from genuinely serving as models of personhood and having real effects (see 
also Hill 2008). In fact, in a newspaper interview the author admits that she 
uses some of the role names with her friends “even in reality” (oikeastikin) 
(IS Sep 22, 2006). Her comment implies that the types are used both jokingly 
– which, of course, is a very real usage, too – and in earnest. In Internet 
conversations and blog comments (IT Oct 13, 2006; S24 Jul 28, 2011) that 
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discuss the book, some commentators actively identify with one or more 
types and even add new ones to the list. Some commentors aggressively 
shoot down the stereotypes, yet many of them still use them as actual, if not 
particularly effective, interpretants of their personhood (Itseäni en ainakaan 
tunnista yhdestäkään, ei mene edes lähelle, “I don’t recognize myself in any 
of them, not even close”).  
Similar stereotyping and discussions about social indexicality appear in 
the other two guidebooks as well, albeit in a much less elaborated forms (see 
also 7.3). The section “The profile creates the first impression” (Profiili luo 
ensivaikutelman) in ND (p. 40), for instance, instructs as follows: 
 
(7.9) Parhaat profiilitekstit kuvastavat aina jollain tapaa kirjoittajaansa. Tyyli voi 
vaihdella lakonisesta hullunhauskaan, pääasia että teksti on omaleimainen, erottuva ja 
rehellinen ja sen lukemalla pystyy luomaan kirjoittajan persoonasta ja elämäntyylistä 
edes alustavan mielikuvan. ”Hei sinä tätä lukeva mies/nainen, otapa yhteyttä niin 
katsotaan mihin se johtaa!” -tyyppiset profiilit eivät kerro kirjoittajasta mitään. 
(7.9) Best profile texts are always in some way a reflection of their writer. The style can 
range from laconic to hilarious, the main thing being that the text is original, 
distinguishable and honest and by reading it one can construct at least a tentative image 
of the writer’s persona and lifestyle. Profiles of the type “Hey you man/woman who are 
reading this, write me and we’ll see where it leads!” tell nothing about the writer.  
 
These guidelines are very general and abstract, and, unlike the ones in SK, 
they are centered on individual “personality” rather than social types. 
Similarly, in NE, the section “You are text, you are pictures” (Olet tekstiä, olet 
kuvia) (p. 40) acknowledges the importance of the writer’s “persona” and 
how it is mediated by the text-artifact:  
 
(7.10) Säteilevä persoona, joka ei osaa kirjoittaa edes yhdyssanoja oikein, ei välttämättä 
pääse näyttämään säteilyään kiinnostuksensa kohteelle.¶ Ihmisen tuottama teksti on 
melko hyvä älykkyyden näyttötaulu, ja siitä voi päätellä myös sosiaalisia taipumuksia. 
(7.10) A radiant persona who cannot even spell compound words correctly, may not get a 
chance to show his or her radiance to the target of their interest.¶ The text that a person 
produces is a fairly good indicator of intelligence, and one can infer social tendencies 
from it as well. 
 
However, the focus is entirely on spelling and orthography. They become 
linked to social and mental kinds, such as intelligence and social competence. 
According to NE, a person who cannot spell correctly cannot appear 
intelligent and, therefore, cannot be taken seriously as a candidate in a 
courtship process. Although the chapter warns against making too hasty 
conclusions based on someone’s written performance, there is a heavy focus 
on evaluating texts in terms of normative correctness as a sign of the mental 
or social abilities of the writer. The entire following chapter in NE (p. 45–49) 
is devoted to belaboring the point that the spelling of compound words is of 
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utmost importance. The four and a half page chapter presents countless more 
or less “humorous” examples of how misspelling can change the meaning of a 
word or a sentence (although most of the examples are highly contrived).115 
The chapter later (NE: 47) further clarifies the authors’ definition of a 
“grammatical error”: 
 
(7.11) Puhekielen ja kieliopillisesti väärän kielen kirjoittaminen ovat kaksi ihan eri asiaa. 
Puhekieli on tyylijuttu, kielioppivirheet taas merkki välinpitämättömyydestä. 
(7.11) Writing spoken language and grammatically incorrect language are two totally 
different things. Spoken language is a matter of style, grammatical errors a sign of 
indifference.  
 
Writing “spoken language” is not a “grammatical error” (i.e., an index of the 
lack of a proper mental disposition) but a “matter of style” (i.e., an index of 
individual personality). Since all the examples concern spelling, it is 
impossible to say precisely what else the writers would regard as a 
“grammatical error.”  
ND puts forth similar ideas, although in a less stern manner. The 
importance of the normative correctness and skillfulness of textual 
performance appears several times in the book as does the logical implication 
that online dating favors people who “write well”:116 
  
(7.12) Nettideittailun sanotaan usein suosivan hyvin kirjoittavia ihmisiä. Jos profiiliteksti 
vilisee yhdyssanavirheitä ja on kirjoitettu täysin ilman välimerkkejä, siistiin kirjalliseen 
ilmaisuun mieltyneet karsiutuvat vastaajien joukosta ensimmäisinä. (ND: 41.) 
(7.12) It is often said that net dating favors people who write well. If your profile text is 
full of misspelt compounds and is written entirely without punctuation marks, those who 
appreciate neat written expression will be eliminated from the group of repliers among 
the first. (ND: 41.) 
 
However, according to ND, the reason for the importance of “correct” 
language is the fact that some people demand “neat” written expression. In 
other words, unlike in NE, the reasoning appeals to a type of norm-guarding 
generalized other rather than the norms per se. ND also emphasizes that 
signs such as the choice of words, the frequency of smileys, and the degree of 
                                                 
115 For instance, the misspelt compound “mieli pide” (mielipide, “opinion”) is analyzed as 
consisting of the words mieli (“mind”) and pide (“a type of Turkish bread”) (NE: 47): Sinulla on ”mieli 
pide”. Pide on turkkilainen leipälaji. Minä laitan sen päälle makkaraa. Entä sinä? (“You have a ‘mind 
pide.’ Pide is a type of Turkish bread. I put sausage on it. What about you?”)  
116 At another point (ND: 59), the guidebook emphasizes the importance of skilled writing by 
referring to a survey according to which the most common reason for the writers not to reply to a 
message they received was that the message was “boring or crass” (tylsä tai tökerö) (cf. section 6.5). In 
strict opposition, one of the quoted respondents of the writers’ own survey claims that the most skilled 
writers are hustlers (ND: 62) (cf. section 7.1.1). 
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“matter-of-factness” versus “speech-likeness” of one’s style are more 
important than orthography in the interpretation of individual personality: 
 
(7.13) Sanavalinnat, hymiöiden käyttäminen (liika on aina liikaa) ja tekstin yleinen tyyli 
– onko se kovin asiallista vai puheenkaltaista tekstiä – ovat oikeinkirjoitustakin 
merkittävämpiä seikkoja, kun tulkitsee viestin takana olevaa persoonaa. (ND: 60.)  
(7.13) Word choices, the use of smileys (too many is always too much) and the general 
style of the text – whether it is very matter-of-fact or speech-like text – are even more 
important matters than spelling when interpreting the persona behind the message. 
(ND: 60.)  
 
For ND, the object of interpretation, the writer’s “persona,” appears as 
something that lies “behind” the text-artifact. The more concrete surface-
level patterning and formulation of writing is something that stands between 
the respondent and the writer’s “persona.” The kinds of signs that are 
highlighted are, then, less emblematic and more indirect than in NE. It is 
emphasized that one should read others’ messages with “sensitive senses,” 
since in some cases even a “careless and unskilled” textual surface may belie 
the “own voice” of an agreeable person (Viestejä kannattaa lukea herkin 
aistein, kuulostella kirjoittajan omaa ääntä jopa huolimattoman tai 
taitamattoman viestin takaa, ND: 59). 
For the most part, then, ND and NE focus on the kinds of evaluative 
dimensions (e.g., “right” versus “wrong”) that are almost entirely absent from 
SK. Each of the three guidebooks adopts a slightly different kind of approach 
towards evaluating written performances in online dating advertisements, 
but the biggest difference is between SK and the two others. SK is mainly 
interested in social types and their distinctive interactional features and only 
more implicitly in individual characteristics. It should be noted that the focus 
in SK is on the (female) reader’s perspective, whereas the other two 
guidebooks emphasize the writer’s perspective. ND and NE do acknowledge 
the fact that writing conveys an impression of the writer’s individual persona, 
but superimposed over that layer of interpretation lies the normative 
dimension of “(in)correctness” and “(un)skillfulness.”117 NE, in particular, 
further links that dimension to (un)intelligence and social (in)competence. 
There is a primary test that everyone (regardless of their more specific kinds) 
must pass and that functions as a kind of gateway to deeper layers of 
meaning. Only by appearing “correct” and “skillful” (and “smart” and 
“competent”) does your text attract readers long enough for them to be able 
                                                 
117 ND (p. 60) does, in passing, cite one “brilliant example” of “writing incorrectly” 
(väärinkirjoittaminen) that relates more directly to social types. In that example a 50-year-old 
academic man writes in a highly colloquial and slang-tinted style. That is, the relation between 
language and social types is most explicitly acknowledged in the case of what is regarded by the authors 
as intentional and successful troping on stereotypic expectations. 
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to see your personal identity.118 “Unique” individuality is secondary to 
collective “normality.” Or at least it is limited to specific semiotic layers, such 
as the denotational content of the text. Individual differentiation by means of 
language stylizing (see Irvine 2001), then, is not exactly encouraged. SK, in 
contrast, has little concern for unitary social norms and presents linguistic 
variation according to social parameters as natural, although all actual 
illustrations of discourse in the book are relatively polished and 
standardized.  
In more specific terms, the guidebooks differ in terms of orders of 
indexicality (see Silverstein 2003), as they appeal to different value-giving 
models or organize them differently. Each guidebook embodies a different 
kind of ontology and epistemic formation. That is, each guidebook theorizes 
and directs attention to different kinds of empirical observations and 
suggests different kinds of practical consequences for these observations. In 
their own specific ways, they narrow the range of appropriate and effective 
linguistic signs in online dating advertisements. If we now compare the ideas 
disseminated in the guidebooks to the interpretation of “views of 
subjectivity” in chapter 4 or to a variety of other textual patterns analyzed in 
chapters 4–6, we immediately see that a great number of actually occurring 
sign patterns in the data sharply contrast with the examples in all three 
guidebooks. That is, the many forms of non-standard (whether “creative” or 
“incorrect”; “personal” or “negligent”) syntax and orthography that actual 
online dating advertisements abound with are not publicly represented in 
any of the guidebooks (or anywhere else in the metadiscourse data to any 
significant degree). SK might, in principle, accept them as type-specific forms 
of language use. Conversely, the kinds of interpretations suggested by NE 
and ND were indeed numerous in the questionnaire responses examined in 
section 4.2. Excerpt 4.6 in 4.2.3, for instance, was typified as the product of 
an “uneducated bimbo” by some respondents. Some, in contrast, found the 
writer “laid-back” and “funny.” That is, they were able to interpret the same 
textual patterns as a positive index of a particular kind of personality or mind 
style precisely because of their non-standard forms – or “grammatical errors” 
and lack of “neatness” as they would be typified in light of NE. 
Finally, we might note that all three guidebooks, in some form, exhibit 
and disseminate an acute awareness of social indexicality and of the 
importance of details of language use in social life. There seems to be little 
trace of such common ideologies as referentialism (i.e., language seen merely 
as a means of referring-to and predicating-about extralinguistic states of 
                                                 
118 In addition to these two dimensions, “politeness” is also mentioned as something that should 
apply to the Internet as much as it does to other fields of life. Politeness is, however, not explicitly 
linked to specific features of language use in the advertisement text. For instance, the section 
Kohteliaisuus kuuluu myös nettiin (“Politeness belongs in the net too”) in NE (p. 50–51) talks in a very 
general manner about “not being rude” (e.g., notifying the other person if you wish to end the online 
contact or if you are late for your date).  
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affairs) or personalism (i.e., “real” meaning reduced to the intentions and 
inner states of the speaker and language reduced to a means of conveying 
them) (see Rosaldo 1982; Bauman & Briggs 2003; Hill 2008; Wilce 2009a). 
In part, this might be explained by the fact that many of the authors (i.e., a 
reporter, a journalist, and a researcher) are clearly classifiable as professional 
“language workers” (Thurlow 2007), implying a more reflective relation to 
language use. It is, however, equally important to point out that the 
phenomenologically rich variation among actual online dating 
advertisements is not represented in any of the guidebooks. Most of them 
rely on polished or generalized examples and on interviews, narratives, or 
opinions about online dating advertisements (i.e., on other forms of 
metadiscourse). 
For some writers, there may be a contradiction between being 
linguistically true to one’s social type or personality (or ideals thereof) and 
complying with generalized others and presumed general cultural norms. For 
many people the two might, of course, never even conflict. The next section, 
instead, discusses a concern that seems to preoccupy in some way most 
interactants and that comes up in all subsets of the metadiscourse data. 
7.2 PROMOTIONAL DISCOURSE, EVALUATIVE 
STANCETAKING, AND “TRUTH” 
This section approaches the external metadiscourse data from the standpoint 
of how language use in online dating advertisements is understood to 
correspond to the “truth.” This correspondence may be framed in more 
specific ways with terms such as “(dis)honesty,” “(in)sincerity,” 
“(im)modesty,” “(un)reliability,” or “(in)authenticity,” which all point to 
particular kinds of (in)coherence between different kinds of semiotic 
processes (such as someone’s linguistic representations and their private 
beliefs). The main focus in this section will be on cultural and ideological 
stereotypes concerning various discrepancies between the “real” person and 
the “image” or “persona” conveyed by online dating advertisements. These 
discrepancies can concern various kinds (e.g., personality, moods, bodily 
features, social statuses) and be ontologized in many different ways in 
relation to agency, intentions, or motives (e.g., “delusional” versus 
“insincere” or “immodest”). 
Unlike commercial advertising of products and services, online dating 
advertisements are not legally or institutionally regimented in terms of their 
“truthfulness.” Neither are they monitored by government agencies or ruled 
on by courts. Similar problems, however, do arise in the domain of 
commercial advertisements and dating advertisements (such as ones 
concerning the “misleading” of readers), but they are settled in quite 
different ways. Parmentier (1994: 142–155) traces historical changes in the 
legal metasemiotic regimentation of advertising discourses in the US. In the 
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1800s, advertising was understood as persuasive by its very nature, and, 
consequently, any sensible consumer was expected to use their critical 
judgement when interpreting advertisements. The official metapragmatic 
label for such language use was “puffery.” Moreover, what legally counted as 
acceptable “puffery” could still be morally evaluated as reprehensible. 
Cultural changes, such as the extension of constitutional protection to 
commercial discourses that were seen as vital to the functionality of the 
economic system and society, gradually led to a legal re-interpretation of 
advertisements as essentially informational in character, although their de 
facto persuasive nature remained. According to Parmentier (id. p. 151), one 
of the effects was an increased trust among consumers in the fact that 
government regimentation ensured the truthful referential nature of 
advertisements. That is, if a consumer believes that it is illegal to make 
“false” representations, their sense of critical judgment may weaken. 
The line between legally acceptable “puffery” and unacceptable 
“misrepresentation” was drawn, for instance, based on whether the qualities 
that a product actually had were merely “fancifully” exaggerated or whether a 
product was assigned qualities it did not actually possess. Another essential 
criterion concerned the metapragmatic marking of the advertisement. 
“Puffery” was not supposed to include any signs that might have suggested 
that the representation was to be interpreted as “literally” descriptive of the 
product. Whereas Parmentier’s discussion focuses on the referential (and 
persuasive) concerns of early advertising, in modern advertising the 
performative aspect is emphasized. Advertisements attach attractive imagery 
of personhood and lifestyles to commercial products, thereby formulating 
them as social indexicals that can be effectively used for self-presentational 
purposes by consumers (see Agha 2011a; also Wernick 1991). The notion of 
“truth,” then, becomes more complicated. Moreover, when the object of 
“puffery” is a person, it becomes increasingly obvious that the line between 
qualities (or kinds) that an object (or an individual) actually has or does not 
have is much more complicated than the above legal discourses about 
commercial products would imply. The matter of “acceptable” 
representations, then, is not only about how signs stand for objects but how 
various agents of interpretation expect them to stand for objects in light of 
their cultural models. That is, the “embellishing” or “beautification” of 
representations or performances is simultaneously evaluated in light of a 
number of different dimensions (see also Parmentier 1994: 148; Bauman 
1983). What is regarded by some community as technically acceptable self-
presentation (or “puffery of self”) may still not be regarded as entirely 
“truthful.” On the other hand, even a sufficiently “truthful” embellished 
representation may be morally disapproved of because of the particular 
individual intentions (e.g., vanity) or general cultural motivations (e.g., 
commercial interest) behind such representations.  
Similar, albeit more implicit, categorizations of types of discourse based 
on their “truthfulness” appear in scientific discourses as well. In discourse 
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and genre studies, “promotionality” has been closely linked with the polarity 
of evaluative stancetaking (or “saying only positive things”) and with notions 
such as “persuasion” and “interest.” That is, promotional discourses have 
been seen as discourses that aim to promote the “interests” of the producers 
and to persuade the readers to adopt them (see e.g. Shaw 2006: 9). “Puffery,” 
then, is seen as a stereotypic feature of these discourses. In addition to 
prototypical cases of promotional discourse (e.g., advertisements, sales 
letters), Bhatia (2004) groups under the colony of promotional genres, for 
instance, certain kinds of book and film reviews, in which one may find 
promotional concerns (id., p. 61). For Bhatia, “promotion” is strongly 
anchored in the polarity of evaluation. That is, one of the most distinctive 
features of promotion seems to be its focus on only positive aspects (see e.g. 
2004: 59, 90; cf. Catenaccio 2008: 27). Shaw (2006), on the other hand, 
criticizes Bhatia for lumping together such a heterogeneous set of genres and 
proposes a distinction between evaluative and promotional genres according 
to the notion of “interestedness.” In Shaw’s words, “book reviews are not 
promotional” since the “recipients may justifiably expect them to be 
disinterested.” Among other examples of “disinterested” genres Shaw lists, 
for instance, the scientific research article and, interestingly, the government 
health propaganda item. 
Bhatia’s and Shaw’s models differ in the way the relationship between 
promotionality, interest, and discourse is understood. For Bhatia, 
promotionality seems to be, first and foremost, a matter of discourse 
organization and surface-level textualization. There is a somewhat 
straightforward link between promotionality and positive evaluation. Shaw 
(2006: 10–11), however, makes the essential distinction between concrete 
discourse, promotional purposes, and the expectations of readers. For Shaw, 
positive evaluation is a feature of “promotional discourse” but does not 
directly ensue from promotional purposes. In some cases it may be in 
accordance with the promotional purposes not to employ overt “promotional 
discourse” in order to induce impressions of “modesty” or “humility” (see 
also Östman 2005). Shaw does not, however, give a particularly satisfying 
definition of “interest.” Exactly in what sense is the book review, let alone the 
health propaganda item, not “interested?” Shaw’s (2006: 1) criteria, which 
refer to the “profits or personal happiness” of the producers of the text, 
suggest a highly specific and limited approach to “interest” (and do not 
specify concrete ways in which texts may or may not contribute to “personal 
happiness”). They seem to exclude, for instance, the “promotion” of social 
structures, statuses, and identities. Furthermore, however we choose to 
understand “interest,” there is an essential difference between having an 
interest and pursuing that interest. After all, humans are capable of, for 
instance, morality and self-control. In any actual event, many kinds of more 
specific goals, beliefs, and desires co-incide and conflict, and (linguistic) 
action is the result of their complex interplay. (See also Ylikoski 2001.) To 
sum up, one might claim that all forms of discursive behavior are marked by 
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a variety of interests. In contrast to Shaw, it could be claimed that (1) any 
type of stereotypically “evaluative” or “promotional” discourse is in actuality 
mediated by a number of different more specific “interested” goals and that 
(2) many types of both “evaluative” and “promotional” discourse additionally 
share the goal of performing an image of “disinterestedness” (cf. also 5.2.2). 
In this study, “(dis)interest(edness)” in discourse is approached solely as 
an issue of ethnometapragmatic negotiation (see Silverstein 2003; also e.g. 
Keane 2002; Shoaps 2002; Bauman & Briggs 2003). That is, “disinterested” 
and “interested” are interpretants of personhood that participants negotiate 
in light of their ontologies in the unfolding interactional processes. As 
sections 7.2.1–7.3 suggest, such interpretations are fractionated and 
participants do not often agree on them. Interpretation of discourse, then, 
overlaps with a variety of folk psychological and language ideological 
evaluations of, for instance, in what sense and for what purpose particular 
forms of language use are or are not “reliable” (see Bauman & Briggs 2003).  
The ideal of and the very possibility for, say, making one’s words correspond 
with an inner truth, thereby making that inner truth transparent to others, 
rely on particular sociohistorical ontologies. For instance, according to Keane 
(2002: 74), the Protestant notion of “sincerity,” the transparent 
correspondence between words and interior states, is linked to the historical 
emergence of referentialism, a family of language ideologies that emphasize 
the referential function of language (over or instead of, say, the performance 
of social identities) (see also Trilling 1972; Bauman & Briggs 2003: e.g. 59–
63; Wilce 2009a: 39, 199; 2009b: 101–102). The above discussions illustrate 
that in many ontologies unilateral representations of objects that are 
understood as somehow closely linked to the speaker have a special status. 
The distrust that is often related to such representations seems to stem not so 
much from the representations per se but from a one-sided organization of 
metastance relations in which corroborating or contrasting accounts from 
others in independent vantage points are missing. The following sections 
take an empirical look at metadiscourses that discuss such matters in relation 
to online dating advertisements.  
7.2.1 TRANSLATING PROMOTIONAL DISCOURSE INTO NON-
PROMOTIONAL DISCOURSE 
Let us start by taking a look at a recurring metadiscursive pattern that is 
particularly well crystallized in the online dating guidebooks. All three 
guidebooks contain a section with more or less humorous guidelines for 
translating the language use in online dating advertisements into everyday 
language. In other words, the underlying assumption is that language in 
online dating advertisements is not quite reliable at face value but relates in a 
variety of conventional and inferential ways to the “truth.” A particular mode 
of interpretation, then, is needed, and it is the aim of the guidebooks to 
illustrate that mode to their readers. The first short and simple example from 
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ND stresses that online dating advertisements, like other promotional 
discourses such as housing advertisements, have their own “code” (i.e., a 
conventional set of relations between particular signs and particular 
denotational stereotypes): 
 
(7.14) Ja kuten asuntoilmoituksissa, myös nettideitti-ilmoituksissa on oma 
koodistonsa: ylipaino on kurvikasta pyöreyttä ja katseenkestävyys miehillä 
tarkoittanee sitä, ettei kukaan ole tavatessa juossut pakoon. (ND: 39.) 
(7.14) And just like housing ads, dating ads have their own code: overweight is curvy 
roundness and, as for men, looking tolerable probably means that no one has run away 
at their sight. (ND: 39.) 
 
That is, according to ND, certain sign patterns used in the advertisements 
cannot be taken simply in their standard (denotational or connotational) 
meanings but need to be redirected to slightly different denotational 
stereotypes. “Curvy roundness,” for instance, is referentially equated with 
“overweight” but registerially contrasted with it.  Both expressions could be 
used to interpret the same person (as an object), but they are indexically 
linked to different personae (as animators). “Curvy roundness” is used by the 
promotional persona, and “overweight” would be used by relatively neutral 
and objective non-promotional personae. (For the “demotional” extreme, cf. 
example 7.8 in 7.2.2.) It is not that “curvy roundness” would not truthfully 
denote the particular aspect of the object that it does denote, but the 
interpreter needs to be aware of the very specific mode of denotational 
entextualization (e.g., what this particular symbolic formulation draws 
attention to; what it elides and why; how it relates to other modes). 
The other two guidebooks offer even more elaborate and concrete 
examples. In SK, a section called “Interpret him right” warns guidebook 
readers about “boasters” and their advertisements that may contain 
“modified personal histories.” The ensuing table instructs readers how to 
interpret their advertisements. (Only a few representative examples are 
included in the following excerpts.) The first column lists different ways in 
which they can present the matter in the advertisement and the second what 
those formulations can “really” mean: 
 
(7.15) 
Maailma on miehiä täynnä, mutta millaisia!? Keekoilevia kukkoja ainakin riittää, 
mutta usein heidän itsetuntonsa lepää hienovaraisesti muokatun henkilöhistorian 
varassa. Aikaa näihin wannabe-tyyppeihin ei kannata kuitenkaan hukata. Joten 
tuntosarvet pystyyn: mitä enemmän tyyppi on saanut aikaan, sitä vähemmän hän 
teoillaan pröystäilee. 
The world is full of men – but what kind of men!? There is no shortage of cocksure 
boasters, but their self-esteem often rests on a slightly modified personal history. It is 
useless to waste time on these wannabes. So prick up your antennae: the more the guy 
has actually achieved, the less he brags about it. 
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How he presents the matter: …and what it can really mean: 
Toimin elokuvien levityksen parissa. 
work:IND.PRS.1SG 
I work in film distribution. 
On myyjänä videovuokraamossa. 
be:IND.PRS.3SG 
[He] is a clerk at a video rental shop. 
Olen ottanut osaa laajaan farmaseuttiseen 
tutkimukseen. 
AUX    participate:PP (=IND.PERF.1SG) 
I have participated in a large pharmaceutical 
study. 
Poltellut pilveä viimeiset kymmenen vuotta. 
 
smoke(FREQ):PP 
[Has] Been smoking pot for the last ten 
years. 
Olin nouseva tähti jääkiekossa; vain polvet 
eivät kestäneet. 
be:IND.PRET.1SG 
I was a rising star in ice hockey; only [my] 
knees couldn’t take it. 
Kävi lapsena luistelukoulua ja harjoitteli 
lähiöliigassa D-junioreissa. 
go:IND.PRET.3SG 
[He] went to skating school as a child and 
trained in the suburban junior league.  
Olen freelance-pelisuunnittelija. 
be:IND.PRS.1SG 
I am a freelance game designer. 
Riippuvainen pelikonsoleista. 
- 
Addicted to game consoles. 
(SK: 194―195.) 
 
The predicates and nominal verb forms in the examples have been glossed in 
order to show the systematic change of perspective between the two columns. 
The first column voices a simulated promotional persona. In the first 
column, all but one of the twelve sentences contain explicit 1SG deictics. In 
the latter column, the first-person perspective has been transformed into a 
3rd- person perspective that simulates an independent non-promotional 
vantage point on the same person. That is, it makes explicit (or “exposes”) 
part of those metastance relations that are normally not accessible to readers 
of online dating advertisements. 
It is noteworthy that the characteristics denoted in the first column are 
relatively neutral biographic representations, particularly when taken 
individually. They do not contain explicit evaluative stancetaking or lexemes 
with clearly positive connotations and are not particularly salient or 
exceptional in any way. However, when juxtaposed with the second column, 
a clear pattern emerges. The latter column denotes a state of affairs that is 
recognizably a lower, anterior, or less valued degree of the first one in light of 
stereotypes of social life, biographic trajectories, or career ladders. That is, 
the table itself makes an evaluative contrast relatively emblematic. The 
biographic facts in the first column appear as somehow superior in relation 
to the latter ones. More specifically, the contrasts imply that the 
“promotional” formulation is a sort of wished-for version of the “actual” fact. 
The third example (“a rising star in ice hockey”) further implies that the 
writer is attached to and longing for a self-presentational form that may have 
been true a couple of decades ago but certainly not anymore (cf. habitualized 
and “out of sync” self-presentation in 4.4.5). In one way or another, then, the 
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exposing other in the second column cuts the simulated promotional persona 
down to size before the eyes of the guidebook reader. 
Similarly, in NE, the chapter called “A new dictionary” sketches a lexicon 
of the “new language” that online daters should master. The chapter is 
addressed specifically to novices. A list of 19 thematically grouped 
expressions (nouns, adjectives, an adverb and a pronoun) and their glosses is 
offered. “Ordinary-looking,” for instance, means “ugly” and “teddybear” 
means “overweight and hairy” (cf. 4.30 in 4.4.4). Someone who lists 
“computers” as their hobby is a “net addict.” Furthermore, the word 
“romantic” means that the person it refers to “wants to get married right 
away”:  
 
(7.16) 
Uusi sanakirja 
Voi sinua noviisi. Osasitko kuvitella, että nettideittailulla on ihan oma sanastonsa? 
Luulisi sitä itse kunkin oman äidinkielensä hallitsevansa. Väärin. Alla ote uudesta 
kielestä, jota olisi hyvä osata. 
Viiskymppinen = 58 v. 
[- -] 
Pukeutumistyyli: 
mahdollisimman mukavasti = verkkarit ja kaljamaha/riippurinnat 
[- -] 
Harrastukset: 
Tietokoneet = nettiriippuvainen 
Naiset = vonkaaja  
[- -] 
Sinä = naiset = vonkaaja 
[- -] 
Tavallisen näköinen = ruma 
Nallekarhu = ylipainoinen ja karvainen  
Romanttinen = haluaa heti naimisiin  
Huomaavainen = huomaa, kun tuot kaljan 
(NE: 135–136.) 
 
(7.16) 
A New Dictionary 
Oh, you poor novice. Could you imagine that online dating has its very own vocabulary? 
You’d think that everyone masters their native tongue. Wrong. Below is an excerpt of a 
new language that you should know. 
In their fifties = 58 years old 
[- -] 
Dressing style: 
as comfortably as possible = sweatpants and a beer belly/saggy breasts 
[- -] 
Hobbies: 
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Computers = a net addict 
Women = a sex pest [lit. “a pesterer” (for sex)] 
[- -] 
You = women = a sex pest 
[- -] 
Ordinary-looking = ugly 
Teddybear = overweight and hairy 
Romantic = wants to get married right away  
Attentive = notices when you bring [them] a beer 
(NE: 135–136.) 
 
A man who lists “women” as his hobby is a sex pest. A man who lists “you” as 
a hobby is also someone who pesters for sex, according to the logic of the 
guidebook. In this metasemiotic model, too, a particular way of using the 2SG 
pronoun in the online dating advertisement context is picked out as a salient 
feature and linked to a specific, and in this case relatively stigmatized, social 
type (cf. section 6.3 and remember also the example in Table 10 in 7.1.2). The 
definition of huomaavainen (“attentive, considerate”) is a pun that restores 
the lexicalized meaning of the adjective to the verb huomata (“to notice”) 
from which it has been derived. An “attentive” (male) partner, then, is one 
who notices when you bring them a beer. This might be interpreted as a 
parody of a particular way of using linguistic symbols in promotional 
discourse. That is, huomaavainen (“attentive, considerate”) represents a 
positive, prestige typification that one should have, if only by manipulating 
the logic of interpretation so that one finds whatever way one can to fit that 
symbol to one’s life (without “lying” at least in the prototypic or most obvious 
sense). The direction is, in a sense, opposite to the “embellishing” cases in the 
lexicon, in which the point of departure is some potentially problematic 
constituent of the self (e.g., being “overweight and hairy” or “ugly”) for which 
one tries to select the most unproblematic and effective symbols. (For these 
two directions, see also sections 4.4.5 and 5.2.1.) 
What is common to all three excerpts above is, first of all, that the actual 
examples are clearly a form of humor. They are, in fact, a sort of parody of 
the language use in dating ads. However, this humorous aspect can easily 
belie the ideological importance of such representations. It is under the guise 
of humor that ideological constructs can sometimes get a much wider 
circulation than they would in any “serious” form (see Hill 2008; also Agha 
2007a: 197). Secondly, each of the excerpts presents a contrast between two 
sets of formulations that point to, as it were, the same state of affairs but are 
indexically linked to different personae: one with “promotional” interests and 
one with non-promotional or even “exposing” interests. Sometimes these 
contrasts of perspective involve a clear pattern of evaluative revalorization. 
That is, what is stereotypically positive (or “prestigious,” “unique”) or merely 
neutral in the speech of the promotional persona is turned into something 
stereotypically negative or neutral (or “banal,” “ordinary”) in the speech of 
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the other persona. The table, then, is translating “interested” discourse into 
its “disinterested” equivalent, thereby fostering a certain distrust of 
promotional language. It is, however, noteworthy that the contrasts are not 
explicitly interpreted here as a difference between honest and dishonest 
intentions (which does happen in the Internet discussions, see section 7.2.2), 
even if what people say is seen as differing from what would be closer to the 
“truth.” Rather, the examples give advice on how to reinterpret biographical 
performances in light of the goals and interests of the reader. Obviously, 
these “dictionaries” can also be used the other way around too, i.e., to turn 
one’s biographic contents into promotional discourse. In all, the 
discrepancies between the two personae appear here as a relatively normal 
part of the game. One needs to appear desirable or ideal without being either 
“dishonest” or naively “sincere.” It is, nevertheless, a challenging gray area, 
and appropriate “embellishing” is always a matter of degree (“the more the 
guy has actually achieved, the less he brags about it”). One must be wary of 
overstepping the line.  
Similar gradual patterns of “exposure” or steps of decreasing 
“promotionality” are modeled in SK in relation to courtship discourse in 
general. The evaluative tone of discourse, in particular, is linked with the 
phase and duration of the unfolding relationship. In a table titled “Do it 
yourself: A Real Man,” the writer gives examples of how a woman’s way of 
speaking to her partner changes over time. The examples are thematically 
organized (into “car,” “home,” “work,” “sports,” and “sex”). In the domain of 
work, for instance, some of the examples include:  
 
(7.17) 
1) “I bet your customers and all the ladies at your workplace have a crush on you”; 
“Your job sounds really interesting and responsible” [first few dates] 
(Kaikki sun asiakkaat ja varsinkin työpaikan leidit ovat varmasti aivan 
ihastuneita suhun; Sun työ kuulostaa tosi mielenkiintoiselta ja vastuulliselta) 
2) “I’m so proud of you! If your boss doesn’t soon realize your value to the company, 
I’m going to set him straight” [after two months] 
(Olen niin ylpeä susta! Jos sun pomo ei kohta tajua sun arvoa yritykselle, niin mä 
menen sanomaan sille suorat sanat) 
3) “I don’t understand why you don’t demand a raise. Are you such a wuss that you 
don’t dare to speak up in front of your boss?” [after two years] 
(En ymmärrä miksi et vaadi palkankorotusta. Oletko sä niin nössö, ettet uskalla 
puhua pomollesi suoraan?) 
(SK: 218–219.) 
 
As the interactants’ mutual discursive history grows in length and their social 
statuses change (from early courtship into steady dating and an established 
relationship), the evaluative tone of their interactions changes considerably 
(from flattering and supporting to belittling and challenging). According to 
this stereotype, then, explicit positive stancetaking is the salient feature of 
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specific, marked phases and events of social life (and will not last). The next 
section takes a closer look at metadiscourses related to explicit positivity and 
selectivity in online dating advertisements. 
7.2.2 POSITIVITY AND SELECTIVITY 
A similar, although slightly differently inflected distrust of the language of 
online dating advertisements that we saw in the guidebooks in the previous 
section can be found in the Internet discussions in the external 
metadiscourse data. Compared to guidebook writers, the interactants in 
these discussions include people who have more immediate personal 
interests in online dating and also represent opposite sides of the 
interactional process (e.g., women versus men, writers versus readers). In the 
following extract, a man replies to a woman’s earlier complaint according to 
which a lot of men have unrealistically and exaggeratedly positive ideas about 
their own physical appeal and, therefore, demand too much from their ideal 
respondents:  
 
(7.18) 
[Post from a woman] 
Siellä on paljon miehiä jotka kuvittelevat olevansa itse ihan vitun hyvännäkösiä ja sitten 
ne olettaa/haluaa että myös nainen on missinmitoissa ja missin näköinen. Tavallinen 
tallaaja kelpaa harvalle. 
[Reply from a man] 
Minulle kelpaisi tavallinen normaalipainoinen maatiaisnainen. Ei minua haittaa jos 
naiselle on vähän pömppömahaa sillä on minulla itsellänikin muutaman kilo 
ylimääräistä. Mutta sanat ”pyöreä” ja ”rehevä” tarkoittavat Suomi24 treffeillä 
olen sairaalloisen ylipainoinen siideri valas. 
(Vauva Mar 23, 2012.) 
 
(7.18) 
[Post from a woman] 
There are a lot of men there who think they are fucking good-looking and then they 
assume/want that the woman too has the measurements and looks of a beauty queen. 
Few are content with an ordinary person on the street. 
[Reply from a man] 
I would be content with an ordinary down-home woman of a normal weight. I don’t 
mind if the woman has a bit of belly on her since I myself have a few extra kilos. But the 
words “round” and “lush” mean on Suomi24 dates I’m a morbidly obese cider 
whale. (Vauva Mar 23, 2012.) 
 
According to the woman, few men are content with “ordinary” women. The 
replier, however, assures that an ordinary woman of normal weight would 
suit him perfectly well. The problem for him is, on the one hand, the 
relationship between self-presentation and truth and, on the other hand, the 
Online dating advertisements as an object of cultural metadiscourses 
262 
general (stigmatized) nature of online daters (see 7.1.1). Those who describe 
themselves as ordinarily “round” and “lush” in reality turn out to be 
“morbidly obese cider whales.” According to the man, then, the limits of 
acceptable and appropriate embellishing are crossed. Another point of 
interest in the above example is the way in which the idealization of self is 
linked to the strictness of the criteria that one can impose on others. The 
woman seems to presume (normatively) that one can only demand ideality 
from others to the degree to which one is ideal oneself (e.g., the more good-
looking a man is the more good-looking ideal respondents he is entitled to). 
At the same time, she assumes (empirically) that this is not the case in 
actuality (i.e., the men are not as good-looking as they should be based on 
their demands). That is, both the writers’ self-presentations and their 
descriptions of ideal others are seen as discrepant in relation to some ideal of 
“truth.” Highly positive evaluation of self and high selectivity for ideal others 
are interpreted as inherently problematic activities, but specifically so if they 
do not relate to one another in an appropriate manner. 
Whereas in the previous example the writer’s concern with positive 
evaluative stancetaking was its excessively “embellishing” nature (i.e., the 
misleading way in which it interperets the object), in example (7.19) the 
quantity and composition of evaluative stancetaking is itself seen as a 
problem (more so than its “truthfulness”). The example is from an Internet 
discussion in which a woman has posted two actual replies to her 
advertisement as examples of the “low quality” of the respondents on a 
particular dating site. (According to her own experience “about 
0,0000000000000001 per mille [of the respondents] were fully sane.”) 
Example (7.19) consists of excerpts from one of the replies the woman 
received:  
 
(7.19) 
Hei! ¶ Hyvää joulua... toivottavasti tämä viesti tuo joulumielen :) – – ¶ Mulla on 
sellainen tunne, että meille voisi kehittyä jotain hyvää, sillä mulla on jäljittelemätön, 
vankkumaton ja pettämätön urheilullisuuden, älykkyyden, huumorintajun 
sekä kirjoitus- ja keskustelutaidon yhdistelmä. Ties vaikka sullakin olisi 
sellainen? Miten voin olla sulle iloksi ja hyödyksi? Olisi paljon sanottavaa ja 
kerrottavaa... – – ¶ No, jospa selvitän vielä vähän, millainen olen ja millainen persoona 
minuun kätkeytyy? – – Jos yritän selvitä vähällä, vastaan: monipuolinen, pohtiva, 
tuumiva, älykäs, herkkä, huumorintajuinen, hauska ja urheilullinen. 
Oikeastaan monipuolinen kattaa tämän kaiken. Tietysti jokainen meistä 
sellainen on, enemmän tai vähemmän, mutta haluan kohdallani käyttää silti sitä 
sanaa. ¶ (Vauva Mar 23, 2012) 
(7.19) 
Hi! ¶ Merry Christmas... hopefully this message will bring Christmas spirit :) – – ¶ I have 
a feeling that something good could develop between us, since I have an inimitable, 
unwavering and infallible combination of sportiness, intelligence, sense of 
humor as well as writing and conversation skills. Who knows maybe you have 
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one [= a similar combination?] too? How may I be of use and delight to you? I’d have a 
lot to say and tell… – – ¶ Well, perhaps I’ll explain a bit more what I’m like and what 
kind of persona lies within me? – – If I try to do it with little effort, I reply: versatile, 
contemplative, reflective, sensitive, humorous, funny and sporty. Actually 
versatile covers all this. Of course each of us is like that, more or less, but I still 
want to use that word in my case. ¶ (Vauva Mar 23, 2012) 
 
We can first note that the reply resembles an independent dating 
advertisement and contains hardly any references to the advertisement it is a 
reply to (i.e., it is self-presentational rather than responsive). The replier 
continues with, for example, several paragraphs related to physical intimacy. 
The replier’s discursive performance is not only regarded as potentially 
“untruthful” but also as a sign of social and mental abnormality (cf. section 
7.1.1) by both the original poster and another female interactant, who sees 
indices of “clear mental health problems,” “perhaps a character disorder” 
with “megalomania” and an “obsession with sex” and draws special attention 
to the “sick self-praise” (aivan selkeitä mt-ongelmia, kenties luonnehäiriö 
johon liittyy suuruudenhulluutta – – omakehu oli aivan sairasta – – ja 
pakkomielle seksiin). (The interactant has also bolded all instances of the 
word “sex” in the above text that she quotes in her reply.)119 The patterns of 
evaluative stancetaking (and the topical foci) of the reply become publicly 
interpreted as “pathologically” abnormal (see also Wilce 2009a: 172). The 
terminology the interactants use points to particular epistemic formations 
(such as popularized psychology that has found its way into folk 
psychological discourses) that both enables and justifies such interpretations. 
The contrast between the first two examples serves to illustrate that explicit 
positive evaluative stancetaking in the context of online dating can be 
problematized both as a cover-up for some stigmatizing fact or as a 
stigmatizing fact in itself (i.e., as a sign of some non-desirable mental 
disposition) in light of particular ontologies. 
Let us now return to the link between the positive evaluation of self and 
the selectivity for ideal others by looking at some more specific textual 
patterns. Excerpt (7.20) below is a parody of a woman’s online dating 
advertisement that was posted in a Finnish language-related Facebook group 
(Kielletyt sanat ja sanonnat, “Forbidden words and expressions”). In the 
first part his message, the writer condenses his experience of women’s online 
dating advertisements into five rules: 
 
Rule 1: The greeting is in the plural [cf. section 6.3] (Tervehdys laitetaan monikossa). 
                                                 
119 Another female interactant, however, finds no fault with the advertisement and later challenges 
the two others by questioning their attitude and asking for a more specific explanation (“Could 
someone explain what is wrong with those ads? – – What is it with you women?”, Voisiko joku 
selvittää mitä vikaa noissa ilmoituksissa on? – – Mikä teitä naisia vaivaa?). 
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Rule 2: The text begins with a disclaimer-like comparison to Pikku-Myy [“Little My,” a 
small and feisty female Moomin character], which justifies all sorts of (inappropriate) 
behavior [cf. section 4.4.4] (Tekstiosuuden alkuun ujutetaan “Pikku Myy” -
vastuuvapauslauseke (jolla saa ennakkoon luvan millaiseen käytökseen tahansa). 
Rule 3: One’s diverse activities are illustrated with the kinds of shoes one wears (Omista 
monipuolisista aktiviteeteista kerrotaan jalkinein).  
Rule 4: One’s multi-talentedness, self-directedness, and independence are illustrated by 
listing the kinds of tools one can handle (Monitaitoisuudesta, omatoimisuudesta ja 
riippumattomuudesta kerrotaan luettelemalla, mitkä työkalut pysyvät kädessä). 
Rule 5: Finally, one describes what one is NOT looking for and other vague and 
unspecified things [cf. sections 5.4, 6.3.4] (Lopuksi kerrotaan mitä EI haeta ja jotain 
muuta epämääräistä). 
 
Parodies are a particularly interesting form of metadiscourse, since they have 
to deal with very specific semiotic details. The writer illustrates each rule 
with a fictive advertisement that consists of the parts listed above. The 
following excerpt contains section 4 (“the kinds of tools one can handle”) and 
the first part of section 5 (“what one is NOT looking for”) as well as one 
representative example of readers’ comments: 
 
(7.20) 
[Excerpt from the original post; examples of rules 4 and 5] 
¶Kädessäni pysyy ruuvimeisseli, pajavasara, pöytäsirkkeli, momenttiavain, 
kulmahiomakone, kaasujuotin, laastinsekoitin, tärytin, iskuporakone, täsmäjyrsin, 
kivisirkkeli, poravasara, epäkeskolaikka, tasohiomakone, hitsauskone, runkonaulain, 
dieselsuutintesteri, liitosjyrsin, särmäyskone, putkileikkuri, induktiokuumennin, 
kierretankoleikkuri, paalutuskone, asfalttijyrsin, pylväsporakone, moottorisaha, jyrä, 
korkeapaineruisku, aggregaatti, oikohöylä, pulttipyssy, nauhahiomakone, NC-sorvi, 
pallonivelen ulosvedin, raivaussaha, puskutraktori, huopakattonaulain, paineilmatunkki, 
leikkurimurskain, betonimylly ja hydrauliprässi. 
¶En etsi lapsilleni isää, sillä se heillä jo on. En myöskään etsi avio- tai avomiestä, 
kirjeenvaihtoseuraa, elämänkumppania, tanssipartneria, juttukaveria, kahviseuraa, 
remonttireiskaa, matkakumppania, vakiopanoa, kämppäkaveria, baariseuraa, 
lounasdeittiä, kotiorjaa, arjen sankaria, seikkailua, mökkeilykaveria, nallekarhua, 
talonmiestä, ulkoiluseuraa, ystävää, seksipartneria, leffaseuraa, rakastajaa, salikaveria, 
avecia, yhden illan juttua, helluntaiheilaa, poikaystävää, varattua tai vapaata, renttua tai 
herrasmiestä enkä myöskään vanhempaa tai nuorempaa miestä. 
[Comment from a man] 
Tämä on loistava ja pureutuu suoraan suomalaisen naisen ongelmaan, että vaatimustaso 
on huomattavasti omaa tarjontaa korkeampi. Kuvitellaan, että miehen rimaa voidaan 
korottaa, kunnes on päästy pilviin.  
(KSS 23 Jun, 2012.) 
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(7.20) 
[Excerpt from the original post; examples of rules 4 and 5] 
¶I know how to handle a screwdriver, a smithy hammer, a circle saw, a momentum 
wrench, an angle grinder [+ 36 other tools, including a type of tractor] – –  
¶I’m not looking for a father for my children, since they already have one. I’m also not 
looking for a husband or a boyfriend, a pen pal, a lifepartner, a dance partner [+ 28 other 
social types, including “teddybear”] – – or an older or a younger man. 
[Comment from a man] 
This is brilliant and tackles directly the problem of the Finnish woman, namely that the 
level of demands is considerably higher than one’s own offerings. They think that the bar 
can be raised until the clouds have been reached.  
(KSS 23 Jun, 2012.) 
 
Many of the rules can be related to patterns that are actually frequent or 
salient in the advertisement data of this study, although the interpretations 
given in (7.20) are somewhat different. The use of 2PL address, for instance, 
is not frequent in the data, but it is used in specific, marked contexts (see 
6.3). Although the specific kind of metonymic or metaphoric presentation of 
self with long lists of artifacts, such as shoes or tools, is not frequent in the 
advertisement data, the list-like structures (associated with rules 3, 4, and 5) 
clearly ressemble the kind of taxonomic structuring examined in chapters 4 
and 5. Moreover, each object is metonymically related to some chronotope 
and habit of behavior, which are the essential ingredients of such taxonomic 
structures. In chapters 4 and 5, we analyzed such lists as hierarchical 
patternings of those constituents of the self that the writer considers most 
important. In the parody, however, the lists are interpreted quantitatively (cf. 
section 4.2.1) as an index of the writer’s wish to showcase her “diverse 
activities” and “multi-talentedness.” That is, the parody animates similar 
(meta)indices (e.g., lists and taxonomies) as the actual writers but interprets 
them differently, or at least in an exaggerated and more explicit manner, in 
terms of (meta)kinds (e.g., as stances towards the self and its constituents). 
As for rule 5, the accumulation of descriptions of what the writer is not 
looking for ends up excluding all conceivable persons (since the excluded 
social types cover all kinds of partners, lovers, and friends as well as “taken 
and free” and “older and younger” men). This is easy to interpret as a parody 
of the highly selective criteria for ideal others (cf. sections 5.4, 6.3.3, and 
6.3.4). The text, then, seems to parodically voice, for example, the bitter 
perspective of someone who has been rejected or sieved off by 
advertisements and their writers. Finally, we see that, as in example (7.19), 
the constitutive (positive) kinds of the self and the restrictive (negative) 
criteria for the ideal other are linked, implicitly in the parodic advertisement 
and explicitly by the sarcastic commenters. The more you (think you) have, 
the more you (think you) can demand – but both excessive self-praise and 
selectivity can easily turn against you.  
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Finally, we may compare this (“bitter male”) interpreter’s perspective to a 
(“bitter male”) writer’s perspective. In the following Internet discussion, two 
men talk about the composition of a dating advertisement. The first poster 
has listed three rules that an advertisement should follow. The two men agree 
on the first two rules, namely, that the profile should (1) attract the readers’ 
attention immediately and (2) be distinguishable and personal. However, 
they disagree on the third rule, namely, that the profile should be “truthful”: 
 
(7.21) 
[Original post] 
Jonkun pitäisi kirjoittaa ohjeet treffiprofiiliin kirjoittamisesta. ¶ Ainakaan siihen ei 
kannata laittaa mitään sosiaalisuudesta, optimismista tai ulospäinsuuntautuneisuudesta 
koska kaikki sanovat olevansa sellaisia. ¶ Profiilin 1) pitää herättää huomio heti, 
2) erottua eli olla persoonallinen ja 3) olla totuudenmukainen. 
[Reply from another man] 
Roskaa. ¶ 1 ja 2 kohta ovat oikein, mutta 3 kohdan tulisi olla juuri tuollainen 
mitä mainitset aiemmin eli ulospäinsuuntautuva jne. ¶ Missään nimessä ei saa 
olla ”tervettä itsekriitiikkiä” – – ¶ Eli varsinkin miehenä jos olet sitä tyyppiä joka ei laita 
tosielämässä liikaa voita leivän päälle koskaan niin se tapaa tulee opetella netissä ja 
päälle vielä höysteeksi kinkkua, juustoa, salaattia jne. jotta varmasti sinusta saa kuvan 
sinä unelmien prinssinä. – – ¶ Sitten yksi tai kaksi värikästä harrastusta ja miehen 
”persoona” netissä on valmis. ¶ Mutta mitkään terveet itsekritiikit, realismit ja 
”ole oma itsesi” tyyppiset häläpölöt eivät tuo normimiehelle naisia netissä. 
(IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
(7.21) 
[Original post] 
Someone should write instructions on writing a dating profile. ¶ At least one shouldn’t 
put in it anything about being social, optimistic or outgoing because everyone says they 
are like that. ¶ A profile 1) must attract attention immediately, 2) stand out, 
i.e., be personal and 3) be truthful. 
[Reply from another man] 
Rubbish. ¶ 1 and 2 are correct, but item 3 should be precisely of the kind that you 
mention earlier, i.e., outgoing etc. ¶ Under no circumstances should one have 
“healthy self-criticism” – – ¶ So particularly as a man if you’re of the type who in actual 
life never puts too much butter on your bread then that habit you must learn in the net 
and on top of it ham, cheese, salad etc. so that they will surely get an impression of you 
as that prince of their dreams. – – ¶ Then one or two colorful hobbies and the man’s 
“persona” in the net is ready. ¶ But none of that healthy self-criticism, realism 
and “be yourself” type of nonsense will bring a normal man women in the net. (IS 
Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
The two men seem to agree on the fact that the truthfulness of the 
advertisement is a secondary feature and the primary function is to arouse 
interest and mediate an impression of personality. That is, the choice of self-
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presentational forms should be governed by an understanding of what 
appears “unique” to readers. In fact, the first writer specifically dissuades 
writers from using “normal” positive typifications that are used (or usable) by 
“all” and essentially non-provable in the advertisement event, even if they are 
true (cf. sections 4.1, 5.2.1, and example 6.32 in 6.5). The other man, on the 
other hand, emphasizes the importance of such general typifications. Since 
he would replace rule 3 (“being truthful”) with the presentation of such 
typifications, it seems that to him they somehow contradict “truthfulness.” 
Later, he further implies that “truthfulness” to him would mean “healthy self-
critique” and “being yourself.” The two men, then, seem to understand the 
“truthfulness” of a self-presentational performance in quite different ways. 
The first writer insists on the truthfulness of the profile in the sense that 
whatever “distinguishable” and “personal” typifications one uses need to be 
chosen from that set of expressions that are understood as true. For him, 
then, idealization in the sense of unipolar biographic selectivity does not 
clash with truthfulness. It is entirely acceptable to exert biographic control 
and only select such contents that are positive, without compromising the 
truthfulness of one’s performance. To the latter writer, in contrast, 
truthfulness would seem to require “critique” and an evaluative balance (see 
also sections 5.2.2 and 5.6). His sarcastic comment, according to which one 
should learn to color “modest” biographic contents, further illustrates that 
his understanding of a successful advertisement is in contradiction with his 
self-conceptions. It is this discrepancy that seems to be the source of his 
affective comment. The writer exhibits angst over the felt obligation to 
appear like a “prince,” to suspend “healthy self-criticism” and to artificially 
appear more “colorful” than he really feels. Vice versa, “being himself” would 
require entextualizing contents that, according to his anticipations, would 
prove ineffective and non-desirable. Therefore, one should feign general 
positive characteristics. However, honesty (and trust) can only be achieved 
by revealing such inner vulnerabitilies.120 
                                                 
120 Another factor that is sometimes linked to the reliability of a person’s words in the 
metadiscourse data is money. It is feared that free dating services will attract problematic social types: 
“Sites that charge a fee have less of these ‘sickos’ or taken [men] pestering [for sex]” (Maksullisilla 
sivuilla on vähemmän näitä "sairaita" tai varattuja vonkaamassa, IS Oct 12, 2012), “Suomi24, 
apparently because it is a free service, contained way too many adventurers and/or psychically 
disturbed individuals (Suomi24 ilmeisesti juuri ilmaispalveluna sisälsi aivan liikaa seikkailijoita 
ja/tai psyykkisesti häiriintyneitä, Plaza Sep 9, 2008). The implication is that by offering something 
from the self, whether sensitive biographic contents or money, one can redeem trust and show that one 
is earnest (as a kind of “trust mechanism,” see Giddens 1991: e.g. 19). To a certain extent and for some 
people, then, the degree of default “reliability” of a speaker’s words is a buyable thing. Both the 
reliability of language and the stigmatization of the type of discourse (see 7.1.1) vary according to 
whether or not the token has been subject to a charge. 
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7.3 ONLINE DATING ADVERTISEMENTS AS AN 
INTERSUBJECTIVE CONTACT 
The last section of this chapter focuses on those segments of metadiscourse 
that discuss the relationship between persons and their text-artifacts from 
the standpoint of intersubjective contacts and interpersonal interaction. This 
section examines how interactants understand the kind of contact mediated 
by the online dating advertisement (or subsequent other forms of written 
communication) and to what extent and in what capacity a displaced text-
artifact is seen to stand for a person in interaction with others. The 
relationship between the body (as the epicenter of personhood) and the 
various artifactual extensions of a person will, then, be an essential part of 
the question. We will see that different semiotic communities have differing 
views on, for example, how “distant” versus “close” the interactants are; or 
how “direct” versus “indirect” or “complete” versus “incomplete” the 
encounter is; and how “authentic,” therefore, the contact with others is. To 
demonstrate the range of possible understandings, this section builds on a 
contrast between two opposite views. 
The first group of examples illustrates the common view that online 
dating advertisements are somehow incomplete encounters and unreliable 
indicators of what the writer is really like as a person. That is, these text-
artifacts are seen as “insufficient” or “inauthentic” extensions of a person. 
Example (7.22) is an extract from a popular documentary-like reality 
television show Parittomat (“The Pairless”) about a group of 30+ urban 
single women looking for a partner. Three women are writing a dating ad for 
one of them (Leni). The other two (Kati, Mesku) are presented as “experts,” 
although from the standpoint of this chapter they would be more 
appropriately classified as “peers” with some previous experience in online 
dating. The point of the short but emphatic discussion is to underline that 
online dating advertisements and the ensuing written communication (such 
as e-mails) are not a good method of “getting to know” someone “really”: 
 
(7.22) 
Parittomat, ”oikeesti tutustuminen” (10:12) 
   Leni = the writer of the advertisement  
   Kati = an “expert” advisor 
   Mesku = an “expert” advisor 
 
01 Kati:  mut tää  ei  o hyvä keino +tu↓tustua  
      kati                                 +nods 
  but this NEG COP good way  get_to_know:INF 
  but this is not a good  way to get to know 
02        ihmisiin eli [ei kannata jäädä niinku  
  people        so        it’s no use to keep like  
03 Leni:                   [nii.                       
           yeah 
04 Kati:  [viikkokaupa[lla kirjottelemaan  
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   week after week         writing 
05 Leni: [↑nii:::::  [aivan jo-o, 
                                         yeah                  that’s right 
06 Kati:  ↑säh[köpostia, (.)  
                                        e-mail 
07 Mesku:         [#joo ei#. 
                                                 yeah no                            
08 Leni: nii. 
                                       yeah 
09 Kati: koska   ei sillä tavalla kehenkään 
   because NEG that way      anyone 
10  +oikeesti tu+tustu       mut 
   mesku  +nodding    +looks at Kati 
                                    really    get_to_know:NEG but    
                                       because that way one doesn’t really get to know 
                                       anyone but 
11 Kati: [↑jos vaikuttaa että ↑kiinnostava tyyppi                
    if  appear    that  interesting guy 
  if it feels like this is an interesting guy 
12 Leni: [nii justii. 
    yeah right 
13 Kati:  ni si[t  +vaa treffit ja 
   kati                +slams her hands together 
  then then just date  and      
  then just [go] on a date and 
14 Leni:           [sit. 
              then 
 
Kati is the one who does most of the talking. She begins by claiming, in a 
highly emphatic way, that “this is not a good way to get to know someone” 
(line 01) (see Figure 3). The women are sitting in front of a computer 
discussing the dating profile they are writing for Leni. Later, in line 06, e-
mails are explicitly included in the picture. Tää (“this”), in other words, 
seems to refer to the whole writing-based part of the practice of online 
dating. The other “expert” Mesku expresses her agreement with joo ei (line 
07) and by nodding (line 10). Based on her enthusiastic back-channeling (e.g. 
emphatic nii and aivan jo-o in line 05, nii justii in line 12), the “novice” 
seems to find the “experts’” advice intuitively and logically sensible. 
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Figure 3 “not a good way to get to know people” 
The three participants, then, negotiate a strong consensus on the fact that 
online dating advertisements and the later e-mail communication are not a 
proper way to “get to know” someone, at least not “really.” This implies that 
written communication may, in fact, produce a sort of illusion of “getting to 
know” someone, but something essential remains missing. According to the 
participants, written communication is only suitable for arousing “interest,” 
after which one should proceed to a face-to-face encounter. The 
advertisement, then, can only stand for the person as an index of their 
existence and as a summary, non-specific, or “fuzzy” icon of that person’s 
characteristics. The “essence” or “true self” of the person, or whatever else it 
is that one “really” gets to know, however, is not present in the text-artifact. 
The text-artifact merely has the capacity to point a certain kind of person in 
the direction of a certain kind of person. 
The mass-mediated face-to-face conversation is able to convey this point 
with different semiotic dynamics than, say, an Internet discussion. Even if 
the event itself is scripted as part of the program, the unfolding and contents 
of the conversation seem relatively spontaneous. In that sense, it resembles 
all other forms of non-solicited external metadiscourse in the data (such as 
the Internet discussions). The face-to-face conversation, however, has a 
different pattern of temporal and interpersonal organization. The relatively 
immediate reactions between persons and the presence of gestural and 
prosodic signs allow the program to disseminate images of (generalizable) 
others that convey their point in an embodied rather than embrained way 
and appeal to intuitions of everyday conversation and personhood (as 
compared with, for instance, the highly processed and stylized guidebooks 
with author personae that are very deliberately performed). The conversation 
also breaks the anonymity typical of Internet dicussions, or at least organizes 
it differently.121 
                                                 
121 Just to underline the relative nature of anonymity: From the standpoint of the unfolding 
conversation, the participants are not anonymous to each other at all, since they have come to know 
each other quite well. From the viewers’ standpoint, these persons would hardly be accessible or 
locatable in the world independently of the program (since, for instance, the participants’ last names 
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Other more or less similar examples abound in different sources. Example 
(7.23a), according to which real getting to know someone can only occur in a 
face-to-face setting, is from the advertisement data. Examples (7.23b) and 
(7.23c) are from the section “The minuses of online dating” in ND (p. 29–33), 
which displays comments from the respondents of the survey organized by 
the writers of the guidebook: 
     
(7.23a) Loppujen lopuksi tällaisesta ilmoituksesta voi kuitenkin saada vain suuntaa 
antavan käsityksen toisesta ihmisestä. Todellinen tutustuminen=han tapahtuu vain 
kasvotusten. 
(7.23a) After all from an advertisement like this one can only get a summary conception 
of another person. Real getting to know [naturally] only happens face to face.  
 
(7.23b) Olemus on aina piilossa niin kauan kunnes ihmisen tapaa. Tosin lukutaitoa 
oppii.  
(7.23b) The essence is always hidden until you meet the person. Though your ability to 
read [advertisements] will certainly improve. 
 
(7.23c) Luulisi että kirjoittaen tutustuisi syvällisemmin mutta monetkaan miehet eivät 
osaa ilmaista itseään kirjallisesti ja ne keiden kanssa kirjoittelu on sujunut, tavatessa 
puuttuu taas kemia, eli toisaalta tuntuu että sittenkin ensi katseen kipinä on tärkeämpi 
tekijä… 
(7.23c) One/you would think that one/you would get to know [someone] better by 
writing but many men cannot express themselves in writing and those with whom 
writing has gone well, the chemistry is lacking when meeting them, so on the other hand 
it feels/seems like the spark of the first look is a more important factor after all. 
 
The last two examples employ expressions such as “essence” (olemus) and 
“chemistry” (kemia) to point to such individual and interpersonal objects in 
which “real” and “ideal” personhood is anchored and which, according to 
these examples, can only be truly experienced in face-to-face settings. All 
three examples imply that the image mediated by the text-artifact, however 
elaborate or informative it is, is not reliable enough. For these interactants, 
the reliability of the image does not necessarily seem to stem from the length 
of shared discursive and biographic histories. As the writer of (7.23c) points 
out with her talk of the “spark of the first look” (ensi katseen kipinä), their 
understanding of reliability prioritizes particular kinds of semiotic process 
over others (e.g., intuitive affective interpretants, sight of the body, gaze 
versus inferential and representational interpretants, cognition, patterns of 
speech). 
Others, however, link the “unreliability” of such text-artifacts to the lack 
of corroborating experiences. That is, text-artifacts are “incomplete” in the 
                                                                                                                                          
are not given) and are therefore relatively anonymous. They would, however, certainly be recognized if 
encountered in the street, and their full names could probably be found out in a number of ways.   
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sense that the information they provide is partial. Reliability comes from the 
quantitative accumulation of different kinds of semiotic processes rather 
than some specific kind (such as the first exchange of gazes). In the following 
examples, getting to know someone “really” is the result of a gradual process 
of de-anonymization, de-promotionalization, and accumulation of biographic 
knowledge: 
 
(7.24a) Muutamalle [vastaajalle] olen antanut puhelinnumeroni että voidaan 
puhelimessa tutustua – –. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.24a) To a few [repliers] I’ve given my phone number so that we can get to know [each 
other] over the phone – –. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
(7.24b) Tapasin kaikkiaan 30-40 hlöä ja huomasin että mielenterveys-ongelmaisia oli 
aika paljon, lähes joka neljäs, osa selvästi leikitteli, salaili intressinsä tapailuun eikä 
antanut itsestään mitään, mm. yksi oli aviossa mutta valehteli sujuvasti. – – ¶ Mieheni 
tapasin omassa kodissani puhelin- ja skypekeskustelujen, valokuvien vaihtojen ja 
sähköpostitutustumisten jälkeen. (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.24b) I met with altogether 30-40 persons and noticed that there were many with 
mental health issues, almost every fourth, some were clearly playing games, hiding their 
interests for meeting and would not give anything of themselves, e.g. one was married 
but lied fluently. – – ¶ I met my husband in my own home after phone and skype 
conversations, exchanging photographs and getting to know [each other] through e-mail. 
(IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
In example (7.24a), talking on the phone is presented as a subsequent and 
more effective means of “really getting to know” one another after the 
advertisement event (i.e., prioritizing phonetic voice over textual voice). 
Example (7.24b) emphasizes both the importance of face-to-face encounters 
in detecting flaws and stigmas in others and a proper succession of different 
types of semiotic encounters. Examples like this, then, imply a gradation of 
successive encounters, in which one type of encounter presupposes a 
previous encounter of a particular kind and can, if successful, lead to a 
further, other kind of encounter that is even closer to the “real” person. Based 
on a number of examples in the data, one particular reconstructed version of 
such a gradated continuum of encounters might look, for example, as 
follows: 
 
Dating advertisement > messages via the dating service > e-mailing > 
exchanging pictures (if not part of the advertisement) > text messaging (SMS) > 
talking on the phone > technologically mediated visual contact (e.g. Skype) > 
bodily co-presence at a public place (in a date context) > bodily co-presence at a 
private place (in a functionally non-specific context) > … 
 
That is, the unfolding of a social relation is mapped to a specific order of 
types of interactional events. Different communities would, however, 
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organize these types of interaction and infrastructure in different orders. The 
essential point to notice, however, is that the first group of interactants 
would also interpret such a gradation as a cline of decreasing intersubjective 
distance, bodily co-presence being the ultimate “real” or “authentic” contact. 
There is, however, an entirely different community of interactants that 
seems to hold an opposing view. Instead of focusing on the limitations of 
written textual interaction, they emphasize the possibilities it offers 
compared to other types of encounters. In contrast to the first set of 
examples, in the second one text-artifacts are seen as a particularly (or at 
least sufficiently) “authentic” and “real” extension of a person. The first two 
examples are from Internet discussions and the last five from ND. Examples 
(7.25d) through (7.25g) are from the section “The pluses of online dating,” 
which displays comments from the respondents of the survey organized by 
the writers of the guidebook (cf. 7.23b and 7.23c above): 
 
(7.25a) Tiesin jo heti ensimmäisestä sähköpostista, että tässä on se oikea minulle. 
Edelleen olemme naimisissa, eikä kaduta! (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.25a) I instantly knew from the first e-mail that this is the right one for me. To this day 
we’re married, and [I/we] have no regrets! (IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
(7.25b) Ja silti tekisi mieli peitellä tätä nettitapaamisosuutta, koska pelkään sosiaalisten 
taitojen puutteen leimaamista. Mutta kumpiko on oikeasti pahempi, (umpi)kännissä 
ulkonäön perusteella tapahtuva valinta vai kriteerien täyttäminen/persoonaan 
tutustuminen ensin? (W, IS Oct 19, 2012.) 
(7.25b) And yet I feel like hiding this net encounter part, because I’m afraid it will be 
seen as a lack of social skills. But which option is really worse, choosing someone (dead) 
drunk based on appearance or fulfilling criteria/getting to know their persona first? (IS 
Oct 19, 2012.) 
 
(7.25c) Netissä voi tutustua siihen, mitä ihminen ajattelee ennen kuin tietää, miltä hän 
näyttää. Ei tule niin helposti hairahtaneeksi vääränlaisiin tyyppeihin. (ND: 23, N38h.) 
(7.25c) In the net one can see what a person thinks before knowing what they look like. 
Less risk of falling for the wrong types of guys. (ND: 23.) 
 
(7.25d) Se, ettei katsota ensimmäisenä ihmisen ulkonäköön vaan siihen mitä hauskaa 
tekstiä hän on osannut kertoa itsestään. (ND: 28.) 
(7.25d) The fact that one doesn’t look first at the person’s appearance but the kind of nice 
text they have been able to tell about themselves. (ND: 28.) 
 
(7.25e) Tutustuminen on enemmän järkipohjaista kuin livetilanteissa. (ND: 29.) 
(7.25e) Getting to know [someone] is more rational than in live situations. (ND: 29.) 
 
(7.25f) Kirjoittaminen yleensä tiivistää sanomista. (ND: 29.) 
(7.25f) Writing usually condenses what one has to say. (ND: 29.) 
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(7.25g) Lisäksi jos haluat rajat hakuasi sellaisiin ominaisuuksiin, joita et ensimmäisenä 
kehtaisi tuntemattomalta kasvotusten kysyä, tämä on ilmoitustekstissä mahdollista. 
(ND: 27.) 
(7.25g) Moreover, if you want to narrow your search to such characteristics that you 
wouldn’t dare ask a stranger face to face, this is possible in the advertisement text. (ND: 
27.) 
 
According to the retrospective narrative from which the first example is an 
excerpt, the first e-mail alone (i.e., the third writing-based phase in the chain, 
following the original advertisement and the first reply) can be an indicator 
of someone being the “right one” (i.e., of the highest degree of interpersonal 
compatibility, cf. also 6.3.3). The second example (7.25b), in turn, relies on a 
strictly polar opposition between a writing-based first encounter and one in 
which bodies are physically co-present. The writing-based encounter is seen 
as the preferred alternative, since it allows for rational demographic and 
biographic selectivity (“fulfilling the criteria”) and focuses on cognitive and 
mental propensities of the person (“getting to know the persona”) (see also 
7.25c, 7.25e). In contrast to the previous group of examples, here it is the 
image mediated by bodily attributes and behaviors that is considered 
potentially misleading, unreliable and inauthentic (i.e., not representing the 
person’s “real essence”). The physical body, then, is regarded as a distraction 
in the intersubjective contact (and can cause a person to “lapse” into the 
wrong kinds of relationships). Similarly, example (7.25e) links writing-based 
encounters with more “rational” intersubjective contacts. That is, they allow 
for contacts between more cognitive and rational constituent processes of 
persons. Examples (7.25d) and (7.25f) draw attention to the more thought-
out and concise nature of writing-based “mind styles” (see 4.2) compared to 
face-to-face conversations. Moreover, example (7.25g) points out that 
anonymous and displaced writing-based encounters instantly enable 
interactants to accomplish more direct intersubjective contacts by bypassing 
some of the steps of gradated progression described above. This is an entirely 
different kind of interpretation of the continuum of encounters sketched 
above. In this version, the progression gradually leads to more socially and 
culturally regimented intersubjective contacts so that a certain possibility for 
(or freedom of) directness diminishes, although intimacy may increase. The 
different constituent processes of intersubjective contacts may, then, develop 
into different directions as such successions of encounters unfold. 
In the preface of the guidebook NE, the writers present as their goal the 
diminishing of the relative importance of outward appearance and pure 
chance in courtship. Instead, they wish to inform their readers of how to 
establish a first contact to another person on the Internet via their 
“thoughts”: 
 
(7.26) Me koetamme jossain määrin vähentää noiden kummankin [ulkoisen olemuksen 
ja sattuman] merkitystä kertomalla siitä, kuinka kumppania etsivään ihmiseen otetaan 
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ensimmäinen kontakti hänen ajatustensa kautta Internetin deittipalveluissa ja 
muuallakin maailmanverkossa. (NE: 9.)  
(7.26) We are attempting to decrease to some extent the importance of both [outward 
appearance and chance] by giving advice on how to get in contact with someone looking 
for a partner through their thoughts in online dating services and elsewhere in the world 
wide web (NE: 9.)  
 
Later, the guidebook warns readers about impatient online daters who try to 
rush others into face-to-face encounters. People like this are grouped into 
three stereotypes according to their linguistic behavior and psychological 
dispositions (NE: 18–20). The “curious” (uteliaat) are chatty and genuinely 
sociable and favor fast-paced interaction. Written communication may be too 
slow for them. For the “illiterates” (kirjoitustaidottomat, humorously 
abbreviated as kooteet, “kt’s”), on the other hand, writing is “Chinese 
torture.” The guidebook, however, reminds us that even though writing, 
sometimes even conversation, is difficult for these people, they may still have 
great personalities and “practical talents.” People like this typically want to 
meet face-to-face as soon as possible, since they are more at ease in that type 
of encounter. The “rascals” (venkulat) can be highly entertaining as 
companions, but they might not be trustworthy or sincere. Those who look 
for a serious relationship should stay away from them. The guidebook, then, 
propagates a view according to which the encounter mediated by online 
dating advertisements is based more on rational selection than serendipity 
and the intersubjective contact mediated by online dating advertisements 
highlights well-articulated thoughts over other constituents of persons or 
minds (such as spontaneous co-construction of patterns of speech; or more 
“practical” and less linguistic ways of being in the world). Therefore, online 
dating advertisements sieve persons according to their mental and discursive 
propensities and competencies into those who are more “at ease” or 
“authentic” in that kind of contact and those who, for one kind of reason or 
another, wish to move on to a further encounter. The guidebook reminds the 
readers of their right to decide when they are ready to progress from one type 
of encounter to another and not to be pushed into the types of encounters 
they are not ready for (and also formulates others’ desire for a different type 
of encounter as a sign of one of three particular kinds of personhood). 
Let us now sum up and discuss the findings of this section. The focus in 
this section has been on cultural ideologies of interaction and 
intersubjectivity (as particular kinds of semiotic ontologies). If 
intersubjective encounters are mediated by ensembles of different kinds of 
semiotic processes and their artifactual residues on different time scales, 
then different semiotic communities can ideologically evaluate and 
hierarchize those constituents differently. Therefore, their attitudes towards 
the kind of encounter mediated by online dating advertisements as well as 
their inclinations to signify and interpret in particular ways in such 
encounters will differ. The online dating advertisement genre and the 
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infrastructure it relies on temporarily split the person into a “body” fraction 
and a “writing” fraction. The “writing” fraction is displaced from the body 
and sent out to represent that person in interactions with others. The ways in 
which the interactants understand the nature of such fractions and their role 
in the mediation of personhood and social relations in part determines how 
such interactions are interpreted. Various ethnotheoretical terms (such as 
persoona, “persona”; olemus, “essence”; sieluttomuus, “soullessness”; kemia, 
“chemistry”; kipinä “spark”; (oikeasti) tutustuminen “getting to know 
(really)”; ajatukset “thoughts”) are used in the metadiscourse data to 
describe those aspects of personhood and interpersonal relations that online 
dating advertisement text-artifacts either can or cannot mediate. The precise 
meaning of these terms often remains relatively vague, but their co-texts 
reveal clear contrasts between semiotic communities in terms of how the 
nature of the intersubjective contact is understood.  
In particular, stances towards the body and its relations to one’s 
“persona” or interpersonal “chemistry” seem to be an important divide. A co-
present face-to-face encounter is certainly not favored by all. For some, an 
encounter mediated by signs embodied in written artifacts rather than 
physical bodies is seen as a better first contact. It gives a more “authentic” or 
“reliable” impression of the “real” person, since the “carnal” aspects of 
personhood are temporatily effaced (cf. also Bauman 1983).122 The images 
mediated by visually present bodies, however complete or desirable those 
images may feel, are not seen as reliable enough in relation to subsequent 
events. For others, the attraction of writing-based first contacts seems to 
relate more to the social and biographic anonymity that enables exceptional 
directness and freedom, which gradually starts to diminish as one becomes 
more and more accountable as a biographically recognizable individual to 
another biographically recognizable individual. Moreover, attitudes towards 
self-controlled selection versus uncontrolled serendipity in social life seem to 
have an effect on the evaluation of contacts. Whereas some value the 
“rationality” or “reliability” that preselection of interactants based on various 
criteria brings, others might consider such encounters too “calculated” or 
“unromantic.” Particular encounters and contacts, then, are evaluated in 
relation to the unfoldings that lead to them and that can follow from them. 
                                                 
122 The other side of the coin is that those who place special value on their bodily appearance may 
not appreciate the (online) dissolution of appearance-based (offline) social hierarchies. One 
interactant, for instance, deplores how “boldly” women who are “entirely below his level, frankly butt-
ugly” contact him online (Olen ihmetellyt myös sitä kovasti, kuinka rohkeasti täysin omaa tasoa 
alapuolellani olevat, suorastaan sysirumat naiset ottavat kontaktia netin kautta). In “real life” he 
would not “even glance at” them, because he himself is “really good-looking, muscularly sporty and 
versatilely smart” (Elävässä elämässä en vilkaisisikaan heihin päin, koska olen itse todella 
hyvännäköinen, lihaksikkaan urheilullinen ja monipuolisen fiksu, IS Oct 19, 2012). 
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That is, intersubjective contacts, like all semiotic processes, have more or less 
distributed roots and fruits. 
Throughout the entire chapter, we have seen examples of mass-mediated 
personae that disseminate particular kinds of models of and stances towards 
online dating advertisements as a practice and the interpretation of others as 
part of that practice. These personae may be internalized by actual 
participants to varying degrees as generalized others whose interpretations 
the participants may take into account. The participants’ orientation and 
positioning in relation to the genred encounter may, therefore, be quite 
different at the outset. The different kinds of data examined in this chapter 
all showed an acute awareness of how patterns of discursive behavior relate 
to social and personal characteristics but offered very different 
interpretations. There was a strong air of mistrust and doubt towards the 
persons behind displaced, anonymous, and promotional personae in terms of 
their social normality, the truthfulness of their representations, or the 
representativeness of their performances. Then again, a writing-based first 
encounter was occasionally seen as having definite advantages, offering a 
more direct contact to “thoughts” and “personas” (in the sense of 
“personality”) (cf. e.g. with views of subjectivity in 4.2). Different forms of 
metadiscourse and metaculture then tapped into partly the same 
infrastructural and interactional features (e.g., spatiotemporal displacedness 
of signers, signs, and interpreters; non-presence of the other’s body; 
anonymity; detachedness from semiotic chains and metastance relations; 
strong reliance on writing-based performances; positive evaluation of self; 
high selectivity in relation to others) but evaluated them quite differently. 
The experienced quality of an interactional and intersubjective contact, then, 
does not follow straightforwardly from such features. The interactants’ 
symbolic understandings of these features shape their semiotic behaviors 
and experiences in such encounters. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
This study has examined the mediation and evaluation of personhood in 
Finnish online dating advertisements. It has approached the online dating 
advertisement genre as one kind of practice in the interactionally and 
infrastructurally distributed semiosis from which interpretations of 
personhood and social relations emerge. The online dating advertisement 
genre has also been approached as an instrument that mediates semiotic 
encounters and intersubjective contacts between interactants. It involves the 
performance of “promotional” personae, a distinct mode of “ideal” 
personhood with specific entitlements and commitments. The goal of the 
study has been to relate the studied practices to various cultural 
metapractices in order to take into account the role of different, sometimes 
conflicting ideologies and ontologies of interaction. Section 8.1 now 
summarizes and discusses the empirical findings in the light of the research 
questions, and section 8.2 reflects on the conceptual approach taken towards 
the idealization of personhood in this study.  
8.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The empirical goal of this study was to examine from four different 
perspectives how “ideal” worlds are distinguished semiotically and 
interactionally from what are understood as more “real” ones. Chapter 4 
focused on textual patterns that function as indices projecting various kinds 
(such as mental or social propensities) on individuals. The focus of the 
chapter was on different modes of personhood (or different ways of 
inhabiting personspacetime) rather than on the biographic facts or ideals 
that people tell about themselves or demand from others. There were, 
certainly, clear tendencies in the source domains that writers drew from 
(such as hobbies, preferences, physical appearance, personality, scenarios of 
dating and courtship; as well as more personalized tidbits hidden in, for 
example, pseudonyms). The focus, however, was on how such biographic 
contents were textually structured and interpreted in relation to dimensions 
such as subjectivity, selfhood, space, and time. Chapter 4 first discussed the 
micro-level mediation of spacetime and views of subjectivity. It was noticed 
that some writers locate the spatiotemporal origo of the intersubjective 
encounter within the online dating world, others in some geographic location 
or biographic phase. Some view the participants as relatively co-present, 
others as separated by a distance that the advertisement traverses.  Secondly, 
it was examined how the advertisement sieves selves in a prism-like manner 
into relatively more iconic-indexical (or “performable”) and relatively more 
indexical-symbolic (or “describable”) fractions. The former fraction (e.g., in 
 279 
the form of views of subjectivity) is encountered and evaluated more directly 
by the respondent. The latter fraction has the nature of a promise, the 
substantiality of which will be negotiated in a later event (e.g., whether or not 
the linguistically described object adequately corresponds to the perceived 
object), insofar as such an event is ever actualized. The study of views of 
subjectivity showed that there was patterned fractionation of interpretations 
in the questionnaire responses. Even the same textual pattern could be 
interpreted quite differently as a sign of personhood (see e.g. the qualitative 
and quantitative or agent-centric and patient-centric interpretations in 
4.2.1). Such fractionation, however, can be made sense of in terms of the 
respondents’ orientations to different signs or different ontologies of 
interpretation. Both the questionnaire data in chapter 4 and the external 
metadiscourse data in chapter 7 showed that the effects based on text-level 
indexicality are often difficult to report and become localized by interactants 
in easily accessible individual symbol-tokens or visible patterns of 
orthography or typography. 
Those aspects of the advertisement texts that were understood as 
contradicting official norms or standards got a dualistic reception from 
respondents. There was a relatively clear contrast between two approaches or 
indexical orders. In the questionnaire data (4.2), the same textual pattern 
was, for instance, interpreted by some as “funny” or “laid-back,” whereas 
others took the same signs as indices of “indifference,” “laziness,” or 
“uneducatedness.” More generally, both in the questionnaire data and the 
external metadiscourse data (e.g. 7.1.2), there seemed to be two alternative 
branches of interpretation of text-level indexicality. The same patterns could 
be interpreted either as indices of individual personality (i.e., indices of what 
is positively or negatively unique about the individual) or as indices of the 
individual’s status in relation to social norms and order (i.e., indices of to 
what degree the person is normal or abnormal). These are, then, two 
different lines of regimenting interpretants that control writing-based 
subjectivities on different grounds sourcing from different cultural models. 
The questionnaire data also illustrated the fact that the interpretation of 
linguistic representations in texts is undetachable from interpretations of the 
animator’s persona. That is, the representational mode, which links the 
representational content to residential and representational conditions and 
consequences, is affected by the propensities projected on the one 
accountable for that representation (i.e., ultimate interpretants such as 
intentions, purposes, interests, moods, or any other material, mental, or 
social kinds). This, of course, is an example of the indexical-inferential 
nature of human communication (see e.g. Kockelman 2013a: 22–24). There 
is an interplay between more immediate objects (e.g., states of affairs 
represented by linguistic utterances; objects of phenomenologically 
emblematic gestures, such as pointing a finger at something) and more 
mediate objects (e.g., interpretations of the speaker’s communicative 
intentions). Pointing (hence indexical or “ostensive”) to more immediate 
Conclusion 
280 
objects is a means of directing attention to more mediate objects (hence 
inferential or “abductive”). For instance, when a writer describes some 
recurring state of affairs (e.g. “I have often celebrated my birthday in 
London” in example 4.25), the reader can interpret that the writer’s aim is to 
induce inferences about the writer’s preferences, social statuses as well as the 
compatibility between the writer and the reader. Conversely, immediate 
objects are interpreted in relation to more mediate objects. For instance, 
whatever description someone animates about themselves is interpreted 
radically differently depending on whether their communicative intentions 
are understood as “deceitful” or “cynical” versus “sincere” (see e.g. 4.6 in 
4.2.3). Chapter 7 suggested that there are nearly opposite ontological beliefs 
about the nature of the intersubjective contact in online dating 
advertisements (e.g., “authentic” versus “inauthentic”; “reliable” versus 
“unreliable”). Such ontologies essentially consist of beliefs about the writers 
of online dating advertisements as dynamic objects that give rise to signs of 
the self (e.g., whether those signs emanate from the “true” self and are 
“authentic” and “reliable” or not).  
The latter part of chapter 4 discussed the linguistic representation of self 
and others as a form of theoretical agency in relation to other semiotic 
modes. Such patterns of theorization in the data ranged from more particular 
and concrete objects (e.g., one’s in instrumentally measurable centimeters; 
the length of one’s hair in relation to cultural stereotypes, see example 4.15a) 
towards more general, abstract, and reflective ones (e.g., ideologies 
concerning ideal romantic relationships; observed changes in mental 
tendencies amongst the whole of humanity, see example 4.5). It was found 
that one of the most characteristic patterns in the data were taxonomies that 
organize theorizations of the writer’s attributes, habitual behaviors, objects of 
desire, and chronotopic imagery into structured hierarchies of preference. As 
was later discussed in section 5.6, such patterns can be regarded as a genre-
specific, textually distributed form of stancetaking, in which reality becomes 
organized in relation to both the writers’ own values and their anticipations 
of others’ values. 
Other textual patterns that were examined included narratives, fictive 
personae, and recontextualizations of discursive artifacts, such as 
pseudonyms, mottos, and slogans. Narratives and fictive personae were 
relatively rare in the data, but they proved all the more interesting for the 
ways in which they illuminate the nature of online dating advertisements as a 
form of discourse. The infrequency of narrativity can perhaps be understood 
with respect to the more general nature of indexical anchoring in online 
dating advertisements. If the prototypic usage of narrative is to recount 
actual, particular and past events, then it should be no surprise that it is not a 
natural fit in a context in which the tendency is to communicate whatever is 
habitual and continuously representative of a person by using selected, 
generalized, and anonymized imagery in a future-oriented manner. As was 
noted in chapter 4, there are only a handful of preterite tenses in the entire 
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advertisement text data. Past happenings are treated more as accumulated, 
possession-like objects and as indices of ongoing patterns of life (cf. with 
naturalized stances in section 5.2). Persons exist in online dating 
advertisements more in a type-like than a token-like manner. Because of the 
anonymity of the context, a sufficient level of generality and non-
recognizability has to be maintained – and is usually enforced by the dating 
services too. Persons, then, have a sort of ghost-like or shadow-like existence 
in online dating advertisements. The semiotic object mediated by them is not 
sharp or localized enough to be linked directly with some embodied 
individual. The imagery is meant to function as a sieve that only lets those 
respondents who fulfill the required criteria through to the next phase of 
sieving (such as e-mail correspondence). The final phase of online dating 
processes, such as an embodied contact, then, is even further down the line 
in some n+xth event.  
The lack of narratives and the prominence of ahistorical taxonomies in 
online dating advertisements clarify non-narrative modes of coherence of 
personhood and selfhood. They show that biography needs to be separated 
conceptually from (hi)stories or narratives, which are merely particular ways 
of organizing discursive biography. When relying on a narrative coherence of 
personhood, stories are used, as Linde (1993: 21) crystallizes, to convey the 
point that “I am such and such a kind of person, since I acted in such and 
such a way.” When relying on a taxonomic coherence of personhood, 
however, one is such and such a kind of person, since one has hierarchies of 
such and such accumulated characteristics and stances. For reasons 
explained in chapter 3, the analyses in this study focused mainly on the free 
text sections of the dating profiles. It would, however, be interesting to 
explore further the interplay between the free text sections and the lists of 
(usually optional) standard questions and fields offered by the interfaces of 
the dating services. These different kinds of fixed profile forms certainly do 
explicitly regiment the form that personhood can take in such profiles (and 
limit individual flexibility). In fact, it is even possible that such standard 
questions – and the more general proliferation of forms and templates both 
in online and offline worlds – may function as models for taxonomic and list-
like organization of free texts as well. 
The analysis of fictive personae (4.4.4) clarified the relative similarities 
and differences between “fictive” and “ideal” personae. The question might 
be approached by further dividing icons of personhood into images, 
diagrams, and metaphors (see Peirce 1955: 105). When someone recognizibly 
inhabits a “fictive” persona (such as a swearing hedgehog), a metaphoric 
interpretation of the denotational text is almost inevitably required. That is, 
the mapping of the figure (“hedgehog”) to the person (“man”) requires a 
particular kind of inferential and abductive process. Or to put it differently, 
the figure’s imagistic and diagrammatic characteristics have to be translated 
into the person’s imagistic and diagrammatic characteristics. In other 
respects, however, the interpretation of “fictive” and “ideal” personae hardly 
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differs. Both, in any case, involve a complex inferential and abductive process 
that links symbolic representations to anticipatable residential consequences. 
“Ideal” denotational texts too can, then, be read more or less metaphorically. 
What is, in fact, implied by much of the cultural metadiscourse is that, 
instead of trustfully taking “ideal” representations as simple images or 
diagrams of other semiotic modes, they should always be interpreted in a 
more metaphorical manner (i.e., some specific conceptual framework, such 
as a cultural understanding of idealized self-presentation, is needed to 
appropriately and effectively map symbol-mediated icons to persons). 
The analysis of the replication and recontextualization of discursive 
artifacts, such as pseudonyms, mottos, and slogans, in section 4.4.5 drew 
attention to the fact that the line between replications and representations 
(or the habitual and the emergent) is fluid and frame-specific. There were 
cases throughout the data in which the interactants oriented to self-
presentational forms as patterns of speech per se without an explicit stance 
towards their appropriateness and effectiveness as representational 
interpretants. For instance, when a writer presents a characteristic as others’ 
speech about her (see example 4.34 in 4.4.5), she treats such a characteristic 
merely as a replicated token of others’ speech habits without explicitly 
committing to its truth (or predicating it about herself) and thereby 
distributing accountability to those others. Similarly, the writers’ own self-
presentational repertoires rely on habitualized patterns that have been 
internalized on biographic scales (see e.g. sections 5.2 and 7.2.2). 
Representational interpretants become attached to individuals as speech 
chain indexicals much in the same way as proper names do. Consequently, 
such interpretants may become suspected or evaluated by others as being by 
degrees “out of sync” with the actual present (see e.g. example 7.15 in 7.2.2). 
Finally, a different kind of indexical life of representational interpretants is at 
stake in the case of the things one “wishes” to or “must” say about oneself 
(see e.g. section 5.2.1 and example 7.19 in 7.2.2). In such cases, it is the value 
of the sign itself that makes it relevant as an interpretant of the self or others. 
For example, the indexical link between that sign and various metadiscourses 
of personhood may give it a prestige status. The performance of the valued 
sign may effectively open doors to new worlds for individuals, even if in 
subsequent events those signs may turn out to be regarded by others as, for 
example, “faked” or “exaggerated.” The essential question, then, is whether 
one can appropriately pull off such a performance.  
Chapter 5 examined evaluative stancetaking and its role in online dating 
advertisements and in the idealization of personhood. Many of the patterns 
examined in chapter 4 and later in chapter 6 (such as “ideological” reflective 
representations in 4.4.1; taxonomies and hierarchies of disclosure in 4.4.2; 
selective address in 6.3; jos “if” clauses of cross-modal iconicity in 6.4) reflect 
and embody evaluative processes and can be seen as forms of genre-specific 
stancetaking (see also section 5.6). The specific focus of chapter 5 was on the 
kinds of stances that make the writer’s evaluative processes maximally 
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emblematic in interactional events and in relation to others’ stances. The 
chapter built on a contrast between two patterns that both address value to 
others and make the self accountable for that value in two quite distinct 
ways. The first pattern consists of CTPs that explicitly denote some mode of 
commitment (e.g., desiring, liking, appreciating) towards some object in the 
world. That is, they explicitly theorize the self or the other as a value-directed 
entity and as a source of evaluation. Such patterns also point to, and 
sometimes reason further about, some evaluative technique (e.g., an affective 
unfolding, an ideological commitment, or any stereotype or prototype of 
personhood). The second pattern of stancetaking examined in chapter 5 was 
based on lexical symbols with stereotypic evaluative connotations. In such 
“naturalized” stances value is projected onto some object on a public stage as 
if the value was its inherent quality. That is, the agent whose perspective, 
values, and evaluative techniques the entextualized stance embodies is left 
relatively implicit, and often such stances are embedded in other actions 
rather than asserted individually. Cases like this, then, are not so much about 
someone’s values as they are grounded in them. It was found that, when it 
comes to CTP-based stances, the “promotional” persona is entitled to be 
highly explicit and direct about his or her desires and need not necessarily 
relate them to concerns of the actual world or actual others. However, 
claiming naturalized attributes was more problematic. This kind of pattern, 
first of all, easily implies that only one perspective can apply at a time, a kind 
of “unidimensional” social space. Naturalized evaluative stancetaking easily 
leads to a rivalry between selves for the symbolic representation of the world 
(i.e., whose values should the formulation of the object conform with). To 
further tease out the differences between these patterns from the standpoint 
of personhood, in the “naturalized” cases the writer appears as an 
accumulation of possession-like characteristics that one holds onto and 
taxonomizes on a public stage. In the CTP-based cases, the writer appears as 
the locus of intentional propensities such as appreciation, wishes, or desires. 
That is, such constructions commit writers to an aspiration towards 
particular kinds of future selves and worlds. The two patterns, then, focus on 
quite different phases of evaluative processes. 
The aim of chapter 5 was also to understand such reflexive models that 
regiment explicit evaluative stancetaking and shape the writer’s 
performances. Matters of evaluative polarity, in particular, were in focus. It 
was, first of all, reminded in 5.2.1 that even stereotypic or conventional 
polarities are relative to one’s interests and positions on maps of the social 
world. (One can, for instance, be stigmaphilic as well as stigmaphobic.) As 
was seen on more than one occasion, “positivity” in online dating 
advertisements seems to come in two forms. There is “uniqueness” (i.e., the 
value of some self as singular and different from others) and “normality” (i.e., 
the value of some self as abiding by norms and generalized others). In 
“promotional” self-presentation, the tendency seems to be towards maximal 
“uniqueness,” but without risking “normality.” A tendency towards 
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unipolarity was seen both on the level of actual discursive behavior and on 
the level of cultural metadiscourse. In a unipolar model of evaluation, one is 
entitled to present oneself entirely in a “positive” light. Even “redundant” 
(5.2.1) positive stances may be important for the general tone expected from 
“promotional” discourse. However, the writers’ implicit stances towards their 
own performances or their anticipations of others’ stances towards those 
performances showed that unipolarity is regarded as problematic by many. 
Both in the writers’ own performances in section 5.2.2 and very explicitly in 
the external metadiscourses in chapter 7, there was suspicion of self-initiated 
“positivity” and a concern for its relation to metasemiotic norms such as 
“honesty” or “modesty.” Moreover, in order to clarify one’s ideals, in online 
dating advertisements one is allowed to use negative stancetaking towards 
non-ideal others and non-ideal forms of personhood. That is, there is a 
specific asymmetrical distribution of metastance relations in the texts. As 
was seen in chapter 7, a combination of a high degree of positivity towards 
the self and a high degree of selectivity and negativity in relation to others is 
something that cultural metadiscourses often tap into. They may evaluate 
such patterns of evaluative stancetaking as (in)appropriate or (in)effective in 
specific ways (e.g., as “self-assured,” “embellishing,” “unreliable,” or even 
“pathological”).  Consequently, in various performances of “human(e)ness,” 
some writers feel the need to take an explicitly or implicitly relativizing 
stance towards the promotional persona and contextualize it in relation to 
other aspects of the person. That is, they momentarily phase out of the 
idealized persona to indicate that it is merely the part one has to play here. 
Such schisms and conflicts between different norms and ontologies as well as 
the solutions participants come up with, then, are all part of the 
“promotional” persona as a distinct mode of personhood.  
Chapter 6 examined patterns of addressivity and the fragmentation of 
respondent roles. The goal was to see how the figures of personhood 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5 are mapped onto frames of participation, i.e., 
how writers select for addressees and attempt to control the ensuing 
interaction. The advertisement texts in the data differed in terms of the 
tightness of the overlap between two different personae, the ideal other and 
the addressee. That is, the sieving of others into “ideal” and “non-ideal” 
persons may be differently calibrated with the sieving of others into “ideal” 
and “non-ideal” respondents. The analysis of “I”-“you” relations showed a 
continuum of approaches that enabled the writers to emphasize and focus on 
different aspects of social reality. As was previously shown in passing (see 
e.g. sections 4.4.3 and 5.1.2), the ideal other may be oriented to more as a 
type of person (i.e., as types of kinds and indices) or as a (fictive) particular 
individual. This distinction is relevant for different techniques of 
addressivity. Textual patterns such as descriptions of selves or others may, 
first of all, be addressed to others without picking them out as direct 
addressees with 2SG indexicals (i.e., taking a third-person approach to 
respondents). When addressees are picked out, they may be picked out more 
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or less selectively (i.e., any actual respondent versus only those of a particular 
kind). The specific degree and mode of selectivity of the address includes or 
excludes respondents from the group of people that can plausibly inhabit the 
role of addressee. That is, the semiotic co-text of 2SG deictics projects more 
particularized types of addressees. Since certain processes (e.g., strong 
desires, highly specific knowledge, burdening commands), cannot easily be 
understood as directed at (whoever) actual, unknown respondent, they 
become interpretable as indices of ideal forms of personhood. Some writers 
explicitly do acknowledge each and any respondent regardless of their degree 
of “ideality.” In that case, the process of sieving is dealt with more openly as 
an intersubjective and interpersonal achievement (i.e., a dialogue about the 
mutual compatibility of the writer and the respondent). Other writers, in 
contrast, only address ideal respondents (i.e., those who fulfill the criteria of 
ideal personhood). That is, as the text advances and criteria accumulate, 
respondents are gradually sieved into two categories: those who can and 
those who cannot inhabit the role of addressee. The “non-ideal” are effaced 
from the group of those participants whose presence in the event is explicitly 
recognized (as an object of attention and a target of words). Some writers 
even seem to orient to an entirely fictive addressee. Actual respondents then 
become onlookers and evaluators of a simulated dialogue between the writer 
and an ideal individual. One can sketch a continuum of depersonification of 
non-desired others and a reverse continuum of personification of one’s 
desires and ideals.  
Furthermore, chapter 6 explored jos (“if”) clauses in which writers model 
ideal responses from others (affective interpretants, such as feelings of 
kinship, similarity, or desire) and link them to ideal interactional 
consequences (energetic interpretants, such as writing a reply). That is, such 
patterns sieve respondents into “ideal” and “non-ideal” based on their 
responses to and evaluations of the writer’s performance. This kind of 
sieving, then, complements those kinds of sieving that are based on the 
respondents’ personal characteristics. Simultaneously, such patterns embody 
ontologies of intersubjective contacts and interpersonal compatibility, as they 
make explicit the writers’ understandings of what the specific nature of the 
semiotic encounter is like and how the writer and the readers should ideally 
relate to one another. That is, these kinds of patterns formulate 
understandings of cross-modal and intersubjective iconicities in which the 
self’s and the other’s processes correspond to one another in some relevant 
manner. As was seen in section 6.5, the writers may also model further 
interactional phases (e.g., replying, first dates, or the rest of one’s life) of the 
semiotic chains that follow from the advertisement. Such virtual models may 
both commit the writer to particular behaviors (e.g., which modes of 
interaction they will or will not participate in) and regiment others’ behaviors 
(e.g., how others should or should not reply).  
As was seen in both chapters 6 and 7, the writers’ authoritative virtual 
models have important social and moral implications. For instance, 
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“disobedient” repliers (i.e., those who do not comply with the model 
formulated by the writer in the advertisement text) can be treated in light of 
different moral norms than “obedient” ones. Cultural norms and the limits of 
appropriateness are constantly present in the writers’ perfomances and 
various “backstage” discourses. Social media, the Internet, and online dating, 
then, are not the moral wasteland they are sometimes depicted as in popular 
opinion. Choices of self-presentational practices, patterns of address, degrees 
of selectivity and control are crucial from the standpoint of intersubjective 
experience and, therefore, inherently moral questions (see also Eronen 
2015). As was seen throughout this study, they are also seen as such by many 
interactants. How does one specify clearly one’s individual criteria without 
appearing excessively negative towards other forms of personhood? How 
does one appear desirable and shield oneself from adverse, or too many, 
contacts by being selective, but at the same time treat others respectfully? 
Balancing between different ontologies and interests is a challenge each 
writer must take a stand on. 
Chapter 7 cast a different kind of light on the discursive patterns 
examined in chapters 4, 5, and 6. It examined how the mediation of 
personhood and social relations via online dating advertisements is theorized 
and evaluated in various cultural metadiscourses. Online dating 
advertisements are an interesting form of interaction in the sense that others’ 
interpretants of the self’s indices are hardly ever directly accessible to the 
writers, although the indices are specifically performed for the purpose of 
appealing to a targeted segment of the audience. Even eventual replies are 
more or less processed and removed from direct responses and may be 
equally “promotional” in terms of their interests (and as was seen in chapter 
7, they may not explicitly deal with the original advertisement to any great 
extent). That is, one has to be oneself without feedback from others, although 
one naturally cares very much about others’ reactions. This curiosity for 
feedback might in part explain the nature and the large quantity of external 
metadiscourses. Pieces of such metadiscourse were scanned in chapter 7 for 
various ontological assumptions in order to illustrate the range of and 
contrasts between different patterns of interpretation that are not visible in 
the advertisement data or the questionnaire data (or possibly anywhere else 
but in such “backstage” discussions). The analyses revealed various 
overlapping stereotypes concerning (1) what kinds of linguistic signs are of 
particular importance in online dating advertisements and what they reveal 
about their animators, (2) how language use in online dating advertisements 
relates to the “truth,” and (3) what kind of intersubjective contact is mediated 
by the advertisements. Such discourses about online dating advertisements 
as interaction, then, are metapractices that selectively tap into features of the 
object-practice. It is noteworthy that different metadiscourses seemed to 
focus largely on the same infrastructural and interactional features, such as 
the spatiotemporal displacedness of signers, signs, and interpreters; the non-
presence of the other’s body; the anonymity of the encounters; the 
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detachedness of personae from semiotic chains and metastance relations; the 
strong reliance on writing-based performances; the presumed tendency 
towards positive evaluation of the self and high selectivity in relation to 
others. However, they interpreted such features quite differently. 
The metadiscourses differed, first of all, in terms of their attitudes 
towards writing-based performances (or their indexical orders of different 
metasemiotic models). One dimension of such attitudes is whether they place 
more relative weight on individual or type-specific “uniqueness” versus 
abidance by collective “normality.” A second, interlocking dimension is 
related to the range of linguistic signs that is regarded as appropriate and 
effective for “unique” self-presentation. Some agents would accept even a 
high degree of indexical styling of one’s textual and graphemic patterns into 
signs of individual personhood, whereas others would be more prone to limit 
the exhibition of one’s uniqueness to the level of denotational contents 
(although there, too, within the confines of normality; cf. also sections 4.4.5, 
5.2.1, 6.4, and 7.1.1). It was noted, for instance, that many actual texts in the 
advertisement data – such as (4.6) that also received positive interpretations 
in the questionnaire data – would hardly appear ideal or even acceptable 
judging from at least two of the three guidebooks in the data. 
The stereotypic stigmatization of the online dating advertisement genre, 
which was first discussed in section 5.5 in light of the orientations of actual 
advertisement writers, was revisited in 7.1.1 from a complementing 
perspective. The latter examination was based on the metadiscourse data, 
and it revealed more intricacies in the ways in which particular interactional 
practices and forms of personhood become stereotypically linked. It 
illuminated (along with sections 7.2. and 7.3), for instance,  the interplay of 
more “trusting” and more “exposing” modes of interpretation of indices of 
personhood in online dating advertisements. A particularly salient type of 
ontological assumption that came up throughout the external metadiscourse 
concerned the intentions of the writers and the reliability of their 
representations and stances. A recurring strategy in the metadiscourse was to 
translate simulated pieces of online dating advertisement into non-
promotional discourse (i.e., to show what it “really” means) (see e.g. section 
7.2). That is, by filling in missing metastances (i.e., more representative or 
truthful counter-stances), such metadiscourses purport to expose the 
communicative intentions behind such promotional representations and to 
represent more reliably the actual consequences a respondent should expect. 
The guidebooks in the data were usually relatively diplomatic in that they 
humorously exaggerated and parodied advertisement discourse in order to 
draw attention to the possibility of “embellishing” and the fact that a specific 
mode of interpretation is needed to avoid unrealistic expectations. The 
Internet discussions, however, were more straightforward and even 
discussed “pathological” forms of self-presentation. 
Both chapters 6 and 7 dealt with different kinds of understandings 
concerning the nature of online dating advertisements as a semiotic 
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encounter and an intersubjective contact. Such understandings differ in 
terms of which constituents of persons, specifically, are in contact in such 
encounters and what the interactional possibilities and consequences of such 
contacts are. The advertisements themselves modeled ideal cross-modal and 
intersubjective iconicities in which the self’s and the other’s processes in 
different semiotic modes correspond to one another in relevant ways (e.g., 
the workings of the writer’s and the reader’s “souls” match one another; the 
respondent’s feeling matches the writer’s representation in the text-artifact). 
Such views became more elaborately articulated in the external 
metadiscourse. A common belief among the interactants was that online 
dating advertisements (or other writing-based artifacts) are not suitable for 
“real” or “authentic” contacts. However, strictly opposite views were found 
too. For some, a writing-based first encounter has definite advantages, as it 
offers a more direct contact to “thoughts” and “personality” by temporarily 
effacing the misleading “carnal” aspects of personhood. Ideologies of 
linguistic interaction, then, are linked to and motivated by wider cultural 
ideologies and practices.  
In all, the stereotypic views disseminated by the metadiscourse data were 
often doubtful about and distrustful of the persons behind promotional 
personae in terms of their social normality, the truthfulness of their 
representations, or the representativeness of their performances. Or to put it 
differently, they fostered a distrust of others’ signs when mediated by a 
particular kind of interactional infrastructure. In part, of course, there is a 
clear bias in the analyses in chapter 7 towards negative ontologies. The 
reason is clear. The negative theorizing in the external metadiscourse data 
was almost systematically more accurate and more concretely linked to 
actual textual patterns than positive views.  
In the analyses of this study, the genre of online dating advertisements 
has appeared as layered, fragmented, and socially distributed. Rather than 
one model, it is a loosely coherent ensemble of community-specific and 
ontology-specific interactional practices. The “promotional persona,” too, can 
be interpreted in more ways than one. We might sketch two maximally 
contrasting summary interpretations of the analyses above. In one kind of 
nutshell the promotional persona might be seen as the one who has the right 
to desire and to naturalize or personify one’s desires, to claim unipolarly, 
unilaterally, and unidimensionally evaluated attributes on a cultural stage, to 
strictly control and organize one’s constituents into atemporal taxonomies 
and hierarchies, and to criticize and depersonify non-ideal others – but who 
also faces prejudices of inauthenticity and unreliability from others. On the 
other hand, one might also crystallize the promotional persona as the one 
who has the right to envision and to commit to ideal futures with ideal 
others, to propose shared interactions and activities to others, to rationally 
and empathically negotiate compatibility with others, to appreciate others 
even if they prove non-compatible, to employ descriptions that others have 
agreed on, to perform rather than describe, to exercise self-criticism, to 
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relativize one’s identity performances and selectivities, and to contact other 
minds in profound, thought-out, and concise encounters. It is noteworthy 
that the circulating stereotypes of online dating advertisements and “self-
promotion” only tend to capture – and uphold – the first line of 
interpretation and particularly its most salient aspects (such as explicit 
unipolar stancetaking). 
8.2 FURTHER IMPLICATIONS  
The promotional persona of the online dating advertisement genre is marked 
by a tension between flexibility and accountability. It lures writers with the 
temptation of a self-defined existence, as it seemingly offers one the power to 
choose the signs by which one is known to others. It provides one with the 
possibility to control one’s name, characteristics, and story (or lack thereof). 
No existence, however, is worth much without the recognition of others. And 
others’ interpretants can be whimsical. Online dating advertisements are 
particularly challenging in this respect, since there is no “real time” feedback. 
The text-artifact has to be shaped into a sieve efficient enough to be able to 
stand on its own. Writers anticipate possible interpretations and structure 
their own personhood so that the text-artifact can successfully divide others 
into the ideal and the non-ideal. The text-artifact comes to embody the 
writer’s desires and beliefs on many levels. The overall organization of the 
text in many ways serves both the desirability of the self to respondents and 
the desirability of repliers to the self. The text-artifact as a sieve, then, 
becomes a relatively independent, public, and displaced prosthetic extension 
of the writer’s mind and self – also producing the kinds of effects the writer 
cannot foresee or will never be aware of (cf. Kockelman 2013b: 48). Although 
such text-artifacts are in many ways quite portable across contexts (see 
Kockelman & Bernstein 2012; Kockelman 2013a: 56, 80–81), their 
verifiability (i.e., how they correspond to the person as perceived in other 
semiotic modes), however, remains crucial to their ultimate effectiveness in 
the eyes of others. 
What is particularly interesting about the kind of promotional persona 
examined in this study is its high dependence on theoretical agency. Such 
“theoretical personae” and the complex virtual models of social reality they 
produce illustrate the fact that humans are highly theoretical beings both in 
their private realms and publicly in interactions with others. In online dating 
advertisements, one exists by theorizing one’s existence. As an entirely 
opposite point of comparison one might cite the Western Apache culture, in 
which acts of silence were prominently used both in courtship and in 
encounters with strangers (Basso 1990). That is, in such acts, the reliable way 
of “getting to know” others and their intentions is entirely without public 
theoretical representations of the participants or the ongoing event.  
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It also seems that the online dating advertisement genre as an instrument 
contributes to particular kinds of upgradings and downgradings of semiotic 
processes and to the objectification of statuses and values (see Kockelman 
2010: 6–7; 2013a: 56, 102–103, 106–107). Interpreters tend to take the 
writers’ performances as more purposeful, intentional, and reified than they 
perhaps would in other contexts. For instance, the processes of action or role 
easily become upgraded towards the process of identity. That is, linguistic 
actions become interpreted as indices of value rather than as indices of 
purpose or status. Writers, in fact, rely on such upgraded patterns of 
interpretation in, for example, taxonomies that cite individual characteristics 
or chronotopic formulations. Such acts of representation are to be 
interpreted as maximally representative of the writers’ identity (e.g., their 
lifestyle, preferences, or “essence”). Textual coherence sometimes relies on a 
shared understanding of such patterns of entextualization (see e.g. example 
4.24). Indices are taken as more emblematic than they would be in other 
contexts. This may lead to an objectification of such lesser or merely 
potential statuses or values in the online dating advertisement context that 
otherwise might be ignored or passed over. That is, relatively “fleeting” or 
“invisible” objects may become more enclosed (e.g., more evident, present, 
and intersubjectively recognized; subject to higher degrees of agency and 
accountability) (cf. e.g. the analysis of intentions in section 4.2.3 or the 
regimentation of orthography in section 7.1.2). 
In contrast, there is a downgrading of epistemic and relational 
emblematicity of signs of the self in terms of transparency or reliability (see 
also Kockelman 2006b: 99 and sources) or, phrased differently, an increased 
sensitivity to forms of incoherence between the object mediated by the online 
dating advertisements and its other modes of existence. According to a 
considerable segment of the generalized others whose views are disseminated 
by mass-mediated cultural metadiscourses, the signs of an online dater 
should always be scanned for hidden intentions, inauthenticities, and 
incoherences. Such suspicions may be heightened by parasitic phenomena, 
such as fake profiles on dating sites and fake personae on the Internet more 
generally (that are either animated by someone for commercial purposes or 
generated automatically).123 They may lead to a heightened sense of being an 
                                                 
123 For instance, in the external metadiscourse one interactant reveals that she had once placed two 
advertisements: an “authentic” one and a “decoy” (Vauva Mar 23, 2012). The point of the latter 
advertisement was to compare whether the same respondents would reply to both advertisements and 
thus be able to sieve off “spammers” (i.e., persons who will send the same non-personalized reply to 
everyone). Also, it is conceivable that at least one of the 111 advertisements in the data might be a 
“fake” in the sense that it is not about an actual person and is not written with the purpose of actually 
finding a partner or getting a date. Yet, it is hardly a “fake” in the sense of an actual scam or spam 
meant to profit the writer or harm the reader. In more neutral terms, that text might be characterized 
as a parody or a social commentary of online dating advertisements or a creative experimentation with 
aspects of personhood (e.g., to see if someone would take this kind of person seriously and what kinds 
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“authentic” person(a), a representative mediation of oneself, distinguishable 
from the masses of real and fake others. We see, then, that representations of 
self are always interpreted in light of residential processes and that online 
dating advertisements incorporate a specific mode of interpretation of 
persons and their lives. 
8.2.1 BIOGRAPHIC CONTENTS, MODES, AND COHERENCES 
The analyses in chapters 4–7 brought out a range of processes that relate 
interactionally and semiotically emerging personae to actual persons in 
different ways. The different ways in which particular forms of personhood 
or biographic contents relate to the person in question might be called 
biographic modes. The analyses showed that (more) “real” versus (more) 
“ideal” modes can be distinguished in a variety of more specific ways on 
different levels. We saw, for instance, that a single writer may be split into a 
number of “views of subjectivity” and denoted figures of personhood (chapter 
4) as well as into animator, co-author, and principals (chapter 5). 
Respondents become regrouped into different kinds of addressees and non-
addressees (chapter 6) and addressors into more selective and less selective. 
Each of such fractions of personhood may have a different relation to the 
“ideal” or the “real.” “Real” and “ideal,” then, are useful only as umbrella 
terms for a range of more specific biographic modes. Each mode projects 
different kinds of residential conditions and consequences. For instance, 
strictly selective patterns of address and or strict controlling of interactional 
consequences (see sections 6.3.2, 6.3.4, 6.4–6.5) embody a “directive-like” 
mode. The formulations are interpreted as something that should 
“transubstantiate” into a perceivable actuality in some later event (see Urban 
2001: 145–180). That is, the success of the entextualized model of 
personhood is interpreted in terms of whether others’ behaviors eventually 
actualize the model (or become cross-modally iconic with it). 
Chapter 7, which explored ontologies related to the interpretation of signs 
of the self in online dating advertisements, showed that the genre itself 
stereotypically entails particular biographic modes. For example, there is a 
tendency to think that language in dating advertisements requires specific 
inferential modes of interpretation (e.g., ones that convert “what is said” to 
“what it really means”). Such a setting might be compared to Turner’s (1982: 
32, 40–42, 82–84) notion of the “subjunctive mood” of culture, found, for 
example, in rituals of passage, or in modern art. In contrast to the “indicative 
                                                                                                                                          
of replies they would write). In fact, one might go as far as to regard cases like these as marginal but 
“conventional” secondary usages of the genre. Such usages are related to April Fools and similar pranks 
(such as Facebook worms and other, more serious forms of “clickjacking”) that are based on the 
interactants’ differential acuities for indices that separate the “authentic” from the “inauthentic” and 
their (lack of) self-control to resist their curiosity and hold off their response long enough to consider 
various likelihoods and risks. (See also Visakko & Voutilainen 2012; Kockelman 2013b.) 
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mood” of quotidian life, the “subjunctive mood” provides a metastructural 
space in which normal social order can be critically reflected upon or 
creatively played with, inverted or even subverted. The liminal phase of a 
ritual, for instance, constitutes a mode of life with rules and orders altogether 
different from those of everyday life. In such phases, persons are reflexively 
remodeled and re-enculturized into new statuses, which then become 
gradually actualized once the persons have been reintegrated into everyday 
practices. Whether language use in online dating advertisements is evaluated 
by particular communities positively as “creative” or negatively as 
“inauthentic” (or somewhere in between as “embellished”), there is an 
orientation to a sort of “subjunctive.” That is, language and the objects it 
mediates are seen as being in an event-specific, subjective-flexible relation to 
what generally speaking would be considered “reality.” Such a mode is not 
entirely unbound by the “indicative” yardstick of truth, but it allows for 
wishful reinvention, idealization, and experimentation. Instead of simple 
tests of truth-conditionality, assessing models of personhood set in such 
“subjunctive” biographic modes involves complex intersubjective 
negotiations that may require a long period of lived experience with the 
person in question. 
As was preliminarily discussed in chapter 2 and empirically seen in 
chapters 4–7, biographic modes can be framed in a variety of ways in terms 
of, for example, the self’s or the others’ affective interpretants or attitudes 
(e.g., “desired” versus “feared” selves; or “serious” or “authentic” versus 
“cynical” or “ironic” performances), habituality of occurrence (e.g., 
“representative” versus “sporadic” or “contingent” behaviors), public or 
official recognition (e.g., “confirmed” or “official” versus “wannabe” or “fake” 
identities), or community-specificity (e.g., “ingroup” versus “outgroup” 
statuses). Such modes may reflexively combine in many ways. One can “fear” 
or “desire” any form of personhood, whether “real,” “ironic,” or purely 
“fictive.” The distributed nature of semiosis and the fractional non-
congruence of sign-interpretant relations between different communities 
means that the same interpretant of personhood may be “real” to some but 
not all. Furthermore, persons are usually to some degree reflexively aware of 
others’ contradicting interpretations (e.g., one may know that what one 
considers “real” and “ideal” may be “inauthentic” and “non-ideal” to some 
others; cf. e.g. section 5.2.1). 
The question of “real” selves and persons is often seen as particularly 
relevant in the context of the Internet and anonymous interaction. For 
instance, building on Turkle’s (1995) argument that the Internet constitutes a 
unique opportunity for self-expression, Bargh et. al (2002: 34) conclude that 
under relatively anonymous circumstances, outside of one’s usual social 
sphere: 
 
[W]e would expect a person to use [the Internet] first and foremost to express those 
aspects of self that he or she has the strongest need to express – namely, the ‘true self’: 
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those identity-important and phenomenally real aspects of self not often or easily 
expressed to others. 
 
They conclude that the Internet “facilitates the expression and effective 
communication of one’s true self to new acquaintances” and the “projection 
onto the partner of idealized qualities,” which are seen as critical for the 
formation of close relationships (ibid., p. 45). While these observations are 
undoubtedly valid for many kinds of Internet communication (see also 
Gerlander & Takala 1997), including online dating advertisements to a 
certain degree, and lend empirical support to the idea that digital text-
artifacts and face-to-face conversations are quite different infrastructures for 
the mediation of personhood and selfhood, a few remarks are in order. 
Firstly, the Internet can hardly be treated as a homogeneous entity from 
the standpoint of communication or interaction (see also Whitty 2008). In 
fact, one might regard “the Internet” as a relatively useless parameter 
altogether. Rather, it is the more specific effects of the infrastructure on 
entextualization, contextualization, and text-artifacts (e.g., the displacement 
of signs from bodies, the temporal dynamics of text production and design, 
strong reliance on symbolic representations and theoretical agency, pre-
selection of respondents) that give rise to the actual differences. Secondly 
and relatedly, we need to take into account the role of reflexive models and 
ontologies (e.g., genres, registers, stereotypes and prototypes of personhood, 
generalized others), their fragmentation between communities, and the fact 
that such ontologies are differentially activated in different Internet contexts 
and sometimes in mutually contradicting ways. This study has shown that 
even within one specific genre there is considerable variation in undertakings 
and understandings. In the terminology introduced in chapter 2 and in light 
of the empirical analyses in chapters 4–7, genres might be seen as loose, 
distributed ensembles of more specific semiotic ontologies (concerning, e.g., 
social roles and relations; intentions and appropriate actions to fulfill them; 
presupposed beliefs about the world; ways of perceiving and evaluating the 
world) that complement and incorporate one another, creating relatively 
distinguishable complex types of interactional practices with more or less 
intersubjective variation or even incoherence (cf. also Bakhtin 1986: 61–62; 
Hanks 1996: 242–246). Furthermore, it is somewhat implausible to treat the 
Internet as an entirely “anonymous” realm completely separate from face-to-
face encounters. As has been seen in this study, personae are often 
performed and interpreted precisely in relation to an anticipated process of 
gradual de-anonymization and an eventual face-to-face encounter. 
In fact, it seems just as plausible as a hypothesis that when a person is, to 
a relative degree, liberated from usual environmental pressures, he or she 
might as well hide and mask those “identity-important and phenomenally 
real” aspects of self that he or she has the strongest need to hide and mask. 
Moreover, metadiscourses about online dating advertisements suggest some 
interactants’ hidden anxieties concerning felt external pressures to be, say, 
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“unique” or “interesting” in particular ways. For some participants the fact 
that the genre allows, encourages, or even forces one to find and publicly 
formulate a “positive” perspective on oneself according to cultural 
stereotypes of what counts as “positive” personhood can be a “therapeutic” 
experience. However, if one’s self-conceptions fall short of one’s internalized 
ego ideals or those ideals projected by the activity type, the task of writing an 
online dating advertisement may, in contrast, be unpleasant and a variety of 
classical symptoms, such as feelings of shame, inadequacy, or fear of 
abandonment, may follow (see Piers & Singer 1971 [1953]; also Goffman 1990 
[1963]: 18). The point here is to emphasize that many processes – the “ideal” 
(what one feels one should be), the “desired” (what one wishes one could be), 
the “real” (what one would be for various others) – are simultaneously at 
stake and may clash or harmonize with each another in a variety of ways. 
That is, the Internet does not liberate one from cultural ideals or generalized 
others. In addition to the “needs of expression,” there is a variety of 
internalized obligations and habits of expression. 
The tension and interplay between more private and more public 
actualities, such as what feels “true” to self versus what a group of others 
projects on self as “real,” can be analyzed into a number of different 
dimensions. There are interpretants of personhood that (a) correspond to the 
person’s own mental states (e.g., beliefs, feelings, or inner discourses) and 
ones that (b) have been recognized and ratified by others in previous 
interactional events or that can be logically inferred from other ratified 
interpretants. The two may or may not co-incide. From the standpoint of 
credible self-presentation, a key factor is a person’s ability to anticipate and 
commit to particular responses or resistances from others to particular 
interpretants. Such anticipations are linked to the interactional histories and 
social lives of both that interpretant and the participants. “Realness,” then, 
does not relate to forms of personhood per se but to relations between 
contents and modes, or signs and interpretants, distributed over 
interactional relations between selves and others. Such relations are 
effectively and flexibly described in terms of various forms of coherence 
(Kockelman 2013a: 107–109, 140–143, 173–175). That is, the kinds of 
interpretive processes examined in this study can be usefully viewed from the 
standpoint of residential coherence (e.g., whether different residential 
constituents, such as instruments, actions, or roles confirm or co-project the 
biographic content), semiocognitive coherence (e.g., whether a biographic 
content has logical inferential relations to other related representations and 
causal relations to residential constituents), intrasubjective coherence (e.g., 
whether a person privately believes what she publicly says), intersubjective 
coherence (e.g., whether others share a person’s stance or hold similar 
beliefs), distributed coherence (e.g., whether what a person says or thinks 
about himself is caused by or justified by what others say or think about 
him), and reflexive coherence (e.g., whether a biographic content fits in with 
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the other constituents of the particular self that is accountable for that 
content). 
Such modes of coherence of distributed semiosis clarify the problems 
related to “ideal” and “real” forms of personhood. “Ideal” selves may be very 
real as objects of, say, intrasubjective desires and aspirations but not 
necessarily “real” in the sense of being intersubjectively recognized. In light 
of the data of this study, a common concern among interactants seems to be 
that the contents presented by a promotional persona merely reflect a 
wished-for (“ideal”) world and are neither semiocognitively nor residentially 
coherent with the actual constituents of the person (e.g., her perceivable 
kinds or actions) and would not intersubjectively or distributedly cohere with 
the interpretations of those others who have independent access to that 
person. From another standpoint, the concern is often that the writer’s 
relatively self-controlled and displaced intentional roles undertaken via the 
advertisement (i.e., linguistic assertions of beliefs, intentions, or affects, or 
any other indices that project an intentional status) would not cohere with 
the writer’s less self-controlled, more habitual and embodied intentional 
roles, nor with the reader’s responses (or intentional attitudes), in face-to-
face settings in “real” life. Another kind of worry voiced or implied by some 
writers is that the kinds of (“ideal”) biographic contents one is expected to 
co-author and commit to in the online dating advertisement are not 
reflexively coherent with one’s self-conceptions or intrasubjectively coherent 
with one’s affects or beliefs about oneself. Whether one chooses to comply 
with such expectations or to breach them, either way, there will be residential 
incoherence of either a more private or a more public kind.   
8.2.2 IDENTITIES, STANCES, AND EVALUATIVE PROCESSES 
This final section presents a few concluding remarks on the approach taken 
in this study towards evaluation, stancetaking, identity, and biography. 
Identity has been understood as the process in which patterns of life become 
organized by selves in coherent ways and in terms of relative desirability or 
value. Evaluation refers to those interpretive processes that produce value in 
light of various evaluative techniques (such as affects, practical utility 
functions, habits or traditions, cultural and experience-based stereotypes and 
prototypes, ideals and ideologies). Stance refers to those semiotic processes 
that make evaluation emblematic in interaction. Biography has been here 
understood broadly as all kinds of interpretations of particular persons and 
their lives, although the focus has been on written biography. Different kinds 
of biographies differ in terms of a number of more specific dimensions. There 
is, first of all, the dimension of artifactual “recording.” That is, biography 
both embodies and carries forward traces of past events and processes. The 
type of “recording” used determines the degree of emblematicity of 
biographic signs and the enclosedness of their objects (e.g., writing typically 
has a high degree of intersubjective perceivability and material durability), 
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which in turn has an effect on the dissemination, regimentation, and 
transformation of such biographies in social interaction. Secondly, there is 
the textual organization of biographic contents in patterns and modes of 
representation that give rise to particular kinds of interactional effects (e.g., 
online dating advertisements consist of a set of linguistic representations 
shaped into coherent textual patterns in light of reflexive models and 
addressed to displaced, anonymous respondents with a highly limited 
possibility for reciprocity in order to sieve them into “ideal” and “non-ideal”). 
Thirdly, the dimension of evaluation is inseparable from the organization of 
biography. The selection, formulation, and patterning of contents for the 
sake of particular kinds of interactional effects are inherently evaluative 
processes. Denotationally explicit evaluative stancetaking towards persons 
and lives, however, is a special case with particular functions and 
consequences. That is, biography is always organized by values, but it can 
also create and communicate value. Biography, then, is an instrument of 
identity. 
Consequently, the following five perspectives were incorporated into the 
analysis of the evaluation of personhood in this study. Firstly, explicit 
evaluative stancetaking was understood as a form of cultural theorization 
and dissemination of value with specific interactional functions and 
motivations. That is, evaluative processes are made emblematic only in 
particular contexts with specific purposes. Secondly, the inherent reflexivity 
of semiotic behavior was taken into account by tracing such reflexive models 
that regiment evaluative stancetaking and specify when evaluative processes 
are appropriately and effectively made emblematic (phenomenologically, 
epistemically, deontically, or relationally). Such reflexive models were looked 
for both in the actual stancetaking practices and the metapractices that 
represent and evaluate actual stancetaking practices. Thirdly, evaluative 
stancetaking was approached in terms of textual distribution and text-level 
indexicality (or performances) in addition to more localized clause-level 
phenomena. Fourthly, different types of discursive agency – describable in 
terms of statuses such as animators, authors, and principals or acts such as 
control, composition, and commitment – were seen as essential for a fine-
grained understanding of evaluative stancetaking. Fifthly, the notion of web-
like metastance relations and the various forms of coherence (elaborated in 
section 8.2.1) provided a solid theoretical and empirical basis for the study of 
the interactionally and infrastructurally distributed life of evaluative stances. 
For instance, the unipolarity, unidimensionality, and unilaterality, which 
were all understood to characterize the stereotype of evaluative stancetaking 
in online dating advertisements (see chapters 5 and 7), are only accurately 
understood in terms of metastance relations (or the distribution of stances 
and metastances between types of events and interactants). 
Different genres of biography also have different ontological scopes of 
evaluative stancetaking. That is, they differ in terms of the kinds of objects 
that can be evaluated (e.g., human individuals versus human kinds; 
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individuals versus interpersonal relations; particular individuals or kinds 
versus types of individuals or types of kinds; self versus other). There may be 
specialized practices for different kinds of objects. In online dating 
advertisements, taxonomies (4.4.2), for instance, are specialized in the 
organization of the characteristics of the writer, whereas jos (“if”) clauses 
(6.4) are specialized in the evaluation of interpersonal relations and 
intersubjective contacts. Different types of biographic events also differ in 
terms of appropriate evaluative techniques (e.g., personal histories of desire, 
transmitted traditions of ideality, stereotypes of compatibility, or prototypes 
of ideal others) and the degree to which such underlying techniques are made 
emblematic and reasoned about (or conversely, naturalized or objectivized). 
Finally, different types of biographic events differ in terms of reciprocity and 
regimentation (e.g., whether others’ stances can be openly contested). As was 
discussed at length, in online dating advertisements such possibilities are 
distributed temporally (advertisement event versus later events) and 
infrastructurally (“stage” versus “backstage”). 
Such approaches are useful particularly if one is interested in identity and 
biography as long-term metaprocesses and from the standpoint of 
interactional habits and habit-change. Denotationally explicit and highly 
emblematic forms of evaluative stancetaking are a form of work that is 
needed in particular types of events and may not be needed in other types of 
events (e.g., when the value of something can be presumed as shared or self-
evident). Active evaluative stancetaking is often necessary when one wishes 
to change something, to resist something, or to defend something from 
falling into decay. In any social reality, there is both ontological inertia, or 
the tendency for objects to resist transformation or to cohere without some 
agent’s active effort (caused by, for example, habit, consensus, or laziness) 
and ontological entropy, or the tendency for objects to transform or to 
incohere without active effort (caused by, for example, serendipitous 
mutation or variation, spontaneous troping, or oblivion) (see also Kockelman 
2013b; Urban 2001). Language (e.g., denotational stereotypes, genres, 
registers), other cultural processes (e.g., models of personhood, ideologies, 
regimentation by force), and habits (e.g., beliefs, self-conceptions, ego ideals, 
generalized others, interactional routines) themselves constitute forms of 
ontological inertia (but are also susceptible to gradual entropy). One needs to 
work hardest when resisting or going against them. “Self-promotion,” too, 
can be framed from the standpoint of biographic inertia and entropy. 
Biographic control, for instance, is a battle against evaluative entropy. It is an 
attempt to impose self-controlled order onto metastance relations by 
accelerating the dissemination of ideal biographic contents and decelerating 
the dissemination of others thereby forcing evaluative stances towards the 
“positive” side. Such forms of biographic inertia that “self-promotional” 
agents may have to work against include, for example, accumulated 
(negative) self-conceptions, anticipated (negative) responses from 
generalized others, and acquired habits of (negative) self-presentation (cf. 
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e.g. the discussion of speech chain indexicals in section 4.4.5 and the 
discussion of “normality” in 5.2.1, 6.4, and 7.1.1). In fact, the marked 
performances of many writers (see e.g. 5.2.2) hinted at a friction between 
different inert processes (e.g., contradictions between self-conceptions or 
habits of self-presentation and models of “promotional” stancetaking; but 
also contradicting norms of evaluative stancetaking). 
Finally, the characteristics and limitations of the method used in this 
study have already been discussed along the way (see e.g. section 4.2.4), but a 
few additional comments are in order. Since the method of this study 
developed gradually alongside the theoretical framework, it is easy, in 
retrospect, to point out ways of improving it. Also, as clarified in chapter 3, 
the main goal of this study was an overview of the semiotic and discursive 
organization of the idealization of personhood in the context of online dating 
advertisements. The empirical focus, therefore, has been on general outlines 
and relevant points of contrast. A more systematic look at empirical details 
would certainly reveal numerous regularities of linguistic features that have 
remained outside the analyses of this study. Although the features that were 
chosen for analysis were examined systematically and sometimes contrasted 
with possible alternatives, undoubtedly a large number of discursive 
phenomena has fallen outside the focus of this study. Another researcher 
with different ontologies and interests would have emphasized other 
phenomena. One of the areas that could be further explored are the 
quantitative relations between different discursive patterns and linguistic 
features. That is, they could be analyzed into hierarchies of 
representativeness that specify how frequent a particular feature is in 
relation to others. If one is more interested in linguistic inventories and 
frequencies, a different selection of analyzed features and the ways of 
locating them in the data would be more useful. To illustrate, one might have, 
for instance, charted all the CTPs and their usages in the data and counted 
their relative frequencies, instead of focusing on contrasts between the 
intuitively most salient ones, which was the strategy in this study (see 
chapter 5). There is, then, a certain trade-off between the systematicity of the 
study of particular sign patterns and the comprehensiveness of the study of 
patterns of interpretation. 
In some sense, this study has been more concerned with the theoretical 
and methodological challenge of approaching language as a form of human 
behavior embedded in other social, cultural, and cognitive processes. The 
methodological question that this study has attempted to solve is how to deal 
with the fact that linguistic meaning, as one kind of semiotic process, is 
perspectival, reflexively organized (i.e., not reducible to simple, one-
dimensional “facts”), socially fragmented, and dependent on ensembles of 
ontologies and values that are rarely fully shared but have a sociological 
pattern of distribution. This study has shown that a semiotic and an 
anthropological framework can help in locating language and discourse 
within semiosis and in building more reflexive research designs. The 
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methodological approach of this study could be taken further into any 
number of directions. For example, the contrastive analysis of discursive 
practices (chapters 4–6) and reflexive metapractices that evaluate and re-
interpret them (section 4.2, chapter 7) proved highly interesting. As the 
combination of solicited and “naturally” occurring metadiscourses seemed to 
work well, this approach could be extended and elaborated. Questionnaires 
could involve more versatile and more specifically segmented groups of 
people, and they could be used to solicit more varied and specific responses 
(e.g., focusing on specific discursive patterns or linguistic features, instead of 
a selection of maximally different texts). The different sets of data could also 
be causally and sequentially calibrated more carefully in relation to one 
another. In particular, some of the naturally occurring metadiscourses could 
well be calibrated more tightly than the ones in this study (e.g., trying to get a 
hold of actual replies and replies to them and so on). Reconstructing and 
analyzing more complete semiotic chains of signification and interpretation 
would contribute to a more specific understanding of the relations between 
practices and metapractices in terms of, for example, their actual effects, 
their circulation, and the sociological characteristics of the participants. 
Another interesting direction would be to trace historical transformations in 
promotional self-presentation and the underlying ontologies (and their 
effects) with diachronically organized sets of data to see what, if anything, 
really changes in such processes of personhood, selfhood, and value. 
Each genred interactional event that gives rise to value with some logic 
(e.g., by sieving persons into “normal” or “stigmatized,” “ideal” or “non-
ideal,” “desirable” or “undesirable”) simultaneously accelerates or decelerates 
evaluative inertias and entropies in particular ways on different time scales. 
From the standpoint of individuals, some such events might even turn out to 
be the kinds of landmark events discussed in 2.3.3 that gradually but 
radically transform persons and their trajectories through personspacetime 
or social terrains (e.g., various “baptismal” events, or “therapeutically” or 
“legally” revelatory events). Such unfoldings are at the heart of, for example, 
human well-being and harmony but present a challenge for empirical study. 
For instance, to sharpen the picture painted in this study of the role of “self-
promotion” in such biographic processes, a more versatile set of data would 
be needed (e.g., earlier biographic accounts of the same writers, earlier drafts 
of online dating advertisements, interviews with writers, actual replies and e-
mail correspondence, observation of first dates and unfolding relationships, 
later biographic accounts, etc.). Value also has distinct phenomenological 
qualities and shapes individual experiences (cf. e.g. affective vs. rational 
“positivity”). Value, then, has natural, cultural, and personal histories. To 
delve deeper into such distributed roots and fruits of value in terms of 
personal experiences, metastance relations, (in)coherences, transformations, 
inertias and entropies, a longitudinal, chain-like data in as ethnographically 
rich forms as possible would no doubt prove useful. Hopefully, this study has 
accelerated the circulation of useful theoretical instruments and also 
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empirically demonstrated some ways in which selves on the Internet can 
better care for the processes they are involved in and for the others who are 
co-involved in those processes. 
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DATA SOURCES 
 
 
Online dating advertisements: 
 
111 advertisements in different categories (in terms of age, sex, type of 
relationship, etc.) from Deitti.net and the Finnish Match.com collected in 
2007 (see section 3.2 for details). 
 
Questionnaire: 
 
Based on three different kinds of online dating advertisements and answered 
by 27 university students in 2014 (see section 3.2 and Appendix 2 for details). 
 
Online dating guidebooks: 
 
ND = Nettideitit – Uusi onni verkosta? (“Net dates – A new happiness from 
the web?”). Minni Niemelä & Pasi Malmi 2011. Helsinki: Tammi. 
NE = Nettideittailijan eloonjäämisopus (“An online dater’s survival guide”). 
Timo Peltonen & Pirjo Werkle 2006. Vantaa: Magentum. 
SK = Sinkkunaisen käsikirja (“Guidebook for a single woman”). Viivi Avellan 
2006. Helsinki: Tammi. 
 
Internet forum discussions and articles with comment discussions: 
 
IS (Oct 12, 2012) = “Keskustele, millaisia kokemuksia sinulla on 
nettitreffeistä?” (Discuss your experiences of online dates?). 
[Short online article meant to stir discussion + readers’ comments] 
http://www.iltasanomat.fi/seksi-parisuhde/art-1288507119081.html [Sep, 
2012] 
 
IS (Oct 19, 2012) = “Lukija nettitreffeistä: ’Vastaan tulee tasan kahdenlaisia 
naisia’ – Lue kokemukset!” (Reader on net dates: ”You’ll meet precisely two 
types of women” – Read about their experiences!’) 
[A report on a tv channel’s questionnaire concerning online dating + online 
readers’ comments] 
http://www.iltasanomat.fi/seksi-parisuhde/art-1288508874773.html [Nov 
5, 2013.] 
 
IT (Oct 13, 2006) = “Viivin luokittelemaa” by Henry Laasanen in the blog 
Ihmissuhteet ja tasa-arvo (Human relations and equality). Oct. 13, 2006 
[Blog entry + readers’ comments.] 
http://ihmissuhteet.blogspot.fi/2006/10/viivin-luokittelemaa.html [Sep 6, 
2012.] 
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IS (Sep 22, 2006) = “Viivi lokeroi miehet” by Antti Hämäläinen in the 
national newspaper Ilta-Sanomat. [Newspaper article + online readers’ 
comments] 
http://www.iltasanomat.fi/viihde/art-1288338959172.html. [Sep. 6, 2012.] 
 
KSS (Jun 23, 2012) = “Deitti-ilmoitus II” (Dating ad II) written by Janne 
Tammensalo in the Facebook group Kielletyt sanat ja sanonnat (Forbidden 
words and expressions) [A post in a Facebook group + members’ comments]  
https://www.facebook.com/groups/kielletytsanat/ [Sep, 2012.] 
 
Plaza (Sep 9, 2008) = “match.com?” [A short forum discussion about the 
Match.com dating site, from which part of the advertisement text data was 
gathered]  
http://keskustelu.plaza.fi/sinkut/loysin-hanet-netista/1730934/match-com/ 
[Sep, 2012] http://keskustelu.ellit.fi/threads/match-com.1730934/ [Oct 16, 
2014.] 
 
S24 (Jul 17, 2002) = “Deitti-ilmoitukset” [A discussion thread on the 
Suomi24 forum in the “Relations/Singles” category about dating 
advertisements and the replies people have got] 
http://keskustelu.suomi24.fi/node/221425 [Sep 13, 2013] 
 
S24 (Jul 28, 2011) = “Miestyypit” (Types of men) [A discussion thread on the 
Suomi24 forum in the “Relations/Singles” category about the categorization 
of men in the dating guidebook Sinkkunaisen käsikirja (SK)] 
http://keskustelu.suomi24.fi/node/10019351 [Sep. 6, 2012.] 
 
Vauva (Mar 23, 2013) = “Onko Suomi24 Treffit -palstalla ihan täysijärkisiä 
miehiä (30-40v)?” (Are there completely sane men (30–40 years old) on the 
Suomi24 dating site?) [A discussion thread on the forum of the Vauva 
magazine about the dating section of the Suomi24 forum] 
http://www.vauva.fi/keskustelu/1587997/ketju/onko_suomi24_treffit_pals
talla_ihan_taysijarkisia_ [Sep, 2012.] 
 
 
Television program: 
 
Parittomat (“The Pairless”). YLE TV1, Oct 28, 2013. (YLE Kulttuuri ja viihde. 
Scriptwriter-directors: Kaisa Alenius, Lulu Salmi; Producer: Jouko 
Salokorpi.) 
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APPENDIX 1: GLOSSING ABBREVIATIONS 
AND TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS 
Glossing 
= clitic boundary 
1SG, 1PL 1st person singular, 1st person plural, etc. 
ABBR abbreviation 
ABL ablative case 
ACC accusative case 
ADE adessive case 
ADV adverb(ial) 
ARCH archaic sounding 
CTP complement-taking predicate 
COLL colloquial variant 
COND conditional mood 
COMP  comparative 
ELA elative case 
FEM  feminine gender 
FREQ frequentative 
GEN genitive case 
ILL illative case 
IND indicative mood 
INE inessive case 
INF infinitive 
IMP imperative mood 
LAT lative 
NEG negative verb; connegative form 
NOM nominative case 
NP noun phrase 
PASS passive voice (or “fourth person,” impersonal) 
PASS(1PL) passive morphosyntax used as 1PL 
PEJ pejorative 
PERF perfect tense 
POSS possessive suffix 
PP past participle 
PRF perfective aspect 
PROG progressive aspect 
PRS present tense 
PST  past tense 
PTCL particle 
PTCP participle 
PTV partitive case  
Q interrogative clitic particle; question 
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REL relative pronoun 
VP verb phrase 
 
Transcription 
. falling intonation 
, level intonation 
↑ rise in pitch 
↓ fall in pitch 
speak emphasis  
spea:k sound lengthening  
#speak# creaky voice 
[ beginning of overlap 
] end of overlap 
(.) micropause (less than 0.2 seconds) 
+ point of gaze or gesture   
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APPENDIX 2: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Original Finnish version [The layout has been compressed here] 
Kyselyn tarkoituksena on selvittää, millaisia vaikutelmia tekstit herättävät kirjoittajan 
mielenliikkeistä. Millainen tunnelma tekstistä välittyy? Miten tekstin eri piirteet mielestäsi 
ilmentävät esimerkiksi kirjoittajan ajattelun kulkua tai tunnetiloja?  
Luettavana on kolme deitti-ilmoitusta. (1) Lue kukin teksti niin kuin lukisit sen vastaavassa 
aidossa tilanteessa. (2) Nimeä sen jälkeen korkeintaan kolme selkeintä tekstin synnyttämää 
vaikutelmaa, ja arvioi kunkin vaikutelman voimakkuus. Yritä nimetä vaikutelmat 
ytimekkäästi tavalla, joka vastaa mahdollisimman hyvin omaa subjektiivista kokemustasi. 
Nimitysten ei tarvitse olla millään muulla tavalla täsmällisiä tai korrekteja. Kirjaa vain 
todelliset vaikutelmasi, jos sellaisia syntyy. Ei siis tarvitse keksimällä keksiä! Myös neutraalit 
vaikutelmat ovat todellisia vaikutelmia. (3) Perustele lopuksi tiiviisti, mihin tulkintasi 
perustuu. Tarkoitus ei ole ryhtyä analysoimaan tekstejä sinänsä vaan kuvailla intuitiiviset 
vaikutelmat ja kytkeä ne konkreettisesti tekstiin. 
Vastaajan taustatiedot: mies / nainen Ikä:______ 
Teksti 3. 
Kaikkea ei pidä kokeilla, mutta monia asioita kyllä:) [nainen etsii miestä, nimim. 
mape1975] 
Nää kerro itestäs jutut on aina vaikeita,,,ainakaan valokuvissa en tykkää olla yksin, 
jos ollenkaan. Tuokin kuva on muutaman vuoden takaa kun kaveri sai jotenkin 
puhuttua ittellensä meikkimalliks valmistuessaan maskeeraajaks, joten maskaran 
määrä on siks aika suuri:) Avoeron olen kokenut tuossa vuosi sitten ja nyt vaan 
alkaa sosiaalinen elämä kiinnostaa uudelleen,,,aattelin kokeilla sit tällastakin kun ei 
tule niin usein tuolla baareissa pyörittyä. Kavereitten kanssa tykkään kyllä iltaa 
viettää ” syöpötellen ja juopotellen”:). Kotisohva ei myöskään oo pöllömpi tapa 
viettää aikaa ja siinä kai tulee töitten jälkeen ihan mukavasti aikaa vietettyäkin, 
vaikka virtapiikkejäkin tulee ja pidän kuntoilustakin kävellen, rullaluistellen jne. 
olen avoin kaikelle liikunnalle. Murteesta huomaa että itä-suomen kasvatteja oon, 
vaikka oon ollu sieltä pois 10 vuotta, asustellu Tampesterissä, Kreikassakin käyny 
pyörähtämässä (ei,,,ei Jorgoksen perässä, töitten:) ja nyt sitten 4 vuotta täälä 
Helsingissä. Mie tykkään nauramisesta,,,saatan heittää aika hurttiakin huumoria, 
vähän sellanen räväkänpuoleinen varmaan,,,joten ehkä se on parempi että 
toinenkaan osapuoli ei ainakaan hirrrvn ujo ole ( vaikka sekin voi olla söpöä) 
huumorintaju ja itseironismi on aina plussaa! Mie osaan kyllä ujostellakkin, 
varsinkin sillon kun jostakin kiinnostun, se on aika persiistä:) Jos kiinnostuit ja olet 
suhteelllisen normaali kaikin puolin, eli olet muuttanut kotoa pois ja työpaikallekkin 
on raahauduttava, otappa yhteyksiä:) Vaikeeta sanoo jotain fiksua ja kiinnostavaa 
tähän loppuun, joten mie sanon vaan Hellurei! 
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1. Nimeä vaikutelma Mitkä kielelliset tai kontekstuaaliset seikat tukevat tulkintaasi? Merkitse 
ne tekstiin suoralla viivalla ja perustele tähän omin sanoin. 
  
Arvioi vaikutelman vahvuus:  [heikko] 1 2          3 4         5 [vahva] 
2. Nimeä vaikutelma Mitkä kielelliset tai kontekstuaaliset seikat tukevat tulkintaasi? Merkitse 
ne tekstiin aaltoviivalla ja perustele tähän omin sanoin. 
  
Arvioi vaikutelman vahvuus:  [heikko] 1 2          3 4         5 [vahva] 
3. Nimeä vaikutelma Mitkä kielelliset tai kontekstuaaliset seikat tukevat tulkintaasi? Merkitse 
ne tekstiin katkoviivalla ja perustele tähän omin sanoin. 
  
Arvioi vaikutelman vahvuus:  [heikko] 1 2          3 4         5 [vahva] 
 
English translation [The layout has been compressed here] 
The aim of the questionnaire is to find out what kinds of impressions of the writer’s frame 
of mind the texts raise. What kind of mood is conveyed by the text? How do different 
features of the text in your opinion manifest, for example, the writer’s train of thought or 
emotional states?  
You have three dating advertisements to read. (1) Read each text like you would in a similar 
actual situation. (2) After that, name at most three of the clearest impressions that the text 
gives rise to and rate the strength of each impression. Try to name the impressions 
concisely in a way that corresponds best with your own subjective experience. The 
expressions need not be precise or correct in any other way. Only write down your real 
impressions, if any arise. No need to make up any! Neutral impressions are real 
impressions too. (3) Finally, explain compactly what your interpretation is based on. The 
purpose is not to analyze the texts as such but to describe your intuitive impressions and to 
link them concretely to the text. 
Background information about the respondent: male / female      Age:______ 
1. Name the 
impression 
Which linguistic or contextual factors support your interpretation? Mark 
them in the text with a straight line and give your reasons here in your 
own words. 
  
Rate the strength of the impression: [weak] 1        2         3         4         5 [strong] 
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2. Name the 
impression 
Which linguistic or contextual factors support your interpretation? Mark 
them in the text with a wavy line and give your reasons here in your own 
words. 
  
Rate the strength of the impression: [weak] 1        2         3         4         5 [strong] 
Name the impression Which linguistic or contextual factors support your interpretation? Mark 
them in the text with a dash line and give your reasons here in your own 
words. 
  
Rate the strength of the impression: [weak] 1        2         3         4         5 [strong] 
